


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


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THE

HISTORY OF GREECE.

VOL. III.

The Vignette on the Titlepage represents
A SILVER COIN OF LACEDÆMON,
Copied from a Specimen in the British Museum.

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THE
HISTORY OF GREECE.
BY
WILLIAM MITFORD, ESQ.

A New Edition,
WITH NUMEROUS ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED
A BRIEF MEMOIR OF THE AUTHOR,
BY HIS BROTHER, LORD REDESDALE.



IN TEN VOLUMES.

VOL. III.

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THE
HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAPTER XIII.

AFFAIRS OF GREECE FROM THE THIRTY YEARS' TRUCE TO THAT COMMONLY CALLED THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR ; WITH A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE HISTORY OF MACEDONIA FROM THE EARLIEST ACCOUNTS.

SECTION I.

Administration of Pericles : Science, Arts, and fine Taste at Athens. — Change in the Condition of Women in Greece : Aspasia. — Popular Licentiousness at Athens. — The Athenian Empire asserted and extended. — Project for Union of Greece.

ATHENS now rested six years, unengaged in any hostilities ; a longer interval of perfect peace than she had before known in above forty years elapsed since she rose from her ashes after the Persian invasion. It is a wonderful and singular phenomenon in the history of mankind, little accounted for by anything recorded by ancient, or imagined by modern writers, that, during this period of turbulence, in a commonwealth whose whole population in free subjects amounted scarcely to thirty thousand families, art, science, fine taste, and politeness should have risen to that perfection which has made Athens the mistress of the world through all succeeding ages. Some sciences indeed have been carried higher in modern times, and art has put forth new branches,

of which some have given new helps to science : but Athens, in that age, reached a perfection of taste that no country hath since surpassed ; but on the contrary all have looked up to, as a polar star, by which, after sinking in the deepest barbarism, taste has been guided in its restoration to splendour, and the observation of which will probably ever be the surest preservative against its future corruption and decay.

Much of these circumstances of glory to Athens, and of improvement, since so extensively spread over the world, was owing to Pericles. Pisistratus had nourished the infancy of Attic genius ; Pericles brought it to maturity. In the age of Pisistratus books were scarcely known, science was vague, and arts still rude. But during the turbulent period which intervened things had been so wonderfully prepared that, in the age of Pericles, science and every polite art waited, as it were, only his magic touch to exhibit them

Plat. Alcib. 1. p. 118. t. 2.
Plutarch. vit. Peric. to the world in meridian splendour. The philosopher Anaxagoras of Clazomene, whose force of understanding and extent of science acquired him the appellation of the Intellect, had been the tutor of the youth of Pericles, and remained the friend of his riper years. Among those with whom he chiefly conversed was also the Athenian Phidias, who, with a capacity for every science, possessed the sublimest genius for the fine arts, and Damon, who, professing only music, was esteemed the ablest speculative politician that the world had yet produced. Nor must the celebrated Aspasia be omitted in the enumeration of those to whom Pericles was indebted for the cultivation

Plat. Menex. of his mind ; since we have it on the authority of Plato that Socrates himself acknowledged to have profited from the instruction of that extraordinary woman.

It will not be the place here to enlarge upon the manners any more than upon the arts and knowledge, of the age of Pericles ; yet it may be requisite to advert to one point, in

which a great change had taken place since the age which Homer has described. The political circumstances of Greece, and especially of Athens, had contributed much to exclude women of rank from general society. The turbulence, to which every commonwealth was continually liable from the contentions of faction, made it often unsafe, or at least unpleasant for them to go abroad. But in democracies their situation was peculiarly untoward. That form of government compelled the men to associate all with all. The general assembly necessarily called all together; and the vote of the meanest citizen being there of equal value with that of the highest, the more numerous body of the poor was always formidable to the wealthy few. Hence followed the utmost condescension, or something more than condescension, from the rich to the multitude; and not to the collected multitude only, nor to the best among the multitude, but principally to the most turbulent, illmannered, and worthless. Not those alone who sought honours or commands, but all who desired security for their property, must not only meet these men upon a footing of equality in the general assembly, but associate with them in the gymnasia and porticos, flatter them, and sometimes cringe to them. The ladies, to avoid a society which their fathers and husbands could not avoid, lived with their female slaves, in a secluded part of the house; associating little with one another, scarcely at all with the men, even their nearest relations, and seldom appearing in public but at those religious festivals in which ancient custom required the women to bear a part, and sacerdotal authority could insure decency of conduct toward them. Hence the education of the Grecian ladies in general, and particularly the Athenian, was scarcely above that of their slaves; and, as we See also Lysias against Diogiton. find them exhibited in lively picture in the little treatise upon domestic economy remaining from Xenophon,

they were equally of uninstructed minds and unformed manners.

The deficiencies to which women of rank were thus condemned, by custom which the new political circumstances of the country had superinduced upon the better manners of the heroic ages, gave occasion for that comparative superiority through which some of the Grecian courtezans attained extraordinary renown. Carefully instructed in every elegant accomplishment, and, from early years, accustomed to converse among men, and men of the highest rank and most improved talents, if they possessed understanding it became cultivated; and to their houses men resorted, not merely in the low pursuit of sensual pleasure, but to enjoy, often in the most polished company, the charms of female conversation, which, with women of rank and character, was

Plutarch. vit. Peric. totally forbidden. Hence, at the time of the invasion under Xerxes, more than one Grecian city is said to have been engaged in the Persian interest through the influence of Thargelia, a Milesian courtezan, who afterward became, as her title is expressed by historians, queen of Thessaly.

Aspasia was also a Milesian, the daughter of Axiochus; for her celebrity has preserved her father's name. With uncommon beauty were joined in Aspasia still more uncommon talents; and, with a mind the most cultivated, manners so decent that, in her more advanced years, not only Socrates professed to have learned eloquence from her, but, as Plutarch relates, the ladies of Athens used to accompany their husbands to her house for the instruction of her conversation. Pericles became her passionate admirer, and she attached herself to him during his life: according to Plutarch he divorced his wife, with whom he had lived on ill terms, to marry her. We are informed, on higher authority, that he was not fortunate in his family, his sons being mentioned by Plato as

youths of mean understanding. After he was firmly established at the head of the Athenian administration, he passed his little leisure from public business mostly in company with Aspasia and a few select friends; avoiding that extensive society in which the Athenians in general delighted, and seldom seen by the people but in the exercise of some public office, or speaking in the general assembly: a reserve perhaps as advantageous to him as the contrary conduct was necessary to the ambitious, who were yet but aspiring at greatness, or to the wealthy without power, who desired security for their property.

Policy united with natural inclination to induce Pericles to patronise the arts, and call forth their finest productions for the admiration and delight of the Athenian people. The Athenian people were the despotic sovereign; Pericles the favourite and minister, whose business it was to indulge the sovereign's caprices that he might direct their measures; and he had the skill often to direct even their caprices. That fine taste, which he possessed eminently, was in some degree general among the Athenians; and the gratification of that fine taste was one mean by which he retained his influence. Works were undertaken, according to the expression of Plutarch, in whose time they remained still perfect, of stupendous magnitude, and in form and grace inimitable; all calculated for the accommodation or in some way for the gratification of the multitude. Phidias was superintendent of the works: under him many architects and artists were employed, whose merit entitled them to fame with posterity, and of whose labours (such is the hardness of the Attic marble, their principal material, and the mildness of the Attic atmosphere) relics, which have escaped the violence of men, still after the lapse of more than two thousand years, exhibit all the perfection of design, and even of workmanship, which earned that fame.

Meanwhile Phidias himself was executing works of statuary which, while they lasted, were the admiration of succeeding times. Nor does the testimony to these works rest merely upon Grecian report; for the Romans, when in possession of all the most exquisite productions of Grecian art, scanty relics of which have excited the wonder and formed the taste of modern ages, were at a loss to express their admiration of the sublimity of the works of Phidias. When such was the perfection of the art of sculpture, it were a solecism to suppose that the sister art of painting could be mean, since the names of Panænus, kinsman of Phidias, and Zeuxis and Parrhasius, contemporaries, remained always among the most celebrated of the Grecian school. At the same time the chaste sublimity of the great tragic poets Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, and that extraordinary mixture of the most elegant satire with the grossest buffoonery, the old comedy as it is called, were alternately exhibited in immense theatres, at the public expense, and for the amusement of the whole people.

Thus captivating the Athenians by their relish for matters of taste and their passion for amusement, Pericles confirmed his authority principally by that great instrument for the management of a people, his eloquence: but this was supported by unremitting assiduity in public business, and evident superiority of capacity for the conduct of it; and, above all,

Plutarch. vit.
Peric. Plat.
Alcib. I.
P. 104. t. 2. by an ostentatious integrity. The whole Athenian commonwealth thus, with all its appurtenances, or, in the words of contemporary authors,

*revenues, armies, fleets, islands, the sea, friendships and alliances with kings and various potentates, and influence that commanded several Grecian states and many barbarous nations, all were in a manner his possession. Plutarch says that, while thus during fifteen years ruling the Athenian empire, so strict and scrupulous was his economy in his

private affairs that he neither increased nor diminished his paternal estate by a single drachma : but, according to the more probable assertion and higher authority of Isocrates, his private estate suffered in maintaining his public importance, so that he left it less to his sons than he had received it from his father.

Isocr. de pace,
p. 254. t. 2. ed.
Auger.

But the political power of Pericles resting on the patronage, which he professed, of democracy, he was obliged to allow much of what a better constitution would have put under more restraint. Such was the popular licentiousness that the comic poets did not fear Plutarch. vit.
Peric. to vent, in the public theatres, the grossest jokes upon his person, the severest invectives against his administration, and even the most abominable calumnies upon his character. His connection with Aspasia was not likely to escape their satire. She was called, on the public stage, the Omphale of her time, the Dejanira, and even the Juno. Many circumstances of the administration of Pericles were malevolently attributed to her influence, and much gross abuse and much improbable calumny was vented against both of them. It would indeed be scarcely possible to distinguish almost any truth amid the licentiousness of wit, and the violence, not to say the atrociousness, of party-spirit at Athens, had we not generally, for this interesting period of history, the guidance of a contemporary author, Thucydides son of Olorus ; of uncommon abilities and still more uncommon impartiality, and whose ample fortune, great connections, and high situation in the commonwealth opened to him superior means of information. For what is deficient in the concise view of Grecian affairs, which he has prefixed to his history of the Peloponnesian war, we have sometimes some testimony from Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, Isocrates, or the orators. To later writers, when not in some degree supported by these, it is seldom safe to trust. Sometimes

they have adopted reports carelessly ; and often, as we find Plutarch frequently acknowledging, they have been unable to unravel truth amid contradiction and improbability. Indeed Plutarch, though often extremely negligent, is yet often, and especially for the life of Pericles, our best assistant. Frequently quoting authorities, he is then always valuable ; and generally it may be gathered from his manner where he deserves respect, where he has been led by prejudice, and where he has been writing what occurs too frequently, not history but romance.

Notwithstanding then the vague accusations reported by Diodorus and others, the united authorities of Thucydides, Isocrates, and Plutarch may warrant belief that the clear integrity of Pericles, not less than the wisdom of his public conduct, was his shield against the scurrility of the comic poets, so adapted to make impression on the popular mind, as well as against every effort of the opposing orators.¹ One great point however of his policy was to keep the people always either amused or employed. During peace an exercising squadron of sixty trireme galleys was sent out for eight months in every year. Nor was this without a farther use than merely engaging the attention of the people, and maintaining the navy in vigour. Himself occasionally took the command ; and sailing among the distant dependencies of the empire, settled disputes between them, and confirmed the power and extended the influence of Athens. The Ægean and the Propontis did not bound his voyages : he penetrated into the Euxine ; and finding the distant Grecian settlement of Sinope divided between Timesileos, who affected the tyranny, and an opposing party, he left

¹ The expression of Thucydides is of that forcible kind which is peculiar to him, and to which his character gives a weight which it would hardly have from any other writer: Περικλῆς — δυνατὸς ἦν τῷ τε ἀξάμετι καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ, χειρίσαν τε διαφανῆς ἀδιαφότατος γενόμενος. Thucyd. 1. 2. c. 65.

there Lamachus with thirteen ships, and a land force, with whose assistance to the popular side the tyrant and those of his faction were expelled. The justice of what followed may indeed appear questionable. Their houses and property, apportioned into six hundred lots, were offered to so many Athenian citizens; and volunteers were not wanting to accept the offer, and settle at Sinope. To disburthen the government at home, by providing advantageous establishments, in distant parts, for the poor and discontented among the sovereign citizens of Athens, was a policy more than once resorted to by Pericles. The colony con-
Ch. 12. s. 4.
of this Hist.

ducted by himself to the Thracian Chersonese has been formerly noticed. It was then during his administration, in the year, according to Diodorus, in
Diod. 1. 12.
c. 9. & seq.
Ch. 2. s. 2. of
this Hist.

which the thirty years' truce was concluded, that the deputation came from the Thessalian adventurers who had been expelled by the Crotoniats from their attempted establishment in the deserted territory of Sybaris, in consequence of which, under his patronage, the colony was settled with which the historian Herodotus then, and afterward the orator Lysias, passing to Thurium, both established themselves there.

Plutarch has attributed to Pericles a noble project, unnoticed by any earlier extant author, but worthy of his capacious mind, and otherwise also bearing some characters of authenticity and truth. It was no less than to unite all Greece under one great federal government, of which Athens should be the capital. But the immediate and direct avowal of such a purpose would be likely to raise jealousies so numerous and extensive as to form insuperable obstacles to the execution. The religion of the nation was that alone in which the Grecian people universally claimed a clear common interest; and even in this every town and almost every family claimed something peculiar to itself.

In the vehemence of public alarm, during the Persian invasion, vows had been, in some places, made to the gods for sacrifices, to an extent beyond what the votaries, when blessed with deliverance beyond hope, were able to perform; and some temples, destroyed by the invaders, were not yet restored: probably because the means of those in whose territories they had stood were deficient. Taking these circumstances then for his ground, Pericles proposed that a congress of deputies from every republic of the nation should be assembled at Athens, for the purpose first of inquiring concerning vows for the safety of Greece yet unperformed, and temples, injured by the barbarians, not yet restored; and then of proceeding to concert measures for the lasting security of navigation in the Grecian seas, and for the preservation of peace by land also between all the states composing the Greek nation. The naval question, but still more the ruin which, in the Persian invasion, had befallen Northern Greece, and especially Attica, while Peloponnesus had felt nothing of its evils, gave pretensions for Athens to take the lead in the business. On the motion of Pericles, a decree of the Athenian people directed the appointment of ministers to invite every Grecian state to send its deputies. Plutarch, rarely attentive to political information, has not at all indicated what attention was shown, or what participation proposed, for Lacedæmon. His prejudices indeed we find very generally adverse to the Lacedæmonian government, and favouring the Athenian democracy. But, judging from the friendship which, according to the authentic information of Thucydides, subsisted between Pericles and Archidamus king of Lacedæmon through life, it is little likely that, in putting forward the project for the peace of Greece, Pericles would have proposed any thing derogatory to the just weight and dignity of Sparta; which indeed would have been, with peace the

pretence, only putting forward a project of contest. Pericles, when he formed his coalition with Cimon, seems to have entered heartily into the enlarged views of that great man; and, with the hope that, through their coalition, both the oligarchical and the democratical powers in Athens might be held justly balanced, had early in view to establish the peace of Greece on a union between Athens and Lacedæmon. It is however evident, from the narrative of Thucydides, that Archidamus rarely could direct the measures of the Lacedæmonian government. On a view of all information then it may seem probable that the project of Pericles was concerted with Archidamus; and that the opposition of those in Lacedæmon of an adverse faction concurred with opposition from those in Athens, who apprehended injury to their interest from a new coalition with the aristocratical party, to compel the great projector to abandon his magnificent and beneficent purpose, in a stage so early that it was no object for the notice of the able and accurate contemporary historian, in that valuable abridgment of early Grecian history which precedes his narrative of the Peloponnesian war.

SECTION II.

War between Samos and Miletus. — Interference of Athens. — Armament under Pericles. — Samos taken. — Funeral Solemnity at Athens in honour of the Slain in their Country's Service.

PEACE between Lacedæmon and Athens was indispensable toward the quiet of the rest of the nation, but, in the want of such a union as Pericles had projected, was unfortunately far from insuring it; and, when war began anywhere, though among the most distant settlements of the Grecian people, how far it might extend was not to be foreseen. A dispute between two Asiatic states, of the Athenian con-

federacy, led Athens into a war which greatly endangered the truce made for thirty years, when it had scarcely lasted six. Miletus and Samos, each claiming the sovereignty of Priene, originally a free Grecian commonwealth, asserted their respective pretensions by arms. The Milesians, not till they were suffering under defeat, applied to Athens for redress, as of a flagrant injury done them. The usual feuds within every Grecian state furnished assistance to their clamour; for, the aristocracy prevailing at that time in Samos, the leaders of the democratical party joined the enemies of their country in accusing the proceedings of its government before the Athenian

Plut. vit.
Peric.

people. The opposition at Athens maliciously imputed the measures following to the weak compliance of Pericles with the solicitations of Aspasia, in favour of her native city; but it appears clearly, from Thucydides, that no such motive was needful: the Athenian government would of course take cognizance of the cause; and, as might be expected, a requisition was sent to the Samian administration to answer, by deputies at Athens, to the charges urged against them. The Samians, unwilling to submit their claim to the arbitration of those who they knew were always systematically adverse to the aristocratical interest, refused to send deputies. A fleet of forty trireme galleys however brought them to immediate submission: their government was changed to a democracy, in which those who had headed the opposition of course took the lead; and, to insure permanent acquiescence from the aristocratical party, fifty men and fifty boys, of the first families of the island, were taken as hostages, and placed under an Athenian guard in the island of Lemnos.

What Herodotus mentions, as an observation applicable generally, we may readily believe was on this occasion experienced in Samos, "that the lower people were most

B. C. 440. Ol.
84. 4—85. 1.
Thucyd.
1. 1. c. 115.

unpleasant associates to the nobles.”² A number of these, unable to support the oppression to which they found themselves exposed, quitted the island, and applied to Pissuthnes, satrap of Sardis. The project of conquering Greece by arms appears to have been abandoned by the Persian government; but the urgency for constantly watching its politics, and interfering, as occasion might offer, with a view to the safety, if not to the extension, of the western border of the empire, was obvious; and it appears that the western satraps were instructed accordingly. The Samian refugees were favourably received by Pissuthnes. They corresponded with many of their party yet remaining in the island, and they engaged in their interest the city of Byzantium, itself a subject-ally of Athens. Collecting then about seven hundred auxiliary soldiers, they crossed by night the narrow channel which separates Samos from the continent, and, being joined by their friends, they surprised and overpowered the new administration. Without delay they proceeded to Lemnos, and so well conducted their enterprise that they carried off their hostages, together with the Athenian guard set over them. To win then more effectually the favour of the satrap, the Athenian prisoners were presented to him. Assured of assistance from Byzantium, being also not without hopes from Lacedæmon, they prepared to prosecute their success by immediately undertaking an expedition against Miletus.

Information of these transactions arriving quickly at Athens, Pericles with nine others, according to the ancient military constitution, joined with him in command, hastened to Samos with a fleet of sixty trireme galleys. Sixteen of these were detached, some to Chios and Lesbos, to require the assistance of the squadrons of

Thucyd. I. 1.
c. 116. 117.

² Συνοίκημα ἀχαιριτάτων. Herodot. I. 7. c. 156.

those islands, the rest to the Carian coast, to look for a Phenician fleet in the Persian service, which was expected to support the Samians. Pericles, with the remaining forty-four ships, met the Samian fleet of seventy returning from Miletus, and defeated it. Being soon after joined by forty more galleys from Athens, and twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos, he debarked his infantry on the island of Samos, and laid siege to the city by land and sea. Intelligence meanwhile arriving that the fleet from Phenicia was approaching, Pericles went with sixty of his galleys to Caunus in Caria; apparently apprehensive for his small squadron there. The Samians, under the conduct of the able Melissus (who, as not unusual in that age, united the characters of philosopher and military commander), hastened to profit from his absence. Issuing unexpectedly from the harbour with their fleet, they attacked the Athenian naval camp, which was unfortified, destroyed the ships stationed as an advanced guard³, and then defeated the rest of the fleet, hastily formed for action against them. Becoming thus masters of the sea, during fourteen days they had all opportunity for carrying supplies into the town.

Thucyd. l. 1. c. 41. Meanwhile an assembly of deputies from the states of the Peloponnesian confederacy was held at Sparta, to consider whether the democratical party in Samos should be protected in what, according to Grecian political tenets extensively held in that age, was rebellion.⁴ The Corinthians, yet weak from the consequences of their last war with Athens, principally decided the assembly to the

³ Τὰς προφυλακίδας γαῦς : for which may be consulted Scheffer's treatise de Militiâ Navali, l. 3. c. 4. p. 108., though he is not very satisfactory. I would not however undervalue his laborious compilation, which may often guard against the supposition of what was not, where it fails to inform what was.

⁴ Ministers from Corinth, afterward giving an account to the Athenian assembly of what had passed at Sparta upon the occasion, affirmed that their deputies had asserted the right of every leading city to PUNISH its allies: τοὺς σφετέρους ἔνυμμάχους αὐτὸν τινα κολάζειν. Thucyd. l. 1. c. 43.

rejection of the proposal. Indeed, unless an invasion of Attica by land might have been effectual, the confederacy had not means to carry it into execution, for its naval strength was very unequal to contention with that of Athens.

The Samians, thus disappointed of assistance from Peloponnesus, were weakly supported by the satrap, and the promised succour from Byzantium was delayed. The return of Pericles therefore compelled them to confine themselves within their harbour: and shortly a re-enforcement arrived, which might have enabled a less skilful commander to overbear opposition; forty galleys from Attica, under Thucydides, Agnon, and Phormion⁵, were followed by twenty more under Tlepolemus and Anticles, while thirty came from Chios and Lesbos. The Samians made one vain attempt to cut off a part of this formidable naval force; and then, in the ninth month from the commencement of the siege, they capitulated: their ships of war were surrendered, their fortifications were destroyed, they bound themselves to the payment of a sum of money by instalment for the expenses of the war, and they gave hostages as pledges of their fidelity to the sovereign commonwealth of Athens. The Byzantines, not waiting the approach of the coercing fleet, sent their request to be readmitted to their former terms of subjection, which was granted.

This rebellion, alarming and troublesome at the time to the administration of Athens, otherwise little disturbed the internal peace of the commonwealth; and, in the event,

⁵ The historian not having distinguished the Thucydides here spoken of by the mention of his father's name, it remains in doubt who he was. Some have supposed him the historian himself; others, the son of Melesias, once the opponent of Pericles, now reconciled to him; while others have imagined a third person of the name, nowhere else mentioned in history. Certainty cannot be had, and the matter is not important; but the first supposition appears to me far the most probable. In the course of the history Agnon and Phormion become farther known.

contributed rather to strengthen its command over its dependencies. Pericles took occasion from it to acquire fresh popularity. On the return of the armament to Athens the accustomed solemnities, in honour of those who had fallen in war, were performed with new splendour; and, in speaking the funeral oration, he exerted the powers of his eloquence very highly to the gratification of the people. As he descended from the bema, the stand whence orations were delivered to the people, the women presented him with chaplets; an idea derived from the ceremonies of the public games, where the crowning with a chaplet was the distinction of the victors, and, as something approaching to divine honour, was held among the highest tokens of admiration, esteem, and respect.

SECTION III.

Affairs of Corcyra. — Sedition at Epidamnus. — War between Corcyra and Corinth. — Defect of the Ancient Ships of War. — Deficient naval Skill of the Peloponnesians. — Sea-fight off Actium. — Accession of the Corcyraeans to the Athenian Confederacy. — Sea-fight off Sybota. — Infraction of the Thirty Years' Truce.

THE threatened renewal of general war in Greece having been obviated by the determination of the Peloponnesian congress not to interfere between the Athenians and their Asiatic allies, peace prevailed during the next three years after the submission of the Samians: or, if hostilities occurred anywhere, they were of so little importance that no account of them remains. A fatal spark then, raising fire in a corner of the country hitherto little within the notice of history, the blaze rapidly spread over the whole with inextinguishable fury; insomuch that the farther history of Greece, with some splendid episodes, is chiefly a tale of

calamities, which the nation, in ceaseless exertions of misdirected valour and genius, brought upon itself.

The island of Corcyra had been occupied, in an early age, by a colony from Corinth. The political connection of colonies with the mother-country will always depend upon their respective strength; and the Grecian colonies, all having been the offspring of very small states, in many instances acquired more than the parent's force. Coreyra thus had grown too powerful to remain obedient to Corinth, and, in independency, was too near a neighbour, and too much engaged in the same course of maritime commerce, not to become the rival, and thence the enemy, of its metropolis. Yet it was common for the Grecian colonies, even when they acknowledged no political subjection, to esteem a reverential regard for the mother-country a duty; holding themselves bound by a kind of religious superiority. Thus, unless in actual hostility, the citizens of the mother-<sup>Thucyd. I. 1.
c. 25.</sup> country were complimented with the precedence at public sacrifices and all festivals; and, if a colony was to be sent out, it was usual to desire a citizen of the mother-country for the leader. Thus, it was supposed,^{c. 24.} the gods of their forefathers would still be their gods, would favour the enterprise, and extend their lasting protection to the settlement.

Corcyra, already populous, had not yet entirely broken its connection with Corinth, when the resolution was taken by its government to settle a colony on the Illyrian coast. An embassy was therefore sent, in due form, to desire a Corinthian for the leader. Phalius, of a family boasting its descent from Hercules, was accordingly appointed to that honour: some Corinthians and others of Dorian race accompanied him; and Phalius thus became the nominal founder of Epidamus, which was however considered as a Corcyraean, not a Corinthian colony.

But in process of time Epidamnus growing populous and wealthy followed the example of its mother-country, asserted independency, and maintained the claim. Like most other Grecian cities, it was then, during many years, torn by sedition; and a war supervening with the neighbouring barbarians, it fell much from its former flourishing state. But the spirit of faction remaining in spite of misfortune untamed, the commonalty at length expelled all the higher citizens. These, finding refuge among the Illyrians, engaged with them in a predatory war, which was unremittingly carried on against the city by land and sea. Unable thus to rest, and almost to subsist, the Epidamnians in possession requested assistance from Corcyra. Conscious however that their state had no claim of merit with the mother-country, and the more doubtful of a favourable reception as at this time the Corcyraean government was aristocratical, those deputed for the purpose, instead of presenting themselves with the confidence of public ministers, put on the usual habit of suppliants, betook themselves to the temple of Juno, as a place whose sanctity would insure them present security, and thence offered their petition; in which still they ventured to solicit nothing more than the mediation of their metropolis with their expelled fellow citizens, and protection against the barbarians. Even this humble supplication however was rejected.

Thucyd. I. 1.
c. 25. On the return of their ministers, the Epidamnians, in great distress, determined to recur to the ancient resource of desponding states, the Delphian oracle. Sending a solemn deputation to Delphi, they put the question to the god, "Whether it would be proper for them to endeavour to obtain protection from Corinth, by acknowledging that city as their metropolis, and submitting themselves accordingly to its authority." The response directed them, in clear terms, to do so; and, thus war-

ranted by the deity, they hastened a deputation to Corinth.⁶

Fortunately for their object, though peace had not yet been broken, yet animosity between Corinth and Corcyra had so risen that the Corcyraeans, who had long refused political dependency, now denied to the Corinthians all those honours and compliments usually paid by Grecian colonies to their parent states. Under stimulation thus from affront, and with encouragement from the oracle, the prospect of an acquisition of dominion was too tempting, and the proposal of the Epidamnians was accepted. Adventurers were collected to strengthen the colony; and a body of Corinthian troops, with some Ambraciots and Leucadian auxiliaries, was appointed to convoy them. Fearful however of the naval force of Corcyra, which far exceeded that of Corinth, <sup>B.C. 436.
O.I.35.4.—86.1.</sup> they passed by land to Apollonia, and, there embarking, proceeded by sea to Epidamus.

The measures of the Epidamnians in possession becoming known to the expelled, these, before apparently hoping for final success with their own strength, and desirous to avoid dependency, now at length in alarm sent a deputation to solicit support from Corcyra. No sooner then was it known there that the Corinthians had taken possession of a colony in whose affairs the Corcyraeans themselves had refused to interfere, than the affair was taken up with warm resentment. Twenty-five triremes were immediately despatched,

⁶ . . . Εἰ παραδοῖεν Κορινθίοις τὴν πόλιν, ὡς οἰκισταῖς. — Ο δ' αὐτοῖς ἀνείλε, παραδοῦναι, καὶ ἴγεμόνας παιέσθαι. Thucyd. I. I. c. 25. In Thucydides's account of the disputes between Corinth, Corcyra, and Epidamus, and of that which followed about Potidaea, we have more authentic information concerning the proper connection between a Grecian colony and its metropolis than is perhaps elsewhere to be found; but we are without means of determining the exact import of the expressions παραδοῦναι τὴν πόλιν ὡς οἰκισταῖς and ἴγεμόνας παιέσθαι, and we are equally uninformed of the proper authority of those Corinthian magistrates whom we find, in the sequel, annually sent to the colony of Potidaea in Thrace.

with a requisition to the Epidamnians to receive their expelled fellow citizens (for these had now been supplicating protection from Corcyra) and to dismiss the Corinthian colonists and garrison. This being refused, a re-enforcement was sent to the squadron, which, in conjunction with the expelled Epidamnians and the neighbouring Illyrians, laid siege to the town.

Thucyd. 1. 1.
c. 27. The Corinthian government was prepared to expect such measures. As soon therefore as intelligence of them was received, a proclamation was published, offering the privileges of a citizen of Epidamnus to any who would go immediately to settle there. What the proposed advantages of the citizenship of Epidamnus were we are not informed. An allotment of land however would be among them, and perhaps a dwelling in the town, with a vote in an assembly, whether of more or less power. All however would be precarious, and especially the land, in the actual circumstances, would be most insecure property. The sense which the Corinthian government had of this is marked in the farther offer of the same advantages to any who, avoiding the dangers of the present circumstances, would pay fifty drachmas, less than three pounds sterling, toward the expense of the expedition. Corinth had rich men, and throughout Greece poor commonly abounded, ready for any adventure. Accordingly some were found to offer their persons, and some to pay for the chance of profit from the event. But Corinth had at this time only thirty ships of war, whereas Corcyra was able to put to sea near four times the number; being, next to Athens, the most powerful maritime state of Greece. Application for naval assistance was therefore made to the republics with which

c. 27. & 30. Corinth was most bound in friendship, and thus more than forty vessels were obtained; Megara sending eight, the Paleans of Cephallenia four, Epidaurus

five, Hermione one, Træzen two, Leucas ten, Ambracia eight, all with their complements of men; the Eleans some unmanned. Loans of money were obtained from the Eleans, Phliasians, and Thebans.

It had been the settled policy of the Corcyraeans, <sup>Thucyd. I. 1.
c. 32. & seq.</sup> islanders and strong at sea, to engage in no alliances. They had avoided both the Peloponnesian and the Athenian confederacy: and hitherto with this policy they had prospered. But, alarmed now at the combination formed against them, and fearing it might still be extended, they sent ambassadors to Lacedæmon and Sicyon; who prevailed so far that ministers from those two states accompanied them to Corinth, as mediators ^{c. 28.} in the existing differences. In presence of these the Corcyraean ambassadors proposed to submit the matters in dispute to the arbitration of any Peloponnesian states, or to the Delphian oracle, which the Corinthians had supposed already favourable to them. The Corinthians however, now prepared for war, and apparently persuaded that neither Lacedæmon nor Sicyon would take any active part against them, refused to treat upon any equal terms, and the Corcyraean ambassadors departed.

The Corinthians then hastened to use the force they had collected. The troops were already embarked when they sent a herald to Corcyra formally to declare war; a ceremony required by custom, which, throughout Greece, was held sacred. But, though they would not omit this, they would delay it till it might in the least possible degree answer its proper purpose. The armament consisting of seventy-five triremes, with two thousand heavy-armed infantry, under the command of Aristeus son of Pellicas, proceeded for Epidamnus. Off Actium in the Anactorian territory, at the entrance of the Ambracian gulf, where the temple of Apollo stands, (so the contemporary

historian describes the place destined to be in after-times the scene of more important action,) a vessel came to them with a herald from Corcyra, deprecating hostilities. The Corcyraeans had manned those of their ships which were already equipped, and hastily prepared some of those less in readiness, when their herald returned, bearing no friendly answer. With eighty galleys then they quitted their port, met the enemy, and gained a complete victory, destroying fifteen ships. Returning to Corcyra, they erected their trophy on the headland of Leucimne, and they immediately put to death all their prisoners, except the Corinthians, whom, as pledges, they kept in bonds. Epidamnus surrendered to their forces on the same day.

The opportunities now open, for both revenge and profit, were not neglected by the Corcyraeans. They first plundered the territory of Leucas, a Corinthian colony, still connected with the mother country; and then, going to the coast of Peloponnesus, they burnt Cyllene, the naval arsenal of Elis. During that year, unopposed on the sea, there was scarcely an intermission of their smaller enterprises; by some of which they gained booty, by others only gave alarm, but by all together greatly distressed the Corinthians and their

B.C. 434.
Ol. 87. 2-3. allies. It was not till late in the following spring

that the Corinthians sent a fleet and some troops to Actium, to give protection to their friends, wherever occasion might require. All the ensuing summer the rival armaments watched one another without coming to action. On the approach of winter both retired within their respective ports.

Thucyd. 1. 1.
c. 31. But since their misfortune off Actium the Corinthians had been unremittingly assiduous in repairing their loss, and in preparing to revenge it. Triremes were built, all necessaries for a fleet were largely collected, rowers were engaged throughout Peloponnesus, and where

else in any part of Greece they could be obtained for hire. The Corcyraeans, informed of these measures, notwithstanding their past success, were uneasy with the consideration that their commonwealth stood single, while their enemies were members of an extensive confederacy ; of which, though a part only had yet been induced to act, more powerful exertions were nevertheless to be apprehended. In this state of things it appeared necessary to abandon their ancient policy, and to seek alliances. Thucydides gives us to understand that they would have preferred the Peloponnesian to the Athenian confederacy ; induced, apparently, both by their kindred origin, and their kindred form of government. But they were precluded by the circumstances of the existing war, Corinth being one of the most considerable members of the Peloponnesian confederacy ; and it was beyond hope that Lacedæmon could be engaged in measures hostile to so old and useful an ally. It was therefore finally resolved to send an embassy to Athens.

Thucyd. 1. 1.
c. 28.

c. 31. : :

A measure of this kind, among those ancient commonwealths which had any mixture of democracy, was unavoidably public ; and this is one among circumstances favourable to ancient history, which counterbalance the want of some advantages open to the historians of modern ages. Gazettes were then unknown ; records and state writings were comparatively few ; party intrigues indeed abounded ; but public measures were publicly decided ; and some of the principal historians were statesmen and generals, bred to a knowledge of politics and war, and possessing means, through their rank and situation, of knowing also the facts which they related. Such particularly was Thucydides, son of Olorus, who has transmitted to us the transactions of the times with which we are now engaged. From him we learn that as soon as the purpose of the Corcyraeans was known at Corinth, am-

bassadors were sent thence to Athens to remonstrate against it.

The Athenian people were assembled to receive the two embassies, each of which, in presence of the other, made its proposition in a formal oration. The point to be determined was highly critical for Athens. A truce existed, but not a peace, with a confederacy inferior in naval force, but far superior by land; and Attica, a continental territory,

Thucyd. 1. 1. c. 40. & 43. was open to attack by land. That recent circum-

stance in the Samian war, the assembling of a congress at Sparta for the purpose of considering whether the Samians, an Ionian people, a colony from Athens, and members of the Athenian alliance, should not be supported in war against the head of their confederacy, also their mother state, would weigh in the minds of the Athenian people. The mere summoning of such an assembly, to discuss such a question, strongly indicated the disposition at least of a powerful party in the Lacedæmonian confederacy; and the determination of the question, in the negative, rather demonstrated a present unreadiness, principally among the Corinthians, for the renewal of hostilities, than any friendly disposition toward Athens. The security of that state rested principally on its maritime superiority. But next to Athens, Corcyra was the most powerful maritime republic; and to prevent the accession of its strength, through alliance, or through conquest, to the Peloponnesian confederacy, was, for the Athenian people, highly important. In

c. 35. & 40. the articles of the truce moreover it was expressly

stipulated, that any Grecian state, not yet a member of either confederacy, might at pleasure be admitted to either. But, notwithstanding this, it was little less than certain that, in the present circumstances, an alliance with Corcyra must lead to a rupture with the Peloponnesians; and this consideration occasioned much

suspense in the minds of the Athenians. Twice the assembly was held to debate the question. On the first day, the arguments of the Corinthian ambassadors had so far effect that nothing was decided: on the second, the spirit of ambition, ordinary in democracy, prevailed, and the question was carried for alliance with Corcyra.

Thucydides gives no information what part Pericles took in this important and difficult conjuncture. If it was impossible, as it seems to have been, to establish secure peace with Lacedæmon, it would become the leader of the affairs of Athens to provide for maintaining future war; strengthening the Athenian confederacy, and obviating accession of strength to the Lacedæmonian. But we are enough informed that Pericles would be farther pressed by other circumstances. The difficulty of keeping civil order in a community of lordly beggars, such as the Athenian people were, which had driven Cimon, in advanced years, to end his life in distant enterprise, we shall find, in the sequel, a difficulty for which, even in speculation, the wisest politicians were unable to propose any remedy, beyond finding the fittest objects for restless ambition. It is therefore everyway likely that Plutarch had ground for asserting that the eloquence of Pericles was directed to promote the decision to which the people came. The character of the measure taken, in pursuance of the decision, may then seem to indicate the wisdom of Pericles, guiding the business. With all other states of the confederacy the alliance was offensive and defensive; with Corcyra it was for defence only.

Meanwhile the earnestness with which the Corinthians persevered in their purpose of prosecuting war against the Corcyræans, now to be supported by the power of Athens, appears to mark confidence in support, on their side, from the Lacedæmonian confederacy; some members of which indeed were evidently of ready zeal. The

*Thucyd. I. 1.
c. 46.*

Corinthians increased their own trireme galleys to ninety. The Eleans, resenting the burning of Cyllene, had exerted themselves in naval preparation, and sent ten triremes completely manned to join them. Assistance from Megara, Leucas, and Ambracia made their whole fleet a hundred and fifty : the crews would hardly be less than forty thousand men. With this large force they sailed to Chimerion, a port of Thesprotia, over-against Corcyra, where, according to the practice of the Greeks, they formed their naval camp.

Thucyd. I. 1.
c. 45. The Athenian government meanwhile, desirous

c. 47. to confirm their new alliance, yet still anxious to avoid a rupture with the Peloponnesian confederacy, had sent ten triremes to Corcyra, under the command of Lacedæmonius son of Cimon; but with orders not to fight, unless a descent were made on the island, or any of its towns were attacked. The Corcyraeans, on receiving intelligence that the enemy was approaching, put to sea with

c. 47. a hundred and ten triremes, exclusive of the

Athenian, and formed their naval camp on one of the small islets called Sybota, the Sowleas or Sowpastures, between their own island and the main. Their land forces at the same time, with a thousand auxiliaries from Zacynthus, encamped on the headland of Leucimne in Corcyra, to be prepared against invasion; while on the opposite coast of the continent, the barbarians, long since friendly to Corinth, assembled in large numbers.

The necessity among the ancients for debarking continually to encamp their crews arose from the make of their ships of war. To obtain that most valuable property for their manner of naval action, swiftness in rowing, burden was excluded;

I. 4. c. 26.
I. I. c. 44. insomuch that not only they could not carry any stock of provisions, but the numerous crews could neither sleep nor even eat conveniently aboard. When the Corinthians quitted the port of Chimerion, with the purpose

of bringing the Corcyraean fleet to action, they took three days' provision ; which Thucydides seems to have thought a circumstance for notice, because it appears to have been the practice of the Athenians, when action was expected, hardly to encumber themselves with a meal. The Corinthians however, moving in the night, perceived in the dawn the Corcyraean fleet approaching. Both prepared immediately to engage. So great a number of ships had never before met in any action between Greeks and Greeks. The onset was vigorous ; and the battle was maintained, on either side, with much courage but little skill. Both Corcyraean and Corinthian ships were equipped in the ancient manner, very inartificially. The decks were crowded with soldiers, some heavy-armed, some with missile weapons ; and the action, in the eye of the Athenians, trained in the discipline of Themistocles, resembled a battle of infantry, rather than a sea-fight. Once engaged, the number and throng of the vessels made free motion impossible : nor was there any attempt at the rapid evolution of the diecplus, as it was called, for piercing the enemy's line and dashing away his oars, the great objects of the improved naval tactics ; but the event depended, as of old, chiefly upon the heavy-armed soldiers who fought on the decks. Tumult and confusion thus prevailing everywhere, Lacedæmonius, restrained by his orders from fighting, gave yet some assistance to the Corcyraeans, by showing himself wherever he saw them particularly pressed, and alarming their enemies. The Corcyraeans were, in the left of their line, successful : twenty of their ships put to flight the Megarians and Ambraciots who were opposed to them, pursued to the shore, and debarking, plundered and burnt the naval camp. But the Corinthians, in the other wing, had meanwhile been gaining an advantage which became decisive through the imprudent forwardness of the victorious

Thucyd. I. 7.
c. 39. & 40.

c. 49. 2742

Corcyraeans. The Athenians now endeavoured, by more effectual assistance to their allies, to prevent a total rout: but disorder was already too prevalent, and advantage of numbers too great against them. The Corinthians pressed their success; the Corcyraeans fled, the Athenians became mingled among them; and in the confusion of a running fight acts of hostility passed between the Athenians and Corinthians. The defeated however soon reached their own shore, whither the conquerors did not think proper to follow.

Thucyd. 1. 1.
c. 50. In the action several galleys had been sunk; most by the Corinthians, but some by the victorious part of the Corcyraean fleet. The crews had recourse, as usual, to their boats; and it was common for the conquerors, when they could seize any of these, to take them in tow and make the men prisoners: but the Corinthians, in the first moment of success, gave no quarter; and, unaware of the disaster of the right of their fleet, in the hurry and confusion of the occasion, not easily distinguishing between Greeks and Greeks, inadvertently destroyed many of their unfortunate friends. When pursuit ceased, and they had collected whatever could be recovered of the wrecks and the dead, they carried them to a desert harbour, not distant, on the Thesprotian coast, called, like the neighbouring islets, Sybota: and depositing them under the care of their barbarian allies, who were there encamped, they returned, on the afternoon of the same day, with the purpose of renewing attack upon the Corcyraean fleet.

The Corcyraeans meanwhile had been considering the probable consequences of leaving the enemy masters of the sea. They dreaded descents upon their island, and consequent ravage of their lands. The return of their victorious squadron gave them new spirits: Lacedæmonius encouraged them with assurance that, since hostilities had already passed,

he would no longer scruple to afford them his utmost support; and they resolved upon the bold measure of quitting their port, and, though evening was already approaching, again giving the enemy battle. Instantly they proceeded to put this in execution. The pæan, the song of battle, was already sung when the Corinthians began suddenly to retreat. The Corcyraeans were at a loss immediately to account for this; but presently they discovered a Thucyd. I. 1. c. 51. squadron coming round a headland, which had concealed it longer from them than from the enemy. Still uncertain whether it might be friendly or hostile, they also retreated into their port; but shortly, to their great joy, twenty triremes under Glaucon and Andocides, sent from Attica, in the apprehension that the small force under Lacedæmonius might be unequal to the occurring exigencies, took their station by them.

Next day the Corcyraeans did not hesitate, with the thirty Athenian ships, for none of those c. 52. under Lacedæmonius had suffered materially in the action, to show themselves off the harbour of Sybota, where the enemy lay, and offer battle. The Corinthians came out of the harbour, formed for action, and so rested. They were not desirous of risking an engagement against the increased strength of the enemy, but they could not remain conveniently in the station they had occupied, a desert shore, where they could neither refit their injured ships, nor recruit their stock of provisions; and they were encumbered with more than a thousand prisoners; a very inconvenient addition to the crowded complements of their galleys. Their object therefore was to return home: but they were apprehensive that the Athenians, holding the truce as broken by the action of the preceding day, would not allow an unmolested passage. It was therefore determined to try their disposition by sending a small vessel with a message c. 35.

to the Athenian commanders, without the formality of a herald. This was a service not without danger. Those Corcyraeans, who were near enough to observe what passed, exclaimed, in the vehemence of their animosity, "that the bearers should be put to death;" which, considering them as enemies, would have been within the law of war of the Greeks. The Athenian commanders however thought proper to hold a different conduct. To the message delivered, which accused them of breaking the truce, by obstructing the passage of Corcyra, they replied, "that it was not their purpose to break the truce, but only to protect their allies. Wherever else the Corinthians chose to go, they might go without interruption from them; but any attempt against Corcyra, or any of its possessions, would be resisted by the Athenians to the utmost of their power."

Upon receiving this answer, the Corinthians,
Thucyd. I. 1.
c. 54. & 55. after erecting a trophy at Sybota on the continent, proceeded homeward. In their way they took by stratagem Anactorium, a town at the mouth of the Ambracian gulf, which had formerly been held in common by their commonwealth and the Corcyraeans; and, leaving a garrison there, proceeded to Corinth. Of their prisoners they found near eight hundred had been slaves, and these they sold. The remainder, about two hundred and fifty, were strictly guarded, but otherwise treated with the utmost kindness. Among them were some of the first men of Corcyra; and through these the Corinthians hoped, at some future opportunity, to recover their ancient interest and authority in the island.

The Corcyraeans meanwhile had gratified themselves with the erection of a trophy on the island Sybota, as a claim of victory, in opposition to the Corinthian trophy on the continent. The Athenian fleet returned home; and thus ended, without any treaty, that series of actions which is distinguished

among Greek writers by the name of the Corcyraean, or, sometimes, the Corinthian war.

SECTION IV.

Summary View of the History of Macedonia.—War of Athens with Macedonia.—Enmity of Corinth to Athens.—Revolt of Athenian Dependencies in Thrace.—Battle and Siege of Potidaea.

THE contemporary historian has strongly marked the difficulties of those who might have desired to guide the sovereign people of Athens in the paths of peace and moderation. The Corcyraean war was far too small an object for their glowing minds : the view toward Sicily and the adjacent Italian shores were fondly looked to for new enterprise. Nor was it intended to stop there. Where spoil allured, no difficulty daunted ; and the wild vision of conquest was extended from Calabria to Tuscany, and from Sicily to Carthage. Pericles endeavoured to repress this extravagant and dishonest ambition ; and his view was assisted by circumstances which necessarily engaged attention nearer home.

Thucyd. I. 1.
c. 44. l. 6.
c. 90. Plut.
vit. Peric.

Plut. ibid.
& Thucyd.
l. 1. c. 144.

The towns which the Athenians held under their dependency on the northern shores of the Ægean, some highly valuable for their mines of gold and silver, others furnishing the principal supplies of naval timber, and all paying some tribute, gave Athens a near interest in the affairs of MACEDONIA. Peopled by the same Pelasgian race which principally gave origin to the Greeks, and brought afterward under the dominion of a Grecian colony, <sup>Æschyl.
Danaid.
Justin. l. 7.
c. 1.</sup> that country claimed always to be a part of Greece.* Its history however, as that of most other Grecian states, is

* Macedonia is reckoned among the unquestioned parts of Greece by Strabo, l. 7. p. 465.

almost only known through connection with Athenian history. Thucydides, who must have had superior opportunity, appears to have been able to discover little more than the genealogy of its kings, downward from Perdiccas, who was ancestor in the seventh degree to Alexander son of Amyntas, the reigning prince at the time of the invasion of Greece under Xerxes.

Herodot. 1. 8.
c. 137.
Thucyd. 1. 2.
c. 99. Thucydides and Herodotus agree in ascribing the foundation of the Macedonian monarchy to

Perdiccas; but later writers have given the honour to a prince whom they call Caranus, reckoning Perdiccas his grandson. This addition to the pedigree of the Macedonian kings cannot but appear utterly doubtful, being opposed by the united authority of Herodotus and Thucydides, almost within whose memory that pedigree had been judiciously discussed at the Olympian meeting.⁷ Three brothers, according to Herodotus, Heraclidæ of the branch of Temenus, of whom Gavanes was the eldest, and Perdiccas the youngest, passed from Argos into Macedonia, where the latter acquired the sovereignty; and it seems not improbable that the ingenuity of chronologers, with a little alteration of the name, has converted the elder brother into the grandfather.⁸ The founder of the Macedonian royal family however was, according to every account, an Argive, descended from Temenus the Heraclidean, whence the princes of that family were commonly called Temenidæ.

Herodot. 1. 8.
c. 137. By a series of adventures, of which romantic reports only remain, he acquired command among the Macedonians; a Pelasgian clan, who held the inland province of Æmathia, otherwise called Macedonia proper,

⁷ Thus the learned and generally judicious Henry Dodwell: "Tres illos reges *Eusebianos* rescindendos arbitror." Annal. Thucyd. ad. ann. A. c. 454.

⁸ According to the chronologers, Caranus began to reign 814 years before the Christian era, and 36 before the first Olympiad; Perdiccas 729 years before the Christian era, in the fourth year of the 12th Olympiad.

to the north of Thessaly, and then esteemed a part of Thrace.

The Macedonian name, according to fable, fabricated however apparently in a late age, had its origin from Macedon, son of Jupiter and Æthria. What led the followers of Perdiccas to assume it, and by what wars or what policy they acquired extensive dominion, precise information fails; but circumstances whence to deduce some probable conjecture remain reported. The innumerable clans who shared that extensive continent, being in a state of perpetual warfare among one another, the situation of the Macedonians, when the Argive adventurers arrived among them, might be such as to make them glad to associate strangers, whose skill in arms and general knowledge were superior. While civil and military pre-eminence were therefore yielded to the new comers, and royalty became established in the family of their chief, the name of the ancient inhabitants, as the more numerous, remained. In the course of six or seven reigns the Macedonians extended their dominion over the neighbouring provinces of Pieria, Bottiae, Mygdonia, part of Pæonia, Eordia, Almopia, Anthemous, Grestonia, and Bisaltia; all, together with Æmathia or Macedonia Proper, forming what acquired the name of Lower Macedonia, which extended from mount Olympus to the river Strymon. The people of some of these provinces were exterminated, of some extirpated; some were admitted to the condition of subjects, and many probably reduced to slavery. The expelled Pierians established themselves in Thrace, at the foot of mount Pangæus; the Bottiæans found a settlement nearer their former home, in a tract on the border of Chalcidice, which Thucydides distinguishes by the name of Bottica. Lyncestis and Elimiotis, with some other inland and mountainous

Schol. ad.
v. 226. l. 14.
Iliad.

Thucyd. l. 2.
c. 99. Strabo.
l. 7. p. 468. ed.
Ox.

Thucyd. l. 2.
c. 101. 99.

provinces, under the government of princes, in the manner of feudatories, acknowledging the sovereignty of the Macedonian kings, became known by the name of Upper Macedonia.

While wars almost unceasing with savage neighbours, and frequent rebellions of conquered subjects, prevented the progress of civilisation among the Macedonians, the weakness of the prince and the wants of the people concurred to encourage Grecian establishments on the coast; of which however the principal, those of Chalcidice and the three peninsulas, had been made probably before the Macedonian kingdom had acquired any considerable extent. But in so little estimation was Macedonia held by the Greeks at the time of the Persian wars, that when, in his father's lifetime, Alexander son of Amyntas offered himself as a competitor for the prize of the stadium at the Olympian games, it was objected to him that he was a barbarian. The prince however producing testimony that he was not only a Greek, but a Heraclidean of the race of Temenus, and this being admitted by the Hellanotics, and approved by the assembly, that illustrious origin of the royal family of

Macedonia, fully acknowledged by both Herodot. 1. 5. Herodot. 1. 22. & 1. 9. c. 45. Thucyd. 1. 2. c. 99. & l. 5. c. 80. dorus and Thucydides, was, among all the invectives of the Grecian orators in after-times, never Herodot. 1. 5. c. 21. & 1. 8. c. 136. Justin. 1. 7. c. 5. disputed.⁹ The marriage of Gygæa, sister of

Alexander, with Bubaris, a Persian of high rank, contributed to the security of the Macedonian kingdom when Xerxes invaded Greece. Alexander was a prince of considerable ability, improved by communication both with

⁹ Demosthenes, among other illiberal language, adapted to excite his audience against the great Philip, would call that prince a barbarian. Æschines called Demosthenes a barbarian, and showed his ground for it; but Demosthenes has not ventured an attempt to show any for his imputation: he has merely thrown out the ugly nickname to the Athenian populace, for the chance of the vogue it might obtain, and the effect it might produce.

Greeks and Persians; but after the retreat of Xerxes he had so many wars to sustain against the neighbouring barbarians that, though generally successful, he had little leisure for attending to the advancement of arts and knowledge among his people.

Long before the establishment of the Athenian sovereignty over the islands and coast of the Ægean, there had been friendly connection between the commonwealth and the Macedonian kings; and in consequence, at the time of the Persian invasion, Alexander son of Amyntas, as it has been before observed, was esteemed the hereditary guest of Athens. While he lived the friendly connection seems not to have been interrupted or impaired by any acquisition of sovereignty to the commonwealth, extending over towns which might be esteemed within Macedonia. Alliance with the republic seems to have passed as an inheritance to his son and successor Perdiccas, who had been honoured with adoption to the citizenship of Athens, for merit with the Greek nation, in defeating a division of the Persian army, which, after the battle of Platæa, retreated from Greece under Artabazus.

But differences afterward arose. One of the principalities of Upper Macedonia was the appanage of Philip, younger brother of Perdiccas, and another was the inheritance of Derdas, a prince more distantly related to the royal family. About the time of the Corcyraean war, Perdiccas proposing to deprive both his brother and his cousin of their commands, the Athenian administration thought proper to take those princes under its protection, and support them against the intended injury. Perdiccas resented this as a breach of the ancient alliance; and perhaps he was, not without reason, jealous of the ambition of the Athenian people. The authority and influence of the two princes however were so considerable that to attack

Herodot. 1. 8.
c. 136.

Thucyd. 1. 2.
c. 100.

them, while they could be supported by the power of the Athenian commonwealth, would have been hazardous : but the circumstances of the times offered a resource suited to the genius of the Macedonian king ; who, not possessing all his father's virtues, was not without abilities. The Athenians had just taken a decided part in the Corcyraean war. The hostile disposition of Corinth toward them was in consequence avowed ; that a similar disposition prevailed in Lacedæmon was well known ; and opportunity occurred for intrigue, which would probably involve the Athenian commonwealth in war, with Corinth immediately, and ultimately with Lacedæmon. Thus invited, Perdiccas, ambitious, active, crafty, and unrestrained by any principle of integrity, (so the historian, describing only his conduct, marks his character,) determined to persevere in his purpose.

The town of Potidæa, critically situated on the isthmus which connects the fruitful peninsula of Pallene with Macedonia where it bordered on Thrace, was a Corinthian colony ; so far still dependent upon the mother-country as to receive magistrates annually thence, and yet, such were the complicated interests of the Grecian republics, tributary allies of Athens. Perdiccas sent an offer to Corinth to assist in recovering Potidæa from the Athenian dominion. At the same time he sent to Lacedæmon a proposal to become a member of the Peloponnesian confederacy. Meanwhile he negotiated not only with the Potidæans, but also with the Chalcidians and Bottiæans, subjects of Athens in his neighbourhood, to induce them to revolt.

The Athenian government, informed of these transactions, and aware of the hostile disposition of Corinth, judged immediate precaution necessary for the preservation of their command on the northern shores of the Ægean. A squadron of thirty ships of war was already preparing in the port of Piræus, to be accompanied by a thousand heavy-armed in-

fantry, for the support of the Macedonian princes, Philip and Derdas. According to that despotic authority which the Athenian people assumed over the Grecian states of their alliance, peremptory orders were sent to the Potidæans to demolish their fortifications on the side of Pallene, to give hostages for security of their fidelity, and to send away their Corinthian magistrates and receive no more. The Potidæans, afraid to dispute, yet very averse to obey, sent ministers to Athens requesting a recal or a mitigation of these commands; but at the same time, in common with the Corinthians, they communicated privately with Sparta, soliciting protection, if the Athenians should persevere in their requisition. From the Athenian people no remission was obtained. The leading men in the Spartan administration¹⁰ promised that if the Athenians attempted to enforce their commands by arms, a Peloponnesian army should invade Attica. The Potidæans communicated with the Chalcidians and Bottiæans; a league was formed and ratified in the usual manner by oaths, and all revolted together.

Thucyd. I. 1.
c. 56. & 57.

c. 58.

Ample assurance remains that the command of the Athenian people over their subject states, always arbitrary, was often very oppressive; but, as accounts of the times have reached us mostly from Athenian writers, particulars have been transmitted almost only when the circumstances have been extraordinary. By an Athenian writer however information is afforded of the measure next resorted to by the Chalcidians; and, under the foreseen necessity for such a measure, it must apparently have been a galling oppression that could induce a people to revolt. The lands of their rich peninsula would be open to ravage from the Athenian fleet, decidedly commanding the Ægean Sea. Its produce then not only would be lost to them, but would assist the

¹⁰ Τὰ τέλη τῶν Δακτιδαιμονίων.

enemy to carry on the war against them. Founded on this view, an extraordinary proposal was made to them by the king of Macedonia: that they should destroy all their sea-port towns, except Olynthus, which should be made their one strong place; and that all their people, beyond what the defence of that city might require, abandoning their lands, should remove, with their families, to a fruitful territory, which he would assign them, about the lake Bolbe in Mygdonia; by the cultivation of which they might subsist till the war should be over. Severe as the sacrifice must have been, the Chalcidians accepted the offer, and the measure, at least in great part, was executed.

These transactions were yet unknown at
c. 57. & 59. Athens, when the armament intended for Macedonia sailed under the command of Archestratus. His instructions directed him to go first to Potidæa, and see the orders of the Athenian government executed there; then to take any measures that might appear expedient for preventing revolt in any other towns in that neighbourhood of the Athenian dominion or alliance; terms apparently equivocal, or nearly so, as applied to those towns; and not, till these were secured, to prosecute the proposed operations in Macedonia. On his arrival in Chalcidice, finding the revolt already complete, he judged his force insufficient for any effectual measures there, and he therefore turned immediately toward Macedonia, to favour a projected invasion of the inland frontier of that kingdom by the king's brother, Philip.

Meanwhile the Corinthians, who had dissuaded
c. 40. & 60. war when the common cause of their confederacy only had instigated, became vehement in the call to arms when the particular interest of their own state was endangered. No negotiation was proposed, no desire to have differences accommodated, according c. 69. 71. & 78. to the stipulations of the existing treaty, was mentioned;

but, while their ministers were everywhere assiduously endeavouring to excite alarm and indignation among their allies, they prepared themselves immediately to assert their cause by force. Sixteen hundred heavy-armed and four hundred light-armed troops, partly volunteers of Corinth, partly engaged for hire among other states of Peloponnesus, were sent to Potidæa, under Aristeus son of Adimantus, who had particular connections with that colony, and was esteemed there: and, so much diligence was used in the equipment, it was only the fortieth day after the revolt (the contemporary historian's term) when they arrived.

The Athenians, on receiving intelligence of these proceedings of the Corinthian government, sent Thucyd. I. 1.
c. 61. Callias son of Calliades, with forty triremes and two thousand heavy-armed, to join the little army under Archestratus. That army, with the assistance of its Macedonian confederates, had already taken Therme and was besieging Pydna, when Callias arrived. The business of the revolted colonies being deemed of more importance than the prosecution of hostilities, however successful, against Perdiccas, proposals were made to that prince. As he was not himself scrupulous, so apparently he had little confidence in any treaty with any of the republics. Views to present advantage prompting, not peace only between him and the Athenian republic, but a treaty of alliance was hastily concluded, in which, rather in opposition to his views, some care apparently was taken of the interests of his brother and the other revolted princes; the interest of Athens so requiring. The whole Athenian force, and a considerable body of allied infantry, with the valuable addition of six hundred Macedonian horse, sent by Philip, then marched for Potidæa. These particulars, otherwise little interesting, are important, together with those which follow, toward a just understanding of the policy of the Grecian republics in the times of their greatest celebrity.

Thucyd. 1. 1.
c. 62.

Perdiccas held his engagement with the Athenians no longer than to serve a present purpose.

Possibly some gross insolence of the Athenian government, which the contemporary historian would prudently avoid to notice, offended him; for often those who best know can least properly or safely declare political truths. So complete however was his tergiversation that he sent two hundred horse to join the army of the Corinthians and their allies. In this confederate army then it was necessary to establish, by common consent, some system of command. It may seem that the Macedonian king, in this new choice of republican allies, was again disappointed; though perhaps the course taken by those republicans was that of prudence and reason. By election Aristeus, general of the Corinthian forces, was appointed commander-in-chief of the infantry, and Perdiccas of the cavalry. The Macedonian prince, apparently little satisfied with the compliment, deputed his general Iolaus to execute the office. The Athenian army soon after approaching, an action ensued, in which Aristeus,

c. 63. with a chosen body, performing the duty more of a brave soldier than of an able general, for so the custom of war seems to have required, broke and pursued a part of the

enemy's line, while the rest completely routed his

remaining army, and drove the survivors for refuge within the walls of Potidæa. Callias, the Athenian general, was killed: but Aristeus, returning from pursuit, not without difficulty and loss, by a hazardous effort, joined his defeated troops in the town. The Athenian army sat down

c. 64. before it, and being soon after re-enforced with sixteen hundred men under Phormion, blockaded it by land and sea.

Aristeus, who, if error in the battle should be imputed to him, appears nevertheless to have been a man of considerable abilities, as well as daring courage

c. 65.

and indefatigable activity, having regulated things within the place in the best manner for sustaining the siege, found means to pass out of the harbour in a vessel unnoticed by the Athenian guard-ships. Going himself to Olynthus, to take the command of the allied forces there, he hastened dispatches to Peloponnesus with information of what had passed, and pressing for a re-enforcement, without which Potidæa, he said, could not be saved: for Phormion was now so superior that, after having completed a contravaluation against the place, he could spare a part of his army to ravage Chalcidice and the Bottiaean territory, where he took some smaller towns.

SECTION V.

Assembly of Deputies of the Peloponnesian Confederacy at Lacedæmon. — The Thirty Years' Truce declared broken. — Second Assembly. — War with Athens resolved. — Embassies from Lacedæmon to Athens. — Final Rejection of the Proposals from Lacedæmon by the Athenians.

IT is from the account, remaining from Thucydides, of that complicated and lasting war, to which the affairs just related immediately led, that we derive our best knowledge of the political and military state of Greece, with much collateral information concerning science, arts, and manners during the period most interesting; that remarkable period, when the leading Grecian commonwealths had a political importance in the affairs of the world, beyond all proportion to their natural strength, and when science and art arose among them to a splendour totally unknown in preceding ages, and never in all points equalled since. If therefore, in following the steps of that able writer, we meet with circumstances which on first view appear little; if armies engaged are not numerous; if the affairs of single towns, and some-

times of small ones, occupy some space in narration ; it must not be concluded that the subject is trifling, since those apparently little matters are connected with consequences among the most important that occur in the history of mankind.

Of those Greeks who were not held in subjection, the Corinthians appear to have been most affected by the rising power of Athens. Their commerce was checked, and their colonial dependencies, not absolutely taken from them, were however compelled to acknowledge a degree of sovereignty in the Athenian people, and to pay a tribute ; originally, and still nominally, for common purposes of Greece, but more really for the particular benefit of Athens. The irritation excited by the check given, in former wars, to the ambition of those adverse to the Athenian supremacy, and particularly by the loss of friends and relations in the unfortunate action in which Myronides commanded against them, was thus kept alive, and the Corinthians nourished the sharpest

Thucyd. I. 1.
c. 67. animosity against the Athenians. When there-

fore intelligence came from Aristeus of the transactions in Chalcidice, far from remitting their ardour for war, the Corinthians applied themselves with increased sedulity to excite their whole confederacy, and especially Lacedæmon, to take up their cause : “ The truce,” they exclaimed, “ was already broken, and Peloponnesus insulted and injured.” At the same time the Æginetans, who bore most impatiently their subjection to Athens, yet feared to make any open demonstration of a disposition to revolt, complained, by secret negotiation among the Peloponnesian states, of the dependency in which they were held, contrary, as they contended, to the treaty ; and they redoubled their importunity as they found a growing disposition to that hostility which would favour their cause. Thus instigated, the Lacedæmonians at length convoked the usual assembly of

deputies from the states of their confederacy; and they invited the attendance of ministers from any other Grecian republics which might have any complaint to prefer against Athens.

The detail remaining from Thucydides of the debates and negotiations which followed afford so much insight into the politics, the political manners, and the temper of Greece at the time, that, with the risk of some appearance of uncouthness to the modern reader, I shall venture to report the more material parts without abridgment, and with the least deviation that may be from the expression of the original. The deputies of the confederacy, or a large proportion of them (for it appears to have been not a full meeting) being arrived at Sparta, the general assembly of the Lacedæmonian people was convened. There happened to be present at the time ministers from Athens, commissioned on some other public business, and these were allowed to attend the audience. All being met, proclamation was made, according to the custom of the Grecian assemblies, declaring permission to speak on the subject for which the assembly was convened. Many came forward exhibiting various complaints against the Athenian government, mostly little important or doubtfully founded, excepting those of the Megarians and Corinthians. The former urged that, contrary to existing treaty, they were, by a decree of the Athenian people, prohibited all commercial intercourse by land with Attica, and excluded from all ports within the Athenian dominion. The Corinthians reserved themselves, till the others should have prepared the minds of the Lacedæmonian people for warmer instigation, and then spoke nearly thus :

“ That strict faith, Lacedæmonians, which characterizes your conduct in public and in private affairs, inclines you to disregard accusations against others ;

Thucyd. 1.1.
c. 67.

c. 72.

c. 67.

c. 68.

and hence indeed you obtain the just praise of moderation and equity, but you remain ignorant of the transactions of foreign states. Often we have forewarned you of the wrongs which the Athenians were preparing for us; but not till there was actual war, and we had already suffered, would you summon this assembly of our confederacy; in which we have perhaps more cause than others to come forward, injured as we have been by the Athenians, and neglected by you. Not that we alone are interested: all Greece is concerned; many states being already reduced to subjection, and others notoriously threatened; among which some, from treaties of alliance, have especial claim to our protection. Corcyra, capable of furnishing a fleet superior to that of any republic of our confederacy, is already taken from us; and Potidæ, our most important post for holding dominion or carrying on commerce in Thrace, is at this time besieged.

Thucyd. I. 1.
c. 69. “Nor can we avoid saying that these injuries, which we have thus suffered, are in great measure to be imputed to you. After the Persian war, you permitted the Athenians to fortify their city; then to build their long walls; and still you have continued to look on, though boasting to be vindicators of the freedom of Greece, while they have deprived of freedom, not only their own, but our confederates. Even now the convention of this assembly has been with difficulty obtained; and even now we meet apparently not for the purpose which ought to be the object of our consideration. For is this a time to inquire whether we have been injured? No, rather how we shall repel injury. You have the reputation of being provident and circumspect; but facts do not justify the opinion. The Persians, we know, came against Peloponnesus from the farthest parts of the earth before you had made any adequate preparation for defence; and now you are equally remiss against the Athenians in your neighbourhood. Thus,

as the barbarian failed principally through his own misconduct, so their errors, and not your support, have enabled us hitherto to maintain ourselves against the Athenians. Let it not however be imagined that this expostulation is prompted by resentment ; we expostulate with our friends who err ; we criminate our enemies who injure us.

" But you seem unaware what kind of people the Athenians are, and how totally they differ from you. They are restless projectors, and quick to execute their projects. You are ever bent upon the preservation of what you possess ; averse to new measures, and in execution, even of those necessary, deficient. They, again, are daring above their strength, adventurous even beyond their own opinion of prudence, and full of hope in the midst of misfortune. It is your disposition always to do less than your power admits, to hesitate even when acting on the surest grounds, and to think yourselves never free from danger. They are quick, you dilatory ; they fond of roaming, you more than all others attached to your home ; they eager to make acquisitions in any distant parts ; you fearful, in seeking more, to injure what you already possess. They push victory to the utmost, and are least of all men dejected by defeat ; exposing their bodies for their country, as if they had no interest in them, yet applying their minds in the public service, as if that and their private interest were one. Disappointment of a proposed acquisition they consider as loss of what already belonged to them ; success in any pursuit they esteem only a step toward farther advantages ; and, defeated in any attempt, they turn immediately to some new project by which to make themselves amends : insomuch that, through their celerity in executing whatever they propose, they seem to have the peculiar faculty of at the same time hoping and possessing. Thus they continue ever, amid labours and dangers, enjoying nothing through sedulity to

Thucyd. I. 1.
c. 70.

acquire; esteeming that only a time of festival in which they are prosecuting their projects; and holding rest as a greater evil than the most laborious business. To sum up their character, it may be truly said, that they were born neither to enjoy quiet themselves, nor to suffer others to enjoy it.

Thucyd. 1. 1.
c. 71. “When such a commonwealth is adverse to you, Lacedæmonians, you still delay. You will consider those only as your enemies who avow hostility; thinking to preserve peace through your antiquated maxims of policy and equity, defending yourselves, but offending none: which are no longer fit for these times: It has been by other maxims, by new arts, and by a policy refined through modern experience, that Athens has risen to a greatness which now threatens us all. Let this then be the term of your dilatoriness: give at length that assistance to your allies which, by the stipulations of our confederacy, you owe them, and relieve the distressed Potidaeans. This can no longer be effectually done but by an immediate invasion of Attica; the measure necessarily to be taken, unless you would leave a friendly and kindred people a prey to your most determined enemies, and compel us, disposed by every consideration of interest, affection, and habit to maintain our connection with you, through despair to seek some new alliance. Consult then your own interest, and do not diminish that supremacy in Peloponnesus, which your forefathers have transmitted to you.”

c. 72. The Athenian ministers judged it consonant neither to the dignity of their commonwealth, nor to the commission under which they acted, to answer particularly to the charges thus urged by the deputies of the Peloponnesian confederacy before the Lacedæmonian people; yet they thought it not proper, on such an occasion, to be entirely silent. They applied therefore to the ephors for

leave to address the assembly, which was allowed¹¹, and they spoke to the following purpose : “ They considered themselves,” they said, “ not at all in presence of those who had any right to assume cognizance of the conduct of the Athenian commonwealth or of its allies ; yet as they had been so publicly witnesses to so virulent an invective against those in whose service they were commissioned, they thought it proper to admonish the assembly not to determine lightly and hastily concerning a matter of very great moment.” Having then mentioned the merit of the Athenian people with all Greece in the two Persian invasions, and the sense which the Lacedæmonians themselves at the time expressed of it, they proceeded to observe, “ That the command of the Athenian people among the Grecian states had been acquired, not by violence, but by the dereliction of the Lacedæmonians, and by the consent, and even at the solicitation, of the subordinate republics : that they had a fair interest in so glorious a possession, so honourably earned, which their reputation, not less than the advantages of command, would urge them to maintain ; and that even their just apprehensions forbade them to relinquish it, since the jealousy of the Lacedæmonians, long apparent, and now especially evident in the transaction of the present day, amply demonstrated what would be their danger in surrendering the smallest portion of their present power.” They then endeavoured to palliate, but they were indeed equally unable to deny as to justify, the general despotism of the Athenian people over their subject-states, and the particular measures of severity which had been taken against some of them. In conclusion

¹¹ Προσελθόντες δέ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐφασαν βούλευθαι καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰς τὸ πλῆθος αὐτῶν εἰπεῖν. *Cum igitur ad Lacedæmoniorum magistratus accessissent.* — This translation is justified by the context, and by other passages of the author.

Thucyd. I. 1.
c. 73.

c. 73. & 74. I

c. 75.

c. 76. & 77.

c. 78.

they asserted, that the truce was not broken by them, neither had they yet to complain that the Lacedæmonians had broken it. They exhorted therefore perseverance in peaceful measures; they claimed for their commonwealth the justice to which it was entitled by the stipulations of the existing treaty, which directed a mode of judicial proceeding for the determination of disputes that might arise; and they declared themselves, in the name of their commonwealth, ready to abide judgment accordingly. “Should the Lacedæmonians determine to refuse such justice, they submitted their cause to the gods, who had been invoked to attest the treaty, and their commonwealth would defend itself and its just command to the utmost.”

*Thucyd. 1. 1.
c. 79.* When the Athenians had concluded, the foreign

1. 5. c. 26. ministers were required to withdraw, and it remained for the Lacedæmonians to debate and to decide upon the question. Thucydides, in his exile, as himself informs us, had opportunities, not open to many foreigners, for acquiring information concerning the internal transactions of the Lacedæmonian state. The

1. 1. c. 79. greater number of speakers, as he proceeds to relate, declared their opinion that the Athenians had already broken the truce, and that war should be immediately commenced. Archidamus then came forward; the prince who above thirty years before, had deserved so well of his country by his conduct in the Helot rebellion. In advanced age now, he maintained, the historian says, the reputation of a wise and temperate man¹², and he addressed the assembly thus: “I, Lacedæmonians, have had ex-

c. 80. perience of many wars, and I see those among you, my equals in age, who will not, as happens to many through inexperience, urge war as in itself desirable, or in its conse-

¹² Ἀγῆς καὶ ξυνετὸς δοκῶν εἶναι καὶ σύρεων.

quences certain. Within Peloponnesus indeed, against bordering states, when hostilities arise, decision may be quick ; and, the forces on both sides being the same in kind, the preponderancy of one or the other may be a subject of calculation. But the war now proposed is widely different ; operations are to be carried far from our frontier, against those whose fleets command the seas, who are superior to every Grecian state in wealth, population, and forces, cavalry as well as infantry, and who besides have under their dominion many tributary allies. In our present unprepared situation, to what do we trust for success in attacking such an enemy ? To our fleet ? No ; we are too inferior. To our riches ? Far less : neither our public treasure nor our private wealth can bear any comparison with theirs. We are superior, it is said, in the force of infantry of ^{Thucyd. I. 1.} _{c. 81.} our confederacy, and we will ravage their country.

But they have large possessions far beyond the reach of your infantry, and a fleet that will come and go with the produce, undisturbed by any force you can oppose to it, while your irresistible infantry will starve amid the devastation itself has made. Instead therefore of bringing your enemy immediately to terms by such measures, I rather fear you will leave the war as an inheritance to your posterity.

“ Let it not however be imagined that I advise ^{c. 82.} to suffer tamely the oppression of our allies, or to leave designs against ourselves unnoticed till the moment of execution. Let us, on the contrary, prepare for war ; let us endeavour to extend our alliances, even among barbarous nations, if either naval or pecuniary assistance can be obtained from them ; let us also contribute liberally from our private properties to form a public fund equal to the probable need. But in the mean time let an embassy be sent to Athens ; and, if our reasonable demands are complied with, our business will thus have its best conclusion. In all events

however, till we are fully prepared for war, let their country remain unhurt. It is a pledge always ready to our hands, the value of which we should not wantonly diminish.

Thucyd. I. 1.
c. 83. “Nor let it be supposed that the delay, which I

c. 84. & 85. advise, will mark any pusillanimity. War is a business less of arms than of expense, which alone can make arms efficacious¹³; especially in the contest of a continental with a maritime people. Money therefore must in the first

place be provided. As for that slowness and dilatoriness with which you have heard yourselves

upbraided, they flow from those institutions of our ancestors, which teach us, in public as in private life, to be modest, prudent, and just. Hence it is our character to be, less than all others, either elated by prosperity or dejected by misfortune: hence we are neither to be allured by the flattery which we have been hearing, nor irritated by the reproach: hence we are at the same time warlike and circumspect; and hence we shall not be disposed to utter sounding words against our enemies, when we are unable to follow them up by deeds.

“Let us not then wander from those maxims and institutions of our forefathers, through which our state has long flourished great and free, and beyond all others glorious: nor let us hurry, in one short portion of a day, to a decision which must involve with it the lives of many individuals, the fortunes of many families, the fate of many cities, and our own glory. Other states may be under necessity of taking measures hastily: our strength gives us the option of leisure. Since then the Athenians profess themselves ready to submit the subjects of complaint to a legal decision, it appears little consonant to justice to proceed against those, as decidedly criminal, who offer themselves for trial. Let

¹³ Εστιν ὁ πίλεμος οὐχ ὅπλων τὸ πλέον, ἀλλὰ δαπάνης, δι' ἣν τὰ ὄπλα ὠφελεῖ.

your determination therefore be to send an embassy to Athens, but meanwhile to prepare for war. Thus, more than by any other measure, you will be formidable to your adversaries ; and thus you will best consult both your advantage and your honour.”

The effect, which this sensible and dispassionate discourse should have had, was overborne by the following blunt speech of the ephor Sthenelaidas : “ The verbose oratory of the Athenians I do not understand. They have been large in their own praise, but their injurious conduct toward our allies, and toward Peloponnesus, they have not denied. If their behaviour formerly against the Persians was praiseworthy, and is now against us the reverse, they deserve double punishment ; for ceasing to be meritorious and for becoming blameworthy. We have not yet changed our conduct ; and if we are wise, we shall not now overlook the wrong done to our allies, nor delay to revenge it. Others have money, and ships, and horses : we have good allies, who ought not to be abandoned to the Athenians. Nor are such disputes to be determined by words and legal process. It has not been by words that our allies have been injured. We must therefore avenge them quickly, and with our utmost force ; nor let any one persuade, that when we are injured we ought to deliberate. Those rather ought to take long time for deliberation who mean to commit injury. Let your determination therefore, Lacedæmonians, be, as becomes the dignity of Sparta, for war ; nor suffer the Athenians to increase in power, nor betray your allies, but, with the help of the gods, let us march against those who wrong us.”

Having thus spoken, Sthenelaidas proceeded, in the function of his office, to put the question to the assembly. A clamour being raised on each side, (for in the Lacedæmonian assembly votes were given by the voice, and not, as at Athens, by silently holding up hands or by

Thucyd. 1.1.
c. 86.

the perfect secrecy of a ballot,) the presiding ephor declared he could not distinguish which had the majority. Thinking therefore, as Thucydides supposes, that the necessity of manifesting more openly his party would urge every one the rather to vote for war, he put the question again thus: “Whoever is of opinion that the truce is broken, and that the Athenians have been the aggressors, let him go to that side; whoever is of a contrary opinion, to the other side.” Upon the division, a large majority appeared for the affirmative. The deputies of the allies, then called, were informed of the determination, and farther told, that it was the wish of the Lacedæmonians to have another meeting of deputies from all the states of the confederacy, who should come authorised and prepared to decide, both concerning peace and war, and how the war, if resolved upon, should be carried on. With this the congress broke up, and the deputies of the allies hastened to their several homes. The Athenian ministers waited to finish the business of their mission.

*Thucyd. 1. 1.
c. 88.* The Lacedæmonian government, the contem-

porary historian says, was now determined for war; not influenced so much by the representations of their allies, as by their own apprehensions of the growing power of the rival state. The Athenian dominion, within Greece, had indeed been greatly contracted by the conditions of the thirty years’ truce, and by the losses which led to it: but during fourteen years following, under the able administration of Pericles, it had been gaining consistency: its force

c. 122. was now so beyond that of any other single state of Greece that not even the extensive confederacy over which Lacedæmon presided was, at the instant, in condition to begin hostilities. To acquire a sanction therefore for their undertaking, which might encourage those engaged

c. 118. in it, they sent a solemn deputation to Delphi, to inquire of the god if they might hope for success.

According to report, (so Thucydides expresses himself,) the god assured them, “ That, if they carried on the war with becoming vigour, they would be victorious; and that his favour should attend them, invoked or uninvoked.

Meanwhile the Corinthians were sedulous in canvassing the several states of the confederacy separately; endeavouring to alarm their fears and excite their indignation, and to promote by every imaginable method the resolution for war. Accordingly, when the congress met again at Lacedæmon, most of the deputies were vehement in accusation of the Athenians, and in requisition of the immediate commencement of hostilities. The Corinthians, in pursuance of their former policy, reserved themselves to the last, and then spoke thus :

“ We no longer, confederates, blame the Lacedæmonians, who, having now resolved on war,^{c. 119.} have summoned this assembly to desire its concurrence in the resolution. Presiding over the confederacy, the general prosperity requires that they should pay due attention to their own particular situation and circumstances; and hence arose their past delay: while the honours we pay them, and the command with which they are invested, impose on them the duty of constantly consulting the welfare of the whole; and hence flows their present determination. It were needless, we are indeed persuaded, to admonish any of you, who have had any experience of the Athenians, how much it behoves us to be upon our guard against them; but we will observe, that it imports the people of the inland commonwealths to reflect that, unless they support the maritime states, not only they will be deprived of the many advantages which accrue, even to them, from maritime commerce, but if they look on till we are subdued, their subjection must follow. Ultimately thus we are all equally interested in the matter on which we are going to decide; differing

more in regard to the time when we may expect the evil to fall upon us, than the degree in which it will affect us.

Thucyd. I. 1.
c. 121. “ It is then to repel and to prevent injuries, and not with any ambitious view, that we are earnest for war. Our cause of complaint against the Athenians is ample : but when we have redressed our wrongs, peace will be our object. Nor have we reason to doubt of success. Our land force is greater than theirs, and in military skill we excel them ; and surely a more unanimous zeal may be expected in our confederacy than in theirs. They are strong at sea : but if we duly employ the means which we severally possess, and add the wealth which we may borrow from Delphi¹⁴ and Olympia, we can equal them even on that element. The offer of greater pay would entice the people of their alliance from their service : for it is to be remembered, that the power of Athens consists more in a purchased than a native force ; whereas ours depends less upon our riches than upon ourselves. One naval victory would therefore probably complete our business. Should that not immediately be obtained, yet their maritime skill will soon cease to give them any advantage, because ours will of course improve with increased experience. But, even without a superiority at sea, we possess abundant means to distress them ; among which we may reckon, as very important, the easy possibility of gaining their allies.

“ It is however not our purpose to persuade you that the dispute before us resembles those which, for ages, have been common within Greece, of each republic with its neighbour, of nearly equal force, concerning the limits of their respective

¹⁴ It appears from this passage and some following ones (I. 1. c. 143. and I. 2. c. 9.) that through some revolution, not particularly mentioned by Thucydides, but probably a consequence of the thirty years' truce, not only Delphi was again brought under Lacedæmonian influence, but the Phocian people were gained to the Lacedæmonian interest ; or, which would operate to the same purpose, were put under oligarchical government.

territories. On the contrary, it deserves your most serious consideration that the Athenians have attained a degree of power to enable them to contend with us altogether: and, what is disgraceful to Peloponnesus even to mention, the question is, whether we shall remain independent, or become their subjects. Our fathers were the vindicators of the freedom of Greece. We fall short indeed of their worth, if we cannot maintain our own freedom; and while we anxiously oppose the establishment of monarchy in any state, yet suffer an ambitious commonwealth to be tyrant over all.¹⁵

“ To undergo any labour and risk any danger, <sup>Thucyd. I. 1.
c. 123.</sup> in a virtuous cause, hath been transmitted to us for an hereditary rule of conduct. Ill would it become us now to deviate from it; and, so much richer and more powerful as we are than our forefathers, to lose amid abundance what they gained in penury. Let us therefore cheerfully engage in a war which the god himself hath recommended, with even a promise of his favour in it. All Greece will be with us; and right is on our side; as not only notorious facts prove, but the god has declared. Nor let there be delay; for be it remembered that the Potidaeans, Dorians, our kinsmen, are at this time besieged by an Ionian army. Let us therefore immediately take measures to reduce that proud republic, which is aiming at the tyranny of Greece; : that we may ourselves live in peace and independency, and that we may restore freedom to those Grecian states which are now so injuriously held in subjection.”

This speech concluding the debate, the question was put, and war was the determination of

¹⁵ Τύραννον δὲ ἵστην ἐγκαθεστάντας πόλιν. Thucydides afterward puts a similar expression into the mouths both of Pericles and of Cleon, when speaking to the Athenian assembly, and having in view something very different from reproach, b. 2. c. 63. and b. 3. c. 37. Τυραννίδα ἴχετε τὴν ἀρχήν.

the majority. Notwithstanding however the clamour for hastening hostilities, and notwithstanding even the danger of delay after such a resolution so publicly taken, it was presently found, so deficiently was the confederacy yet prepared, that delay was unavoidable. The leading men therefore recurred to negotiation, in which they had three distinct purposes : to induce the Athenians to suspend hostilities while their own preparations should be advancing ; to strengthen their own cause among the Grecian states, by making the Athenians the refusers of offered peace ; and to sow dissension among the Athenians themselves.

Thucyd. 1. 1.
c. 126. With these objects in view, ministers were sent to Athens, commissioned to make representations concerning a matter wholly foreign to every thing that had been yet in dispute between the two republics, and of no importance but what Grecian superstition might give. Complete atonement, it was pretended, had never been made for the sacrilege committed, near a century before, when, under the direction of the archon Megacles, the partizans of Cylon were taken from the altars to be executed. Many who now enjoyed the privileges of Athenian citizens, it was urged, stood affected by that pollution ; which, according to prevailing ideas of the age, adhered to all the descendants of the sacrilegious. Lest therefore the contamination should bring down the vengeance of the gods of Greece in some general calamity, the Lacedæmonians, as assertors of the common welfare, required that all such persons should be banished, and the pollution completely expiated. This was intended as a blow principally against Pericles, who, by his mother, was descended from Megacles : not however with the expectation that the requisition would produce his banishment ; but with the hope that, through alarm to the popular mind, some embarrassment might be created for the administration.

c. 127.

Pericles however was not at a loss for a measure to oppose to this. Two sacrilegious pollutions were recollected, in which many of the principal families of Lacedæmon were involved; the death of Pausanias who had been starved in the temple of Minerva Chalcicæca, and the execution of some Helots who had been dragged from the sanctuary of Neptune on mount Tænarus. The latter was esteemed a profanation so grossly impious that popular superstition attributed to it that tremendous calamity the great earthquake of Sparta. It was therefore required of the Lacedæmonian government to set the example of regard for the welfare of Greece, and respect for the gods its protectors, by removing all those who were contaminated through either of those sacrileges. With an answer to this purpose, the Lacedæmonian ministers returned to Sparta.

A second embassy arrived at Athens soon after, very differently instructed. As preliminaries to a general peace, these ministers urged that the siege of Potidæa ought to be raised, and Ægina restored to independency; but chiefly they insisted, that the prohibitory decree against Megara should be revoked; and, that only being done, they pledged themselves that Lacedæmon would not commence hostilities. The two first propositions, little insisted on, were with little ceremony rejected. To the third it was answered, “That the Megarians had made themselves obnoxious to gods and men by cultivating the extralimital land between the boundaries of Attica and Megaris, which was consecrated to the Eleusinian goddesses¹⁶; and that they received and encouraged Athenian runaway slaves.” With this answer the second embassy

¹⁶ Ἐπικαλοῦντες ἐπεργασίαν τοῖς Μεγαρεῦσι τῆς γῆς τῆς λεῖας καὶ τῆς ἀσείστου. *Megarensibus criminis dantes quod sacrum nullisque limitibus finitum solum colerent.* — *Land that was sacred; land not marked out for culture.* Smith. — These interpretations are totally unsatisfactory. The scholiast, who has not equally evaded the difficulty, seems to warrant the sense ventured in the text.

Thucyd. 1. 1.
c. 139.

returned to Sparta. Soon after arrived a third, of three members, Rhamphias, Melesippus, and Agesander; probably men of more eminence than the former ministers, Thucydides distinguishing only these by name. In their representations they noticed none of the requisitions of their predecessors, but they demanded, as the one condition of peace, that all Grecian states held in subjection by Athens be restored to independency.

An assembly of the people was then convened, and it was proposed to consider of a decisive and final answer. Many spoke, some urging war, some contending for peace, and particularly insisting that the offensive decree against Megara ought not to remain an obstacle. At length Pericles ascending the bema declared himself thus :

Thucyd. 1.1.
c. 440. “ My opinion, Athenians, has been always, that we ought not to submit to the Peloponnesians, and it remains the same: sensible as I am that men seldom support a war throughout with the same animation with which they ordinarily begin it, but that, in disasters, even such as must in the course of things be expected, their spirits droop, and their opinions change. Beforehand therefore I claim, from those who agree with me in opinion now, to concur with me in effort whenever misfortune may arise; or else at once to renounce all pretension to merit, should success attend our endeavours.

“ With regard to the grounds of my opinion, the insidious designs of the Lacedæmonians against this commonwealth have long been obvious, and are now become more than ever manifest. For, notwithstanding that the articles of the existing treaty point out the manner in which disputes between the two states should be adjusted, declaring that in the mean time each party should hold what it possesses, yet not only they have not desired such adjustment, but they refuse to admit it. They are, in short, evidently enough

determined to support their allegations against us, not by argument, but by arms: they come to us, not accusing, but commanding: they require imperiously, that the siege of Potidæa shall be raised; that Ægina shall be independent; that the decree against Megara shall be annulled; and, now at last, that we shall renounce our command over all Greecian states. Let it not be imagined that even the Megarian decree is too light a matter to be supported as a cause for war. That comparatively little matter has been proposed merely to try your steadiness. Were you to yield that point, a greater trial would quickly be imposed upon you: resisting that, you give them to understand that they must treat with you as equals, not command you as subjects.

“ It behoves you therefore at once to resolve, either to submit to a state of dependency, without uselessly incurring the unavoidable evils of resistance, or, what appears to me far preferable, to take arms with a determination to yield to no command, whether concerning a matter in itself of great or of little moment, nor at any rate to hold what you possess in fear and under control. For in the moment in which you give up your right of judgment, and yield obedience to a command, however unimportant the object of that command, your subjection is decided.

“ If then we cast our view upon the means of each party, we shall find ours not the unfavourable prospect. The funds of the Peloponnesians must be drawn from the produce of Peloponnesus: for they have no foreign dependencies capable of affording considerable supplies; and in Peloponnesus neither private nor public wealth abounds.¹⁷ In protracted war, and in maritime war, they are equally unexperienced; for their

¹⁷ We find this observation repeated more than once in the speeches reported by Thucydides, without any exception for the Corinthians, who were commercial and rich, and had colonies: but their wealth bore but small proportion either to the resources of Athens, or to the wants of Peloponnesus.

Thucyd. I. 1.
c. 141.

poverty has always disabled them for both. They cannot equip fleets ; nor can they send armies often, or maintain them long from home. For, through the scantiness of their public revenue, every man must subsist on service from his private means ; and, by long absence from their domestic affairs, even those means must be ruined. A superfluity of wealth alone, and not the strained contributions of a people barely above want, can support lengthened and distant hostilities. Such people are commonly readier to make war with their persons than with their purses : they hope that those will finally escape ; but these may be completely drained and the business yet unfinished. The Peloponnesians indeed, with their allies, for a single battle might be equal to all the rest of Greece. But for protracted war, beside their want of money, which is their great and insuperable deficiency, wanting one common administration, each state having its equal voice for the decision of measures, and each its separate interest¹⁸, each anxious for its own particular concerns, the general good will be sometimes thwarted, often neglected, and no great design can be steadily pursued.

Thucyd. 1. 1. “ You need therefore neither fear that posts
c. 142. will be occupied and fortified within your coun-

try, with which some would alarm you, nor that a formidable navy can be raised against you. Since the Persian war, now above fifty years, you have been assiduously applying to naval affairs, and your proficiency is still far below per-
fection. Naval science, and the skill of experienced seamen, are not to be acquired by a people when they please, and in

c. 143. moments of leisure ; on the contrary, they require

practice to the exclusion of almost all leisure. Nor, should the Peloponnesians seize the Olympic or Delphian treasures, will even that avail them, to the degree that

¹⁸ Ισόψηφοι δύτες, καὶ οὐχ ὁμόφυλοι.

some seem to suppose. They cannot, with these, form naval commanders and seamen, such as we possess among our own citizens more and abler than all Greece besides: nor is it to be supposed that the seamen of our allies, for a temporary increase of pay, will banish themselves from their country, and join the party which has the worst prospect of final success.

“ Such are the deficiencies under which the Peloponnesians labour, while we not only are free from these, but possess advantages peculiar to ourselves. If they are strong enough to invade our country by land, we are equally able to harass them by sea; and should we waste but a small part of Peloponnesus, and they even the whole of Attica, the distress would be far greater to them than to us: for they have no other country whence to obtain supplies; while we have our choice among islands and continents. The command of the sea is indeed a most important possession. Consider then: were we islanders, who would be so secure against all hostile attempts? What therefore should be now our aim, but to put ourselves as nearly as possible into the situation of islanders? Our lands and their appurtenances within Attica should be put out of consideration: no vain attempt should be made to protect them against the superior land force of the enemy: our whole attention should be directed to the safety of the city and the command of the sea. Could we gain a battle, fresh and perhaps greater forces would be brought against us. But should we lose one, the revolt of our allies, the sources of our wealth and strength, would follow; for they will no longer rest under their present subjection than while we have power to compel them. Not the loss of lands and houses therefore, but the loss of valuable lives, whenever it may happen, is to be deplored; for lands cannot produce men; but let us keep ourselves strong in men, and we shall not

want for lands. If therefore I thought I could persuade you, I would propose that you should yourselves go forth and waste Attica; to show the Peloponnesians how vain is their expectation, that the fear of such an evil may induce you to surrender your independency.

Thucyd. i. 1. c. 144. “I have indeed many other grounds for clear

hope of success, provided our own impatience and rashness, and the wild desire of conquest, when defence should be our object, injure us not more than the strength or policy of our enemies. On these topics however admonition may better be reserved for the circumstances when they arise. The answer now to be returned to Lacedæmon should be this: ‘Our ports and markets shall be open to the Megarians, provided the Lacedæmonians will abrogate their prohibitions of the residence of strangers within their territory, as far as regards us and our allies: for the treaty of truce leaves these matters equally open to both parties.¹⁹ We will give independency to those states of our alliance, which were independent when the truce was concluded, whenever the Lacedæmonians will allow to the states of their alliance free agency in whatever concerns their several governments, and will no longer enforce among them a constitution and a mode of administration, which under the show of independency keep them in effectual subjection to Lacedæmon.²⁰ Finally, we are ready to submit any dis-

¹⁹ The rough manner in which the Lacedæmonians executed their decrees for the expulsion of strangers, is noticed by Aristophanes in his comedy of the Birds:

Meton. Τί δ' ἔστι δειγόν; Pisthetærus. "Οὐαὶ εἰ, Λακεδαιμονοι,
Ξενηλαστοῦνται, καὶ χειρίγυροι τίνες
Πληγαὶ συχναὶ πατ' ἔστιν. — v. 1014.

Where it seems also implied that Lacedæmon afforded temptation for strangers, to go thither, probably for gain by sale or exchange of commodities. In the difficulties made for commerce by the Lacedæmonian laws, especially the prohibition of money, the trader would always have advantage over the exchanger, not a professional trader.

²⁰ Οταν κάκινοι ταῖς ἱερᾶς ἀποδῆσι πόλεσι μὴ σφίσι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις

puted points to a judicial determination according to the terms of the treaty; and we will not begin war, but we will defend ourselves to the utmost.' Such an answer will be just, will be honourable, will be consonant to the renown and to the wisdom of our ancestors, who raised this empire, which we ought not to transmit diminished to our posterity."

The assembly assented to the opinion of Pericles, and an answer was accordingly delivered to the Lacedæmonian ambassadors nearly in the terms of his speech ; concluding with the declaration, " That the Athenian commonwealth would obey the commands of no power upon earth, but would readily abide the event of a judicial determination, conducted upon a footing of equality between the parties, in the mode directed by the existing treaty."²¹

With this answer the Lacedæmonians returned home, and no more embassies were sent. Hitherto the people of the two states had communicated, as in peace, without the intervention of a herald, though not without caution and suspicion : for, since the affairs of Corcyra and Potidæa, the truce was considered on both sides as broken, and war as impending. But now, though no hostilities immediately ensued, yet communication was ventured on neither side without the same formalities as if war had been declared.

ἐπιτηδίας αὐτονομεῖσθαι, κ. τ. λ. To turn this into modern language, or perhaps into any language, long circumlocution is necessary.

²¹ We want information from Thucydides what that *Δίκη κατὰ τὰς ξυρίζας*, which he so repeatedly mentions, was to have been.

Thucyd. 1. 1.
c. 145.

1. 2. c. 1.

SECTION VI.

Attempt of the Thebans against Platæa.

Herodot. 1. 6.
c. 108.
Thucyd. 1. 2.
c. 5.

WHILE want of preparation still withheld the Peloponnesians, the Thebans, judging war to be now unavoidable, thought the moment of suspense advantageous for an attempt toward the more complete establishment of their own sovereignty over Bœotia : Lacedæmon must favour them ; Athens would fear to attack them.

The little town of Platæa, with a territory of scarcely half a dozen miles square, utterly unable by its own strength to subsist in independency, nevertheless, for near a century, Herodot. ut sup. Thucyd. 1. 3. c. 55. had been resolutely resisting all control from Thebes, whence it was less than nine miles distant. When, before the Persian war, Cleomenes king of Sparta was with an army in the neighbourhood, the Platæans, to obtain the protection, had offered to put themselves under the dominion, of Lacedæmon. The answer, which, with his usual expressive simplicity, Herodotus attributes to the Lacedæmonians upon the occasion, strongly paints the state of Greece : “ We,” they said, “ live afar off, and ours would be a cold kind of assistance ²²; for you might be overpowered and sold for slaves, before any intelligence about you could reach us. We recommend to you therefore rather to put yourselves under the dominion of Athens ²³, a bordering state, and able to protect you.” This advice, adds the historian, they gave, not through any good-will to the Platæans, but with a view to create embarrassment for the Athenians by embroiling them with the Bœotians. The Platæans however followed the advice. The solemnity of

²² Τοιῆς τις γίνεται ἀν ἐπικουρεῖν φυχεῖ.

²³ The expression of Herodotus is very strong, Δοῦται ὑμίας αὐτοὺς, to give yourselves.

the sacrifice to the twelve gods being chosen for the occasion, ambassadors were sent to Athens, but in the habit and character of suppliants. Placing themselves at the altar, according to the customary forms of supplication, these ministers thence urged their petition, “ That their commonwealth might be taken under the sovereignty and protection of Athens.”²⁴ The Athenian people acceded to the humble request.

The Thebans, upon the first intelligence of this transaction, marched against Platæa. An Athenian army moved at the same time to protect the new dependency of the commonwealth. The Corinthians however interfering, it was agreed to submit the matter to their arbitration. Actuated apparently by a spirit of justice and of liberty, and desirous to give as great extent as the nature of things would admit to that doubtful independency which could be enjoyed by the smaller Grecian commonwealths, the Corinthians decided, “ That the Thebans were entitled to no sovereignty over any towns of Bœotia whose people chose to renounce the advantages of that Bœotian confederacy of which the Thebans had assumed the lead.” On this the Athenians moved homeward. The Thebans, irritated by the decision which the presence of the Athenian force had encouraged, followed and attacked it. Being defeated, the Athenians then took upon themselves to prescribe terms. They extended the limits fixed by the Corinthians for the Platæan territory; took the neighbouring little town of Hysiæ also under their protection; and, to provide better security for the Platæan and Hysian lands, declared the river Asopus their boundary against the Thebaid.

Thenceforward Platæa, more than ever averse to Thebes, became warm in political attachment to Athens. The whole force of the little commonwealth was exerted on the glorious day of Marathon, in the honour of which the

²⁴ Ἐδίδοσαν σφίς αὐτούς.

Platæans alone partook with the Athenians. In the not less memorable action of Salamis, though an inland people, they had their share aboard the Athenian fleet; and they had distinguished themselves, under the command of Aristides, in that great and decisive battle, fought near their town, which, beyond all other circumstances, hath given celebrity to its name. Under the patronage of Athens democracy of course prevailed at Platæa. But as Athens itself was not without an aristocratical party, so there were in Platæa persons to whom democratical government, sometimes perhaps partially oppressive, and always an obstacle to their ambition, would be dissatisfactory. Their cause being hopeless under the dominion of Athens, Thebes remained the protecting power to which they looked for an alteration in their favour.

*Thucyd. 1. 2.
c. 2.* In these circumstances a plot was concerted

between Naucleides, the leading man of the aristocratical Platæans, and Eurymachus, who held the greatest influence in Thebes. The official directors of the Theban government were gained to it; and, in the fifteenth year of the thirty years' truce, when Chrysis was in the forty-eighth year of her priesthood at Argos, Ænesias ephor at Sparta, and two months were yet wanting to complete the archonship of Pythodorus at Athens, in the sixth month after the battle of Potidaea, the spring then beginning (thus, in the want of a readier and more perfect method, Thucydides has

B. C. 431.
Ol. 87. 4.
7th May,
Ann. Thu.
but more
likely 8th
April. 25

marked the date), an armed body, of somewhat more than three hundred Thebans, reached Platæa about the first sleep. The Bœotarchs Pythangelus and Diemporus commanded, and

²⁵ Eighty days, according to Thucydides (b. 2 c. 19.), after the corn of Attica was nearly ripe. Eighty days from the eighth of April would be the twenty-seventh of June, rather a late harvest season in Attica. Eighty days after the seventh of May, namely the twenty-sixth of July, wheat is often ripe in the south of England.

they were accompanied by Eurymachus. In so small a city, which scarcely had a public revenue, no guard was maintained: the gates only for security were shut at night. These were now opened by the party friendly to the enterprise, and the Thebans entered unresisted. Naclides and the Platæans about him, in the too commonly atrocious spirit of Greek sedition, would have completed the business by the immediate massacre of the principal of their fellow-townersmen of the opposite party. But Eurymachus and the Bœotarchs, not equally stimulated by the passions either of fear or resentment, refused concurrence in the proposal. Reckoning themselves already masters of the place, and depending upon the ready support of a body of troops, which was to follow from Thebes, they lodged their arms in the agora; and sending heralds around the town, with a conciliating proclamation, they invited all, who were disposed to accede to the confederacy of the Bœotian people, to come and place their arms by theirs.

The Platæans, hastily and in great alarm assembling, rejoiced, in the moment, on finding a disposition so far friendly among those who seemed to have them, their families, and their whole state completely at mercy. They showed therefore a ready disposition to accede to the terms proposed. But in the course of the ensuing communication, having opportunity to discover, amid the darkness, how few the Thebans were, they began to observe to one another that they were abundantly able to overpower those who had thus insidiously surprised them; and the resolution was taken to make the attempt. That they might not be noticed in preparation, they broke ways through the partitions of houses, and they formed a barricade of carts and waggons, from behind which they might make their assault. Waiting then till just before daybreak, while darkness might yet at the same time give them the

Thucyd. I. 2.
c. 3.

greater advantage from their intimate knowledge of the place, and increase the alarm and uncertainty of the enemy, they began the attack. Twice or thrice they were repulsed; but they returned to the charge, the women and slaves at the same time throwing stones and tiles from the house-tops, with an unceasing clamour which enhanced the confusion, while a heavy rain made the obscurity more complete. The Thebans, unable to hear commands or see commanders, and thus incapable of acting in concert, at length fled, each as he could find a passage, in darkness and in dirt, mostly ignorant of the ways, while their pursuers were acquainted with every turn. A Platæan had shut the gate of the town by which they had entered, and which alone had been open; and, for want of other means at hand, fastened it by thrusting the head of a javelin into the catch of the lock. Checked thus in their hope of flight, some of the Thebans mounted the rampart, and throwing themselves down on the outside mostly perished: some, finding a gate unguarded, obtained an axe from a woman, with which they forced the lock, and a few thus escaped. Many were killed, scattered about the town; but the greater part, who had kept more in a body, entered a large building adjoining the rampart, whose door, which stood open, they mistook for the town-gate. This being observed by the Platæans, measures were immediately taken to confine them there. It was then proposed to set fire to the building and burn those in it; but, offering to surrender, they were received as prisoners at discretion; and shortly after, all the rest, who remained alive within the town, came and delivered their arms.

Thucyd. I. 2.
c. 5.

The march of the troops which should have supported the enterprise had been retarded by the rain. Arriving at the river Asopus, they found it swelled so as to be not without difficulty forded: and before they could reach Platæa, the miscarriage of those who had en-

tered the place was complete. As soon as they were aware of this, the resource they resolved upon was to seize all the people they could find in the villages and fields as hostages for the security of their own people, prisoners in Platæa, and also to take all the moveable property. The Platæans, expecting such a measure, sent a herald, threatening immediate death to the prisoners if any farther attempt were made against the persons or effects of the people of Platæa, but promising to restore them if the Thebans would immediately quit their territory. The agreement was presently made and ratified by oath, and the Theban army retired accordingly. Such, says Thucydides, is the Theban account : but the Platæans deny that any oaths passed, and that any promise was given for the restoration of the prisoners, except on condition that a treaty should be concluded between the two states. The Platæans, however, allowed no opportunity for farther treaty. Hastening the removal of their effects from the country within their fortifications, they put to death all their prisoners, to the number of a hundred and eighty, among whom was Eurymachus, the author of the enterprise.

Such was the inauspicious prelude to the Peloponnesian war. The execution of the unhappy prisoners, supposing no compact to forbid it, seems indeed to have been in strict conformity to what may be called the national law of the Greeks ; upon the principle on which spies, traitors, and pirates are liable to capital punishment by the law of nations in modern Europe. The Grecian law of humanity then was not so extravagantly violated but that, through the intervention of heralds, the bodies were restored ^{Thucyd. I. 2.} _{c. 6.} for burial. But the Platæans, aware that the Thebans would feel upon the occasion, and perhaps reason, differently from themselves, prepared for resisting the revenge to be expected. Immediately upon discovery that

the town was surprised, a messenger had been dispatched to Athens with the intelligence ; and as soon as the Thebans were made prisoners another was sent. On receiving the first news the Athenian administration issued orders for seizing all Bœotians within Attica : in return to the second, directions were sent to keep the prisoners made in Platæa in safe custody, till the Athenian government should determine what farther was to be done. Unfortunately, such was the inconsiderate haste of the Platæans, the fatal execution was completed before the messenger with this order arrived. So severe a measure, even supposing no breach of faith, plighted or implied, would, by its operation upon the passions, preclude negotiation. An Athenian army was therefore sent with a convoy of provisions to Platæa ; a small body was left to strengthen the place ; and the women, children, and whatever else would be useless in a siege, were brought away.

CHAPTER XIV.

OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, FROM ITS COMMENCEMENT
TO THE DEATH OF PERICLES, WITH A SUMMARY VIEW
OF THE HISTORY OF THRACE.

SECTION I.

State of the Athenian and Peloponnesian Confederacies. — Invasion and Ravage of Attica by the Peloponnesians. — Operations of the Athenian Fleet in the Western Seas under Carcinus. — Gallant Action of the Spartan Brasidas. — Ravage of the Peloponnesian Coast, and Acquisition of Cephallenia to the Athenian Confederacy. — Operations of the Athenian Fleet in the Eastern Seas under Cleopompus. — Measures for the Security of Athens. — Remarkable Decree. — Extermination of the Æginetans. — Invasion and Ravage of Megaris by the Athenians.

THIS unfortunate transaction between two inferior republics, which no prudence in the leading states could prevent or foresee, made accommodation more than ever impracticable; and both parties prepared for hostilities with the most serious diligence. At this time, says Thucydides, who was a living witness, <sup>Thucyd. i. 2.
c. 7.</sup> Greece abounded with youth, through inexperience ardent for war, while, among those of more sober age, many things contributed to stimulate ambition, or excite apprehension. Many oracular responses were circulated, many signs and wonders were reported; and some phenomena really occurred, of a kind to affect the imaginations of men in a superstitious age; to raise hope or inspire alarm. Among these, what most engaged attention was an earthquake that shook the sacred island of Delos; which never before, within

the reach of tradition, had been so affected. Amid this universal irritation of men's minds, a very general disposition prevailed, so the candid Athenian in the most explicit terms avows, to favour the Lacedæmonian cause, as the cause of liberty and independency; while animosity and indignation were the sentiments excited by that arbitrary and oppressive command which a large portion of the Grecian people experienced, and the rest dreaded, from the sovereign Many of Athens.

The two confederacies, now upon the point of engaging in war, were very differently composed, but the force of the Greek nation was very equally divided between them. With the Lacedæmonians all the Peloponnesian states joined, except the Argives, who remained neuter, and the Achæans;

Thucyd. 1. 2.
c. 9. of whom the Pellenians only took part in the beginning. Of northern Greece, the Megarians, Bœotians, Locrians, Phocians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians joined the Peloponnesian alliance. The navy was to be formed by the Lacedæmonians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Megarians, Ambraciots, and Leucadians. The Bœotians, Phocians, and Locrians furnished cavalry; the other states infantry only; their mountainous territories being mostly ill suited to either the breeding of horses or action with them. It was proposed to raise no less than five hundred trireme galleys within the confederacy; its proportion being assessed upon every maritime state; and contributions in money were required from all. Ministers were sent to endeavour to form alliances among foreign nations; and the great king, as the king of Persia

Ibid.
Diiod. 1. 12.
c. 41. was called, or oftener simply the King, was not neglected; but for external assistance the principal expectation was from the Italian and Sicilian Greeks, who possessed considerable maritime force, and mostly favoured the Peloponnesian interest.

Athens had few allies, properly so called. On the continent of Greece the principal were the Thessalians and the Acarnanians; the former little engaged by interest or inclination, but bound by a treaty of long standing: most of the Acarnanian towns, though some were adverse, joined with more zeal in the Athenian cause. The Plataeans are besides named, and the Messenians of Naupactus: the republic of the former however, the mere garrison of their town excepted, existing only within the walls of Athens: and that of the latter holding means to exist only under Athenian protection. Of the islands, Corcyra, Zacynthus, Chios, and Lesbos are alone to be properly reckoned among the allies of Athens. Chios and the several republics of Lesbos had been still treated with some respect by the Athenian government, as independent states; and they still possessed their own fleets. All the other islands of the Ægean sea, except the Lacedæmonian colonies of Melos and Thera, all the numerous and wealthy Grecian cities of Asia Minor, the Hellespont, and Thrace, were tributary subjects of the Athenian people; not allowed to possess ships of war, but dependent upon Athens for protection, and liable to every kind and degree of control from the people of that imperial state.

News of the transactions at Platæa, arriving at Lacedæmon, hastened the measure, before in some degree resolved upon, to invade Attica. Summonses were sent through the confederacy, in pursuance of which two-thirds of the whole land force of the Peloponnesian states met the Lacedæmonian army, on an appointed day, at the Corinthian isthmus. The command-in-chief was not denied to the venerable king Archidamus, notwithstanding his known disapprobation of the war, nor did he scruple, in that command, to show his steadiness in the principles he had always professed. Before he would lead his forces out

Thucyd. 1. 2.
c. 22.

c. 9.

c. 10.

of Peloponnesus he sent a herald, to make one more trial whether the threatening storm, now ready to burst, might have produced any disposition in the Athenians to relax. Thucydides has left no room to doubt either that his purpose was liberal and generous, or that to guide the counsels of the confederacy in the way of liberality and generosity, the way which the common good of Greece required, and the good of Lacedæmon with all Peloponnesus, as inseparable from the common good of Greece, required, his influence was very deficient. Answer was returned, probably under direction of Pericles, importating that, if the Peloponnesians would communicate with the Athenians, they must withdraw their army, and send the troops of the several states to their respective homes. The Lacedæmonian herald, charged with the communication, was required to leave Athens the same day, and, for his security, was conducted by a guard to the Attic border. Archidamus then proceeded on his march. The Thebans, sending a part of their force to waste the Platæan lands, joined him in the Megarian territory with the remainder.

Thucyd. 1. 2.
c. 13. While the Peloponnesian troops were assembling, Pericles had been engaged in the arduous office of preparing the minds of the Athenian people for what he foresaw would follow; exerting himself to obviate the clamours of faction, to calm the discontent which would arise from the unavoidable calamities of a defensive war, and lessen the jealousies to which his own situation of first minister of the commonwealth would now more than ever expose him. According to the ordinary military establishment of Athens, he had been elected with nine colleagues, to command the Athenian forces. But, since the first Persian invasion, the practice seems to have gained to appoint, by popular election, one of the ten commander-in-chief, with the title of general of the commonwealth, and

with the sole power to convoke, at his discretion, extraordinary assemblies of the people. Pericles was now so elected. He had always lived in habits of friendship with the Spartan king Archidamus; engaged with him in the league of hospitality, deemed sacred. Possibly Archidamus, amid the general ravage of Attica, might, in kindness to Pericles, procure favour to his estates: possibly, to excite envy and jealousy against him, the Lacedæmonians most hostile to him might procure ostentation of such favour toward him. In the assembly of the people Pericles declared his apprehension of this; adding that, if any of his lands should be more spared than those around them, they should be no longer his own but the public property. At the same time he took opportunity for repeating his exhortation to the people, to disregard the waste of their possessions in Attica, to avoid at any rate a general engagement by land, and give their utmost attention to their navy. This alone, he said, could maintain their dominion over their invaluable transmarine possessions and dependencies, and only those could insure them that final success, which superiority of revenue, under the direction of wise counsels, must always give. He proceeded then to a display of the means which the commonwealth possessed. The annual tribute from transmarine dependencies, exclusively of other sources of revenue, he observed, amounted now to six hundred talents, about one hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling. But there were actually in the treasury, in coined money, no less than six thousand talents, or one million five hundred thousand pounds sterling. The uncoined gold and silver which might be employed, should the necessities of the commonwealth require, offerings public and private, sacred vases used in processions and public festivals, Persian spoils, and a variety of smaller articles, would amount to not less than five hundred talents. Besides all this, the

pure gold about the single statue of Minerva in the acropolis was of the weight of forty talents ; precisely, according to Arbuthnot, a ton avoirdupois, in value about a hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling ; and this quantity had been so adapted by Phidias that the whole might be taken off for use without injury to the statue, and replaced if returning public wealth in settled peace might afford means. The quantity of gold, to be so employed, may seem enormous. But when gold was amassed, means to make interest of it were not, in those days, ready ; and to secure it against democratical extravagance, for a resource in calamity, no method was so effectual as dedicating it in a temple.

The military force of the commonwealth was at the same time formidable. The native heavy-armed foot were no less than twenty-nine thousand men. Sixteen thousand of these sufficed for guards and garrisons ; and the eldest and the youngest of the citizens were competent for that service ; so that there remained thirteen thousand, the flower of the Athenian youth, to be employed in annoying the enemy wherever opportunity might offer. The cavalry, including the horse-bowmen, were twelve hundred ; the foot-bowmen were sixteen hundred ; and the whole native force of the commonwealth thus amounted to near thirty-two thousand men, exclusively of the numerous light-armed slaves always attendant upon Grecian armies. What should be added for the forces which might be raised among the allies and subjects of the state no historian has informed us. The fleet consisting of three hundred trireme galleys, the crews would be more than fifty thousand men. How far slaves were employed, and how far the citizens of subject states, we have no

Thucyd. I. 6.
c. 91. & al.

precise information. But every Athenian was more or less a seaman : even the heavy-armed sometimes worked at the oar ; and, upon occasion, all the

seaman equally served by land. The mere sailor was commonly of the lowest order of citizens, carried only light armour, and was esteemed of inferior military rank to the heavy-armed, and perhaps to the middle-armed soldier.

Xen. Hel. l. 1.
c. 2. s. 1, 2.
Thucyd. l. 2.
c. 14.

Persuaded, says Thucydides, by these, and other arguments which Pericles was accustomed to urge, the Attic people applied themselves to the ungrateful task of stripping their own country, and fixing themselves with their families within that space, ample of its kind, which the walls surrounding Athens, and connecting it with its ports, inclosed. All their furniture they brought with them; and many even the frames of their houses; valuable in a country where the materials for building were wood and marble; the former scarce; the latter, though plentiful, yet in workmanship costly. Their cattle, great and small, and attending slaves, were transported to the neighbouring islands, principally to Eubœa. This measure however was not resolved on, even upon conviction of the pressure of necessity, without extreme reluctance; for, continues the contemporary writer, the Attic people were, beyond all other Greeks, attached to their country possessions and a country life. The ravages of the Persian war were now repaired, with large improvement upon the ancient state of things; most of the houses were newly built; some lately completed, and elegantly and expensively furnished, so that, according to Isocrates, they were superior to the houses in the city. The temples also in the several borough towns, destroyed in the Persian war, had been zealously restored; and the people were warmly attached to those which they esteemed their own inherited religious rites, peculiar to that town which had been the town of their ancestors, before Theseus concentrated the religion, government, and jurisprudence of the country in Athens.

Isocr. Areop.
p. 130. t. 2.

Beside the prejudices thus to be violated and imaginary evils to be supported, the real inconveniences, unavoidably attending the measure, were great. While their improvements were to be demolished, and the revenues from their estates to cease, only a few of the more opulent could obtain houses for the habitation of their families ; and but a small proportion could be received into those of their friends. The numerous temples of Athens afforded an incommodeous shelter to many. All were occupied, excepting those within the citadel, and the magnificent and highly venerated Eleusinum, the fane of the mysterious Ceres, with one or two others, which were firmly locked. Even the superstition which had taught to dread the roof of the temple called the Pelasgic, as under a curse from the deity, yielded to the pressing necessity of the times. Those who, in the actual circumstances, took the lead in public business, had certainly a difficult and hazardous office : it was of urgent necessity for them to be cautious of pressing upon a larger portion of the sovereign multitude in favour of a smaller ; and hence perhaps the distressed individuals from the country were not objects, as apparently they ought to have been, of the care of government, but were left almost entirely to their own means and their own discretion. When the temples were all occupied, the turrets of the city walls were resorted to for private residence. But neither buildings nor space within the city sufficed for the multitude. Many families formed for themselves the best shelter they were able, on the vacant ground inclosed within the long walls and about the port of Piræus. In this space, had the administration been provided with power to use the foresight and diligence which it seems to have possessed, in the manner best for the public, all perhaps might have been tolerably accommodated. Measures against the enemy showed ability and energy. The most effectual steps were taken for applying

the force of the allies; and a fleet of a hundred triremes was prepared for an expedition against Peloponnesus.

The Peloponnesian army had already entered Attica by the way of Cœnoe, and laid siege to that town, critically situated for the defence of the border against Bœotia, and therefore strongly fortified and well provided. The reluctance of the Athenians to abandon their estates had been such that much of their effects might have been the prey of the invaders, if the delay occasioned by the siege of Cœnoe had not given opportunity to complete the removal. Complaint was in consequence loud against Archidamus. That worthy prince had scarcely now given up all hope that some disposition to concession on the part of the Athenians might afford opportunity for opening a treaty, and saving Greece from the ruin threatened by the exertion of its whole force so equally divided against itself. The siege was pressed for several days, with the machines then in use, and in all the known ways of attack upon fortifications¹, yet little progress was made. Discontent then spreading and growing more vehement through the army, and no symptom appearing of a disposition among the Athenians to treat, Archidamus yielded to the wishes of his troops. About eighty days after the attempt of the Thebans upon Platæa, when the corn was nearly ripe, raising the siege of Cœnoe, he advanced into Attica with an army, according to Plutarch, of sixty thousand men. The Eleusinian and Thriplut. vit. Peric. asian plains were immediately ravaged: a body of Athenian horse was defeated near Rhiti; and the army, keeping mount Ægaleon on the right, passed by the way of Cecropia to Acharnæ, the largest and richest borough of Attica, situate within eight miles of Athens.

¹ Μηχανᾶς τε καὶ ἄλλων τείστω.

Thucyd. i. 2.
c. 18.

c. 19.

26th June.

Plut. vit. Peric.

<sup>Thucyd. 1. 2.
c. 20.</sup> Archidamus had expected that the Athenian people, strong in numbers, naturally high-spirited and impatient, and prepared for war as they had never been before, would not have borne, without opposition, the waste of the Eleusinian and Thriasian lands; but he depended still more upon the ruin now hanging over Acharnæ. The people of that borough formed no fewer than three thousand heavy-armed foot; they could not but have great weight in the Athenian assembly; and Archidamus thought it probable that their impatience, under the destruction of their property, would influence the whole people to require that they should be led out to battle: or otherwise, that when the Acharnians saw their own estates ruined, they would with little zeal engage in the defence of those of others, and thus he might proceed with more security to ravage all the rest of the country. What passed in Athens proved the

^{c. 21.} justness of his judgment. From the time of the

Persian war, remembered only by a few of the oldest citizens, Attica had been exempt from that evil, so ordinary in many parts of Greece, the ravage of an enemy. About fourteen years before the Eleusinian and Thriasian plains had been plundered by the army under Plistoanax; and so much was supported now as matter to be expected. But when the Peloponnesians encamped within sight of Athens, and the rich Acharnian vale was to be the next object of devastation, the whole city was in uproar. Some were vehement for marching out to defend their property; others as warmly opposed a measure which would so endanger the commonwealth; but on all sides there was an outcry against Pericles; who, whether as advising the war, or refusing the means of engaging the enemy, was reproached as the principal author of the present evils.

^{c. 22.} Amid all the vehemence of clamour, the intrigues of faction, and the threats of popular ani-

mosity, Pericles remained immoveable. Leaving the ferment to evaporate in altercation among individuals, he would convene no assembly; he would hold no council; but while he gave his own attention, he directed also that of others as much as possible to what, in any moment of sober reflection, all would admit to be of the first importance, the guard of the city and the preservation of good order. Meantime he was frequently sending out parties of cavalry to cut off stragglers and prevent the extension of ravage to any distance from the Peloponnesian camp. Expectation thus raised, and an interest created for the public mind, popular passion was diverted, popular combination dissipated, and ruinous resolutions were prevented. In an action with the Bœotian horse the Athenian and Thessalian had the advantage, till a body of Peloponnesian foot coming up compelled them to retreat. They so far however vindicated the honour of their arms as to carry off their dead, without a truce, which the defeated usually solicited for the purpose; and it was not till the next day that the Peloponnesians, in claim of victory, erected a trophy on the field. After some time, provisions beginning to fail in the Peloponnesian camp, and every provocation appearing ineffectual against the resolution of the Athenians not to risk a general engagement, the army moved from Acharnæ. Ravaging the lands between the mountains Parnes and Brilessus, they proceeded by Oropus, whose territory they also ravaged, into Bœotia, and returning into Peloponnesus, dispersed to their several homes.

While, in this first summer of the war, Attica so suffered, a fleet of a hundred trireme galleys, with a thousand heavy foot and four hundred bowmen, under three commanders, Carcinus, Proteas, and Socrates son of Antigenes, was sent to retaliate devastation upon Peloponnesus. Fifty galleys from Corcyra, and a few from some of the other allies, joined

<sup>Thucyd. I. 2.
c. 25.</sup> this armament. A descent was made first on the Messenian coast, and the troops marched toward Methone; a town then ill fortified, and without a garrison. As it was known that there was no considerable military force in the neighbourhood, they encamped, scattered around the place, at the same time to prevent valuables from being carried out, and to collect booty from the country. But Brasidas, who commanded the district with only a hundred Lacedæmonians, piercing their camp, got into Methone; and by the order which he established among the inhabitants, together with the small force which he brought (for the Spartans were all bred to be either soldiers or officers as occasion might require), secured the place against an assault.² The Athenian commanders, finding their design thus frustrated, for it was not at all their purpose to engage in a siege, re-embarked their forces. By this bold and successful effort Brasidas gained great credit in Sparta, and became considered as an officer superiorly qualified for commands which might require activity and daring exertion.

The Peloponnesians early found that a navy was not to be created so rapidly as some of their warmer politicians had promised them. A wide extent of coast remained, and was likely to remain, open to the attacks of the Athenian fleet. The land force was again debarked near the Elean town of Phea, which was taken; the neighbouring country was ravaged, and the Eleans, assembling in haste to protect their property, were defeated. To keep Phea being however no object to the Athenian commanders, the Eleans were no sooner collected in force sufficient to oppose them

² Ἀνθεάπτων οὐκ ἐνόπτων is the phrase used by Thucydides in first speaking of Methone. In the very next sentence he says that Brasidas ἐσόνθει τοῖς ἐν τῷ χωρίῳ. His meaning therefore was, that there were no Lacedæmonians in the place, and consequently no soldiers; the inhabitants being all unarmed Messenians and Helots.

than they re-embarked their troops, and, proceeding northward along the coast, continued their depredations wherever they found most temptation and least danger. They took Solium, a small town on the Ætolian coast belonging to the Corinthians, and gave it to the Acarnanians <sup>Thucyd. 1. 2.
c. 30.</sup> of Palira. They took Astachus in Acarnania, and expelling its tyrant Evarchus, they committed the supreme power to the popular assembly, and the city became a member of the Athenian confederacy. They proceeded then to Cephallenia, which was at that time divided between no less than four republics, Pale, Crane, Same, and Prone. The particularity with which Thucydides describes its situation and circumstances implies that, in his time, those western islands were little generally known among the Greeks. Without any act of hostility, the whole of Cephallenia was induced to accede to the Athenian alliance. After these considerable services, the armament returned to Attica.

While war thus was carried into the western seas of Greece, a squadron of thirty galleys, under Cleopompus, sailed eastward and northward, to protect Eubœa, and to annoy the hostile states in its neighbourhood, especially Locris. Some of the lands on the Locrian coast were ravaged; the town of Thronium, capitulating, gave hostages to insure performance of some compact; probably for paying a subsidy and abstaining from hostility. The Locrians of the other towns, taking the field to relieve Thronium, were defeated at Alope. To prevent depredations on the Eubœan coast, which the Opuntian Locrians were accustomed to make, the little island of Atalanta, near the coast of Locris, was fortified, and a small naval force was stationed there. <sup>c. 26.
c. 32.</sup>

Within Attica, meanwhile, after the departure of the Peloponnesian army, the counsels of the administration were diligently directed to provide the best security for the

country that its exposed situation and the inferiority of its land force would admit : posts were occupied on the frontier, and guard-ships were stationed on different parts of the coast. A measure followed which, taking place at the time when Thucydides wrote and Pericles spoke, and while Pericles held the principal influence in the administration, strongly marks both the inherent weakness and the indelible barbarism of democratical government. A decree of the people directed that a thousand talents should be set apart in the treasury in the citadel, as a deposit, not to be touched unless the enemy should attack the city by sea ; a circumstance which implied the prior ruin of the Athenian fleet, and the only one, it was supposed, which could superinduce the ruin of the commonwealth. But, in a decree so important, sanctioned only by the present will of that giddy tyrant the multitude of Athens, against whose caprices, since the depression of the court of Areopagus, no balancing power remained, confidence so failed that the denunciation of capital punishment was added against whosoever should propose, and whosoever should concur in, any decree for the disposal of that money to any other purpose, or in any other circumstances. It was at the same time ordered, by the same authority, that a hundred triremes should be yearly selected, the best of the fleet, to be employed on the same occasion only.

Another measure, of no small actual severity, was thought justified by public expediency, and by the right and the Thucyd. I. 2.
c. 27. duty of obviating public danger. It was judged unsafe to permit a people so inveterately inimical as the *Aeginetans*, and known to have been active in exciting the war, any longer to hold, though under the control of an Athenian garrison, that island which had been emphatically termed the Eye-sore of Piræus. To disencumber the city of a part of the multitude which so in-

conveniently crowded it, was also desirable. With this double view the Æginetans were expelled from their island, and a colony of Athenians took possession. Thus by the same measure the government was relieved of some portion of the care incumbent on it to provide for citizens who were unable to provide for themselves, and a garrison was maintained in Ægina without public expense. A distribution of money from the public treasury alleviated the immediate wants of the remaining poor in Athens. For the exterminated Æginetans no provision seems to have been made or proposed by the Athenian government. Instances indeed are so familiar, in Grecian history, of an obnoxious people, a Grecian people, reduced to slavery by a Grecian people, that it might perhaps be thought an act of clemency to allow them to migrate in search of a better lot, which they were fortunate enough to find. The Lacedæmonians gave them the Thyreatis, a small territory on the confines of Laconia and Argolis, of which they would be as a garrison to protect the former against the inroads from the latter.³ A few only of the exiles found more peaceful establishments among their friends in other parts of Greece. Among the events of this summer Thucydides mentions a nearly total eclipse of the sun, beginning soon after mid-day, which ascertains the chronology.

Plut. vit.
Peric.

Thucyd. ut
sup.

Aug. 3. Ann.
Thu.

Toward the close of autumn the whole force of Athens marched, under the command of Pericles, to retaliate the vengeance and reap the profit of ravage, where it could be done most readily, and now with complete security, in the bordering territory of Megara. The fleet under Carcinus,

³ The failure of mention, by the historian, of any former inhabitants appears to indicate that it had remained uninhabited and uncultivated, being so insecure a possession, divided by lofty mountains from the rest of Laconia, but more open to Argolis, that, unless under Argive protection, it could be an object only for those in the miserable condition of the expelled Æginetans.

just returned from the western sea, was at Ægina. Proceeding to the Megarian coast, its land force joined that under Pericles. Thus was formed, according to Thucydides, the largest Athenian army ever assembled in the course of the war. The Athenians were not less than ten thousand, and the Metics, those denizens of Athens who had not the privileges of Athenian citizens, were four thousand heavy-armed foot: the number of light-armed he does not state, saying only that they were a large body. When plunder and waste had been carried as far as circumstances allowed, the whole armament returned to Piræus and Athens.

SECTION II.

Summary View of the History of Thrace. — Alliance negotiated by Athens with Sitacles King of Thrace and Perdiccas King of Macedonia. — Public Funeral at Athens in honour of the Slain in their Country's Service. — Expedition of the Corinthians against Acarnania and Cephallenia.

DURING these, the principal military transactions of the first summer of the war, negotiation had been diligently prosecuted by the Athenian government, chiefly with the view to provide security for that revenue, arising in tribute from transmarine Grecian states, which enabled Athens to maintain the most powerful navy then in the world, and to withstand the superior land force of the Peloponnesian confederacy. The enmity of the king of Macedonia threatened inconvenience; and, especially to obviate this, an improvement of friendly connection with the extensive monarchy of Thrace was desirable.

Thrace, as we have formerly observed, appears to have been occupied in early times by the same Pelasgian hordes who principally gave origin to the Grecian people. But instead of advancing with the Greeks in knowledge and

civilisation, those glimmerings of science which, according to the oldest Grecian traditions, beamed upon their country before they reached Greece, were totally lost ; and two prejudices, perhaps brought by hordes from the mountains of the interior, who overwhelmed the civilised inhabitants of the coast, becoming leading principles over the whole nation, made the Thracians incorrigibly barbarous : “ To live by war and rapine,” says Herodotus, “ is their delight <sup>Herodot. 1. 5.
c. 6.</sup> and their glory ; and nothing they esteem so dis- honourable as agriculture.” A most indispensable ornament of their persons was to have the skin punctured in various figures ; a whimsical practice of barbarism, remarkable for its extension ; found anciently among our ancestors the Britons, in the extreme of the old world, and lately among their antipodes in the little islands of the Pacific Ocean ; who, but for the wonderful improvements of modern European navigation, must have remained ever equally unknown to the people of the old world, and of what has been called the new. Between mount Hæmus and the Danube lived the Getes, founders, it has been supposed, of the Gothic name ; a Thracian people, according <sup>Thucyd. 1. 2.
c. 96, 97.</sup> to Thucydides, but still more barbarous than the other Thracians ; resembling in manners the Scythians, who wandered, to an unknown extent, over the vast continent to the northward and north-eastward of the Danube and the Euxine.

Under Darius the whole of the Thracian country had been brought to acknowledge the Persian dominion. The retreat of the Persians out of Europe, after the defeat of Xerxes, appears to have given opportunity for forming among its people an empire such as had been before unknown. Of what wars or what policy led to it information fails ; but we are assured that Teres, chief of the Odrysian clan, ^{c. 29.} became sovereign of all the Thracians from the

Ægean sea to the Danube, and from the Euxine to the Strymon; a country considerably larger than all Greece. Some mountaineers of the borders, and some clans of the plains, in the central part of the continent beyond the Strymon, alone maintained independency. The Grecian towns on the coast, all for safety to their commerce paying tribute to Athens, found it convenient also to pay tribute to the Thracian prince for safety to their lands. So far then owning subjection, and contributing to the strength and splendour of the monarchy, they were not objects of jealousy and oppression, but rather of protection and encouragement: for the Thracians, wealthy by the possession of ample and fruitful territory, by the produce of mines of the richest metals, and by the command of numerous tributaries, scorning to employ themselves in agriculture or commerce, did not despise conveniences, or even luxuries, which only agriculture and commerce can give.

On the death of Teres the extensive monarchy of Thrace devolved to his son Sitalces, who had married the sister of Nymphodorus, a citizen of the Grecian town of Abdera, one of the subject dependencies of Athens. An advantageous opening was thus offered to the Athenian government for improving their interest with the Thracian king. Through Nymphodorus an alliance was formed with Sitalces: and, such was the ascendancy which the little republics of Greece had acquired among foreign nations, Sadocus, eldest son of the powerful monarch of Thrace, accepted, as a valuable honour, his admission to the name and privileges of one of the Athenian people. The brother-in-law of Sitalces then undertook to be mediator between the king of Macedonia and the Athenian commonwealth; and, for the cession of the town of Therme to him in sovereignty, Perdiccas joined the Thracian prince in the Athenian alliance.

Winter setting in, and military operations being suspended,

Pericles did not neglect the means, which established custom offered, for animating the Athenian people in the cause in which they were engaged, and converting even the calamities of war into an occasion of triumph. The funeral of those who had fallen in their country's service was publicly solemnised; and the manner of it remains particularly described by Thucydides. Three days before the ceremony of burial, the bones, collected from the bodies previously burnt according to the ordinary practice of the Greeks, were arranged under an ample awning. While thus, according to the modern phrase, they lay in state, it was usual for the relations to visit them, and throw on anything that fancy or superstition gave to imagine a grateful offering to the spirits of the deceased, or honourable to their memory among the living. The day of the burial being arrived, the bones were placed in ten chests of cypress-wood, raised on carriages, one for each ward of Attica; and an eleventh carriage bore an empty bier with a pall, in honour of those whose bodies could not be recovered. Procession was then made in solemn march to the public tomb in the Ceramicus, the most beautiful suburb of the city; the female relations of the deceased attending, and, according to the Grecian custom, venting their lamentations aloud. From the time when the ceremony was instituted, the tomb in the Ceramicus had been the receptacle of all who had been honoured with a public funeral, excepting those who had fallen at Marathon; who, for the supereminence of their merit, and the singular glory of the action, had been buried in the field of battle, where their peculiar monument was raised over them. Always a person of superior dignity and acknowledged eminent ability was appointed by the people to speak the funeral panegyric. On the actual occasion every circumstance directed the public choice to Pericles.

Ibid. & Not.
ed. Duk.
Thucyd. ib.

When therefore the ceremony of entombing was over, Pericles passed through the crowd to a lofty stand raised for the occasion, so that he might be heard by the attending multitude the most extensively possible; and thence delivered that oration, the heads of which at least
Thucyd. I. 1. c. 22. I. 1. c. 35. & 46. Thucydides, who was probably present, has, from his own professions, it is to be presumed, faithfully collected, preserving in a great degree even the phrases. It remains to us a finished model of the simple and severe sublime in oratory, which, in its original language, has been the admiration of all succeeding ages; but which must sink in any translation, denies abridgment, and defies either imitation or paraphrase, perhaps beyond any composition that ever was committed to writing.

I. 2. c. 33. The winter was not for all parts of Greece, as for Athens, a season of repose. Evarchus, the expelled tyrant of Astacus in Acarnania, applied to Corinth for assistance to restore him to his little dominion. The ancients rarely ventured upon maritime expeditions in short days and stormy seasons; the narrowness of their seas, the height and rockiness of their coast, the frequency of sudden squalls, and the want of a guide in cloudy weather, rendering it far more dangerous than where the ocean is at hand, and, in a stout vessel, under guidance of the compass, distance from land is safety. The zeal of Corinth however was not to be deterred. Forty ships of war and fifteen hundred heavy foot, under Euphamidas, with some auxiliary mercenaries raised by Evarchus, recovered Astacus. Attempts were made upon some other towns of Acarnania, but without success. The Corinthians then moving homeward debarked in Cephallenia on the Cranæan lands. The Cranæans, amusing them with the pretence of a disposition to capitulate, attacked them unawares, and forced them to re-embark with loss. Without attempting anything farther they then returned to Corinth.

SECTION III.

Second Invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians. — Pestilence at Athens. — Operations of the Athenian Fleet on the Peloponnesian Coast under Pericles; and on the Macedonian Coast under Agnon. — Effects of popular Discontent at Athens. — First Effort of the Peloponnesian Fleet. — Attempt of the Peloponnesians to send an Embassy into Persia. — Barbarity of the Grecian System of War. — An Athenian Squadron stationed in the western Sea. — Surrender of Potidea to the Athenians. — Death of Pericles.

THE events of the first campaign justify the wisdom both of Pericles and of Archidamus in the counsels they respectively gave before the commencement of hostilities. The Peloponnesians were evidently not prepared to wage offensive war against Athens with any advantage. A considerable part of Attica had been ravaged; the harvest had been consumed, carried off, or destroyed. But Athens could support that loss; and the Athenian fleets had meanwhile, with less expense and inconvenience, and probably with more profit, been dealing destruction and gathering spoil in various parts of Peloponnesus and its confederate states. At the same time negotiations had been concluded which promised great access of strength to Athens for the campaigns to ensue; while the Peloponnesians, endeavouring also to extend their alliances, had nowhere yet succeeded.

In the second year the Peloponnesian army was assembled in spring; and, toward the beginning of summer, under the command of Archidamus, again entered and ravaged Attica. But a natural calamity, far more terrible than the swords of their enemies, now attacked the Athenians; a pestilential fever, in many points nearly resembling that scourge which, under the name of the plague, has been, in modern times, continually desolating the fine

B. C. 430.

climates of the east ; yet, according to the accurate Thucydides, differing in some essential circumstances. It was then new to the Greeks. Like the modern plague, it was supposed to have originated in Ethiopia ; whence, passing into Egypt, it was quickly communicated over the greater part of the Persian empire. Among the Greeks it was first observed in some towns of the Asian coast, and of the neighbouring islands, particularly Lemnos. Its first appearance among the Athenians was in Piræus ; and so little were they aware how it came, or what it was, that a fancy arose, and gained some credit among them, that the wells had been poisoned by the Peloponnesians. Quickly it made its way into the upper town, as Athens was often called, and then the mortality increased rapidly. What was the cause of this malady, says Thucydides, I will leave to others to investigate ; but I will describe its effects, which I can undertake to do exactly ; having both experienced them in my own person, and seen numbers of others under the same affliction.

Thucyd. i. 2.
c. 49. The year, it is universally acknowledged, was

remarkably healthy till the pestilence appeared ; and then every existing sickness seemed to change into that one, or lost its symptoms in the violence of the supervening disorder. Persons, apparently in perfect health, were suddenly seized, first with extreme heat in the head, attended with particular redness and inflammation of the eyes ; then quickly the tongue and throat assumed a bloody appearance, the breath became fetid, frequent sneezing followed, with hoarseness of the voice ; and before long the breast laboured, and a violent cough ensued. The stomach was then affected ; evacuations in all ways followed, attended with excessive colicky pains, and often with violent hiccoughs and spasms. The flesh meanwhile, not externally hot to the touch, appeared reddish and livid, and broke out in pustules and ulcers. But the internal fever was such that the patient could

scarcely bear the lightest covering; and what the affection of the moment gave to imagine as the most agreeable relief, was to plunge into cold water. Many of the poorer sort, ill attended, ran to the wells, and there indulged in extreme the immediate calls of immoderate thirst. Through the whole of the disorder to sleep was impossible; yet, considering the violence of the symptoms, the sufferers were less weakened than might have been expected. The fever was mostly spent by the seventh, or, at farthest, by the ninth day; and if the patient resisted so long, he was generally left not without some strength to combat what was to follow. But the ulceration of the bowels, which then took place, and the flux, in consequence, destroyed numbers. For the disease, beginning with the head, pervaded the whole body, and finally fixed upon the extremities: so that some, who had supported all the vehemence of its attack upon the vital parts, survived, not without the loss of their hands, their feet, their privy members, or their eyes. Some were totally deprived of memory; on their recovery not knowing their nearest friends, nor even themselves. The extreme and singular virulence of the disorder appeared also remarkably in the refusal of animals of prey to touch the numerous unburied corpses, and in the death which ensued to the more ravenous few which fed on them. Of birds of prey indeed there was a very remarkable scarcity, almost a dereliction of the country, so that the effect was observed principally in dogs.

For this terrible disease the skill of physicians was found utterly vain, and all attempted remedies were either useless or totally uncertain; what seemed to relieve some patients appearing even injurious to others. Nor did any strength of constitution avail; but the robust and the infirm were nearly equally affected. Among the first symptoms, and the most grievous, an extreme dejection

Thucyd. I. 2.
c. 50.

c. 51.

of spirits was almost universal; the patient lost the ability even to struggle for life; and this despondency was rendered the more fatal by the infectious nature of the disorder, which either deterred assistance, or quickly involved the attendants upon the sick in the same evil and the same inability with those whom they served, or to whom their charity was afforded. Many therefore died wholly unattended; while others received little advantage from every assistance that could be given. One only comforting circumstance appeared to alleviate this dreadful calamity: different from the modern plague, the disease was among those which, through some inscrutable management of Providence, the human frame is incapable of receiving more than once; or, if not perfectly secured by once suffering against all future injury from the virulence of the infectious matter, yet incapable of receiving twice the full force of the disorder. Of those who had recovered from the Athenian pestilence none were again so infected by any communication with the diseased as to appear in any danger of their lives. Thus hope first shone upon the sick, upon those yet in health, and upon those who had borne the disease; thus alarm first ceased to be universal, and thus the Athenian people seemed at length warranted against that utter extinction which the effects of the disorder had appeared to threaten.

Thucyd. l. 2. c. 52. The mortality was however tremendous; and the misery was greatly enhanced by the increase of multitude in the city, which the war had occasioned.

Strab. l. 5. p. 235. The want of sewers, a convenience unknown in Grecian towns, and of which the Romans appear to have given the first example, would also be severely felt upon this occasion.⁴ It was the hot season; and not

⁴ The necessity of a drain for the marshy soil, as well as of a vent for the filth which accumulated in the hollow between the Palatine hill and the Capitoline, seems to have given occasion to that wonderful structure the Cloaca

only every house was fully occupied, but very many families of the poorer people were crowded together in stifling huts, where they died in heaps. To bury all regularly was impossible: corpses were rolled out into the streets, and there left; and numbers were to be found dead and dying about every fountain, whither intolerable thirst impelled them to seek relief. What would before have been esteemed a portentous pollution became now familiar; the temples of the gods occupied as the habitations of men, were filled with dead bodies. Funeral rites were not less profaned, and a singular kind of robbery became common. When those who had means of burning the bodies of their deceased friends, according to the established practice, had formed their funeral pile, others would put on their dead, and immediately set fire to it. With less scruple, of course, where a pile was found burning, many, without ceremony, would throw on it a corpse, and go their way.

The moral effects of this extraordinary visitation, reported by that judicious eye-witness to whom we owe this detail, deserve notice. Wherever the doctrine of retribution in a life to come, for good and evil deeds in this world, has taken any hold on the minds of men, a general calamity strongly tends to check the passions, to inspire serious thought, to direct attention toward that future existence, and to make both hope and fear converge to the great Author of nature, the all-powerful, all-wise, and all-just God, who can compensate the sufferings of the good with endless blessings, and convert to lasting misery any short-lived joys that can arise from the perpetration of evil. But in Athens, where the Deity was looked to very generally and very anxiously, and

Maxima at Rome, perhaps the first and the greatest of its kind. Sewers are seen among the ruins of Carthage, or were so when Shaw visited the site of that city in the beginning of the past century; but whether Carthaginian works or Roman, does not appear. Shaw's Travels, p. 151. ed. fol. 1738.

almost only, for the dispensation of temporal good and evil, it was otherwise.⁵ The fear of the divine power, says Thucydides, ceased; for it was observed, that to worship or not to worship the gods, to obey or not to obey those laws of morality which have always been held most sacred among men, availed nothing. All died alike; or, if there was a difference, the virtuous, the charitable, the generous, exposing themselves beyond others, were the first and the surest to suffer. An inordinate, and before unknown, licentiousness of manners followed. Let us enjoy ourselves, let us, if possible, drown thought in pleasure to-day, for to-morrow we die, was the prevailing maxim. No crime therefore that could give prospect of any enjoyment was scrupled; for such were the ravages of the disease that for perpetrator, accuser, and judges, all to survive, so that an offender could be convicted in regular course of law, was supposed against all chance. The final consummation already impending over equally the criminal and the innocent, by the decree of fate or of the gods, any punishment that human laws could decree was little regarded. How most to enjoy life while life remained became the only consideration: and this relaxation, almost to a dissolution of all moral principle, is lamented by Thucydides as a lasting effect of the pestilence of Athens.

Thucyd. l. 2. c. 47. 54. The Peloponnesian army had already begun the ravage of Attica when the pestilence was first publicly observed. They wasted all the vale of Athens, and then proceeded through the sea-side country, more fruitful and better cultivated than the inland hills, toward the silver-mines of mount Laurium. The firm mind of Pericles meanwhile was not to be depressed by all the calamities

⁵ Anaxagoras, the preceptor of Pericles, seems to have been the first who taught that better religion, if the term may be allowed, which was afterward propagated by Socrates and his disciples, and he was persecuted for it as an atheist.

which surrounded him, nor by all the terrors which threatened, from the war, from the pestilence, and, above all, from the irritation and despair of the despotic people whose minister he was. Steadily persevering in his former policy, of avoiding any decisive action with the land force of the enemy, he prosecuted offensive operations by sea as if Athens were under no affliction ; thinking probably in some degree to divert the public mind from brooding over domestic misfortune, and to suspend any rising acrimony against himself. He took the command of the armament destined against Peloponnesus, consisting of a fleet of a hundred Athenian and fifty Chian and Lesbian triremes, with an army of four thousand foot and three hundred horse. It appears from Thucydides that this was the first instance of the cavalry of any Grecian state going on an expedition by sea ; though the practice was not new to the Asiatics, the Persians having, sixty years before, sent a large force of horse across the Ægean under Datis and Artaphernes. Vessels were sometimes built, sometimes only fitted, for the purpose, with the name of *hippagogi*, horse-transports. For the present occasion some old triremes were converted under the direction of Pericles. The first descent was made on the Epidaurian territory, the greater part of which was ravaged. The operations of waste and plunder were then continued along the coast, through the Trœzenian, Halian, and Hermionean lands. The troops being then re-embarked, the fleet having passed the friendly Argive coast, a second descent was made in Laconia, near the town of *Prasiæ*, which was taken. Ravage then having been extended through the neighbouring country, as far as circumstances permitted, the whole armament returned to Piræus and Athens. The country was then clear of an enemy. The Peloponnesians, alarmed by the accounts given by deserters, probably slaves, of the rapid

progress of the pestilence, and of its fatal effects in Athens, and seeing the frequent blazing of funeral piles, had hastened their retreat homeward, about the fortieth day after entering Attica.

The Athenian armament soon sailed again under

Thucyd. 1. 2.
c. 58.

Agnon son of Nicias, and Cleopompus son of Clinias, two of the nine colleagues of Pericles in the supreme military command. The purpose was to press the siege of Potidæa, which remained still blockaded by Phormion. This was apparently an ill-judged, and certainly an unfortunate measure. The fresh troops, carrying with them the pestilential disorder from Athens, not only fell themselves in great numbers, but communicated the infection to Phormion's army, which had before been healthy. After losing,

Ibid. & 1. 3.
c. 117.

within forty days, no fewer than fifteen hundred of his four thousand foot, Agnon returned with the remainder to Attica. Phormion, with about three thousand, continued the blockade of Potidæa.

Accumulated evils, public and private, at length irritated beyond sufferance the minds of the Athenian people. Popular discontent will find an object on which to vent itself, and that object now was Pericles. Such was the depression of the public spirit that ambassadors were sent to Lacedæmon, to try the temper of the Peloponnesians, and endeavour to negotiate a peace; but as the Athenians drooped, the Lacedæmonians and their allies became arrogant, and the negotiation failed. The shame of disappointment, and increased apprehension from the failure, being thus added to former popular feelings, the ferment was such that Pericles judged it expedient more than previously to hold communication with the sovereign multitude. In his capacity of general of the commonwealth, or first of the board of war, if we may so express it, he had a right to summon the general assembly whenever he thought

proper. The people met, and he mounted the speaker's stand. He began his oration with urging a maxim applicable to all states, but the force of which would be more particularly sensible in the little Grecian republics, "That every individual has a deeper interest in the public than in his private prosperity ; for the decay of private affluence must ever be involved with the country's ruin : but while the country flourishes, opportunity will be open for the recovery of private fortune." He proceeded then to assert, with manly confidence, his own claim to the merit of integrity above suspicion, and to reproach the people with that want of firmness which disposed them to impute, as a crime to him, a public misfortune, impossible equally to be prevented and to be foreseen ; and which could reasonably be ascribed only to the inscrutable will of the Deity. " So far then," he added, " from having just cause for that despondency which infected them, they were still in full possession of what, well used, would give them certain superiority over all their enemies. No potentate upon earth possessed such a navy as theirs, nor could any one prescribe bounds to the empire which they might acquire by it. Such an opinion he never had declared before ; and, but for the universal depression of the public mind, he would not now have uttered a truth too flattering to them, and too alarming to all the world besides. What then were their houses and fields, the momentary loss of which they deplored, in comparison with such a possession ? To others indeed necessaries; but to them merely incidental decorations of high fortune ; or, at most, luxuries and superfluous conveniences, with which they might well, for a time, dispense. Their fleet, on the contrary, was truly essential ; not only to their command, but to their independency ; not only to their prosperity, but to their safety against the revenge which that invidious empire, that

Thucyd. I. 2.
c. 60.

c. 61, 62.

Thucyd. I. 2.
c. 63.

tyranny which they had long extensively held⁶, could not

*Thucyd. I. 2.
c. 64.* fail to excite. What we suffer from the gods,"

continued Pericles, "we should bear with patience; what from our enemies, with manly firmness; and such were the maxims of our forefathers. From unshaken fortitude in misfortune hath arisen the present power of this commonwealth, together with that glory, which, if our empire, according to the lot of all earthly things, decay, shall still survive to all posterity. Let no more begging embassies then be sent to Lacedæmon, nor let it any way appear that you are sinking under your misfortunes: but be assured that the steadiest resistance will bring our troubles to their best conclusion."

c. 65. This speech had not all the effect which Pericles hoped from it.

So far he prevailed, that it was determined no more to take any measure bearing the appearance of suing for peace from Sparta. But the acrimony excited among the people by their private sufferings was not to be immediately appeased: many of the poor were reduced to total want, while the rich bore with extreme uneasiness the loss of revenue from their estates in Attica, the destruction of their country-houses, their favourite residences, and the waste of all the expense bestowed on them. But what now, says Thucydides, principally affected all was, that instead of peace they had war; not, as often formerly, war far from home, but all the present evils of war at their doors, and apprehension of consequences which could not be considered without shuddering. The ferment did not subside till Pericles was deposed from his military command, and mulcted in a heavy fine.⁷

⁶ Ος τυραννίδα γὰρ ἔχετε αὐτήν (τὴν ἀρχήν).

⁷ Thucydides, in mentioning the fine, does not name the sum. According to Diodorus, if we may trust our copies, it was no less than eighty talents, about nineteen thousand pounds sterling. (Diod. I. 12. c. 45.) But Plutarch says that, among various accounts extant in his time, none made it exceed fifty

At the same time with this public disgrace, Pericles was suffering under the severest domestic misfortunes. Several of his children, some in this year, some in the former, had died of the pestilence; which, with the return of warm weather, had broken out again in Athens. The same cruel disorder had deprived him of others of his nearest relations, together with some of those invaluable friends in whose assistance he could best confide for the administration of public affairs. During these successive and complicated scenes of private woe, rendered more distracting by the public calamity, and the pressure of that popular discontent which arose from it, the firmness of his mind was the admiration of all around him. That philosophy, then new in Greece, which had been the favourite study of his leisure, inculcated rather the pride of disdaining to complain, and of being above the feelings of humanity, than a just resignation to the will of a Supreme Being, infinitely wise and good; though such a Being it acknowledged for the author and preserver of nature. No complaint was heard from the disciple of Anaxagoras, no change of countenance or manner was perceptible in him, till he lost his favourite son Paralus. Even then he would not seem to feel the anguish which oppressed him. But when, according to custom, in the funeral ceremony, he approached the bier to put the chaplet on the head of the deceased youth,^{Plut. vit. Peric.} the sight overcame him, and he burst into tears.⁸ In this accumulation of distress to retire from public business was, in the moment, a relief.

talents, about twelve thousand five hundred pounds; whereas some asserted it to have been no more than fifteen, less than four thousand pounds sterling.

⁸ According to Plutarch, Pericles lost all his legitimate sons by the pestilence, one of his own name, who survived him, being illegitimate. But Xenophon mentions Pericles, son of Pericles, without noticing any irregularity of his birth (*Xen. Mem. Socr. I. 3. c. 5.*); and it appears that he long survived his father. Plato also speaks of a son or sons of Pericles surviving him, and not as illegitimate.

But the people had no sooner vented their anger than they repented of what they had done : the keen sensation of distress in their private affairs, says the contemporary historian, abated, while, upon reflection, they became aware that no other man was qualified, like Pericles, for the supreme direction of public business. First, or equal to any, in birth, clearly superior in abilities, eminent in tried integrity, in all together he had not a second. None of the other orators therefore, with all the support of faction they were able to muster, could satisfy the multitude. With loud and anxious voices Pericles was called to mount the bema, and declare his opinion of public affairs ; what was the situation of things, and what measures, in his judgment, ought to be taken. He did not refuse to obey the honourable summons ; and quickly a strong reflux of popular favour restored him to the situation of commander-in-chief and prime minister, if we may use the term, the nearest which modern language affords, but inadequate to express the plenitude of that power, which absolute possession of the favour of the people gave him over the Athenian empire.⁹

^{c. 67.} Thucyd. I. 2. While Athens, weakened by the pestilence, and ^{c. 66.}

labouring with internal discord and depression of public spirit, was in some degree disabled for exertion, the Peloponnesians, for the first time, ventured upon a naval expedition. A hundred triremes, with a thousand heavy-armed Lacedæmonians, sailed to Zacynthus; an Achæan colony, but of the Athenian confederacy. The troops debarking ravaged great part of the open country. But the fortified places all either deterred or resisted their efforts : the people could neither by threats nor promises be induced to treat, and the armament returned home.

^{c. 67.} Toward the end of the summer a measure was
^{Herodot. I. 7.} Herodotus. I. 7. taken in another line, from which more important
^{c. 137.} c. 137.

⁹ Στρατηγὸν εἶλοντο καὶ πάντα τὰ πράγματα ἐτίγεψαν.—Thucyd. I. 2. c. 65.

advantages were expected. An embassy was appointed to go to the Persian court, with a view to negotiate an alliance, and particularly to obtain pecuniary assistance. It consisted of three Lacedæmonians, Aneristus, Nicolaus, and Pratodemus, with the Corinthian Aristeus, the Tegean Timagoras, and Polis an Argive, who went unauthorised by his own commonwealth; whence it appears that he was of the party in opposition to the ruling party there. But means to make their journey to Susa were not obvious; for the Athenians commanded all the western coast of Asia minor with the Hellespont; and the hazards that might attend the unusual passage by the way of Phenicia were many to their knowledge, and probably many which they could not know. It was therefore determined to go first to the court of Sitalces king of Thrace, whose alliance with Athens did not bind him to be the enemy of Lacedæmon; hopes on the contrary being entertained of detaching him from the Athenian interest; and his protection, it was reckoned, might be trusted for the journey through his dominion to the satrapy of Pharnaces, on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont, whence the progress to Susa, though long, would be secure. Though two Athenian ministers, Learchus and Aminiades, were with the Thracian prince, the Lacedæmonians found a gracious reception; but their endeavours to withdraw him from the Athenian alliance failed. No opposition to their journey however occurred, and they proceeded. The Athenian ministers, equally unable to engage Sitalces in all their views, found however the zeal of an Athenian citizen in Sadocus his eldest son. That prince took upon himself to send a party, under the orders of Learchus and Aminiades, in pursuit of the Peloponnesian ministers, who were seized before they could cross the Hellespont. Being conveyed to Athens, a decree of the people, without a trial, consigned them to the executioner. Thucydides acknowledges

the most illiberal policy in his fellow-countrymen as, in part at least, instigating this measure : they dreaded the enterprising abilities of the Corinthian Aristeus, which had been conspicuous in operations against them in Chalcidice and Macedonia. The law of retaliation was alleged in justification of it ; and such was the illiberal and cruel spirit of war among the ancients that the law of retaliation might generally be pleaded to justify almost any atrocity. From ^{Thucyd. 1. 2.} the beginning of the war the Lacedæmonians, ^{c. 67.} wherever they seized merchant-ships of the Athenians or their allies, or even of the neutral Greeks, had usually put the crews to death.

^{c. 68, 69.} Such were the transactions of the summer. In the beginning of winter circumstances arose, in the north-western parts of Greece, to call the attention of the Athenian administration ; and Phormion, recalled from his command in Chalcidice, was sent with a squadron of twenty ships to block the Corinthian gulf. Meanwhile, though the Peloponnesians had no fleet at sea, yet their privateers¹⁰, harbouring on the coasts of Caria and Lycia, had been annoying the Athenian trade with Asia minor and the eastern parts of the Mediterranean. A squadron of six triremes was thought sufficient, to prevent such depredations, and also to collect the tributes from the dependent states in those parts. But Melisander, who commanded, undertaking an expedition up the country of Lycia with the troops of his little squadron and some auxiliaries which he collected, was overpowered in an action in which he lost his life.

^{c. 70.} The winter was not far advanced when the Potidaeans, pressed by famine so that they had begun, the historian says, to eat one another, and hopeless

¹⁰ Τὸ ληστικὸν τῶν Πελοποννησίων. — Thucyd. I. 2. c. 69.

of succour, desired to capitulate. Xenophon, son of Euri-pides, who with two other generals commanded the besieging army, considering what their troops must suffer in winter operations, and what expense the commonwealth had already incurred by the siege, which was not less than two thousand talents, about five hundred thousand pounds sterling, was induced to treat. The garrison and people were allowed to quit the place; the men each with one garment, the women with two; and both with a small specified sum of money, which might enable them to travel to such retreats as they could find in Chalcidice, or elsewhere in the neighbouring country. Xenophon and his colleagues did not escape censure from their sovereign, the Athenian people, for granting, without first consulting them, terms, even such terms; the Potidæans being considered as merit-ing vengeance, and, after the surrender it was found, were incapable of longer resistance. Thus however the Athenians, unable, in their full strength, to defend their own country, yet persevering amid affliction, gained that distant object of contention which had given immediate rise to the war.

Pericles lived probably to know the success of the Athenian arms against Potidæa, and it was not long after that he fell a victim to that calamity, the endemic disorder, which had already carried off so many of his nearest relations, and most valued friends. He survived however the violence of the fever, and died in full possession Plutarch. vit. Peric. of his senses, of a lingering illness which it superinduced.

No man seems to have been held in such estimation by most of the ablest writers of Rome equally as of Greece for universal superiority of talents, as Pericles. The accounts remaining of his actions hardly support his renown; which was yet perhaps more fairly earned than that of many, the merit of whose achievements has been in a great degree

due to others acting under them, whose very names have perished. The philosophy of Pericles taught him not to be vain-glorious, but to rest his fame upon essentially great and good, rather than upon brilliant actions. It is observed by Plutarch that, often as he commanded the Athenian forces, he never was defeated; yet, though he won many trophies,

Saxe's Memoirs. he never gained a splendid victory. A battle,

according to a great modern authority, is the resource of ignorant generals: when they know not what to do, they fight a battle. It was almost universally the resource of the age of Pericles: little conception was entertained of military operations beyond ravage and a battle. His genius led him to a superior system, which the wealth of his country enabled him to carry into practice. His favourite maxim was to spare the lives of his soldiers; and scarcely any general ever gained so many important advantages with so little bloodshed. It is said to have been his consolation and his boast, in his dying hours, that he never was the cause that a fellow-citizen wore mourning: a glorious and perhaps a singular subject of exultation for a head of a party in Greece; where, in the struggles of faction, secret assassinations, numerous public executions, and bloody contests in arms, were so ordinary. Pericles might almost equally have made it his boast as general of the commonwealth: for, when his soldiers fell, they fell victims to the necessity of their country's service, and not to the incapacity, rashness, or vanity of the commander. Had he been less a patriot, less a philosopher, less humane, his achievements might have been more brilliant, but he would not equally have earned, from the mouth of Socrates, and the report of Plato, the praise of supereminence in what was wise, great, and becoming.¹¹

¹¹ Περικλέα οὕτω μεγαλοπεπῶς σοφὸν ἀνδρεα is a phrase which Plato puts into the mouth of Socrates, immediately after the mention of Themistocles and

This splendid character however perhaps may seem to receive some tarnish from the political conduct of Pericles; the concurrence, at least, which is imputed to him, in depraving the Athenian constitution, to favour that popular power by which he ruled, and the revival and confirmation of that pernicious hostility between the democratical and aristocratical interests, first in Athens, and then, by the Peloponnesian war, throughout the nation. But it is remarkable that Thucydides and Xenophon, both suffering banishment, one for twenty years, the other for life, from that democratical power, with which both express themselves abundantly dissatisfied, nevertheless always speak with the highest respect of Pericles. The testimony of Isocrates will also deserve consideration. Complaining of the depraved state of the Athenian constitution in his own time, that patriotic statesman says, “Pericles found the constitution less perfect than it had been, but still tolerably good; yet he did not use his extraordinary power for his own profit, but, leaving his private fortune less than he had received it from his father, he carried into the treasury eight thousand talents (near two millions sterling) over Isocrat. de Pace, p. 254. and above the proceeds of the sacred revenue.”

This concurrence of three such men, in successive ages, (of whom, Thucydides probably had personal acquaintance with him,) all friendly to the aristocratical interest, and all anxious for concord with Lacedæmon, strongly indicates that what may appear exceptionable in his conduct was, in their opinion, the result not of choice but of necessity; a necessity produced by the violence of a party in opposition to him at home, together with the violence of a party in Peloponnesus, adverse to the politics of his friend the king of

Aristides. Plat. Menon. p. 94. t. 2. The force and elegance of the Greek, expressing in one compound adverb the great and the becoming, cannot be given perhaps in any other language.

Lacedæmon, Archidamus. By no other conduct probably the independency of Athens could have been preserved ; and however the power of Athens, unless it might be moderated and modelled by an extraordinary union of political wisdom and moral rectitude in the leaders, was threatening to the liberty of every other Grecian state, yet the independency of Athens, as the event showed, was indispensable for the liberty of Greece. On such a view of things those three great writers may seem to have formed their judgment of the political conduct of Pericles, and to have reckoned that on his wisdom, his probity, and his influence, had his life been lengthened, would have rested the best chance for an advantageous settlement of the singularly troubled state of the Greek nation.

CHAPTER XV.

OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, FROM THE DEATH OF PERICLES, IN THE THIRD YEAR, TO THE APPLICATION FOR PEACE FROM LACEDÆMON IN THE SEVENTH.

SECTION I.

Siege of Platæa by the Peloponnesians.

IN the third spring of the war the Peloponnesians changed their plan of offence. By the invasion and ravage of Attica for two following summers, though much injury had been done to the Athenians, little advantage had accrued to themselves: the booty was far from paying the expense of the expedition; the enemy, it was found, could not be provoked to risk a battle, and the great purpose of the war was little forwarded. The Peloponnesians were yet very unequal to attempt naval operations of any consequence. Of the continental dependencies of Athens none was so open to their attacks, and none so completely excluded from naval protection, none so likely by its danger to superinduce that war of the field which they wished, as Platæa. Against that town therefore it was determined to direct the principal effort; and success was more reasonably expected as public councils at Athens were no longer directed, and popular passion no longer restrained, by the wisdom and influence of Pericles.

B. C. 429.
Ol. 87. 4.
P. W. 3.
Thucyd. 1. 2.
c. 71.

Accordingly, under the command still of Archidamus, the confederate army entered the Platæid, and ravage was

begun. The Platæans sent ministers to deprecate hostilities ; urging the ancient merit of their commonwealth in the Persian wars, and the privileges solemnly granted to it when, after the glorious battle in their territory, Pausanias sacrificed to Jupiter the deliverer in the agora of their city.

Thucyd. 1. 2.
c. 72. & 73. Archidamus was not disposed to harsh measures, and he offered them neutrality. The Platæans

professed that, if they could choose for themselves, they should willingly accept his offer ; but without the consent of the Athenians, in whose power their wives and children were, they could decide nothing. Besides, should they lose the protection of Athens, they could never be secure against the superior power of the Thebans, their most bitter enemies, longer than while a Peloponnesian army remained in the neighbourhood. To obviate the latter objection, Archidamus made this remarkable proposal : “ If such are your fears, deliver your city, your lands, and all your immoveable property in trust to the Lacedæmonians. Show us the boundaries of your territory, number your fruit-trees, and take an exact account of whatever else admits of numeration or description. Go then yourselves wherever you can find the most convenient residence while the war shall last ; and we will provide that your lands shall be duly cultivated ; we will engage that subsistence shall be regularly remitted to you ; and, when the war is over, every thing shall be restored.” The Platæan deputies returning with this answer, the assembled people, or rather garrison, agreed to accept the conditions, provided the consent of the Athenian government could be obtained. Leave was readily granted by the Spartan prince to send to Athens ; but those deputed returned with requisition that the Platæans should abide by the terms of their confederacy with Athens, accompanied with assurance of every assistance. The Platæans in consequence resolved to remain firm to

the Athenian alliance; and, without sending to the Peloponnesian camp, they declared from their ramparts, "That it was impossible for them to comply with the demands of the Lacedæmonians." Archidamus then made this solemn address to the deities of the country: "Ye gods and heroes who preside over Platæa, be witnesses that, not till the Platæans had renounced the sworn terms of the general confederacy of the Greeks, we act hostilely against this land, in which our fathers, after due invocation to you, vanquished the Persians, you rendering it propitious to their arms. We have made liberal offers, which have been rejected. Grant therefore that they may receive that punishment which breach of faith deserves, and that we may obtain the success to which a righteous cause entitles."

Then immediately was begun that siege, the first of which any connected detail remains in the annals of mankind. The town was small, as may be judged from the very small force which sufficed for an effectual garrison; only four hundred Platæans, with eighty Athenians. There were besides in the place a hundred and ten women to prepare provisions, and no other person free or slave. The besieging army, composed of the flower of the Peloponnesian youth, was numerous. The first operation was to surround the town with a palisade, which might prevent any ready egress; the neighbouring forest of Cithæron supplying materials. Then, in a chosen spot, ground was broken, according to the modern phrase, for making approaches. The business was to fill the town-ditch, and against the wall to form a mound, on which a force sufficient for assault might ascend. For this operation also the woods of Cithæron were highly serviceable. Either extremity of the mound was made firm with interwoven piles, and the interval was filled with wood, stones, earth, any thing that came readiest to hand. Seventy

Thucyd. I. 2.
c. 75.

c. 78.

c. 75.

days were employed uninterruptedly on this work : reliefs being established through the army, and Lacedæmonian officers always superintending ; those appointed to the allies bearing the peculiar title of *Xenage*.

Such was at that time the inartificial process of a siege. Thucydides appears to have been well aware that it did no credit to the science of his age. The principal dependence of the besieging army, he says, was on the disproportionate superiority of its numbers. To oppose this mode of attack, the first measure of the besieged was to raise, on that part of their wall against which the mound was forming, a strong wooden frame, covered in front with leather and hides ; and, within this, to build a rampart with bricks from the neighbouring houses. The wooden frame bound the whole, and kept it firm to a considerable height : the covering of hides protected both work and workmen against weapons discharged against them, especially fiery arrows. But the mound still rising as the superstructure on the wall rose, and this superstructure becoming unavoidably weaker with increasing height, while the mound was liable to no counter-balancing defect, it was necessary for the besieged to devise other opposition. Accordingly they broke through the bottom of their wall, where the mound bore against it, and

Thucyd. I. 2.
c. 76. brought in the earth. The Peloponnesians, soon aware of this, instead of loose earth, repaired their mound with clay or mud inclosed in baskets. This requiring more labour to remove, the besieged undermined the mound ; and thus, for a long time unperceived, prevented it from gaining height. Still however, fearing that the efforts of their scanty numbers would be overborne by the multitude of hands which the besiegers could employ, they had recourse to another device. Within their town-wall they built, in a semilunar form, a second wall, connected with the first at the extremities, which extended, on either side, be-

yond the mound ; so that should the enemy possess themselves of the outer wall, their work would be to be renewed in a far less favourable situation.

Machines for battering walls were already known among the Greeks. According to the historian Ephorus, as Plutarch informs us, though he says it was disputed by other writers, they were first used by Pericles at the siege of Samos, under the direction of a lame engineer named Artemon ; who being commonly carried among his works in a litter¹, had thence the surname of Periphoreus. Battering-rams were certainly of much earlier date in the east ; and Thucydides would scarcely have left unmentioned the first introduction of so remarkable a military engine among the Greeks, had it happened within his own memory. The Peloponnesians were not without it at the siege of Platæa, but they seem to have been unskilful in its use ; and probably the machine itself was far less adapted to its purpose than, through various improvements, it afterward became. A ram, advanced upon the Peloponnesian mound, battered the superstructure on the Platæan rampart, and shook it violently ; to the great alarm of the garrison, but with little farther effect. Other machines of the same kind were employed against different parts of the wall itself, but to yet less purpose. The Platæans, letting down ropes from the rampart, dragged some out of their direction ; others they broke by dropping on them weighty beams suspended with chains. No means however were neglected by the besiegers that either approved practice suggested, or their ingenuity could devise, to promote their purpose ; yet, after much of the summer consumed, they found every effort of their numerous forces so completely baffled by the vigilance,

¹ Φορέων.

activity, and resolution of the little garrison, that they began to despair of succeeding by assault. Before however they would recur to the tedious method of blockade they determined to try one more experiment, for which their numbers and the neighbouring woods of Cithæron gave them more than ordinary facility. Preparing a very great quantity of faggots, they filled with them the town-ditch in the parts adjoining to their mound, and disposed piles in other parts around the place, wherever ground or any other circumstance gave most advantage. On the faggots they put sulphur and pitch, and then set all on fire. “The conflagration,” says Thucydides, “was such as was never before known to have been prepared by the hands of men; though, in mountain-forests, the friction of dry wood, by the agitation of the wind, may sometimes have produced greater.” Had the wind favoured, it must have had all the effect that the besiegers desired: great part of the town actually became unapproachable. But, fortunately for the garrison, a heavy rain, brought on by a thunder-storm without wind, extinguished the fire, and relieved them from an attack far more formidable than any they had before experienced.

Thucyd. I. 2.
c. 78. 6 July. This attempt failing, the Peloponnesians determined to reduce the siege to a blockade; which, though slow, and consequently expensive, would in the end be sure. To the palisade, which already surrounded the town, a contravallation was added; with a double ditch, one without, and one within. A sufficient body was then appointed to the guard of these works: the Bœotians undertaking one half, the other was allotted to detachments drafted from the troops of every state of the confederacy, and a little Sept. 19. after the middle of September the rest of the army was dismissed for the winter.

SECTION II.

Operations of the Athenians on the northern Coast of the Ægean.— Affairs of the western Parts of Greece.— Assistance sent by Peloponnesus to the Ambraciots against the Amphilochian Argives and Acarnanians.— Battle near Stratus.— Sea-fight between the Peloponnesian Fleet under the Corinthian Machon, and the Athenian Fleet under Phormion.— Sea-fight between the Peloponnesian Fleet under the Spartan Cnemus, and the Athenian Fleet under Phormion.— Attempt to surprise Piræus.— Success of Phormion in Acarnania.— Invasion of Macedonia by Sitalces King of Thrace.

WHILE the Peloponnesians were thus bending their whole strength, and hitherto so vainly, against the little town of Platæa, offensive operations were not neglected by the Athenians. Xenophon, son of Euripides, who had commanded the Athenian forces at the taking of Potidæa, was sent again into Chalcidice with a body of two thousand heavy foot and two hundred horse. A little before harvest he entered Bottiæa, and ravaged the country about Spartolus. Often in the wars of the Greeks among one another, the intrigues of faction did more than arms. Through such intrigue the Athenian general entertained hope of acquiring Spartolus; but timely support, which the party in opposition to the Athenian interest obtained from the neighbouring city of Olynthus, disappointed him. A battle ensuing, the superiority of the enemy in cavalry prevailed against the superior discipline of the Athenian heavy foot: Xenophon, with two general officers his colleagues, and above four hundred of their heavy-armed, were killed; and the remainder, who found an immediate refuge in Potidæa, too weak to prosecute offensive operations, returned to Athens.

Through this extensive war, upon which the Athenians

B. C. 429.
OL. 87. 4.
P. W. 3.
Thucyd. 1. 2.
c. 79.

fixed the name of the Peloponnesian, we become in some degree acquainted with the history of some parts of Greece, which otherwise might have remained wholly unknown. The Amphilochian Argos, a city on the border of Acarnania against Epirus, was founded, according to Thucydides, by Amphilochus, son of that Amphiaraus who is celebrated among the heroes of the war of Thebes. Amphilochus himself fought at Troy. On his return to the Peloponnesian Argos, his native city, little satisfied with the state of things under the usurpation of Ægisthus, he departed with such as chose to follow his fortune, and settled his colony at the bottom of that gulf anciently called the Amphilochian, but afterward the Ambracian. To the town which he built there he gave the name of that from which he had migrated; and the same partiality fixed upon the river, near whose mouth it stood, the name of the Peloponnesian stream of Inachus. The epithet Amphilochian was added to the town for the convenience of distinction. Situate among barbarians, at the extremity of Greece, or where Grecian and barbarian states were intermixed, the city of Amphilochus flourished; the inferiority in arts and knowledge of the neighbouring clans, to whom the Amphilochian name was communicated, but who, according to Thucydides, were barbarian, being perhaps a principal cause of its prosperity. Afterward, through various misfortunes, its strength was so reduced that it was scarcely able to support itself as an independent commonwealth; and to obviate other evils, its people recurred to a dangerous expedient for weak states, that of associating a number of families from the neighbouring Corinthian colony of Ambracia. Disputes arose between the two people, and in the end the Ambraciots expelled the Argives from their own city. These applied to the neighbouring people of Acarnania, and the Acarnanians to the Athenians; who, a little before the beginning of the

Thucyd. 1. 2.
c. 63.

Peloponnesian war, sent Phormion with thirty triremes to their assistance. Through the abilities of that officer, and the superior discipline of the very small body of Athenians which he commanded, Argos was taken by assault. The city and territory were restored to the Argives, with whom some Acarnanians were associated; and, according to the barbarous practice not unusual with the most polished of the Greeks, the Ambracian inhabitants and garrison were condemned to slavery. Hence followed the alliance of both Acarnania and the Amphiliocian Argos with Athens, which has been mentioned as subsisting when the Peloponnesian war began.

In the second summer of that war, while the pestilence was raging at Athens, the Ambraciots, incensed against the Argives by the treatment of their captive fellow-citizens, determined to attempt revenge. Associating the Chaonian and some other barbarous clans of their neighbourhood, they overran the territory of the Acarnanian Argos, but, after some vain efforts against the city, returned home. In the following year, that of the siege of Plataea, they proposed not only to take Argos, but to conquer all Acarnania. With this view they applied to Lacedæmon; promising that, if they might have such support, naval and military, as they desired, not only they would reduce their particular enemies the Acarnanians, but they would bring over the neighbouring islands of Zacynthus and Cephallenia to the Peloponnesian confederacy, and they hoped also to take Naupactus. Thus the Athenians would be deprived of what principally enabled them to carry expeditions around Peloponnesus, and keep a fleet in the western seas. The project was alluring: the Corinthians instantly and zealously engaged in it; incited by their enmity to Athens, their connection with Ambracia, the desire of revenge against Corcyra, and the hope of recovering their power in that island,

Thucyd. I. 2.
c. 80.

to which any success in the proposed measures would be at least a step; and they induced the Lacedæmonians to concur.

The Athenian administration, receiving intelligence of these motions and preparations, and judging Phormion, apparently on account of his experience of the western people and western seas, most proper for the command there, recalled him from Chalcidice, and sent him, as we have seen, with twenty triremes to Naupactus. In the following summer, in pursuance of the measures concerted with the Peloponnesians, the naval force of the Leucadians, Anactorians, and Ambraciots was assembled at Leucas; and the Spartan admiral Cnemus had the good fortune to join them from Cyllene, with a small squadron and a thousand heavy-armed Peloponnesian infantry, undiscovered in his passage by the Athenians. Assistance was also received from Molossis and Macedonia. The Corinthians and Sicyonians were preparing their naval force, but could not so readily escape out of their own gulf. Cnemus therefore, without waiting for them, determined to begin operations, by marching directly for Stratus, the largest town of Acarnania, in the hope of carrying it by assault; expecting thus so to break the force of the province that it would become an easy conquest.

Thucyd. 1.2.
c. 81. The Acarnanians, informed that, beside the for-

midable army already in their country, a fleet was expected which might choose its points of attack upon their coast, resolved to remain within their respective towns, and attempt the protection of their fields only so far as, with their strength, and opportunities offering, might be prudent. In hope of assistance from the Athenian admiral at Naupactus they were disappointed. He gave them to understand that he could spare no part of his scanty force from attendance upon the Peloponnesian fleet in the Corinthian gulf, which was ready to sail. Thus the hostile army marched unop-

posed from Leucas, through the Argive territory into Acarnania, disposed in three columns; the Peloponnesians and Ambraciots forming the left, the Leucadians, Anactorians, and some other Greeks the right, and the barbarian Epirots the centre. The Greeks kept their columns regularly formed, and chose their camps carefully; which, according to their usual practice in an enemy's country, they constantly fortified. But the Epirots, and particularly the Chao-nians, vain of their reputation for superior prowess among the clans of that part of the continent, disdained the trouble and delay of nice choice of ground; they pressed forward in confidence that the town would yield to their first assault, and the glory would be all their own. Intelligence of these circumstances being carried to the Stratians by their scouts, they planted an ambush, into which the imprudent Epirots fell. The forces from the town sallied; the Epirots, partly through surprise, partly through the vigour of the attack, were instantly put to flight, a great number were killed, and the rest were pursued till they reached the Grecian camps. The Stratians would neither make any attempt upon these, nor risk any close engagement against the superior discipline of the Peloponnesians; but they gave unceasing annoyance from a distance with their slings; in the use of which the Acarnanians, through universal practice, ex-celled.

Information of this important success obtained by the Stratians was rapidly forwarded through all the Acarnanian towns, accompanied with exhortation to assemble the force of the country, and drive out a half-conquered enemy. Cnemus meanwhile found his measures so broken by the defeat of the Epirots that in the ensuing night he retreated to the river Anapus, ten miles from Stratus. Thence he sent a herald to desire a truce for the burial of the slain; and, soon after, falling back to Oeniadæ, he dismissed the

allies, and embarked himself for Peloponnesus. Acarnania thus was completely freed from so alarming an invasion.

<sup>Thucyd. 1. 2.
c. 83.</sup> During these transactions by land, the allied fleet, consisting of forty-seven trireme galleys, under the Corinthian admirals Machon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas, sailed out of the gulf. It was the purpose of Phormion, who, with only twenty, watched them from Chalcis and the river Evenus, on the Ætolian coast, to let them pass the straits; and attack them in the more open sea. The Corinthians, strong in men as well as in ships, but less confident in naval skill, hugged, according to the sea phrase, the southern shore as far as Patræ; and thence, in the night, pushed across for the Acarnanian coast: their object being less to fight the Athenians, than to join their allies in the prosecution of the preconcerted purposes of the campaign. The daring vigilance of Phormion surprised them in the middle of the passage. Though it was night, yet being perfectly clear and calm, they perceived his approach at some distance. Immediately they formed their fleet in a circle, the largest they could, so as not to give opportunity for that evolution of piercing the line, called the diecplus, in which the Athenians excelled, and which their enemies dreaded. The prows of course were on all sides outward; the transports², with a reserve of five of the swiftest triremes, were stationed in the centre; and thus, in posture of defence, as if to oppose an enemy who outnumbered them, forty-seven triremes remained to receive the attack of the twenty under Phormion, if, which they could not readily believe, he should be bold enough to attack them.

^{c. 84.} But the Athenian admiral, confident in his own abilities and experience, and in the practised skill of his people, and observing the order of the enemy to be

² Τὰ λιπτὰ πλοῖα.

very readily susceptible of confusion, bore immediately upon them with his line of battle formed a-head, and rowed around them ; having first directed his captains to threaten as near as possible, so as to avoid engaging, till they should have the signal from him. He well knew that when the breeze from the gulf sprang up, which seldom failed about daybreak, the enemy's circle could not long remain perfect ; and his purpose was, by alarming, to hasten and enhance the confusion. It happened precisely as he foresaw : the first of the breeze drove the windward ships against the transports in the centre : confusion immediately arose ; clamour, with expostulation from ship to ship, ensued ; orders were no longer heard ; signals remained unobserved ; the attention of the crews was wholly engaged in obviating the continually threatened shock of one ship against another, or of many against one ; and the swell, quickly arising, sufficed to prevent any effectual use of oars by rowers so little skilful. Phormion seized the critical moment for giving the signal of attack. In the first onset one of the Corinthian admirals was sunk ; several other ships were quickly disabled ; and such was the confusion that resistance was scarcely attempted, but the first effort of the Peloponnesians was to fly toward the friendly ports of Patræ and Dyme. The Athenians took twelve triremes, the greater part of whose crews they put to the sword. Having pursued as far as was judged convenient, they returned with their prizes to the Ætolian coast ; according to the usual practice, which landlocked and stormy seas, the want of the compass, and the deficiency of accommodation in the ancient ships of war made necessary. On the headland of Rhium they raised a trophy, and dedicated to Neptune one of the captive triremes. After these ceremonies they returned to their station at Naupactus. Then the defeated Peloponnesians moved from the places of their first refuge to the Elean port of Cyllene, where

Cnemus, with the forces from Acarnania, soon after joined them.

This action of Phormion, though the forces employed on either side were too small for the consequences to be very important, yet for the boldness of the attempt, the ability displayed in the execution, and the completeness of the success, has been deservedly reckoned by Plutarch among ^{Thucyd. 1. 2.} the most brilliant achievements of the war.³ It c. 85.

appears to have disturbed, not a little, the Peloponnesians, and particularly the Lacedæmonians. Those who directed the administration of their government, unversed in naval affairs, could not readily conceive a superiority of science among the Athenian commanders, and of skill among their seamen, that should give the advantage against more than double their numbers without great misbehaviour on the part of their own people; especially as in land war the superiority of the Peloponnesians, to all the world besides, was held incontestable. The unwise practice of dividing military command, ordinary with most of the other Greeks, was little usual with the Lacedæmonians; but now, in some indignation that the Peloponnesian navy should, by a squadron of only twenty ships, be excluded from the western seas, which were esteemed more peculiarly their own, three Spartan officers, Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron, were sent to be of council with Cnemus in his

c. 86. command. The ships damaged in the late action

were diligently repaired; a re-enforcement was required from the maritime states of Peloponnesus; and a fleet of seventy-seven triremes was thus collected, which proceeded from Cyllene to Panormus on the Achæan coast; where a land army, in the ancient manner of naval war gene-

³ We find a compliment to Phormion, which seems to mark the popularity of his character, in the comedy of Aristophanes called *The Knights*, v. 551.

rally capable of advantageous co-operation with a fleet, was also assembled.

Phormion, informed of these preparations, had sent intelligence of them to Athens, and desired a re-enforcement. Twenty triremes were in consequence ordered to join him. It is upon this occasion that we first discover in history the importance of the loss of Pericles, and the want of those superior abilities for the direction of public affairs, which had hitherto, in so great a degree, obviated misfortune and commanded success. Nicias, a Cretan of Gortynium, having in view to advance his own power, proposed to the Athenian government the reduction of Cydonia in Crete, a member of the Peloponnesian confederacy. It would be an easy conquest, he said, for the fleet which was ready to sail for Naupactus, and, with the assistance to be readily procured within the island, could occasion little delay. The Athenian people were ill-advised enough to decree as he desired. The armament went to Crete, and ravaged without opposition the Cydonian lands; but the town was found so strong, and its people so determined, that there appeared no probability of taking it without the tedious process of a siege, or perhaps a blockade. The commanders would have then hastened their voyage to Naupactus, but contrary winds detained them long in Crete.

Meantime Phormion was left to exert his abilities and his vigilance against an enemy who too much outnumbered him. Yet though they had nearly four times his strength, so confident was he in superior skill that not only he did not refuse, but he appears to have been desirous to meet them wherever he could have sea-room. Moving therefore from Naupactus, he took a station just without the gulf, near the headland of the Molycrian or northern Rhium; and a small army, composed chiefly of Naupactian Messenians, joined his naval camp

Thucyd. I. 2.
c. 85.

c. 88.

c. 90.

on the shore, to assist in case of any attempt from a superior force upon the fleet in its station. This movement was not without danger, as the event proved ; but the apprehension that the squadron expected from Attica might be intercepted and overpowered by the Peloponnesian fleet, appears to have been his motive for quitting the security of his station at Naupactus, before that assistance arrived.

The Peloponnesians, however, with all their advantage of numbers, with all the pride of reputed pre-eminence in arms, and all the zeal of the Lacedæmonian commanders to incite them, so felt their inferiority in naval action, from the event of the late engagement, that they perseveringly avoided the open, and directed their endeavours to draw the Athenians into the narrow sea. From Panormus, which is a little within the gulf, and nearly opposite Naupactus, they moved to the Achæan or southern Rhium, overagainst the station of the Athenians. The two headlands, forming the mouth of the gulf, are less than a mile asunder : the stations of the two fleets would be somewhat more.

Thucyd. 1. 2.
c. 86. During six or seven days they watched one another without moving. The Peloponnesians then practised a stratagem, apparently well imagined, for forcing the Athenian admiral to action within the gulf. The town of Naupactus, while its youth were in the army attending the Athenian fleet, was left almost without defence. At daybreak the Peloponnesians moved eastward, along the Achæan coast, in a column with four triremes abreast ; twenty of the swiftest forming an advanced guard. Phormion was immediately in alarm for Naupactus. Hastening his people aboard from the naval camp, he proceeded eastward by the northern coast of the gulf, with his line of battle formed a-head ; the Messenians at the same time pressing their march along the shore toward their town. This was precisely what the Peloponnesians wished. They no sooner

saw the Athenian fleet irrecoverably engaged within the straits than, trusting to the advanced guard for preventing its escape into the harbour of Naupactus, they formed for action in line of battle abreast, and pushed across the gulf.

The eleven headmost ships of the Athenian line, through superior swiftness, outstretching the right wing of the Peloponnesians, escaped attack: the nine others were intercepted, overpowered, and forced ashore. One was taken with its whole crew: all fell into the hands of the Peloponnesians; but, of their people, many escaped by swimming; the rest were mostly put to the sword. What followed, reported by the authoritative pen of Thucydides, proves how important, in the ancient system of naval war, the co-operation of an army might be to a fleet. The brave Messenians, zealous in hereditary enmity to Lacedæmon, arriving on the beach, dashed completely armed through the surf, boarded the stranded galleys, and, driving out the conquerors, recovered all; though some were already taken in tow.

Meanwhile the twenty galleys of the Peloponnesian advanced guard were pursuing the eleven Athenian which had overstretched the main body. Ten of these reached the harbour of Naupactus; and, forming against the shore, prepared to resist any attack that might be attempted against them. A Leucadian trireme, the swiftest of the allied fleet, in which was Timocrates, the first of the Lacedæmonian commissioners appointed to be of council with the admiral, pursued the eleventh, and gained upon her so fast, that to escape into the harbour of Naupactus seemed impossible. It happened that a large merchant-ship was lying at anchor off the harbour's mouth. The Athenian captain having passed this vessel, turned close round it, and judged his time so well, and managed the evolution with such combined

Thucyd. 1. 2.
c. 91.

c. 92.

c. 91.

rapidity and exactness, that with his beak he struck the galley of the amazed Leucadians amidship, and with such force that she presently sunk. Timocrates, in a fit of passionate despair, stabbed himself; and his gored body, floating into the harbour of Naupactus, was taken up there. The rest of the advanced squadron was following in a disorderly manner, the crews singing the song of triumph, as if already completely conquerors.⁴ The catastrophe of their comrades, happening within sight of all, astonished and alarmed them. Some rested on their oars to await the main body of their fleet: but the main body of their fleet was far off, and the enemy near. Some, through ignorance of the coast, struck upon shoals. Their hesitation and distress were as a signal to the Athenians in the harbour. The Athenians, quickly aware of all circumstances, advanced in good order against the enemy yet in confusion. The contest was not long: the Peloponnesians fled for their port of Panormus, on the opposite coast of the gulf, distant about seven miles, losing six triremes taken by the Athenians. The main body of their fleet, too distant to give any considerable support, and apparently fearful of passing the night on a hostile coast with which they were imperfectly acquainted, also sought the security of the port.⁵ The success of the Athenians was altogether extraordinary: they took six of the enemy's triremes; they sunk one; they recovered all their own which had been taken or forced ashore, excepting

⁴ The song of battle and the song of victory, both hymns to the gods, one a prayer before battle, and at the same time a signal for engaging, the other a thanksgiving for success, were equally called Pæan; but Thucydides distinguishes that it was the song of triumph which was sung upon this occasion;—*Ἐπαινίζον τε ἄμα πλέοντες, ὡς νενικήστες.*

⁵ Thucydides does not with his usual accuracy account for the inefficiency of the main body of the Peloponnesian fleet in the latter part of the day. Perhaps there was among them something of that mismanagement frequently incident to confederate armaments, of which he was not himself perfectly informed.

only that which had fallen into the enemy's hands with its crew aboard; they collected the wreck and their own slain; they restored the slain of the enemy only through the customary ceremony of a truce solicited for the purpose; and, erecting their trophy, which was an easy part of the business, they vindicated to themselves, against a force so superior, every ordinary mark of decided victory. The Peloponnesians also erected a trophy at the Achæan Rhium, on pretence of their success in the early part of the day, and placed by it the single captured ship which had not been retaken, as an offering to the god of the sea.

If the event of the former action against Phormion had excited indignation at Lacedæmon, that of the recent battle would give Cnemus, and his two surviving coadjutors, to apprehend no very favourable reception on their return thither. A project therefore occurring, while the fleet remained yet assembled on the Corinthian coast, for attempting an important stroke against the enemy before they dispersed for the winter, was received, particularly by the enterprising Brasidas, with eager joy. It was known to the Megarians that the Athenian government, secure in naval superiority, left their harbour of Piræus without an adequate guard. That most important place therefore it was proposed to surprise. A select body of seamen was marched by land to Megara, each carrying his oar, with its bag and thong.⁶ Arriving in the evening, they

⁶ Τὴν κάπην καὶ τὸ ὑπηρέσιον καὶ τὸ τροχωτῆρα. — Cum singulis remis, et singulis pulvinis, quos sibi remigantibus substernerent, et cum singulis scalmis. — Τρηπέσιον ἔστι τὸ κῶμας ἦπικάθηνται οἱ ἵεροντες, διὰ τὸ μὴ συντείσεσθαι αὐτῶν τὰς πυγὰς. — Schol. This passage of Thucydides, and the Latin translation, and the scholiast's interpretation have been already noticed in the Appendix to the 8th chapter of this history. In the former editions I proposed for those who have leisure for the inquiry to decide whether the ὑπηρέσιον of Thucydides may have been such a case or bag, rather than a cushion to sit upon. Nothing having, to my knowledge, been advanced against the supposition, I have now ventured to adopt it in the text.

with all haste launched forty triremes which had been laid up in the port of Nisaea, and putting immediately to sea made for the Attic coast. A contrary wind presently arising gave them to apprehend that they should not be able to reach Piræus in time to accomplish a surprise. Doubtful therefore of the possibility of executing their original plan, they determined upon a smaller enterprise, which was clearly within their power. Instead of pushing for Piræus, they debarked on Salamis. Notice communicated to Athens, by fire-beacons, raised an alarm there, says Thucydides, equal to anything experienced in the course of the war. The immediate apprehension was, that the Peloponnesians were already in Piræus ; and the inhabitants of that place supposed them at least masters of the town of Salamis, and that attack on themselves would presently follow. At daybreak the whole strength of Athens moved down to the port ; a strong garrison was appointed to Piræus, while the galleys were hastily launched and manned. The danger however was over almost as soon as known. The Peloponnesians meanwhile collected some booty, made some defenceless people prisoners, seized three triremes from which the crews had fled, and then hastened back to Nisaea, not without apprehension that their leaky vessels might founder before they reached that port. Had the Peloponnesians persevered, says Thucydides, in their first design, supposing no hindrance from the wind, they might easily have succeeded. The event therefore was salutary to Athens, by the admonition it gave. A proper guard was thenceforward kept in Piræus, the mouth of the harbour was shut with a chain, and precaution was observed against surprises.

Winter, considered as forbidding naval enterprise, now approaching, the Peloponnesian seamen returned to their fleet, the ships were sent to their several homes, and laid up. But the active Phormion did not let the severe season

pass unemployed. A party adverse to that which favoured the Athenian alliance was strong in some of the Acarnanian towns. As soon as certain intelligence arrived that the Peloponnesian fleet was dispersed, nothing remaining to be feared for Naupactus, he sailed to Astacus. Debarking there four hundred heavy-armed Athenians and as many Messenians, he marched through Acarnania, and, concerting measures with the friendly at Stratus, Coronta, and other principal towns, he banished the obnoxious. Such was the precarious condition of the people of the Grecian republics, the population everywhere divided into parties, and the families of each uncertain when they might not be expelled from their little state, to seek their livelihood by adventure or beggary. Oeniadæ, strongly situated among marshes near the mouth of the Achelous, alone of all the Acarnanian cities maintained its alliance with the Peloponnesians. Phormion then re-embarking with his escort returned to Naupactus. In spring he proceeded to Athens, taking with him the captured ships, and the prisoners: of whom the freemen were shortly exchanged for so many Athenians, prisoners with the Peloponnesians.

During these transactions in the western part of Greece, while in Lacedæmon and Athens war seemed to sleep for the winter, far more alarming movements occurred on the northern borders. Philip, brother of Perdiccas king of Macedonia, dying, his son Amyntas claimed the succession to the principality which he had held in upper Macedonia. Perdiccas, who had proposed to deprive his brother of that little subordinate sovereignty, seized it on his death. What the Macedonian law on the subject may have been we have no information, and perhaps it was not very well defined. Amyntas however resorted to the neighbouring powerful sovereign of

c. 95.

Ch. 13. s. 4.
of this Hist.

Thrace, Sitalces. This prince, by his recent alliance with Athens, for what advantages in return is not said, had engaged to compel the revolted dependencies of Athens in Chalcidice to return to their obedience. Ready therefore with his army he took Amyntas under his patronage ; and, Perdiccas refusing to reinstate his nephew in the principality which had been held by his brother, he resolved to dethrone Perdiccas, and make Amyntas king of Macedonia.

Xen. Hel. l. 7. Winter was approaching ; but with the Thracians, in severer climate, winter warfare, we find, was more common than with the Greeks. The forces of

Thucyd. l. 2. c. 98. Sitalces, unlike the little armies of the Grecian republics, almost rivalled in numbers the hosts of

Asia : but, far alien from Asiatic effeminacy, Thrace was held by the Greeks themselves to be the favourite residence of Ares and Enyo, or, as the Romans named them, Mars and Bellona, the deities of war. Sitalces put himself at the head of, it is said, a hundred thousand foot and fifty thousand horse ; and, taking with him the Macedonian prince, marched toward that inland district of the Macedonian kingdom, which had been his father's appanage. Here Amyntas had

c. 100. still friends, and the towns of Gortynia and Atalanta readily opened their gates to his protector.

Perdiccas, though of no mean talents, and commanding a considerable dominion, yet weakened by civil war with the princes of his family, was utterly unequal to meet the Thracian army in battle. With his cavalry only he attended upon its motions, while his people sought refuge, some in the fortified towns ; but as these in Macedonia, a country yet little improved, were few and small, the greater part fled to the marshes, woods, and mountains.

The first opposition that Sitalces met was from the town of Idomene, which he took by assault. He next attacked Europus ; but, unskilled in sieges, and unprovided for them,

he there failed. Meanwhile the Macedonian horse, armed for defence in the Grecian manner, did not fear to meet superior numbers ; and it was found that against the most numerous body of Thracians, wherever they made a charge, they made an impression. Being nevertheless constantly in the end overpowered, and continually liable to be surrounded, they soon desisted from efforts which were found unavailing. All the open country therefore was at the mercy of the Thracian prince : the provinces of Mygdonia, Grestonia, Anthemous, and Æmathia were wasted. It had been concerted with the Athenian government, that an Athenian fleet should co-operate with the Thracian army : but with so little expectation that Sitalces would perform his engagement at that season, or so little disposition among the Athenians to meet the usual storms of that season in vessels so ill adapted to bear them as the ancient ships of war, the fleet was never sent. As soon however as it was known that the Thracian prince had actually entered Macedonia, an embassy was despatched to apologise for the omission, carrying presents, as the Thracian custom required. Sitalces, not to fail in his part of the engagement, sent a part of his army into Chalcidice, to the gratification of the revenge, rather than of any real interest of the Athenian people. The ravage of that country was added to the destruction made through so many other provinces, but the people found personal security in their towns : for against a Grecian town, moderately fortified, unless by surprise or by the slow operation of a blockade, all the force of Thrace was little efficacious.

The apprehensions excited by the fame of the vast army of Sitalces were not confined to Macedonia. All the Greeks, as far as Thermopylæ, were in alarm, and took measures for resisting the storm, should it reach them. The various clans of free Thracians, north of the Strymon, were not less

Thucyd. I. 2.
c. 101.

apprehensive and not less in motion. But want and the rigour of the season began soon to press severely upon such a multitude, so unprovided as the army of Sitalces.⁷ The able Perdiccas used the opportunity for negotiation. He found means, through confidential persons, to communicate with Seuthes, nephew and principal favourite of the Thracian monarch. Stratonice, sister of Perdiccas, was offered him in marriage, with a large portion. The intrigue succeeded : the restoration of Amyntas to his father's principality was of course allowed ; and, after a month spent in wasting Macedonia and Chalcidice, but no farther purpose of the expedition accomplished, Sitalces led his forces home. A treaty of amity followed between the two monarchs, and the Macedonian princess gave her hand to Seuthes.

SECTION III.

Fourth Campaign. — Third Invasion of Attica. — Revolt of Mitylene. — Flight of Part of the Garrison of Platea. — Siege of Mitylene by Paches. — Distress and Exertions of Athens. — Transactions under the Lacedæmonian Alcidas and the Athenian Paches on the Ionian Coast.

IN the former summer, as we have seen, invasion Thucyd. I. 3.
c. I. B.C. 428.
OL. 87.4—88.1.
P. W. 4. of Attica was intermitted by the Peloponnesians ; but in the year to whose transactions we now proceed, the fourth of the war, they entered that country for the third time, still under the command of the Spartan king Archidamus. They chose, as usual, the season just before harvest, and extensive waste followed : but the Athenian cavalry was successful in desultory attacks, and re-

⁷ There is a remarkable resemblance between this expedition of the king of Thrace, as compendiously related by Thucydides, and that of the Khan of Crim Tartary, described at large by Baron Tott, who accompanied the Tartar prince in his winter campaign, in war between Russia and Turkey.

pressed the excursions of the Peloponnesian light troops beyond the protection of their heavy-armed, so that the lands immediately around Athens were little infested. After no long stay, the Peloponnesian army, having consumed the small stores brought with it, and what could be collected in Attica, returned home and was disbanded.

But new troubles were preparing for Athens, the more dangerous as they had their source in the defective constitution of the empire. Among its most valuable and most powerful dependencies was the island of Lesbos, about forty miles long only, and ten wide, yet divided between six republics, each claiming its separate and equal independency of all the rest, though all owned the sovereignty of the Athenian people. But in population and power Mitylene and Methymne were far superior to any of the other four. A consideration for their *Æolian* extraction tended <sup>Thucyd. I. 3.
c. 2.</sup> to dispose all to the Lacedæmonian alliance; but more especially to the Bœotian, rather than to the Athenian, to which the course of events, the naval superiority of Athens, and their own situation as islanders, had led them. But the momentary interest of faction overwhelmed all other considerations; deadened all feeling for the ties of blood, and blinded to all views of enlarged policy. In Methymne the democratical party was decidedly superior, and its people held close alliance with those of the neighbouring island of Tenedos, who were influenced by the same political principles. The Methymnæans and Tenedians were therefore warmly attached to Athens. But in Mitylene the aristocratical party was powerful; and an aristocratical party, if not even oppressed, must be always insecure, where Athenian influence prevailed. Nor could men of observation and foresight consider, without great apprehension, what had already befallen other states of the Athenian confederacy; all of which, except those of Lesbos and Chios,

were deprived of their marine, forbidden even fortifications for their defence, and reduced to complete subjection under the despotic will of the Athenian multitude.

Accordingly, before the war broke out between Athens and Lacedæmon, the principal Mitylenæans had sent offers to the Lacedæmonian administration to renounce the Athenian, and reunite themselves with the Peloponnesian confederacy. Their views indeed extended farther than the mere change of their domestic constitution and foreign

Thucyd. 1. 3. c. 5. connections: they proposed to reduce the rival

republic of Methymne, or at least to repress the democracy there; they had already a secure influence in the four inferior commonwealths; and thus the whole island would be brought under one dominion, in which they would have the principal, if not the sole authority. The Lacedæmonians however seem to have judged far better on the occasion than the Mitylenæans. Aware that they were utterly incapable of protecting an ally, across the Ægean, against the Athenian navy, they declined the proposal. The former sentiments nevertheless continuing to animate the Mitylenæans, when they saw the Athenians, between invasion and pestilence, in deep distress, they thought the season favourable for the execution of their project: they built ships of war; they strengthened the walls of their town; they took measures for giving security to their harbour; they imported corn from the Euxine to form magazines; and they increased their military force by hiring archers from the same parts.

c. 3. Information of these transactions at Mitylene,

and of the prevailing political sentiments there, was repeatedly given to the Athenians by the Methymnaeans, by the Tenedians, and by the democratical party in Mitylene itself; but in the dejection of the public mind, under severe and complicated calamity, there was great unwillingness to

give it credit. At length commissioners of inquiry and inspection were sent, with a requisition for the Mitylenæans to desist from measures which gave alarm to the neighbouring commonwealth of Methymne, and umbrage to Athens. The Mitylenæans nevertheless continued active in preparation. On the return of the commissioners then the energy of the Athenian administration and people was roused, and it was determined to use every exertion for checking, in its beginning, an evil which, in its progress, might involve the ruin of the commonwealth.

The Peloponnesian army had now quitted Attica; and the news of the extraordinary successes of Phormion, manifesting a decided superiority in the Athenian marine, had somewhat reanimated administration and people. A squadron of forty triremes, under the command of Cleippides, was ready to sail on an expedition against the Peloponnesian coast. It was recollectcd, by the Athenian administration, that the festival of the Maloeian Apollo was approaching, in the celebration of which the whole Mitylenæan people would go in procession out of the city. Cleippides was ordered with his squadron to surprise them in the performance of this ceremony; but apparently a vote of the general assembly was deemed necessary to authorise the measure. To prevent the communication of intelligence therefore, ten Lesbian triremes, then in the ports of Attica as auxiliaries to the Athenian fleet, were stopped, and their crews put into safe custody. A private Lesbian nevertheless carried the intelligence. Hastening to Geræstus in Eubœa, and procuring a small vessel, he reached Mitylene on the third day from Athens. The Mitylenæans in consequence kept within their walls, and prepared for defence. Cleippides arriving shortly after, and finding the intended surprise frustrated, demanded the surrender of all ships of war, and the demolition of the fortifications of the

Thucyd. I. 3.
c. 4.

city; informing the Mitylenæans that his instructions required him, in case of refusal, to denounce war against them, and immediately to begin operations. The Mitylenæans, yet incompletely prepared, endeavoured to gain time by negotiation; and Cleippides, thinking his force insufficient for the reduction of the place, permitted them to send a deputation to Athens. The deputies were directed to assure the Athenian people that no defection from political engagements had been intended by the Mitylenæans; and, to give some colour to the assertion, one of the persons who had sent intelligence to Athens, but who had been gained over to the ruling party in Mitylene, was appointed of the deputation. Looking however only for the relief of delay from this sinister measure, the Mitylenæans at the same time privately despatched information to Lacedæmon, with solicitation for assistance.

Thucyd. I. 3.
c. 5. The Mitylenæan deputies returning from Athens without procuring any relaxation of the terms required, both parties prepared for hostilities. All Lesbos declared for the Mitylenæans, except Methymne, whose whole force joined the Athenian armament; and this was farther strengthened from Imbrus, Lemnos, and other places. The Mitylenæans at first endeavoured to gain credit to their cause by making a parade of their strength in taking the field against the Athenians; but, after an action in which, though not defeated, no advantage was obtained, they retired within their fortifications. Then the Athenian general sent with more confidence to require assistance from the other allies: and these came in with readier zeal as they began to conceive a worse opinion of the Mitylenæan affairs. The siege of Mitylene was thus regular formed.

c. 8. Ol. 88.
B. C. 428.
July. The Mitylenæan ministers arriving at Sparta, found no very earnest disposition to engage in their cause. The Lacedæmonian government

would neither of itself undertake it, nor call a congress of the confederacy. The season of the Olympian festival, the Mitylenæans were coldly told, was at hand. At Olympia they would find some principal persons of every state of the Lacedæmonian alliance, and there might have opportunity to learn how each was disposed. Going accordingly, they found readier favour among the subordinate than in the imperial government. After the conclusion of the festival, a meeting of deputies of the several states being held, it was determined to receive the Lesbians into alliance, and to make immediately a diversion in their favour by a fresh invasion of Attica. Summons were issued for two-thirds of the force of the confederacy to repair without delay to Corinth; and, to give new efficacy to the invasion, frames were prepared, on which to drag the triremes, which lay in the Corinthian gulf, across the isthmus, that a fleet might co-operate with the army: for, weakened as the Athenians were by the pestilence, by the repeated waste of their territory, and by the distraction of their forces, it was supposed impossible that they could make any considerable opposition by sea, without withdrawing their squadrons employed in the siege of Lesbos and on the coast of Thrace, and thus they would expose their maritime dependencies.

This new crisis roused the spirit of the Athenian administration and people. It was indeed become of the utmost importance to show that they had still resolution to dare, and still strength to execute. The formidable state of their navy at this time, which enabled so small a commonwealth to command such extensive dominion, and to resist such a powerful confederacy, is indeed truly wonderful, and does the highest honour to the foresight and exertions of Themistocles, by whom it was first raised, and of Pericles, by whom principally it was main-

Thucyd. I. 3.
c. 15.

c. 16. & 17.

tained and improved. Forty triremes were at this time employed at Lesbos, ten on the Thracian coast; thirty under Asopius son of Phormion were circumnavigating and ravaging Peloponnesus: and guard-ships were in various parts of the coasts of Attica and Eubœa. None were called in. A hundred remaining ready for service in the harbour of Piræus, it was determined immediately to use these. Every Athenian was in some degree a seaman. Excepting only those of the highest orders, distinguished by the titles of knights and *pentacosiomedimnians*, to whom, with the superannuated and the minors, the charge of the city was left, all within the age for foreign service, resident foreigners

^{August.} as well as Athenians, were required aboard. The

fleet moving immediately for the isthmus, displayed its strength in sight of the Peloponnesians; who remained in their ports motionless. Debarkations were made at pleasure, on various parts of the Peloponnesian coast, and a watch was kept on the movements of the Peloponnesian army.

The Lacedæmonian leaders were astonished and distressed by this well-judged and successful bravado. They had con-
Thucyd. I. 3.
c. 16. fided in the report of the weakness of Athens, which the Lesbians were led by their interest to exaggerate. They had depended upon the compliance of

^{c. 15.} their allies with the summons for their proportions of troops for the invasion of Attica; and there

too they were disappointed. Where the people are at the same time cultivators and soldiers, they cannot be always ready to go on distant expeditions, and leave the care of their domestic affairs to women and slaves. The Peloponnesians were now busy with their harvest; they were already wearied with fruitless invasions of Attica, and they delayed to obey the call to arms. Meanwhile intelligence arriving that the armament under Asopius was ravaging Laconia, the

projected invasion of Attica was abandoned, and the Lacedæmonian forces marched home. Then the Athenian fleet also retired within its ports.

The purpose of the Lacedæmonian government to obviate the immediate pressure of the siege of Mitylene had nevertheless been in some degree fulfilled. <sup>Thucyd. I. 3.
c. 18.</sup> The Athenian force in Lesbos was so little equal to its object that the Mitylenæans, holding intelligence with the aristocratical faction in Methymne, marched to that place in hope of having it betrayed to them. They were disappointed; but in their return they regulated, at leisure, the affairs of the subordinate republics of Antissa, Pyra, and Eresus, and, without any effectual opposition from Cleippides, returned into Mitylene. Upon receiving intelligence of this, the Athenian government sent Paches son of Epicurus with a re-enforcement of a thousand heavy-armed Athenians, to take the command in Lesbos. This sufficed to insure superiority; and by the beginning of winter a contravallation was completed, and Mitylene was blockaded by land and sea. ^{Begin. Octob.}

The expenses of the war however had been so great to Athens that its treasury, wealthy as it had been at the beginning, was now exhausted. The daily pay of every Athenian foot-soldier on distant service (Thucydides mentions particularly those employed in the siege of Potidaea) was no less than two Attic drachmas, about twenty pence English; one drachma for his own subsistence, the other for a slave-servant. The pay of the fleet was the same. Thucydides does not specify that the seamen had their servants aboard, but, what may imply the contrary, he says that the thousand soldiers, who went with Paches to Lesbos, themselves rowed the vessels which carried them. Upon other occasions also we find Athenian soldiers doing duties that would seem to be rather the

business of servants, if any were attending; and as none are mentioned by the historian, we must suppose the indulgence was not always allowed. Sieges were the most expensive military operations of the age, and generally lasting. Extraordinary measures therefore were necessary to provide means for prosecuting the siege of Mitylene; and accord-

^{Thucyd. I. 3.} _{c. 19.} ingly now, for the first time, a contribution, apparently in the way of a free gift, was collected from the Athenian citizens, to the amount of two hundred talents. This manner of taxation became afterward, as was likely in a government where the multitude was despotic, a source of intolerable oppression upon the higher ranks. A reduction of pay to the soldiers and seamen seems to have taken place, as a correspondent tax upon the lower; for we learn from Thucydides, that the pay was afterwards considerably below what he states it to have been till this time. Exactions from the subject cities supplied the farther wants of the commonwealth.

^{c. 20.} While the vengeance of Athens was thus directed against the seceders from its confederacy, its faithful allies of the little republic of Plataea seem to have been forgotten. Closely blockaded now for above a year and a half, distress was coming fast upon them. It was already winter: they had nearly consumed their stores, relief was despaired of, to hold out much longer was impossible, and from their besiegers no mercy was expected. In this situation of their affairs the commander of the garrison, Eupolidas, encouraged by his friend Thænetus, who was, either by reputation or by office, a prophet, proposed to attempt his escape, by forcing their passage across the enemy's lines. The proposal was at first joyfully accepted by the whole garrison, and preparation was made zealously for the execution: but on the nearer view of so hazardous an undertaking full half retracted. About two hundred and

twenty however persevered with the commander. Friendly union fortunately remained between the parties, and co-operation proceeded probably the more readily, as, on one side, it would be considered that escape would be easier for half than all, and, on the other, that when half were gone, subsistence would last longer for the remainder, while relief from allies, or other favourable contingencies, might be hoped for. Accordingly ladders were prepared, equal to the height of the enemy's wall, which was calculated by counting the rows of bricks. The interval between the walls of circumvallation and contravallation, to use terms the nearest to the purpose that our language possesses, was sixteen feet. This space, being roofed, formed barracks for the besieging army, the appearance being that of one thick wall ^{Thucyd. I. 5. : c. 21.} with a parapet and battlements on each side. At the interval of every ten battlements were towers of equal width with the space enclosed by the walls; and in these the guards of the besieging army were kept, and, in bad weather the sentries sheltered.

It was midwinter when all was ready for the undertaking. A dark stormy night was chosen, with rain and sleet falling. The adventurers <sup>B. C. 427,
after 25th
January.
Thucyd. I. 3. : c. 22.</sup> were all compactly armed; and to tread more surely on the slippery soil, they went with the right foot bare. To avoid the clashing of arms, keeping distance, they directed their way to the middle of the interval between two towers. They passed the ditch unperceived, and then placing ladders, twelve light-armed, with only a short sword and a breastplate, mounted under the command of Ammeas son of Corœbus, who himself led. On reaching the top they divided, six toward each tower, and waited. Others meanwhile hastened to support them, light-armed with small spears; their shields, that they might climb more nimbly, were borne by those who followed. Many had already

mounted, while the din of the storm and the extreme darkness of the night prevented discovery, when a tile, accidentally thrown from a battlement, fell with so much noise as to alarm the guard in the neighbouring tower. The call to arms was immediate, and the whole besieging army was quickly in motion. The remaining garrison, according to the plan concerted, attentive to this, sallied from the opposite part of the town, and made a feigned attack upon the contravallation. The besieging army being thus distracted, and in darkness and tempest unable to discover what were the real circumstances, none dared quit his post : a body of three hundred only, appointed as a picket-guard to move whithersoever emergency might require, went without the wall of circumvallation, directing their march by the clamour. Fire signals were raised to give notice to Thebes ; but, to render these unintelligible, the garrison formed similar signals in various part of the town.

Meanwhile those Platæans who first mounted the wall had forced the towers on each side, put the guards to the sword, and proceeding by their ladders to the tops of the towers, discharged missile weapons with advantage against those who approached to disturb the passage of their comrades. To make the passing easier, the parapet between the towers was thrown down : ladders were placed on the outside, and every one, as soon as over the outer ditch, forming on the counterscarp, with arrows and darts co-operated with those on the towers in protecting the rest. To cross the ditch however was not easy ; for there was much water in it, frozen, but not so as to bear ; and before those from the tower-tops, who were the last to descend, could pass, the enemy's picket-guard approached. But the torches which these carried, of little use to themselves, enabled the Platæans to direct missile weapons against them, and so efficaciously as to give opportunity for the last of their own people

to reach the unbroken ground. All then hastened off, and struck directly into the Theban road, as that which they would least be expected to take, leaving the temple of the hero Androcrates on the right; so Thucydides describes their march. The stratagem was completely successful: they could plainly perceive the Peloponnesians with their torches pursuing along the Athenian road by Dryocephalæ toward mount Cithæron. Having themselves followed the Theban road about three quarters of a mile, they turned short to the right, and passing by Erythræ and Hysiæ, soon gained the mountains, whence they proceeded securely to Athens.

Of those who engaged in this hazardous but well-planned and ably-executed enterprise, two hundred and twelve profited from its success: none were killed; one only was taken on the counterscarp of the circumvallation; five or six returned into the town without attempting to scale the wall. These told the garrison that their comrades, who persevered, were all cut off. Next morning therefore a herald was sent to solicit the dead for burial, and by his return the success of the undertaking was first known in the town.

Relief of Mitylene meanwhile was not neglected at Lacedæmon. Requisitions were sent to the several maritime states of the confederacy to furnish their proportion of a fleet of forty ships of war; and toward spring, while these were preparing, Salæthus was forwarded with a single trireme to inspect the state of things, and direct what might be necessary. Salæthus, landing at Pyrrha, learnt that the contravallation, where it crossed a deep water-course, was incomplete, and he found opportunity that way to enter Mitylene. The people, pressed by the able and vigorous conduct of Paches in the command of the besieging armament, were already talking of capitulation: but the exhortations of Sa-

Thucyd. 1.3.
c. 16.

c. 25.

After 23d Feb.

B. C. 427.
P. W. 5.
Thucyd. I. 3.
c. 26.

læthus, with assurance of speedy succour, encouraged them to persevere in defence. Early in summer the fleet, which the zeal of the confederacy had increased to forty-two ships of war, sailed for Mitylene under the command of Alcidas ; and, shortly after, the Peloponnesian army, commanded by Cleomenes, as regent for his minor nephew Pausanias, son of the banished king Plistoanax, invaded Attica. Not only the produce of the earth was destroyed, wherever cultivation had been attempted in the tract formerly ravaged, but parts of the country before untouched, were now laid waste ; so that, excepting that of the second year of the war, this was the most destructive inroad that Attica had experienced.

c. 29.

Meanwhile, Alcidas loitering long on the coast of Peloponnesus, and then not pressing his voyage across the Ægean, the Mitylenæans, distressed by scarcity of provisions, began to despair of timely succour. Sa-

c. 27.

læthus himself at length grew hopeless of that assistance of which he had brought the promise ; but he thought he saw a resource in the yet unexerted strength of the garrison. The oligarchical party in Mitylene, according to a policy common in the Grecian commonwealths, reserved to themselves exclusively the complete armour and efficacious weapons of the heavy-armed, and allowed the lower people the use of the inferior arms, and the practice of the inferior discipline, of the light-armed only. Salæthus, who, in an oligarchy supported by the extraordinary institutions of Lycurgus, was accustomed to see all the citizens, without inconvenience, equally intrusted with the completest armour, and trained in the completest discipline, thought that to enable the Mitylenæans, instead of starving within their walls, to meet Paches in the field, nothing was wanting but to distribute among the lower people the arms lying in their stores. The experiment was made

under his authority, but the event was very wide of his hope. The lower people were no sooner vested with this new military importance than they assumed civil control; they held their own assemblies; they required that the remaining stock of provisions should be open to public inspection, and distributed equally to the people of all ranks; and they threatened, in case of refusal, to make immediately their own terms with the Athenians. In this state of things, the leading men thought no time was to be lost: they proposed at once to the people to treat for a capitulation, in which all should be included. This was approved: a herald was sent to the Athenian general, and the following hard terms were accepted: That the Mitylenæans should surrender themselves to the pleasure of the Athenian people: That the Athenian army should be immediately admitted into the city: That the Mitylenæans should send deputies to Athens to plead their cause: That, before the return of these, the Athenian general should neither put to death, reduce to slavery, nor imprison any Mitylenæan. The concluding stipulation was intended particularly for the security of those of the aristocratical party who had been active in the negotiation with Lacedæmon. Many of them nevertheless, whether doubtful of Athenian faith, or apprehensive of vengeance from their fellow-citizens, who through their means chiefly had been led to their present disastrous situation, took refuge at the altars. Paches removed them under a guard to the island of Tenedos, there to await the judgment of the Athenian people. Such was the unhappy state of politics in the Grecian republics.

Alcidas, with the fleet which should have relieved Mitylene, was no farther advanced than the islands of Icarus and Myconus, when report of its surrender met him. Desirous of more authentic information he proceeded to Embatus, a port of the Erythræan territory on the

c. 2

Ionian coast; and there receiving assurance that the Athenian forces had been seven days in possession of Mitylene, he summoned a council of war to concert measures. In the

^{Thucyd. L. 3.} _{c. 31.} fleet were some Ionian refugees. These proposed

to excite a defection of Ionia, the richest dependency of Athens, the great source of that revenue which supported the war. The people they affirmed would be found not averse: it would only be necessary, by a sudden and vigorous exertion, to get possession of some one Ionian city, or of Cuma in Æolis, for which the strength of the armament was more than sufficient, and the business would be done; and beside that hardly a greater blow could be given to the Athenian power, it would lead of course to communication with the Persian satraps of the western provinces, who might probably be induced to form alliance with the Peloponnesians. The assertions of the Ionians were corroborated, and the project recommended, by those Mitylenæan ministers who had been sent to Peloponnesus, and were now with the

fleet on their return. But Alcidas was not enterprising: all proposals for vigorous exertion

_{c. 30.} were rejected, and he was most inclined to move immediately home. Weakness indeed seems to mark equally what was blameable and what was praiseworthy in his conduct. He

proceeded at length eastward along the coast, as

_{c. 32.} far as appears, without any decided object, unless to make prize of merchant-ships, of which he took numbers; for since he had been in those seas none had avoided him; some, not suspecting that a Peloponnesian fleet could show itself on the Asiatic coast, had made toward it, supposing it Athenian. At Myonnesus, in the Teian territory, he put to death the greater part of the prisoners thus made. Alarm spread in consequence, and deputies from Samos came to him, deprecating such barbarities. Convinced by their representations, at least of the impolicy of his proceeding, he

dismissed many of his surviving prisoners, particularly the Chians, and he made no more such executions.

Meanwhile intelligence reaching Paches that the Peloponnesian fleet was on the Ionian coast, occasioned no small uneasiness. It was the ordinary policy of the Athenian imperial democracy, for holding subject republics in obedience, to demolish the fortifications of their towns; thus making them dependent upon the power or renown of the sovereign people for security against foreign enemies, and open to ready coercion from the same power, through the force which the Athenian navy could readily carry anywhere. But thus the rich commercial towns of Lesser Asia were now open also to attempts from the Peloponnesian fleet. Paches therefore hastening toward them with his fleet, learnt in the way that the cautious Alcidas had already turned his course toward Peloponnesus. Paches having followed as far as Latmos, and there finding pursuit vain, resolved to go himself to Ionia; opportunity being there open for doing service to his country; but it was by an act of united treachery and cruelty, which through the impartial justice of the admirable historian his contemporary and fellow-countryman, has marred with a blot of eternal infamy a character otherwise of some glory, not without extending a stain to that of the Athenian government and people, who for the profit approved the deed.

Colophon, once famous for the wealth of its citizens, and its general prosperity, was afterward, through violence of civil contention, greatly reduced. It was however still considerable when, about three years before the time of which we are treating, one party, not scrupling to solicit Persian support, obtained from a neighbouring Persian officer what gave them so clear a superiority that their opponents withdrew from the city. It

Thucyd. I. 3.
c. 33.

c. 34.

Aristot. Polit.
I. 4. c. 4.
Thucyd.
ut sup.

Ch. 12. s. 3.
of this Hist.

has been formerly observed that the capitals of the Grecian maritime republics were mostly at some distance from their ports. Notium was the port of Colophon; and the fugitives, gaining possession of that important place, maintained it so as to become there esteemed a separate commonwealth. But all the evils they had suffered through violence of faction were insufficient admonition to guard them against the growth of that common bane of every Grecian republic. It rose so among them that one party adopted the resource which had produced the division of their state and their own banishment from their capital, soliciting support from the neighbouring Persian satrap, Pissuthnes. Already the Persian satraps of the provinces bordering on the Grecian possessions in Asia had adopted the policy, for which the state of Greece afforded abundant opportunity, of entertaining a Grecian military force, composed mostly of exiles from their several republics, destitute of other means for subsistence. But in ancient Greece the Arcadians, as in modern Europe the Swiss, more than any other Greeks, perhaps on account of the poverty of their country, sought foreign military service. Pissuthnes had a body of these in his pay, which he sent to support the party soliciting assistance, together with a body of those whom the Greeks called barbarians, intrusting the chief command to the Arcadian commander, Hippias. Their opponents were in consequence expelled; but the result was not to their wishes; the satrap required the reunion of the Colophonian state, by which they became effectually subjects of their most inveterate enemies, their fellow citizens who had retained possession of the city. This was the state of things when Paches came with his fleet into the neighbourhood. While their circumstances were thus probably uneasy enough, their fellow citizens whom they had expelled would be far more deeply distressed. With joy and new hope therefore they saw an

Athenian fleet approaching. They hastened to apply to Paches, claiming his protection, and that of the Athenian commonwealth, to which, they asserted, they had been faithful against barbarians and rebels, by whom they were oppressed. Paches, going accordingly to Notium, and landing his forces, desired a conference with Hippias, the commander of the Arcadian troops. Hippias, trusting in a safe-conduct, went into his camp, but was immediately arrested; and Paches advancing with his forces to Notium, where no such attempt was apprehended, took it, and put all the Arcadian and Persian troops to the sword. Not satisfied with this efficacious treachery, as if in mockery of good faith, conducting Hippias unhurt into the town, and claiming so to have complied with the terms of his engagement, he ordered that deluded officer to execution. The Colophonians of the party adverse to the Persian interest were then put in possession of Notium, and Paches returned to Mitylene. Notium was soon after strengthened by a colony of Athenians; the ancient constitution was superseded by the Athenian law, and the town was made an immediate appendage of Attica.

The measure which followed, on the return of Paches to Mitylene, seems to have been as little consistent with his plighted faith as his treatment of the unfortunate Hippias. All those Mitylenæans remaining in the city who had been active in the revolt, that is, all the aristocratical party, were apprehended; and, together with those who had been lodged in Tenedos, were sent to Athens. The Lacedæmonian Salæthus, who had been discovered in concealment during the absence of Paches, was sent prisoner with them. The greater part of the forces were sent home: the general remained to administer the affairs of the island.

SECTION IV.

State of the Athenian Government after the Death of Pericles. — Nicias. — Cleon. — Inhuman Decree against the Mityleneans : Death of Paches. — Plataea taken.

THE supreme direction of the Athenian affairs had now passed into very different hands from those whose extraordinary abilities had raised the commonwealth to its present power. After the abolition of royalty, and even after the establishment of the constitution of Solon, which reduced the aristocracy, while democratical sway was gradually advancing, illustrious birth had still been greatly considered among the Athenian people, and was almost necessary for rising to high political situations. For, little willing as the Athenians were to allow superiority of rank, superiority of political situation was indispensably to be given to some ; and they submitted to it less impatiently in families which they had been accustomed for ages to respect, than in new men, yesterday their equals or inferiors. Themistocles and Aristides seem to have been the first whom the most extraordinary advantages of ability and character could raise from even middle rank, to that eminence which enabled them to take a decisive lead in public affairs. After them, in Cimon, and again in Pericles, superior talents met with illustrious birth. But even the constitution of Solon had contributed to transfer to riches that respect which was formerly paid to high ancestry. Other circumstances afterward assisted to give immoderate influence to the possession of wealth. The great Cimon set the injurious example, though probably not the first example, of bribing the people from his private purse. The great Pericles set the still more ruinous example of bribing the people from the public treasure. After his death no man was found capable of

wielding like him a democracy, commanding, with little interruption, for fifteen years, a people, every individual of whom claimed equality with himself, as if he had, by the most undisputed claim, been their legal sovereign. But a constant succession of men possessing superior abilities, with disposition and constitution to exert them in public business, is not to be expected among the small numbers who compose the highest rank in any state. Nicias son of Niceratus, to whom the principal families, and sober men in general, now looked as the fittest person to lead the councils of the commonwealth, was a man of high merit, but unfortunately not, like the great men who had preceded him, born for the peculiar circumstances of the situation for which he was wanted. His abilities, political and military, were considerable. Integrity, piety, generosity, a pleasant complying temper, and an elegant taste were conspicuous in him. Decidedly adverse to democratical power, he was nevertheless so clear a friend to public welfare, so ready and so judicious in the employment of his large fortune in gratifications for the multitude, so humane and liberal in relieving the distressed and promoting the advantages of individuals, that he was in no small degree a favourite of the people. But he was bashful and diffident: of clear courage in the field, in the assembly of the people he was a coward; while a reserve, the effect of bashfulness, injured him as if it had been the effect of pride. It was said of him, that his generosity was a revenue to the deserving, and his fearfulness to the undeserving. Under a better government his character might have been splendid; but his diffidence and want of firmness, amid the civil turbulence in which it was his fate to live, gave it sometimes the appearance even of weakness.⁸

⁸ Plato certainly esteemed Nicias an able statesman and general. See the dialogue Laches, throughout, but particularly p. 198. v. 2. ed. Serran. Plutarch is large upon his defects.

In opposition to Nicias stood a man such as never before was known to sway the Athenian assembly. Cleon seems to have been as remarkably born for the depression of Athens as Miltiades, Themistocles, Aristides, Cimon, and Pericles for its exaltation. Bred among the lowest of the people, the son of a tanner, and said himself to have exercised that trade, he was the opposite of Nicias in character as in political interest. Of extraordinary impudence and little courage, slack in the field but forward and noisy in the assembly, corrupt in practice as in principle, but boastful of integrity, and supported by a ready though coarse eloquence, he had gained such consideration, flattering the lower people and railing at the higher, that he stood in the situation of head of a party.⁹

B.C. 427. OI.
87. A. P. W.
5. Thucyd.
I. 3. c. 36.

Such was the state of things when the unhappy Mitylenæans surrendered their lives and fortunes

to the pleasure of the Athenian people. On the arrival of the prisoners, the Lacedæmonian Salæthus was ordered, by the absolute command of the assembled people, for immediate execution. To obtain a respite he made large offers, and among other things, undertook to procure the raising of the siege of Platæa; but in vain. The assembly then deliberated concerning the punishment to be inflicted upon the Mitylenæan people; and sentiments of anger, inflamed by the boisterous eloquence of Cleon, prevailing, the inhuman decree passed for putting every man to death, and reducing the women and children of all ranks to slavery. Such was the right which the Athenian people claimed over Greeks whom they called allies, and who had every pretension so to consider themselves; and such the punishment for renouncing that alliance, to

⁹ "Xerxes himself did not suffer more by the flattery of his courtiers than the Athenians by that of their orators." Lord Littleton's dialogue of Pericles and Cosmo de' Medici.

connect themselves with other Greeks. The assembly was no sooner dismissed than a trireme was dispatched, with orders for Paches to carry the decree into immediate execution.

But the Athenians were not universally of a temper to sleep upon such a deed without remorse. The very next morning extensive repentance became evident ; and many of the principal men joined the Mitylenæan deputies, in pressing the summoning of a second assembly, for the purpose of reconsidering the decree ; and they prevailed. The people were hastily called together, and various opinions were delivered. The mild Nicias was a weak opponent to the insolent Cleon, who harangued with vehemence in support of the measure already taken. “ What folly,” he said, “ to rescind, on one day, what had been, on due de- Thucyd. I. 3.
c. 37, 38, 39,
40. liberation, resolved but on the preceding ! With- out more stability in measures there was an end of government. With regard to the purport of the decree complained of, example was become absolutely necessary ; and a more just example than that decreed against the Mitylenæans never could be found. They had always been treated by Athens not only with justice but with kindness, not only without offence, but with cautious respect. And as nothing could be more unprovoked than the revolt, so nothing could be less defended upon any plea of necessity. The Mitylenæans could not be compelled to the part they had taken : being islanders, attack could hardly reach them ; possessing ships and fortifications, they could have repelled it. Enjoying then these advantages, they had before their eyes the example of others, who, having revolted against Athens, had been punished by deprivation of their marine, demolition of their fortifications, and reduction under a strict subjection. Nevertheless, unsatisfied with possessed felicity, undeterred by obvious example, they not barely renounced their political

connection, but they united themselves with those whose professed purpose was the destruction of Athens. Such being the case, it would be weakness to let sentiments of mercy prevail ; and it would be folly even to delay that decision which wisdom required, but which, if the present anger of the people cooled, they would want resolution to make." These were the principal arguments in support of the inhuman sentence. But Cleon would enforce argument by menaces ; and knowing that he could not use a more effectual weapon against the timid Nicias, impudently imputing corrupt motives to any who should dare to oppose him, he threatened criminal prosecution before that wild judicature the assembled people.

The assertor of the cause of humanity, upon this occasion, was Diodotus son of Eucrates. He must have deserved to be better known, but upon this occasion only we find him mentioned in history.¹⁰ In the debate of the preceding day

^{Thucyd. I. 3. c. 43.} he had been the principal opponent of Cleon : and

he now again came forward with firmness, with zeal, and at the same time with prudence, to plead a cause which, he insisted, was not more than of humanity than of political wisdom. Such was the ferment of men's minds, and so much passion entered into the decision of political questions at Athens, that he would not venture to attribute

^{c. 42-48.} injustice to the decree ; he would not venture

to affirm that the Athenians might not, in strict right, condemn the whole Mitylenæan people to death ; but he desired them to consider, " that the lower Mitylenæans had no sooner had the power, in consequence of having arms put into their hands, than they compelled the aristos-

¹⁰ A brother of Nicias was named Eucrates, (Lys. or. pro fil. Eucr.) and the manner in which family-names were usually distributed among the Greeks would favour the supposition that the father of Diodotus may have been brother of Niceratus, the father of Nicias.

critical party to treat with the Athenian general. Setting aside however the question of right and justice, he would consider the matter upon the point of expediency only. The terror of capital punishment, it was notorious, did not prevent the commission of crimes. It was the business therefore of a wise policy, by attentive precaution, to prevent revolt and not to enhance evils, to which negligence or misrule might give occasion, by making the situation of those engaged in revolt completely desperate: it was the business of a wise policy to draw profit from conquest, and not to convert a city, capable of paying large tribute, into a heap of ruins, and a cultivated country to a desert. The lower people, he observed, even in the subject-states, were in general attached to Athens. Even were it just therefore, nothing could be more impolitic than, by an act of extreme severity, to alienate, in every subject-state, that party which alone was, or ever would be, well disposed to them." He concluded with recommending, "that those who had been selected by Paches as most involved in the guilt of revolt should be, not condemned in haste and in anger, but judged at leisure with dispassionate deliberation, and that the rest of the Mitylenæan people should have a free pardon."

The speeches being concluded, the question was put, and Diodotus prevailed; but the influence of Cleon was such that he prevailed but by a very small majority. It was, after all, very much feared that notice of the second decree could not be conveyed to Mitylene in time to prevent the execution of the first; orders for which had been forwarded nearly twenty-four hours. A trireme was in all haste dispatched, with no small promises to the crew for arriving in time. They rowed incessantly, refreshing themselves with a preparation of meal, wine, and oil, which they could take without quitting their labour, and

Thucyd. 1. 3.
c. 49.

sleeping by reliefs. Fortunately no adverse wind impeded ; and the trireme with the first decree, going on an odious errand, did not press its way. It arrived however first; the general had opened the dispatches, and was taking measures for executing the horrid order, when the second trireme arrived with the happy countermand.

The case of those whom Paches had sent to Athens, as principal actors in the revolt, seems to have been hopeless, since Diodotus himself had not ventured to offer a word in their favour, farther than to claim for them a dispassionate

Thucyd. 1. 5.
c. 50. trial. They were more than a thousand, and all

were put to death. Nor were those saved from the executioner treated with the generosity which Diodotus recommended. All the ships of war of the Mitylenæan commonwealth were confiscated to the use of the Athenian people; the fortifications of the city were demolished, and the lands were disposed of in a manner which appears to have been new. According to the genius of democracy, it was calculated rather for private emolument than public advantage; being either required by the sovereign people, as an indulgence which they wished and could command, or proposed by some leading men as a bribe to obtain popular favour. The whole island of Lesbos, except the territory of Methymne, was divided into three thousand portions. Three hundred of these were dedicated to the gods; for such was Grecian religion that it was supposed the deity might be thus bribed, not only to pardon, but even to favour the most atrocious inhumanity. The remainder was divided by lot among the Athenian citizens, who were however not to have possession of the lands: that was to remain with the Lesbians, who, for each portion, were to pay a yearly rent, in the nature of our quitrents, of two mines, about eight pounds sterling. A territory belonging to the Lesbians, on the neighbouring continent, was disposed of in the

same manner. Both the insular and the continental territory were reduced under complete and immediate subjection to the sovereignty of the Athenian people. But the gratification of individuals only was provided for; the public treasury derived nothing from the arrangement.

A very remarkable fact, unnoticed by Thucydides, is however so asserted by Plutarch as authenticated that it must require mention here. The conduct of Paches, throughout his command, appears to have been able, and his services were certainly important. On his return to his country, he expected honour and respect, suitable to those services; but he found himself called upon to answer a charge of peculation before the assembled people. The orators who conducted the accusation were virulent: their harangues had evident effect upon the multitude; and the indignation of Paches, perhaps less an orator than a soldier, was so raised that, in presence of the assembly, he stabbed himself to the heart.

Plut. vit.
Aristid. p. 335.
& vit. Nic.
p. 526.

After proceeding thus far in Grecian history, we become so familiarised with instances of slaughter committed in cold blood, generally not without some claim of sanction from lawful authority, and a pretence to the execution of justice, that the horror lessens, and we are prepared for the tragedy which closed the siege of Platæa. We find Thucydides so often giving due measure of censure to his fellow-countrymen, that it seems reasonable to suppose they would not have escaped his animadversion for neglecting all endeavour to succour the brave little garrison of that place, had there been any prospect of success from any attempt within their power. We may conceive indeed that the pestilence first, and then the revolt of Lesbos, would greatly weaken their means; not only reducing their ability for exertion, but increasing the danger of hazardous measures. The besieging army however alone would scarcely deter them; but the

force of Bœotia was at hand, equally to support the besieging army, or to take advantage of the absence of the Athenian forces from Attica, and to intercept their return; and the loss of a battle, in the critical circumstances of that time, might have endangered all the dependencies of Athens, and even Athens itself.

Thucyd. I. 3.
c. 52. Such being the inability of the Athenians to

relieve Plataea, in the course of the summer, the third of the siege, the garrison began to be severely pressed by famine. The first proposal for a capitulation was nevertheless made by the Lacedæmonian general, in pursuance of instructions, the result of an illiberal and even treacherous policy, which we should deem more unworthy of Sparta, were there fewer instances of it upon record to her shame. The success of the Peloponnesians in the war not having been so great and so rapid as they had promised themselves, it was foreseen that to restore places taken on both sides might probably become a necessary condition of any peace. But it was an object with the Lacedæmonian government, in compliment to Thebes, not to restore Plataea. As soon therefore as it was known that the garrison were in extremity of want, the general sent a herald with the proposal, “That if they would voluntarily submit themselves to the Lacedæmonians, and take them for their judges, the guilty only should be punished, and none without trial.” The Plataeans, utterly unable to struggle for better terms, acceded to these, and surrendered their town and themselves to the Lacedæmonians.

Commissioners shortly arrived from Sparta, authorised to pronounce the doom of the unfortunate garrison, which seems to have been already determined; for the mode of trial promised nothing equitable. No accusation was preferred, but the simple question was put to the Plataeans, “Whether, in the existing war, they had done any service

to the Lacedæmonians or their allies." Startled at such a proceeding, the Platæans requested that they might be permitted to speak more largely for themselves than merely to answer that question. This being not denied, Astymachus and Lacon, the latter connected by hospitality with Sparta, were appointed to speak for the whole body. After urging their confidence in the justice of the Lacedæmonians, and the expectation of a different kind of trial, which had induced them to surrender themselves, they pleaded the acknowledged merit of their commonwealth with Lacedæmon and with all Greece in the Persian wars; and they mentioned their service to Sparta in particular in the Helot rebellion. They stated the refusal of the Lacedæmonians to undertake the protection of their commonwealth against the oppression of Thebes, which above ninety years before had given origin to their alliance with Athens: and they expatiated on the extreme hardship of their case, if they were to be punished for fidelity to that alliance, which they could not have deserted without the basest ingratitude and the foulest dishonour. They expostulated on the proposed desolation of those temples, where thanksgiving had been offered to the gods, for blessing Greece with liberty, through the glorious success obtained against the Persians, and on the abolition which, from the destruction of their commonwealth, would ensue to those solemn rites then appointed, by the grateful voice of Greece united, to be performed by the Platæan people. Finally, adjuring the Lacedæmonians by the sepulchres of their ancestors, to which the Platæans paid annual honours, they deprecated, beyond all things, being delivered to their inveterate enemies the Thebans, whose insidious attempts against them, they said, after having successfully resisted, they had justly punished; and they required rather to be restored to the possession of their town, to which, by the terms of the

capitulation, they were equitably entitled, there to have the choice of their mode of perishing: but on the mercy of the Lacedæmonians they would willingly throw themselves.

The Thebans, with exasperation, not abated by time, but rather increased by the difficulties they had undergone in obtaining means to revenge their friends and relations, murdered, according to their sentiment, by the Platæans,

Thucyd. 1. 3. c. 61. undertook to reply. They began with asserting

their claim to sovereignty over Platæa, derived from their ancestors, founders of all the municipal governments of Bœotia, when they conquered the country. They would allow no merit to the Platæans for their exertions in the Persian war; to which they were led, it was insisted, not by an enlarged spirit of patriotism, not by any liberal regard for the common cause of Grecian freedom, but merely by an attachment to Athens, founded on the separate interest, not even of their city, but only of a faction in their

c. 63. city. No connection with Athens however could

excuse their defection from the general confederacy of the Greek nation, under the presidency of Lacedæmon, of which Athens itself had been a member. On the contrary, if it was dishonourable to betray any engagement, into which they had unguardedly entered with Athens, much more dishonourable and more criminal was it to betray the common cause of Greece, by supporting the Athenians in their endeavours to subdue the whole nation, against the Lacedæmonians and their allies, whose only

c. 64. purpose was to protect its liberties. Thus, among

others, the Æginetans, whose commonwealth had been a member of the general confederacy, were already reduced to a state of subjection: and yet, notwithstanding these offences, liberal offers had been made to the Platæans before the siege, and had been rejected.

"With regard then," continued the Theban orator, "to the attempt to surprise your city during an existing truce, which is so vehemently objected to us, had it been a measure of our own, or had we come hostilely against you, ravaged your lands and attacked your persons, you might indeed reasonably have accused us. But the leaders in that business were the best of your own citizens : they invited us ; they opened your gates to us ; under their authority, who had the best title to authority among you, we acted ; nothing hostile was done, nothing intended ; but the sole purpose was the salutary one of withdrawing you from a foreign connection, and reuniting you to the body of the Bœotian people. Nevertheless the death of those of our fellow-citizens who fell in arms we are willing to pass over ; but for the assassination of those others, who submitted themselves to your mercy, whom in the moment you spared, and for whose safety you pledged yourselves to us, how can it be excused ? Shall then, Lacedæmonians, their lamentations and prayers for mercy avail them ? The fathers of those gallant youths, who have been thus murdered, were the very men who, by their deeds in the field of Coronea, rescued Bœotia from the Attic yoke, and restored it to the Grecian confederacy. Some of them fell there ; some, now in old age, living to bewail the treacherous massacre of their sons and the orbitude of their families, are with far better plea your suppliants for revenge. We therefore demand of you, Lacedæmonians, in the punishment of these men, that justice to which the laws and customs of Greece, so nefariously violated by them, entitle us."

Thucydides, cautious almost to extreme of offending against that impartiality so valuable and so uncommon in a contemporary historian, avoids declaring any sentiment as his own upon this extraordinary transaction ; the more

important to be related in some detail, because it was afterward but too much drawn into precedent, and because the circumstances, and the speeches commenting upon them, tend much to explain both the nature of the Grecian confederacy, and the ideas prevailing at the time, concerning the laws of nature and of nations. It is not indeed likely that the speeches made upon the occasion would come very exactly reported even to Thucydides. In what that historian therefore has given us for those speeches, as well as in what he attributes to the Lacedæmonian commissioners as the ground of their proceeding, he seems rather to have stated the arguments publicly circulated by the friends of the several parties. It appears to have been very generally held among the Greeks of that age, that men were bound by no duties to each other without some express compact. The property of foreigners might be anywhere seized, and themselves reduced to slavery, or even put to death, without the breach of any human law; and not only without the breach of any divine law, but prayers were addressed to the gods for favour and assistance in the commission of such violences. Those connected with them by political or social compact the Greeks described by a term peculiar to themselves, **ENSPONDI**; meaning, originally, persons with whom they had poured wine to the gods, or with whom they had made a compact, sanctified by the ceremony of pouring wine to the gods: those who were bound to them by no compact, or who had forfeited their claim to the benefit of a compact once existing, they called **ECSPONDI**, out of com-

Thucyd. I. 3.
c. 68. pact, or outlaws. The Lacedæmonian commissioners, upon the present occasion, determined that the Platæan people, in consequence of their renunciation of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, and of their refusal of equitable terms offered them immediately before the siege, were **ecspondi**; and not only so, but they were

ecspundi who had treated the Lacedæmonians and their allies injuriously. It was therefore resolved that the sentence should rest upon the answer that could be given, and supported, to the simple question first proposed. Accordingly the Platæans were again called upon, one by one, to say, “Whether in the present war they had done any service to the Lacedæmonians or their allies.” All answering in the negative, they were severally led aside and immediately put to death, to the number of not fewer than two hundred Platæans, and twenty-five Athenians; to whom probably this severity was extended with the less hesitation, in consequence of the late execution of the Spartan, Salæthus, at Athens. The women were condemned to slavery; the town and territory were given to the Thebans. A few Platæan refugees of the aristocratical party, together with some Megarians, whom faction had also driven from their own city, were permitted to inhabit Platæa during one year. Afterward the lands were confiscated to the public use of the Theban state, and let to Theban citizens on leases for ten years; the town was levelled with the ground, the temples however being carefully preserved; and, adjoining to the temple of Juno, an inn two hundred feet square, something like the modern caravanserais of the East, was built with the materials. In the spirit of Grecian piety, with which revenge was congenial, and no vice absolutely inconsistent, furniture for the inn, made of the iron and brass found in the town, was dedicated to Juno; and a new temple, a hundred feet long, was erected to the same goddess. Such was the fate of Platæa in the ninety-third year from its first alliance with Athens.

SECTION V.

Sedition of Corcyra. — Operations of the Athenian Fleets under Nicostratus and Eurymedon, and of the Peloponnesian under Alcidas.

FROM this scene of bloodshed and desolation, such is the tenor of Grecian history, we proceed to another still more shocking, whence we should willingly avert our eyes, but for the more than curious information, the valuable instruction, which, as from a well-imagined tragic fable, may be derived from it. In the island of Corcyra, since its connection with Athens, the democratical had been the prevailing interest.

Ch. 13. s. 3.
of this Hist. In the sea-fight with the Corinthians, off Sybota, a number of Corcyraeans of rank, as we have seen, had been made prisoners. To conciliate these became then the policy of the Corinthian government, in the hope, through them, to bring over Corcyra to the Peloponnesian confederacy, which would of course restore some portion of the ancient influence and authority of Corinth in the island.

Thucyd. 1. 3.
c. 70. The Corcyraean nobles readily acceded to the first idea; and possibly a less reward than the change from a dungeon, with daily fear of death, to liberty, affluence, and power, might have induced them to accede to the second; for to be masters of their island, under the sovereignty of Corinth, was likely to be far preferable to living under the rod of democratical rule in the hands of their fellow-citizens. They were accordingly set at liberty; bound, as it was given out, by sufficient pledges to pay a large sum for their ransom. The real ransom however appeared in the sequel: every Corcyraean was canvassed separately for his support, in the general assembly, to a proposed motion for renouncing the Athenian alliance, and renewing the ancient connection of Corcyra with Corinth its mother-city. Success in this intrigue was considerable;

but party became warm, and the whole island was in commotion. The democratical leaders, in alarm, sending information to Athens, the Athenian government dispatched ministers to watch over the interests of the commonwealth in Corcyra. Ministers from Corinth arrived nearly at the same time. An assembly of the Corcyraean people was held in presence of both ; the question concerning the alliance was discussed ; and the Corinthians so far prevailed that, though it was resolved to maintain the alliance with Athens, it was resolved also to maintain peace with Peloponnesus.

How far it might have been possible for the aristocratical party to stop there, and preserve quiet, means for judging fail ; but that no discreet zeal directed their following measures amply appears. A prosecution was commenced against Pithias, chief of the democratical party, the most powerful individual of the island, warm in the Athenian interest, and a public guest of the Athenian commonwealth. The vague accusation urged against him was, “ that he had subjected, or endeavoured to subject, his country to Athens.” The aristocratical party had so ill considered their strength, or so ill concerted their measures, that he was acquitted. It was then perhaps necessary for him to ruin those who would ruin him ; and the interest which had enabled him to repel the attack would be likely to give him means of revenge. He accused five of the wealthiest of the aristocratical party of cutting stakes in the sacred groves of Jupiter and Alcinous. Superstition furnished the crime, and party-spirit would decide upon the fact. We have difficulty indeed to imagine an inducement for men of wealth and rank to risk the penalty, which was a stater, about a guinea, for every stake. The five were all condemned in fines to an amount that would reduce them to indigence. Immediate payment or imprisonment were the alternative, to be avoided only by flight, if indeed that were now prac-

ticable, or by taking refuge at the altars. They chose the latter expedient, hoping that their friends might yet obtain for them a mitigation of the penalty. The interest of Pithias however prevented; and, more master in the supreme council in consequence of the absence of the five, he procured a resolution for proposing to the people an alliance offensive as well as defensive with Athens. The suppliants, looking upon their ruin and that of their party as complete if this should be carried, in the rage of despair quitted the altars, collected some of their adherents, armed themselves with daggers, and rushing into the council-hall killed Pithias, with others, some counsellors, some private persons, to the number of sixty. Those counsellors of the democratical party, who avoided the massacre, fled for refuge to the Athenian trireme, which lay in the harbour.

: Thucyd. 1. 3. c. 71. The five were no sooner thus masters of the council than they summoned an assembly of the people, acknowledged what they had done, and claimed merit from it, as what alone could save the commonwealth from subjection to Athens; and then immediately proposed a decree for maintaining a strict neutrality, for refusing to admit more than one ship of war at a time belonging to either of the belligerent powers, and for declaring any attempt to introduce more into any port of Corcyra an act of hostility. Their own influence was extensive, their opponents were intimidated and without a head, the decree, moderate in its purposes, was well calculated to gain in the instant the approbation of all who were not violent in party, and it was carried. Ministers were then dispatched to Athens to apologise to the Athenian government for what had passed, as a measure, without forethought, produced by the crisis of the moment, and they were directed to reconcile, if possible, the Corcyraeans who had fled thither. But instead of being received at Athens as deputed by due au-

thority, they were apprehended as rebels, and sent in custody to Ægina.

Meanwhile the aristocratical party in Corcyra, far from being decidedly masters of the government, drawing encouragement from the arrival of a Corinthian ship with ministers from Lacedæmon, attacked, and in the moment overpowered their opponents; who however not only held still the citadel, but also some of the higher parts of the town. Collecting then their strength, they took possession of one of the ports of the city, called the Hyllaic. The aristocratical party remained yet in possession of the principal port, and also of the agora, the common place of general assembly. Next day both sent detachments into the country, inviting the peasant-slaves to their assistance, with promises of freedom. In this the democratical party had the greater success. The nobles on the other hand obtained eight hundred Epirot auxiliaries from the continent. In the course of the day light skirmishes passed with missile weapons.

Thucyd. 1. 3.
c. 73.

On the next day but one matters were brought to a crisis. System was now in some degree restored in the conduct of the affairs of the democratical party; and leaders were become settled in command and influence, in the room of those who had been assassinated: superior in numbers, they possessed also, within the city, the more commanding situations. With these advantages, issuing from their quarters, they attacked their opponents; and, such was the effect of party-spirit, the women took a zealous part in the action, throwing bricks and tiles from the house-tops, and supporting the tumult of battle, says Thucydides, with a resolution beyond their nature. Late in the evening the aristocratical party were compelled to yield; and, fearing that their opponents, pressing upon them in their retreat, might become masters of the naval arsenal and

c. 74.

the port, their last refuge, they set fire to all the buildings about the agora, sparing neither their own houses (for there the principal men mostly had their residence) nor those of others; so that, beside dwellings, many warehouses full of valuable merchandise were consumed; and, had any wind blown toward the city, the whole would have been destroyed. The conflagration effectually checked pursuit, and prevented that immediate destruction which the aristocratical party had apprehended; but their reverse produced defection among their friends. In the night the greater part of the Epirot auxiliaries returned home, and the commander of the Corinthian trireme consulted his safety by sailing away.

At the beginning of this civil war the democratical party had sent intelligence to Naupactus, where Nicostratus son

Thucyd. 1. 3. c. 75. of Diitrepheis commanded the Athenian squadron.

On the next day, after the departure of the Epirot troops and the Corinthian ship, Nicostratus arrived in the harbour of Corcyra with twelve triremes and five hundred heavy-armed Messenians. His purpose of course was to support the democratical, which was the Athenian party; but, in the actual circumstances, his arrival perhaps gave greater joy to the defeated nobles, who dreaded nothing so much as the unrestrained revenge of their fellow-citizens. Nor did he deceive their expectation: proposing a treaty, he succeeded in mediating an agreement, by which it was determined that ten only, who were named as the most guilty of the nobles, should be brought to trial, and that the rest should retain all their rights as citizens, under a democratical government. He provided then that even the selected ten should have opportunity to escape; and thus a sedition, begun with the most outrageous violence, was composed in a manner little heard of in Grecian annals, totally without bloodshed. The proposal for a league offensive and de-

fensive with Athens was carried, as in the circumstances might be expected, without opposition.

Nicostratus would then have returned with his whole squadron to Naupactus; but, the more completely to insure the continuance of quiet so happily restored, the democratical leaders requested that he would leave five of his ships; undertaking to supply him with as many of their own, completely manned. The magistrates, whose office it was to appoint citizens for this service, thought to gain farther security against fresh commotion by selecting for it many of the aristocratical party. Unfortunately a suspicion arose among these that the pretence of service was only a feint: that the purpose was to send them to Athens; where, from the sovereign people, they expected no favourable measure. Under this persuasion they betook themselves, as suppliants, to the temple of Castor and Pollux, which no assurances from Nicostratus could persuade them to quit. This extreme and apparently weak mistrust excited suspicion among the democratical party. Arming themselves, they broke into the houses of the nobles to seize their arms; and they would have proceeded to bloodshed, if Nicostratus had not prevented. The alarm of the aristocratical party then became universal, and four hundred took sanctuary in the temple of Juno. All the labours of Nicostratus to restore peace and harmony were thus frustrated; for mutual jealousy prevented the possibility of accommodation. While the suppliants of Juno feared assassination should they quit their sanctuary, and starving if they remained, their opponents were apprehensive of some sudden blow meditated by them. To prevent this therefore they proposed to remove them to a small island not far from the shore, near which the temple stood, promising not only safety, but regular supplies of provisions. The utter inability of the suppliants in any way to help themselves induced them to

consent. The same confidence earlier given to the oaths of their adversaries, under support of the faith of the generous Nicostratus, might have prevented the miseries that followed.

<sup>Thucyd. 1. 3.
c. 76 & 69.</sup> Things had rested thus four or five days, when a Peloponnesian fleet of fifty-three ships of war appeared in sight. Alcidas, its commander, had been ordered for the relief of Lesbos; but, on arriving at Cyllene, had found counter-orders requiring him to go immediately to Corcyra, with thirteen additional ships, taking

^{c. 77.} Brasidas for his colleague in command. Consternation and tumult presently pervaded the town; the party now triumphant scarcely knowing whether most to dread the Peloponnesian armament or their own fellow-citizens. They however obeyed Nicostratus, who, with his little squadron, quitting the port to meet the Peloponnesian fleet, directed the Corcyraeans to support him as they could get their triremes ready. Sixty were immediately launched; but they were manned with so little selection that, as they advanced, scattered, toward the enemy, two deserted; and in some others the crews went to blows among themselves. The Peloponnesians, observing their confusion, detached twenty triremes against them, retaining thirty-five, including the two deserters, to oppose the Athenian squadron.

^{c. 78.} Nicostratus showed himself not less able in military than prudent and humane in civil command. By superiority in evolution, avoiding the enemy's centre, he attacked one wing, and sunk a ship. The Peloponnesians then, as in the engagement with Phormion off Rhium, formed in a circle. Nicostratus, as Phormion had done, rowed round them. With twelve triremes he was thus acting with advantage against thirty-five, when the detached squadron, which had obtained more decisive advantage against the Corcyraean fleet, returned to support their own.

Nicostratus then retreated toward the port, in such order as to enable the distracted Corcyraeans also to reach it without farther loss ; but thirteen of their ships had been already taken.

Evening was now advanced, and the alarm and confusion in Corcyra were extreme. An immediate attack was expected from the victorious fleet, while it was scarcely possible to be secure against the domestic foe. But the domestic, if powerful, being commonly the more horrible foe, among measures for the defence of the town, such as might be taken in the tumult of the moment, the removal of the suppliants of Juno from the island to their former situation in the temple, it being a great object to secure such hostages against relief from the Lacedæmonian fleet, is alone specified by the historian. The inability however of the Spartan commander-in-chief, and apparently his cowardice, uncommon as that defect was in a Spartan, seem to have given them their best security. After his naval victory, instead of immediately pushing his success and profiting from the consternation of the enemy, he retired with his prizes to the harbour of Sybota. Even on the next day the active zeal of Brasidas in vain exhorted attack upon the city ; Alcidas would carry exertion no farther than to debark some troops on the headland of Leucimne, and ravage the adjacent fields. The democratical Corcyraeans nevertheless remained in the most anxious suspense. Their domestic opponents were indeed completely in their power, but a superior enemy might severely revenge any severity exercised against them. It was therefore resolved to try, in a conference, to make some arrangement for mutual benefit. The body of the aristocratical party still refused all confidence to their opponents : but some, both of those who had and of those who had not taken refuge in the temples, less fearful, consented to serve in the fleet ; and thirty triremes

Thucyd. 1.3.
c. 79.

c. 80.

were manned with mixed crews, those of the aristocratical party being distributed so as best to obviate danger from their disaffection. Alcidas however, attempting no attack, about noon re-embarked his ravaging troops, and returned to his harbour of Sybota. In the evening he received intelligence by fire-signals, that a fleet of sixty Athenian ships of

Thucyd. 1.3.
c. 81. war was approaching. Immediately then he got

under way; and hastening his course close under shore, as far as Leucadia, would not double the cape of that peninsula, but dragged his galleys across the isthmus, and so passed undiscovered to Peloponnesus.

No sooner were the democratical Corcyraeans assured of the approach of the Athenian fleet and the flight of the Peloponnesians, than every dark passion mixed itself with the joy which instantly superseded their fears; and measures were deliberately taken for perpetrating one of the most horrid massacres recorded in history. The Messenians, hitherto encamped without, to oppose the foreign enemy, were now introduced within the walls. The fleet was then directed to pass from the town port to the Hyllaic port. In the way, all of the aristocratical party among the crews were thrown overboard, and in the same instant massacre began in the city. The suppliants only in the temple of Juno remained protected by that superstitious dread, which so generally possessed the Greeks, of temporal evil from the vengeance of the gods for affronts to themselves, while no apprehension was entertained for the grossest violation of every moral duty. The fear of starving nevertheless induced about fifty of them, on the persuasion of their opponents, to quit their situation and submit to a trial. They were all summarily condemned and instantly executed. Their miserable friends in the sanctuary, informed of their fate, yielded to extreme despair: some killed one another within the temple; some hanged themselves on the trees of the adjoining sacred

grove; all, in some way, put a hasty end to their wretchedness.

In the city, and through the island, the scene of murder was not so quickly closed. For seven days the democratical party continued hunting out their opponents, and massacring wherever they could find them. Some had taken sanctuary in the temple of Bacchus. Superstitious fear prevented any direct violence there, but a wall was built around the temple, and they were starved to death. Nor was difference of political principles and political connections the only criterion of capital offence. Opportunities for private revenge, or private avarice, were in many instances used. Debtors cancelled their debts by the murder of their creditors; the nearest relations fell by each other's hands; audaciousness in crime went so far that some were forced from the temples to be murdered, and some even murdered in them; and every enormity, says the historian, usual in seditions, was practised, and even more.

The Athenian admiral, Eurymedon son of Thucles, lay in the harbour with his powerful fleet, the quiet and apparently approving spectator of these disgraceful transactions; and not till the democratical Corcyraeans had carried revenge to the utmost sailed away. The impolicy of his conduct seems to have been equal to the inhumanity. Nicostratus, interfering as a generous mediator, had put Coreyra into a situation to be a valuable ally to Athens. The licence, which Eurymedon gave, to massacre all who were supposed adverse to the Athenian interest, had a very different effect.¹¹ About five hundred had escaped;

¹¹ Thucydides, in his manner of marking the different characters and different merits of the two Athenian commanders, offers an admirable model for writers of contemporary history. Without any offensive observation, merely stating facts in the simplest manner, he gives the reader fully to discover which deserved the highest praise, and which disgraced himself and his country. Nicostratus, arriving in the very height of the sedition, with only a small force,

Thucyd. I. 3.
c. 85.

some aboard the triremes which had deserted to the Peloponnesians, some on other occasions. They took possession of some forts and lands, which had belonged to the Corcyraean people, on the continent opposite to their island ; and thence, with all the activity that the spirit of revenge, the thirst of plunder, and the desire of recovering their ancient possessions united could excite, they carried on hostilities against Corcyra ; seizing ships, making descents on the coast, living by depredation, and wasting whatever they could not carry off. After this experience of the weakness of their adversaries, they determined to attempt the recovery of the island ; and having in vain solicited assistance from the Lacedæmonians and Corinthians, who would no more risk their fleet against the naval force of Athens, they, with a few auxiliaries, who made their whole number only six hundred, debarked on Corcyra. The conduct of these undoubtedly brave, but apparently ill-judging men, misled by passion, remarkably supports an observation which Strabo, who lived in an age to see a long train of consequences, and advert to them at leisure, has made upon the conduct and character of his fellow-countrymen. The warmth of temper, which perpetually engaged their whole souls in party disputes and petty quarrels, disabled them for great objects ; insomuch that they were continually employing, for mutual destruction, abilities and courage which, with more political union, might have enabled them to defend their independency for ever, against Rome, and against the world. The aristocratical Corcyraeans, had they directed their views to

with which he had soon to cope with a very superior enemy, interfered as a generous mediator, and so efficaciously as to prevent all outrage. Eurymedon came commanding what deterred opposition ; stayed seven days, during which all the enormities were committed, and went away. This is absolutely all that the historian says of Eurymedon : but that so short a tale, with so few circumstances marked, might not escape the reader's notice, with a slight variation of words, he has repeated it.

their establishment on the soil where they had found refuge, might probably have raised a powerful city there. But passion, to an extraordinary degree, still directed their measures. Immediately on landing in Corcyra, determined to maintain themselves or die, they burnt those vessels by which they had hitherto been successful and even powerful. They then occupied mount Istone, a post naturally strong, and fortified it; and, from that advantageous post, issuing as opportunity offered, they compelled their adversaries to confinement within their walls, and themselves commanded the desolated country. The calamities which followed, being connected with Athenian history, will be for notice hereafter.

SECTION VI.

An Athenian Squadron sent to Sicily under Laches. — End of the Pestilence at Athens. — Sixth Year of the War. — Operations of the Athenians, under Nicias on the eastern Side of Greece, and under Demosthenes on the western. — State of Ætolia. — Defeat of Demosthenes near Ægitium. — A Peloponnesian Army sent into the western Provinces. — Ozolian Locris acquired to the Peloponnesian Confederacy. — Demosthenes elected General of the Acarnanians. — Battle of Olpæ. — Battle of Idomene. — Important Successes of Demosthenes. — Peace between the Acarnanians and Ambraciots.

THE Sicilian Greeks, mostly well disposed to the Peloponnesians, and engaged in alliance with them, but distracted by a variety of political interests within their island, had given no assistance in operation. War had now broken out among themselves; and toward the end of summer, after the return of Eurymedon from Corcyra, the Athenians sent a squadron of twenty ships, under Laches son of Melanopus, to assist the Leontines, an Ionian people, against the Syracusans, who were of Dorian

B. C. 427. OL.
88. 2. P. W. 5.
Thucyd. I. 3.
c. 86.

race. The immediate consequences were not very important; but those more remote will require much notice hereafter.

Thucyd. I. 3.
c. 87. In the beginning of the ensuing winter the pestilence again became a subject for the historian of Athens. It had never yet entirely ceased, though after the two first years there had been a remission: but in the renewal of its fury it seems to have worn itself out, and we hear of it no more. In its whole course it carried off not less than four thousand four hundred Athenians of the vigorous age in which they were required for enrolment among the heavy-armed, and three hundred men of the higher rank who served in the cavalry. Of the multitude of other persons who perished by it no means existed for ascertaining the number.

Archidamus king of Sparta did not long outlive the friend of his youth, whom, in elderhood, he was destined to oppose in arms, the illustrious citizen who with more than regal sway had directed the affairs of the Athenian democracy. Pericles died about the beginning of the third campaign of the war. Archidamus commanded the Peloponnesian army which invaded Attica in the following spring; and it is the last occasion upon which the contemporary historian mentions him. In the fifth year Cleomenes, regent for the minor king of the other reigning family, had the office of

B. C. 426.
O. 88. 2-3.
P. W. 6.
Thucyd. I. 3.
c. 89. general of the confederacy; and now in the sixth spring the command was given to Agis son of Archidamus. The forces were assembled at the Corinthian isthmus for a proposed invasion of Attica, when the terrors of repeated earthquakes, which affected various parts of Greece with uncommon violence, checked the design, and the troops were dismissed.

As the war drew out in length, every circumstance tended more and more to justify the councils which led the Athe-

nians to engage in it. Notwithstanding that calamity, beyond human prudence to foresee, which had so reduced the strength of the commonwealth; notwithstanding the loss of those talents which had prepared its resources during peace, and directed them during the two first years of hostility; Athens was advancing toward a superiority which promised, under able conduct in the administration, to be decisive. Indeed the energy of the Athenian government, directed for near a century by a succession of men of uncommon abilities, was so put into train that, notwithstanding the inferiority of the present leaders, it was scarcely perceived to slacken. Democracy, though a wretched regulator, is a powerful spring. The highest offices in Athens were now open to the lowest people. Great competition of course arose; and one consequence was, that men of rank and education, however unambitious, were forced to put themselves forward in public business, that they might avoid being trodden upon by their inferiors. Thus Nicias seems to have been rather compelled by circumstances, than induced by his own inclination, to accept the situation in which he was placed. He had succeeded Pericles in the office of commander-in-chief. Plutarch says that his cautious temper led him always to choose commands where success might be certain, though the glory would be small; not from any defect of personal, but of political courage; he was less afraid of the swords of enemies than of the voices of fellow-citizens. After the reduction of Lesbos he had conducted the Athenian forces against a fortified islet, called Minoa, at the mouth of the harbour of Nisaea, the seaport of Megara. It was without much difficulty taken, and a garrison was left in it. The purpose was to prevent any future surprise, like that lately attempted upon Piræus, and to curb more effectually the Megarian privateers; which, not-

*Plutarch. vit.
Nic.*

withstanding the look-out from Salamis, annoyed the Athenian trade.

In the present summer it was determined to send out two expeditions. Having recovered the principal of those dependencies in Thrace, whose revolt had given rise to the war, having checked defection in Asia by the severe punishment of the Lesbians, having learnt to despise the ravage of Attica, and, safe within their walls, possessing a navy that commanded the seas, the Athenian leaders had leisure and

Thucyd. 1.3.
c. 91. means to prosecute offensive operations. Nicias,

with a fleet of sixty triremes, went to the island of Melos; whose people, a Lacedæmonian colony, though through dread of a naval force of Athens they had avoided acting with the Peloponnesians, yet rejected the Athenian alliance, and refused to pay tribute. It was expected that the waste of their lands would have brought them to submission; but the Melians shutting themselves within their walls with a declared determination not to treat, the tedious business of a siege was postponed for another enterprise, which had been concerted before the fleet left Attica. Passing to Oropus, on the confines of Bœotia, Nicias landed his forces by night, and marched immediately to Tanagra. There he was met by the whole strength of Athens, under Hipponicus son of Callias, and Eurymedon son of Thucles, whose conduct at Corcyra, it appears, had not displeased the people his sovereign. The day was spent in ravaging the Tanagræan lands. On the following day the Tanagræans, re-enforced by a small body of Thebans, ventured an action, but were defeated. The forces under Hipponicus and Eurymedon then erecting their trophy marched back for Athens, and the others to their ships. Nicias proceeding with the fleet to the Locrian coast plundered and wasted what was readily within reach, and then returned home. The expedition indeed seems to have had no great object.

Apparently the principal purpose was to acquire a little popularity to the leaders, and obviate clamour against them, by retaliating the evils of invasion on those of their enemies who were most within reach, and by holding out the recompense of pillage to gratify the vulgar mind.

The purpose of the other expedition was to support the allies, and extend the influence of Athens, in the western parts of Greece; a service on which a squadron had been employed every summer from the beginning of the war. Phormion, during his command on that station, had so endeared himself to the Acarnanians, that they particularly requested his son, or at least some relation, for his successor. A petition so honourable to so deserving an officer was not denied. In the fourth year of the war Asopius son of Phormion was appointed to the command of a squadron of thirty ships. According to his instructions, in circumnavigating Peloponnesus he landed on the coast of Laconia, where he was successful in ravage and plunder, with which he sent home eighteen ships, and then proceeded to his station at Naupactus with only twelve. Anxious, on his arrival there, to show himself worthy of the preference given to a son of Phormion, he seems to have undertaken what his force was unequal to; and after an unsuccessful attempt against Oeniadæ he lost his life in an attack upon Leucas. In the next year we find the command committed to Nicostratus, who had distinguished himself so advantageously both in the Corcyraean sedition, and in action with the Peloponnesian fleet. Thirty triremes were now sent to Naupactus, under Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes.

Demosthenes began operations by the surprise of Ellomenus, a port of the Leucadian territory, whose garrison he put to the sword; and then collecting the

allies of those parts, Acarnanians, Zacynthians, and Cephalenians, in addition to the Naupactian Messenians, who were in effect Athenian subjects, and obtaining fifteen triremes from Corcyra, he proceeded against Leucas itself. The Leucadians, unable to resist such a force in the field, abandoned their territory to its ravages, and confined themselves within their walls. The Acarnanians were highly desirous to reduce a city perpetually hostile to them, and situate in a manner within their country. But, before the siege could be formed, Demosthenes was allured by a more splendid, though far more hazardous project, suggested by the Naupactian Messenians.

Ætolia was a much more formidable foe to Naupactus than Leucas to Acarnania. Always numbered among the members of the Greek nation, and according to Homer, in the age which he describes, among the most respectable, yet when science and art were approaching meridian splendour in Attica, scarcely sixty miles from their borders, the Ætolians were a most rude people. Since the Trojan war, barbarism instead of civilisation had gained among them. They lived scattered in unfortified villages : they spoke a dialect scarcely

Thucyd. 1. 3.
c. 95. intelligible to the other Greeks; and one clan of

them at least, the Eurytanian, was said to feed on raw flesh : they used only light arms ; yet their warlike character was high. This barbarous and hostile people, the Messenians urged, might be subdued with the force now collected ; and then nothing would remain, in that part of the continent, able to oppose the confederate arms. These arguments engaged the attention of Demosthenes, and the view which they opened led him to a more extensive plan. Having reduced Ætolia, he thought he should be able, without other force than that within his command, to penetrate through the Ozolian Locris, and, keeping the impassable summits of Parnassus on the right, traverse the high lands as

far as Cytinion in Doris. Thence the descent would be easy into Phocis, whose people he hoped, from of old friendly to Athens, would zealously join him with their forces : for they had been withheld from the Athenian confederacy only by their situation, surrounded by the allies of the Peloponnesians ; and if a party adverse to the Athenian interest should now prevail among them, his force would suffice to restore the superiority to its friends. Arrived in Phocis, he should be on the border of Bœotia ; and, assisted by the Phocian forces, he could make such a diversion on the northern or western frontier of that powerful, hostile province, that, with due co-operation from Athens and some assistance from a party favouring democracy, which was to be found in every Grecian state, there was no degree of success against the enemies of the commonwealth, in the northern parts of Greece, to which it might not lead.

In the opinion of Thucydides, if we may judge from the manner of a writer so cautious of declaring an opinion, the enterprise was ably projected ; but obstacles occurred, against the projector's hopes. The Acarnanians, disappointed in their own views, and offended at the preference apparently given to the Messenians, refused to join in it. The Corcyraeans, whose government, pressed by a domestic enemy, could ill spare any part of its strength, took the opportunity of example for returning home. The Cephallenians, Zacynthians, and Messenians remained ; apparently altogether no great force, and the Athenian infantry were only three hundred ; but the Ozolian Locrians of Oeneon, inveterate enemies of the Ætolians, were ready to join in any attempt against them ; and their intimate knowledge of the country, and practice in war with the people, would make their assistance particularly valuable. The Messenians, moreover, who were best acquainted with the strength of Ætolia, and were likely to be the greatest sufferers from a miscarriage of the undertaking,

persevering in recommending it, Demosthenes was unwilling to give up a favourite project, with opportunities which might not recur. It was accordingly determined that the siege of Leucas should be postponed, and that the forces under the Athenian general should enter Ætolia by the nearest way from Æneon, while the Æneonians took a circuit to meet him in the interior country.

Thucyd. 1.3. c. 96. The army of Demosthenes was so little numerous that the whole passed a night in the precinct of the temple of Nemean Jupiter, on the borders of Locris, where, according to report current in the country, the poet Hesiod died. Nevertheless, no force appearing in the field capable of opposing him, the three towns of Potidanium, Crocylium, and Tichium were taken in as many days; and plunder was collected to such an amount as to influence the decision of future measures. It was sent to Eupolium in Locris, while the army remained at Tichium.

c. 97. As soon as it was safely lodged, pursuing still the advice of the Messenians, without waiting for the Locrians, who had not yet joined him, Demosthenes proceeded to Ægitium, which, as unfortified, was abandoned on his approach, and he took possession of the empty town.

Ibid. & 1.4. c. 50. He was now in a mountainous and woody country, full of defiles, with his little army consisting almost wholly of heavy-armed infantry. Meanwhile

1. 3. c. 96. the Ætolians, who had early gathered his intention from his preparations, and who, by the time he passed their frontier, had already collected their forces from the most distant parts, arrived in the neighbourhood of Ægitium. Well knowing their advantage, they would come to no regular engagement; but, occupying the heights around, made desultory attacks upon the allied army in various parts, running down the hills, throwing their darts, retiring when-

ever the enemy advanced, pursuing when they retired, and, both in pursuit and in retreat, with their light armour, holding certain advantage.

Demosthenes had now to regret that he had not waited the arrival of his Locrian allies, armed like the *Ætolians*, and accustomed to contend with them in their desultory mode of action. As long as the few bowmen of his army had a supply of arrows, wherever they could give <sup>Thucyd. I. 3.
c. 98.</sup> their assistance, their weapons, of longer flight, kept off the enemy, ill armed for defence. But when, at length, all were worn with long exertion, and their arrows were nearly spent, their commander received a mortal wound. Presently then they dispersed, each to seek safety as he best might. The heavy-armed then, unable to stand the darts of the *Ætolians*, whom, with their weapons, they could not reach, had no resource but in hasty retreat. Pursued by active men, practised in running among rocks and mountains, many were killed. A Messenian, on whom they had principally depended as their guide in this wild and rough country, was among those who early fell. Some then strayed into impassable dells, and, a considerable body entering a pathless wood, the *Ætolians* set fire to it, and all were destroyed. Order was now totally lost, and every form of flight and of destruction, says the contemporary historian, was experienced by the Athenians and their allies. Procles, the second in command, was killed, with a hundred and twenty of the three hundred heavy-armed Athenians; and of all the youth of Athens who fell in the whole war, continues the historian, those were the prime. Of the allies also a large proportion were slain. The survivors, with difficulty reaching the coast, at the distance of about ten miles from the place of action, proceeded to Æneon. The bodies of the dead, through the usual ceremony, being obtained for burial, those of the Athenians were carried to Athens by the returning fleet; but the un-

fortunate commander, fearing to meet the anger of his sovereign, the Athenian people, remained at Naupactus.

Thucyd. I. 3.
c. 100. A circumstance which, in the eye of dispassionate reason, must tend to justify the attempt of Demosthenes, would perhaps enhance the immediate indignation of an ill-informed public. The Ætolians had sent three ambassadors, one from each of their principal clans, to Corinth and Lacedæmon, requesting assistance against the common enemy; proposing, as their particular object, to take Naupactus, which would deprive the Athenians of their best means for keeping a fleet in the western seas. The success obtained against Demosthenes appears to have obviated former objections, and it was resolved to gratify the Ætolians. Whether the jealousy of the kings or of the people was the obstacle, to send a Lacedæmonian force beyond the Lacedæmonian frontier otherwise than under royal command seems always to have met with objection. The business of Ætolia being thought not important enough to require one of the kings of Sparta, no Lacedæmonian troops were sent: a body of three thousand of the allies only were, toward autumn, assembled at Delphi, and, such was the Lacedæmonian authority, placed under the orders of three Spartans, Eurylochus, Mecarius, and Menedæus.

c. 101. The Ozolian Locrians, whose country lay between Delphi and Ætolia, were then in alliance with Athens. But the people of Amphissa, one of the principal towns, alarmed at the prospect of attack from the Peloponnesian confederacy, and still more apprehensive of an interest which their neighbours and inveterate enemies, the Phocians, might acquire with the Lacedæmonian commanders, proposed to Eurylochus to revolt to the Lacedæmonian alliance, adding assurance that, so little firm was the Ozolian Locris in the Athenian interest, he might acquire the whole more readily by negotiation than by arms. The pro-

posal perfectly suiting the views of the Spartan general, he sent ministers through all the towns. The narrow territory was at this time divided between no less than thirteen republics. Urged then at once by the Peloponnesian arms, ready to fall upon them, and by both the example and the persuasion of the Amphissians, eight of those republics acceded to the Peloponnesian confederacy. Of the remainder, the Olpæans gave hostages as pledges that they would commit no hostility against the Peloponnesians, but refused to engage in offensive alliance against the Athenians. The Hyæans refused even to give hostages, till the Peloponnesian forces entered their territory and took one of their villages. The Æneonians and Eupolitans persevering in fidelity to their engagements with Athens and with their neighbours of Naupactus, their towns were attacked and taken. The hostages were sent to Cytinion in Doris; the Ætolian forces joined the Peloponnesian, and Eurylochus, entering the Thucyd. 1. 3.
6. 102. Naupactian territory, ravaged the whole, and took the suburbs of Naupactus, which were unfortified. Postponing then the siege of the town, he proceeded to the easier conquest of the neighbouring town of Molycrium, a Corinthian colony, but long since subject to Athens.

Demosthenes, living as a private individual at Naupactus, saw with the utmost anxiety these consequences of his rash enterprise. Uncommissioned he went into Acarnania; and, though at first ill received, he persevered in apology, remonstrance, and solicitation, till he obtained a thousand heavy-armed Acarnanians, with whom he passed by sea to Naupactus. The principal hope of taking the place having been founded on the extent of the fortifications, and the disproportionate smallness of the garrison, this seasonable reinforcement gave it security: for blockade by land would be nugatory against a town open to the sea, of which the Athenians were masters.

The disappointment on this occasion was lessened to Eurylochus by greater views offering in another quarter. Ministers from Ambracia had solicited his assistance for the conquest of the Amphilochian Argos. Success, they urged, would be attended with the immediate submission of all Amphilochia; Acarnania might then be attacked with advantage; and the consequence, reasonably to be hoped for, would be the acquisition of all that part of the continent to the Lacedæmonian confederacy. Eurylochus acceded to the proposal, and, withdrawing his forces from Naupactus, waited in Ætolia while the Ambraciots should prepare for the execution of their part of the undertaking.

Thucyd. 1.3.
c. 105. Autumn was already advanced when a body of three thousand Ambracian heavy-armed foot entered Argia (so the territory of the Amphilochian Argos was called) and seized Olpæ, a strong fortress upon a hill close upon the gulf; belonging to the Acarnanians, but little more than three miles from Argos. Intelligence was immediately communicated through Acarnania, and the force of the country was assembled; part marched to the assistance of Argos, part was stationed at Crenæ in Amphilochia, to watch the approach of Eurylochus, and dispatches were sent to Aristoteles son of Timocrates, then commanding the Athenian squadron in the western seas, requesting succour. Meanwhile the Acarnanians came to a resolution of appearance somewhat extraordinary. Notwithstanding the offence they had taken at his preference of other interests, as they reckoned them to theirs, notwithstanding his lamentable failure in the measures to which he so gave his preference, and while he was, in consequence of that failure, yet afraid to meet the judgment of the despotic multitude in his own country, in this critical moment they sent him an invitation to take the office of commander-in-chief of the forces of all the Acarnanian republics. This remarkable fact, highly

honourable to Demosthenes, proves more than that he was personally esteemed among the Acarnanians. Their country was nearly equal in extent to Attica, and at least proportionally populous in free subjects, though not in slaves; but being divided among a number of village republics, no man could have either the education of Athenians of rank, or that acquaintance with public business upon a great scale, which the Athenians in office acquired. Hence, in a great measure, the admitted superiority of the Athenians and Lacedæmonians to the other Greeks; and hence the Acarnanians felt the want of a man better educated and better initiated in public business than any among themselves to take, in the present moment of danger, the supreme direction of their affairs.

Eurylochus, informed of the movement of the Ambraciots, crossed the Achelous into Acarnania. Thucyd. 1. 3.
c. 106.

Avoiding the towns, he passed unnoticed through the deserted country, the men being with the army, the women in the fortified places, till he reached Agrais, a detached district, occupied by an Ætolian tribe. Thence proceeding over an uncultivated mountainous tract, and evading thus the body of Acarnanians appointed Strab. 1. 8.
p. 338. to watch his entrance into Amphilochia, he descended by night into Argia, passed unperceived between the town of Argos and the Acarnanian camp, and joined the Ambraciots in Olpæ. Strong with this junction, he moved next morning, and chose a situation not far distant, where he encamped.

Aristoteles meanwhile, with his squadron of twenty ships, arrived in the Ambracian gulf, accompanied by Demosthenes, who brought a small re-enforcement, two hundred heavy-armed Messenians, and sixty Athenian bowmen. The whole strength of Acarnania was already collected at Argos, with only a small body of Amphilochians, of whom the greater part, though friendly to the Athenian interest, were withheld by the Ambraciots. In-

vited by the Acarnanians only, Demosthenes was now elected commander-in-chief of all the allied forces ; and the resolution was taken, by common consent, to give the enemy battle. The army in consequence moved toward Olpæ, and Demosthenes encamped on ground divided only by a deep valley from the camp of Eurylochus.

Thucyd. 1. 3.
c. 107, 108. Thus situated, both armies rested five days, and on the sixth both prepared for battle. Demosthenes had observed that the enemy outnumbered him, and, to prevent being surrounded, he placed four hundred heavy and as many light-armed Acarnanians in a hollow covered with bushes, whence they could have opportunity to attack, in the rear, that extreme of the enemy's line which would overstretch his flank. The Messenians were placed in the right, with a few Athenians, apparently from the fleet, with whom he took post himself. The Amphilochians, who were not regular heavy-armed, but used javelins, were mixed with the Acarnanians in the rest of the line ; the Argives are not mentioned, few of them probably being to be spared from the garrison of their town. On the other side Eurylochus, with a chosen body, took the left of his line, against Demosthenes and the Messenians : the Mantineans were posted next to him ; the other Peloponnesians were mixed with the Ambraciots ; who, being a Corinthian colony, preserved the Peloponnesian arms and discipline, and were esteemed the best soldiers of that part of the continent.

The armies meeting, the Peloponnesian left, outstretching the right of the enemy, was wheeling to attack their flank, when they were themselves attacked in the rear by the Acarnanians from the ambush. Eurylochus was killed ; the Peloponnesians about him, panic-struck, fled ; and this immediate defeat of what was reputed the firmest part of the army spread dismay as far as the knowledge of it was communicated. Demosthenes profited from the opportunity,

the Messenians in particular seconding him with a valour worthy of the fame of their ancient heroes; and quickly the left and centre of the enemy were completely routed, the Mantineans only retreating into Olpæ in some order. But in the mean time the Ambraciots and others, who held the right of the Peloponnesian army, had defeated the Arcanans opposed to them, and pursued as far as Argos. Here however the flying troops found refuge, while the conquerors, returning toward the field of battle, were met by superior numbers, and many fell: the remainder joined their defeated comrades in Olpæ. The slaughter of the Peloponnesian army altogether was very great: of the three Spartan generals, Menedæus only survived.

By the unforeseen train of circumstances which led to this battle, and much by the activity and able conduct of Demosthenes, both in previous measures and in the action itself, the face of things was now completely changed in the western countries; the Athenian affairs were at once restored, as if the disaster in Ætolia had never happened; and instead of gaining Naupactus, lately considered as the last refuge of the Athenian interest in those parts, the Peloponnesian cause was in a far worse situation than before any force from Peloponnesus was sent into the country. Mene-
Thucyd. I. 3.
c. 109.
dæus, with whom the command of the defeated army remained, was at a loss for measures. He had force indeed sufficient to defend the fortress he held, but means were wanting to subsist there. He had no stores, and by land a victorious army, by sea the Athenian fleet, excluded supplies. On the day after the battle therefore, when he applied for leave to bury the dead, he sent proposals for surrendering Olpæ, upon condition of having safe passage for his troops to their several homes. Leave to bury the dead was readily granted; the rest was openly refused; but assurance was secretly given, that the Peloponnesians might

depart in safety, if they would go quietly and quickly. In this Demosthenes and the Acarnanian chiefs had two objects; to have the Ambraciots, and the mercenary troops in their service, at mercy; and to weaken the Peloponnesian interest in those parts, by rendering the Peloponnesian name, and particularly the Lacedæmonian, odious for self-interestedness and treachery. Menedæus did not scruple to accept the conditions: the dead were hastily buried; and then the Peloponnesians, of whom the Mantineans were the largest surviving portion, went out in small parties, under pretence of gathering herbs and firewood. The Ambraciots and others, as soon as it was observed that all the Peloponnesians had quitted the place, and were already at a distance, in great alarm followed, in hope to overtake them. The Acarnanians from their camp perceiving this, without waiting for orders, immediately pursued equally Peloponnesians and Ambraciots; and when their commanders interfered, some went so far as to throw darts at them, supposing the public interest betrayed. The matter being however at length explained, the Peloponnesians, where they could be with certainty distinguished, were permitted to pass unmolested. But much doubt arose, and much contention, which were Peloponnesians; for the Ambraciots retained so nearly the armour, habit, and speech of their mother-country that the discrimination was difficult. About two hundred were killed; the rest reached Agrais, whose prince, Salynthius, gave them a kind reception.

Thueyd. 1. 3.
c. 110. The chiefs of Ambracia, on receiving intelligence that their troops were possessed of Olpæ, had hastened to support them with their whole remaining strength. Ignorant of what had since passed, they had already entered Amphilochia, when information of their march was brought to Demosthenes. Immediately that general sent a strong detachment of Acarnanian

c. 112.

troops to pre-occupy the defiles among the highlands, which the enemy must cross to enter the plain of Argia. A few miles from Olpæ were two lofty hills, called Idomene, at the highest of which the detachment arrived by night, unperceived by the Ambraciots, who were encamped on the other hill. Demosthenes, after having made the remainder of his army take refreshment, marched in the evening in two divisions; one he led himself by the plain, the other he sent over the Amphilochian mountains. About daybreak both arrived at the camp of the Ambraciots, who were still at their rest. Demosthenes had formed his advanced guard of Messenians; who, speaking the Doric dialect, deceived the Ambraciot out-guards, while it was yet too dark to see distinctly, so as to be taken for their friends from Olpæ. The surprise was in consequence complete, and the rout immediate. Great slaughter was made on the spot; the fugitives sought the highlands: but the roads were pre-occupied by the Acarnanians of the advanced detachment; and the light-armed Amphilochians, among their own mountains, were terrible in pursuit of the Ambraciots, ignorant of the country, and encumbered with their panoply. Some who had made toward the gulf, seeing the Athenian triremes close in with the shore, swam to them; in the urgency of the moment, says Thucydides, choosing to receive their death from Greecian foes, rather than from the barbarous, and most inveterately hostile Amphilochians. As if blushing to declare in express terms their catastrophe, the historian adds no more than that a very small portion only of the defeated army escaped to Ambracia.

Next day a herald arrived from the Ambraciots, <sup>Thucyd. I. 5.
c. 113.</sup> who had escaped with the Peloponnesians from Olpæ into Agrais, for leave to bury those who had been killed on that occasion. Ignorant of what had since passed, and astonished at the number of his slaughtered fellow-

citizens, whom he saw lying scattered over the country, on being informed of the extent of the calamity, he was so overwhelmed with grief that he returned without executing his commission. During the whole war, says Thucydides, no Grecian city suffered equally within so short a time; and could Demosthenes have persuaded the Acarnanians and Amphilochians to march immediately to Ambracia, it must have yielded to the first assault. But a cause for jealousy, of which their chiefs were politicians enough to be aware, prevented. While there were cities, in those parts, connected with the Peloponnesians, the Acarnanians would be necessary allies to the Athenians, and would be treated with <sup>Thucyd. 1. 3.
c. 114.</sup> deference; but, were nothing remaining adverse to the Athenian interest, they would not long avoid the fate of so many other states, once allies, but now subject to the despotic rule of the Athenian people. Winter approaching, ordinarily the season of rest from warfare, it was resolved that the allies might go to their several homes; the spoil being first divided, of which a third was allotted to Athens. In pursuance of a vote of the army then three hundred panoplies were selected for a present to their Athenian general, as an honourable testimony to his merit, and these Demosthenes, no longer fearing to meet his fellow-citizens, dedicated in the temples of Athens.

After the departure of Demosthenes and the Athenian fleet, the conduct of the Acarnanians was directed by a wise and liberal policy, of which we cannot but wish that Grecian history afforded more examples. They permitted the refugees in Agrais to pass, under assurance of safety to Oeniadæ, and thence to their several homes; and soon after they concluded a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive, for a hundred years, with the Ambraciots, including in it the Amphilochians; with a condition, judiciously added, that neither the Ambraciots should be bound to act offensively

with the Acarnanians against the Peloponnesians, nor the Acarnanians with the Ambraciots against the Athenians. The only concessions required were, that whatever towns or lands the Ambraciots had taken from the Amphilochians should be restored, and that the Ambraciots should not assist Anactorium in the war in which it was engaged with Acarnania. This wise moderation of the Acarnanians was not without its reward. It established for a long time, in their part of the continent, not perfect peace, but more quiet than was usual among the Grecian republics; and it tended to fix upon them that character of benevolence and uprightness, by which we find they were long honourably distinguished, and for which they were respected throughout the Greek nation.

Polyb. l. 4.
p. 299.

SECTION VII.

Seventh Campaign.—Fifth Invasion of Attica.—Conquest in Sicily projected by the Athenian Administration.—Pylus occupied by Demosthenes.—Blockade of Sphacteria.—Negotiation of the Lacedæmonians at Atheus.—Cleon appointed General of the Athenian Forces.—Sphacteria taken.—Application for Peace from Lacedæmon to Athens.

THE Athenians were now so familiarised to the invasion and waste of Attica, and to the inconvenience of confinement within their fortifications, which experience would teach to alleviate, that the eloquence and authority of Pericles had ceased to be necessary for persuading to bear them. The want of his wisdom and the want of his authority were however felt in the general conduct of affairs; an authority capable of controlling every part of the administration, and of preserving concert and consistency throughout. While, in the seventh year of the war, Attica was a fifth time the prey of the Peloponnesian forces,

B. C. 425. Ol.
88. 3. P. W. 7.
Thucyd. l. 4.
c. 2.

now commanded by Agis king of Lacedæmon,

the Athenians, contrary to the admonition of Pericles, were looking after foreign conquest. Instead of merely enabling their Sicilian allies to support themselves, and preventing naval assistance to Peloponnesus from their Sicilian enemies, the experience of their naval power led them to covet acquisition in that rich island, and to imagine that they might

<sup>Thucyd. I. 3.
c. 115.</sup> reduce the whole under subjection. In the winter

a fleet of forty triremes had been preparing for that service. Pythodorus was hastened off, with those first ready, to supersede Laches in the command in Sicily; and

^{I. 4. c. 2.} in spring the larger number followed, under Eu-

rymedon son of Thucles and Sophocles son of Sostratidas. Intelligence having been received that the city of Corcyra was reduced to extreme famine by the expelled Corcyraeans, now masters of all the rest of the island, Eurymedon and Sophocles had orders to relieve it, in their way to Sicily. Those officers, and Pythodorus also, were apparently of the ten generals of the establishment. Demosthenes was in no office, military or civil; but he was now become a favourite of the people; and irregularities of all kinds were growing familiar in the Athenian government. Without any public character, and without any military rank¹², for under the Athenian government no military rank appears to have been held beyond the term for which the people specifically granted it, he was authorised to embark in the fleet with Eurymedon and Sophocles, and, during the circumnavigation of Peloponnesus, to employ its force, though those officers were present, as he might think proper.¹³

¹² Ὅντι ιδιώτη.

¹³ We are not accurately informed of the nature of the joint commands, so usual in the Athenian and other Grecian services. Thucydides sufficiently marks that there was a gradation, though the inferiors appear to have had some controlling power. The commission given to Demosthenes was of a different kind.

No opportunity for any service, within the plan of Demosthenes, had occurred, when, off the Laconian shore, under which description Thucydides commonly includes the Messenian, intelligence was met that a Peloponnesian fleet of sixty triremes had sailed from Cyllene, and was already at Corcyra. Eurymedon and Sophocles, probably never well pleased with the unusual interference in their command, thought themselves now justified in refusing to delay their voyage for any operations on the coast of Peloponnesus. Demosthenes on the contrary, claiming the authority committed to him by the Athenian people, insisted that they should stop at Pylus on the Messenian coast; and when that service for which he was sent, and which the interest of the commonwealth required, was performed there, it would be time enough to proceed for Corcyra. The admirals persisted in refusal; but it happened that a storm compelled them to seek refuge in the very port which Demosthenes desired to make.

The harbour of Pylus, one of the best of Greece, was at this time deserted: the ruins only of an old castle remained, and the bordering country, to a considerable extent, was uninhabited; for the Lacedæmonians, in conquering Messenia, had acquired what, according to their institutions, they could little use. Here it was the purpose of Demosthenes to fortify some advantageous post, and place in it a garrison of Messenians from Naupactus; whose zeal in vindicating a possession, which they esteemed of right their own, would second his views, and whose Doric speech would give them great advantage for incursion upon the Lacedæmonian lands. Unable however to persuade the generals at all to co-operate with him, he had recourse to a very dangerous expedient, for which democracy gave licence; he applied first to the soldiers and then to the officers, but still

Thucyd. 1. 4.
c. 3. et al.
Strab. 1. 7.
Déscri. de la
Moree, par
Bellini.

in vain. A regular system of military command, under a democratical government, was hardly possible ; and indeed due subordination appears to have been, in this age, nowhere established by law among the Greeks, excepting only the Lacedæmonians. But the military spirit of the Greek nation must have been great, when, with subordination so deficiently enforced, and in some cases so ill understood, a regularity of conduct, that would do credit to troops under the severest discipline, so generally prevailed. It happened that foul weather, continuing, prevented the departure of the fleet from Pylus ; and at length the soldiers, tired of inaction, took the inclination, for amusement, to construct the proposed fort. No preparation had been made for the work, no tools were brought for it. Loose stones, found about the spot, were carried by hand, and laid in the most advantageous manner that their accidental form and size permitted ; and the interstices were filled with mud, which, for want of better means, the soldiers bore on their backs ; bending, and locking their hands behind them. The fancy thus taken, grew into zeal ; all diligence was used to render the place defensible before it should be attacked, and the greater part of the circuit was strong by nature. In six days the rest was fortified, so far that, with the crews of five triremes, which the generals now consented to leave at Pylus, Demosthenes resolved to remain, while the fleet proceeded on its destination.

Thucyd. 1. 4.
c. 5. When the first intelligence of these transactions arrived at Lacedæmon, the people were celebrating one of those religious festivals which so much engaged the Greeks. The news gave little alarm, but rather excited ridicule : for, confident in the superiority of their land force, yearly experienced in the unopposed invasion of Attica, the Lacedæmonians could not immediately believe that the Athenians, through any management, could become formid-

able by land in Peloponnesus ; and a fort raised in six days, they thought, could not cost the strength of Lacedæmon much time to take and destroy. The same intelligence however, carried to the army in Attica, made a different impression. Moreover the invasion there having <sup>Thucyd. 1. 4.
c. 6.</sup> been made earlier than ever before, the corn of the country, commonly a considerable resource for the subsistence of an invading army, was yet green ; provisions began to fail, and the weather, unusually <sup>After middle
of May.</sup> stormy for the season, pressed them. After a stay therefore of only fifteen days in Attica, Agis hastened back into Peloponnesus.

It was not long before the business of Pylus <sup>Thucyd. 1. 4.
c. 8.</sup> began to be more seriously considered also at Lacedæmon. A fortress on their coast, occupied by an enemy commanding the sea, and garrisoned by men connected by blood with their slaves, of whom they were, not without cause, ever apprehensive, might indeed give very reasonable alarm ; and the measures immediately taken in consequence would alone go far to justify what had been deemed at first, both by friends and foes, the improvident and extravagant project of Demosthenes. Beside promoting the evacuation of Attica, Corcyra was instantly relieved, the Peloponnesian fleet being in all haste recalled thence ; and, to avoid observation and consequent attack from the Athenian fleet, it was again hauled across the Leucadian isthmus. Requisitions for auxiliary troops were at the same time dispatched to all the allies within Peloponnesus ; and the Spartans of the city marched for Pylus, while the Lacedæmonians of the provincial towns, just returned from one expedition, required some time for preparation to proceed on another.

The situation of Demosthenes however was highly critical. Already part of the enemy's forces was arrived to form the

siege of his little garrison, when he descried their fleet also approaching. He just saved opportunity for sending two of his triremes with dispatches to Eurymedon at Zacynthus, and presently he was blockaded by land and sea.

It became immediately the object of the Lacedæmonians to push assault, so as to complete their business before the Athenian fleet could arrive; and this they hoped would not be difficult, against a fort so hastily constructed, and a garrison so small. At any rate however they wished to avoid a naval action, and yet to keep the command of the harbour; and then the fort, scantily provided, and cut off from sup-

Thucyd. I. 4.
c. 8. Déscri.
du Golfe de
Venise, par
Bellin. plies, could not hold long. The harbour of Pylus, now Navarino, is a spacious basin with two entrances, one at each end of an island, then called Sphacteria, near two miles long, uncultivated and woody. The northern entrance, near which stood the Athenian fort, barely admitted two triremes abreast; the southern not more than eight or nine. This island the Lacedæmonians occupied with a body of troops; other troops they disposed along the shore; and both entrances of the harbour they proposed to defend with triremes, moored with their prows toward the sea. Beyond the harbour's mouth, the coast was rocky and without landing-place.¹⁴

Thucyd. I. 4.
c. 9. Meanwhile Demosthenes, to make the most of the small force under his command, hauled ashore the three triremes which remained to him, and formed of them a kind of outwork against the sea, under his fort. Two small Messenian privateers had accidentally put into Pylus; and with some shields, mostly of wicker, and other sorry armour which he found aboard them, he armed the sailors from his triremes.¹⁵ Forty heavy-armed Messenians,

¹⁴ Ἀλιμενα.

¹⁵ Ναύτας. Those who constructed the fort were soldiers, στρατιώται, but the historian does not mention what proportion there was of each.

who had formed part of the complement of the privateers, were a more valuable addition to his garrison. In the hasty construction of his fort, he had been most careful to strengthen it toward the land, as the side on which the Lacedæmonians were generally most to be apprehended. Toward the sea it was far weaker, but then on that side it could be approached only from the sea. To resist an army and a fleet moving in concert to attack him, he selected, from his whole force, sixty heavy-armed and a few bowmen, whom he posted on the beach to oppose debarkation, and of whom he took himself the immediate command. The remainder he appointed to the defence of the walls.

Where soldiers are members of that assembly in which sovereign power legally resides, and where persuasion may with impunity be attempted to induce them to disobey their officers, encouraging speeches previous to action may be often necessary; and to such a little band as that with which Demosthenes had engaged in a very arduous undertaking they would be easily addressed. “ My fellow-soldiers, and companions in the chance of war,” <sup>Thucyd. 1.4.
c. 10.</sup> said that able officer, “ let no man now think to show his wisdom by computing the exact magnitude of the danger which threatens us, but rather let every one cheerfully resolve to exert himself to the utmost, as the one thing necessary to the safety of us all. Nevertheless, I think, notwithstanding the disproportion of numbers, the circumstances are in our favour, if we make the most of advantages in our possession. We Athenians, practised in naval war, well know that debarkation in the face of an enemy is no easy business, if opposed with firmness. Let the Peloponnesians then, who have not the same experience, now try it; for, adding the difficulties of this rocky shore, which will fight for us, I have no doubt of success, if we are only true to ourselves.” This simple oratory, adapted to excite, not

the boiling spirit of enterprise, which in the circumstances might have been even injurious, but the deliberate valour which defence requires, had the desired effect, and the Athenians waited in due preparation to receive the attack.

<sup>Thucyd. 1. 4.
c. 11.</sup> The Peloponnesian fleet consisted of forty-three triremes, mostly of the allies, but commanded in chief by Thrasymelidas, a Spartan.¹⁶ While the fort was threatened on all sides, by sea and land, the principal attack was made from the fleet, precisely where Demosthenes expected. But a few triremes only could approach at a time, and those not without risk from the rocks and the surf. The attack was therefore carried on by reliefs, and no exhortation was omitted to promote exertion. Some of the captains and masters¹⁷ nevertheless hesitating at the view of the dangers of the shore, the Spartan Brasidas, who commanded a trireme, became presently distinguished by the Athenians, loud in expostulation : “ Ill it became them,” he said, “ to spare their timbers, when the enemy possessed a post in the country : the Lacedæmonians deserved better things of their allies. Striking, splitting, landing anyhow, they should make themselves masters of the place, and of the men who held it.” Brasidas was not of a disposition thus to exhort others, without setting the example himself.

^{c. 12.} Having compelled his master to lay his galley close to the shore, he was stepping upon the gangboard¹⁸, to lead the landing, when a number of the enemy’s missile weapons at once struck him; insomuch that he fainted, and fell backward, fortunately into the ship, while his shield, which among the ancients it was highly disgraceful and even criminal to lose, dropped into the sea.

¹⁶ Ναύαρχος.

¹⁷ Τείχαρχοι καὶ κυβερνῆται, answering precisely to our terms captain and master.

¹⁸ Ἐπὶ τὴν ἀποβάθμησην.

Notwithstanding this ill success of Brasidas, the attempt to force a landing was repeated through the whole of that day, and part of the next, but was resisted so efficaciously that at length the fleet drew off. Demos-thenes then, for the encouragement of his people, and not without just claim of victory, erected his trophy, of which the shield of Brasidas, taken by the Athenians, became the honourable ornament. No stain however could ensue to the reputation of the owner; but, on the contrary, the story being related through Greece, it was everywhere remarked, as a singular result of the incident, that what disgraced others brought glory to Brasidas.

Thucyd. 1. 4.
c. 13.

c. 12.:

The Lacedæmonian commanders, hopeless now of succeeding by assault, prepared immediately to proceed to a regular siege, and with that view sent some ships for timber to make battering-engines. Before these could return, Eurymedon arrived with the Athenian fleet; which, with the junction of four Chian ships, and a re-enforcement taken from the station of Naupactus, consisted of forty triremes. Approaching enough to observe that the harbour of Pylus was occupied by the enemy's fleet, and the island before it and the shore on each side by their army, Eurymedon withdrew, and encamped for the night on the small island of Prote, at no great distance. On the morrow he prepared for action, determined to attack the enemy in the harbour, if they would not meet him in the open sea.

End of May.

The Peloponnesian fleet seems to have been ill commanded: the resolution was taken to await the enemy within the basin; where the confined space, and the army surrounding, it was thought, would give advantage; and the previously proposed blockade of the entrances was omitted. A larger proportion of the crews would thus have their nightly rest ashore, and the Lacedæmonians would desire to

maintain their strength as entire as possible, to balance, as far as might be, the enemy's superiority of skill. But so deficient were they in circumspection that the

Thucyd. 1. 4.
c. 14.

Athenian fleet was entering the basin by both the mouths while the greater part of the Peloponnesian crews were but quitting their camp to go aboard. Some ships were already under way; but the crews, seeing they should not be supported, instantly fled to the shore. Five triremes were taken; the men however escaping from all except one. The Athenians then proceeded to attack the ships upon the beach, and to haul away those from which the crews had fled. The Lacedæmonian land forces, mortified by the disaster of their fleet, but far more alarmed for their troops in the island, pressed toward the shore. A fierce engagement ensued, between the Athenians from their galleys and the Lacedæmonians dashing into the water to defend theirs. After much bloodshed on both sides, the Lacedæmonians secured all their ships except the five first taken, with which the Athenians drew off, masters also of the enemy's dead, who were restored on the usual application from the defeated. Eurymedon erected his trophy, and then directed his care to keep a strict watch upon Sphacteria, looking upon the Lacedæmonians there as already his prisoners.

They were four hundred and twenty, drafted by
c. 8. lot from the several lochi of the army, with attending Helots, whose number the historian does not mention. These indeed were little thought of; but among the others were some connected with most of the principal families of Lacedæmon.

The following transactions furnish very remarkable proof of the importance of a very few citizens to the most powerful of the little republics of Greece. Those republics were all so constituted that they could bear neither diminution, nor any considerable increase of their citizens, without incon-

venience. It was not the loss of inhabitants to the country that would be felt, though of a small republic, when four hundred men were killed or taken; but it was the loss of those intimately connected with the ruling powers, by ties of blood, by religious prejudices, by political prejudices, and most of all if by party prejudices. Those who formed the strength of every Grecian state for every other purpose, the slaves, could not be trusted with arms. But the military establishment was composed of all the freemen capable of bearing arms. Losses in war therefore could be recruited only by time, which would bring boys to manhood, and by fresh births; unless the invidious and hazardous resource were admitted, of associating foreigners, or of raising slaves to be citizens. Of the small proportion then of the inhabitants who filled the military function, four hundred lost would affect a great number of families; and hence private passion had such influence on public measures.

Intelligence of the transactions at Pylus filled Sparta with consternation. The men in Sphacteria had not, like the Romans whom, we are told, their country refused to ransom, disgraced themselves by flight or by the surrender of their arms; but, placed in their present situation in the accidental turn of duty, with their honour clear, they were likely to become a sacrifice to the mismanagement or deficient exertion of those who, by more effectually opposing the Athenian fleet, ought to have preserved them from such calamitous circumstances. The principal magistrates therefore of Lacedæmon, the leaders of the administration¹⁹, came to the camp at Pylus to assure themselves of the exact state of things; and, when they were satisfied that to rescue those in the island was impossible, it was immediately determined to enter into negotiation with the enemy, with a view

¹⁹ Τὰ τέλη.

Thucyd. I. 4.
c. 15.

to a treaty of peace. A truce was accordingly agreed upon, of which these were the conditions : “ That, as a preliminary measure, all the Peloponnesian ships of war which had been in the late action, and all others then in any port of the Lacedæmonian territory, should be delivered as pledges to the Athenian admiral at Pylus : That Lacedæmonian ambassadors should be conveyed to Athens in an Athenian trireme to treat concerning a peace, and brought back again by the same conveyance : that the truce should hold during their absence, and that, on their return, the ships delivered should be restored : That, in the mean time, the Lacedæmonians should be permitted to supply their people in the island with provisions in specified quantities, under the inspection of Athenian officers : That the Athenians should still keep their naval guard over the island, but not land upon it ; and that the Lacedæmonians should send no vessel thither, but in conformity to the terms of the truce : That a breach of any one article of the treaty should be esteemed an annihilation of the whole.”

The Lacedæmonian ambassadors²⁰, arriving at Athens, had a business to manage, in itself difficult, and rendered more so by the forms of democratical administration, and the ready jealousy of a sovereign multitude. The distress which occasioned the negotiation was peculiar to their own state, but in any treaty their allies must be included ; the discussion of whose interest, before the assembled Athenian people, could scarcely be conducted so as to avoid offence. Before the assembled Athenian people however it was necessary that some declaration should be made of the purpose of their mission. In their speech therefore they simply proposed a treaty of peace, together with an alliance offensive and defensive between Lacedæmon and Athens, each party keeping

²⁰ The name of the chief of the embassy, Archeptolemus, not mentioned by Thucydides, is given by Aristophanes, Equit. v. 794.

what it possessed; and in return for the restoration of their fellow-countrymen, in a manner prisoners at Sphacteria, they offered simply the glory which would redound to Athens, from a peace solicited by those who were heretofore in a situation rather to grant conditions, together with gratitude for a generous deed, whence might arise that mutual good will between the two republics, which alone could make a peace lasting.

It was not however without probable ground for supposing the proposal would be welcome at Athens, that the Lacedæmonian administration had determined thus to sue for peace. They knew that a large portion of the Athenian people had always been averse to the war; and that a majority of them, since they had experienced its evils, had more than once manifested great anxiety for a conclusion of it. But, at this time, the favour which Cleon had acquired with the lower people proved an obstacle of which they could not be entirely aware. That turbulent orator reminded the assembly, that the Megarian ports of Nisæa and Pegæ had once belonged to the Athenian people; that the Athenian people had commanded the city of Træzen; that all Achaia had been of their confederacy; and that these possessions had been wrested from them, not in war, but by a treaty; to the hard terms of which a calamity, similar to that which now pressed the Lacedæmonians, had compelled them to consent. This therefore was the time for recovering those possessions. It should be insisted that the Lacedæmonians in Sphacteria should be brought prisoners to Athens; to be released as soon as Nisæ and Pegæ were surrendered to the Athenians, and the administrations of Achaia and Træzen restored to the footing upon which they stood before the thirty years' truce. Accordingly such were the terms which the sovereign assembly of Athens required.

Thucyd. I. 4.
c. 21.
Aristoph. Pax
et Acharn.

Thucyd. 1. 4.
c. 22. To debate before a whole people concerning propositions affecting to such a degree the interests of the allies of Lacedæmon, the Lacedæmonian ambassadors judged utterly imprudent. Instead therefore of giving any answer, they desired that commissioners might be appointed to discuss the several points at more leisure than the nature of a general assembly admitted. This proposal suited the views of Cleon, only as it afforded opportunity to infuse into the people a jealousy of the ambassadors, and of those who were disposed to favour their purpose, and an opinion of his own political sagacity. He exclaimed against it accordingly in a style of indecent passion : “ Well he knew before,” he said, “ that the Lacedæmonian ambassadors came with injurious views, and for clandestine purposes; but now their refusal to declare themselves before the people, and their requisition to treat with a small number of commissioners, must make it manifest to all. If they had anything just and honourable to propose, they need not hesitate to speak it publicly.” The ambassadors, highly desirous of an accommodation upon any moderate terms, yet seeing the Athenian people impracticable through the sway which Cleon held among them, and considering the probable ill consequences of publicly proposing conditions disagreeable to their allies, which might after all be rejected, immediately took their leave.

c. 23. & c. 39.
End of June. They arrived at Pylus about the twentieth day after their departure thence, and with their return the truce of course expired. The Lacedæmonians then demanded the restoration of their ships according to the treaty: but the Athenians refused; alleging some hostility committed against the garrison of the fort, and some other matters of little importance, contrary to the strict letter of the convention, but altogether, in the opinion evidently of the impartial but cautious Thucydides, not warranting a procedure so contrary to the spirit of it. Whether Demosthenes or

Eurymedon was the principal actor in this business, we are not informed; but, in favour of either, it may be observed that to exercise any discretionary power was extremely hazardous, when responsibility was immediate to that despotic and wayward sovereign the Athenian people, under the influence of Cleon. If Cleon, or any other turbulent orator, could persuade the people that their generals ought not to give up, of their own authority, any advantage that the letter of the treaty warranted, their utter ruin, even capital condemnation, might have been the consequence of a contrary conduct.

Both parties now prepared to prosecute hostilities with vigour. The Athenians directed their attention particularly to the guard of Sphacteria: two triremes were constantly circumnavigating it during day, and at night the whole fleet kept watch; in moderate weather all around the island; but fresher winds induced the necessity of leaving the side toward the sea unguarded. A re-enforcement of twenty triremes from Attica made the number of the besieging fleet seventy.

The Peloponnesians meanwhile pushed the siege of the fort. But the object for which the Lacedæmonians were most anxious was to relieve their people in Sphacteria; and what they chiefly apprehended for them was famine. Large rewards therefore were offered, freedom to Helots,
Thucyd. 1. 4.
c. 26. and money to any freemen, who would introduce provisions. Many thus were allured to the attempt; and though some were taken, some succeeded; especially in blowing nights, when the Athenian triremes could not hold their station at the back of the island. Some supply was also carried by divers, who swam under water across the port, rising occasionally only for air, and dragging after them skins filled with bruised linseed, or with poppy-seed mixed with honey.

The blockade of the island being thus protracted, the Athenians began to suffer those very wants through which they had hoped to compel the Lacedæmonians to surrender. In their fort was one small spring, ample for the garrison, but very inadequate to the supply of the whole armament; the greater part of which was reduced to the use of brackish water, obtained by digging in the sand under the fort. All the rest of the coast was possessed by the superior land force of the Peloponnesians: and the triremes, far from capable of carrying supplies for any length of time, had not convenient room even for their crews to sleep or to eat aboard; insomuch that Thucydides mentions it among their hardships upon this occasion, that they went ashore by Thucyd. 1. 4.
c. 27. reliefs for their meals, living otherwise aboard their triremes at anchor.

The uneasiness hence arising in the fleet and army was ere long communicated to Athens, and reasonable apprehension arose that approaching winter would increase the difficulties; that it would become impossible to supply the armament with provisions by the navigation around the capes of Peloponnesus, which in summer they found could not be done in the requisite extent; and that, even if supplies could be furnished, the fleet could not remain, during the stormy season, on a coast where they possessed no port. It was then farther considered that, if the Lacedæmonians should recover their people from Sphacteria, not only an opportunity for making an advantageous peace was lost, but future opportunities were precluded: at least the first proposal must hereafter come from themselves; for the Lacedæmonians would scarcely risk the disgrace of a second refusal.

Public indignation was rising fast against Cleon, as the evil counsellor of the commonwealth, and author of the evils felt or apprehended. He found it necessary, for obviating

popular clamour and disgust, to exert himself in the assembly; and, in a very extraordinary train of circumstances that followed, his impudence and his fortune (if, in the want of another, we may use that term) wonderfully favoured him. He began with boldly insisting that “the circumstances of the fleet and army were not so adverse as they were reported.” This assertion called forward the officers who brought the intelligence: they desired that, “if they were thought unworthy of belief, proper persons might be sent to examine into the state of things.” The assembly assented to this request, and Cleon himself was named among those to be commissioned for the purpose. Pressed by this proposal, which he was aware would not answer his end, and anxious anyhow to throw the weight of the business upon others, he seems in the moment to have lost his guard. “It were idle waste of time,” he said, “to send commissioners to inquire, when they should rather send generals to execute. If those who directed the military affairs of the commonwealth were men, it would be easy, with the force which they could at all times command, to subdue the little band in Sphacteria: were he in that station, he would engage to effect it.” The unenterprising Nicias, at this time commander-in-chief,<sup>Thucyd. 1.4.
c. 28.</sup> being thus called upon, in his anxiety to obviate crimination, miserably betrayed the dignity of his high office. “As far as depended upon him,” he said, “Cleon might take what force he pleased, and make the attempt.” Cleon immediately accepted the offer, thinking it not seriously made; but Nicias persisting, Cleon would have retracted, saying, “Nicias, not he, was general of the republic.” Nicias however, observing that his proposal had not displeased the people, declared solemnly before the assembly that, for the business of Pylus, he waived his right to command. The more then Cleon appeared still anxious to withdraw, the

more the people, in the usual temper of mobs²¹, (such is the historian's observation) insisted that he should make his words good; with clamour requiring that Nicias should resign the command, and that Cleon should take it. Thus appointed general, Cleon, though alarmed with the danger, was elated with the extravagant honour; and in the next assembly held on the business²² he resumed his arrogant manner: "He did not fear the Lacedæmonians," he said; "and for the expedition to Pylus, he would desire no Athenian forces: he would only take the Lemnian and Imbrian heavy-armed, at that time in Attica, with the middle-armed of Ænus, and four hundred bowmen of the allies; and, with that small addition to the armament then at Pylus, he would, within twenty days, either bring the Lacedæmonians in Sphacteria prisoners to Athens, or put them to the sword upon the spot." Amid the many very serious considerations involved with the business, this pompous boast excited a general laugh in the assembly: yet even the graver men, says the historian, were upon the whole pleased with the event, upon considering that of two good things one must result; either an important advantage must be gained over the Lacedæmonians, or, what they rather expected, they should be finally delivered from the importunity of Cleon.

It however soon appeared, that though for a man, like Cleon, unversed in military command, the undertaking was rash and the bragging promise abundantly ridiculous, yet the business was not so desperate as it was in the moment generally imagined; and in fact the folly of the Athenian people, in committing such a trust to such a man, far

²¹ Οἶον ὄχλος φιλεῖ ποιεῖ. Thucyd. 1. 4. c. 28.

²² Thucydides does not specify that it was in a second assembly; but from the circumstances, and from the tenor of his narrative, it should seem that it must have been so.

exceeded that of the man himself, whose impudence seldom carried him beyond the control of his cunning. He had received intelligence that Demosthenes had already formed the plan, and was preparing for the attempt, with the forces upon the spot or in the neighbourhood. Hence his apparent moderation in his demand for troops; which he judiciously accommodated to the gratification of the Athenian people, by avoiding to require any Athenians. He further showed his judgment, when the decree was to be passed which was finally to direct the expedition, by a request, which was readily granted, that Demosthenes might be joined with him in the command.

Thucyd. I. 4.
c. 29.

The natural strength of Sphacteria, uneven, rocky, woody, together with ignorance of the enemy's force there, had long deterred Demosthenes from attempting any attack; and the more, because his misfortune in Ætolia had arisen from incautiously engaging himself, in a rough and woody country, against unknown numbers. But it had happened that a fire, made by the Lacedæmonians for dressing their provisions, had accidentally caught the woods, and, the wind favouring, had burnt almost the whole. Their best defence being thus destroyed, Demosthenes, now enabled to see his enemy and his ground, no longer hesitated concerning measures. He had sent for such re-enforcements as might be obtained from the nearest allies, but before they could join him Cleon arrived.

Demosthenes himself had been appointed to an anomalous command, interfering with the authority of the regular generals of the commonwealth; and it does not appear that he made any difficulty of yielding to the wayward will of his sovereign, and taking the second rank in the command with Cleon. When the new general arrived at Pylus with his re-enforcement, it was determined first to try if their busi-

ness could not be managed by negotiation ; and a message was accordingly sent to the commander-in-chief of the Lacedæmonian army, proposing that the men in Sphacteria should surrender themselves prisoners, with the condition, that they should be liberally treated in confinement, till the two republics might come to some accommodation.

Thucyd. 1. 4.
c. 31. This being refused, Cleon and Demosthenes prepared to use the force under their command.

Giving one entire day of rest to their troops, on the next, at night, they embarked all their heavy-armed, who were only eight hundred, and, a little before dawn, landed at the same time on both sides of Sphacteria, from the harbour and from the open sea. An advanced post of the Lacedæmonians was surprised, and the guard put to the sword. As soon as

c. 31, 32. day broke, the rest of the forces were landed,

consisting of eight hundred bowmen, about as many middle-armed, a few Messenians and others from the garrison of the fort, and, except the rowers of the lowest bench, distinguished by the name of thalamians, all the seamen of the fleet ; who, as the triremes were more than seventy, would be a large body. The force all together was not of the most regular kind, but it was ample against those who held Sphacteria ; of whom the Lacedæmonians, the only regular troops, had been originally but four hundred and twenty, and thirty of those were killed in the outpost. Of the number of attendant slaves, and of those who, after landing provisions, may have remained in the island, we are not informed. Epitadas, the commander, had posted himself, with his main body, in the central and plainest part, near the only spring the island afforded. A small reserve he placed in an ancient fort, of rude construction, but strong by situation, at the extremity next Pylus.

The Lacedæmonians, and indeed all the Peloponnesians, seem to have been absurdly attached, through a point of

honour, to the exclusive use of weapons for close fight. Among the early Greeks, the first purpose of arms, after self-defence, was to defend their cattle: the second, when civilisation advanced, to protect their harvest, and cultivated fruits: the third, and not least important, to hold a secure superiority over their numerous slaves. Hence, as well as because of the more determined courage requisite for the use of them, and of their greater efficacy in the hands of brave and able men, wherever they can be used, arms for stationary fight in plains were deemed more honourable than missile weapons. But as, under many circumstances, especially in mountainous countries, like the greatest part of Peloponnesus and of all Greece, it was easy to evade the force of the heavy-armed, yet we find the Lacedæmonians often suffering for want of light troops and missile weapons. Epitadas chose, with his little band, to meet an enemy who so outnumbered him, in the levellest part of the island; not only because the fountain there was necessary, but because there the weapons and the discipline of his people would be most efficacious. But among the Athenians, though the first honour was given to the panoply, yet the use of the bow was cultivated; and we find the Athenian archers frequently mentioned as superior troops of their kind. Demosthenes had been taught by misfortune both how to value light troops, and how to use them; and Cleon's prudence left him the direction of operations. Placing his light-armed in detached bodies of about two hundred each on the heights around the Lacedæmonian station, he proceeded with his heavy-armed within a certain distance of the front of it, and then halted.

Epitadas did not refuse to meet superior numbers; but, as he advanced to attack Demosthenes,
Thucyd. I. 4.
c. 33. he was assailed on each flank and in his rear with darts, arrows, and stones. If he turned, those who thus annoyed

him instantly fled from his attack, and his heavy-armed would in vain pursue them; but the moment he resumed his march towards Demosthenes, they renewed their annoyance. Such was the character of the Lacedæmonian heavy infantry at this time in Greece that, with all the advantage of numbers on their side, the light-armed of the Athenian army had not approached them without awe, and, as Thucydides expresses it, a kind of servile apprehension. But encouraged by the effect which their first wary exertions derived from the able disposition of Demosthenes, and by the evident inability of the Lacedæmonians for efficacious pursuit, the light-armed pressed their attacks. This desultory manner of action astonished the Lacedæmonians with its novelty: the ashes and dust, formed by the late conflagration, rising and mingling their darkness with that of the constant flight of missile weapons, disabled them from seeing their enemy, whom with their arms they could not reach, if they could see: while the clamorous noise of the irregular assailants drowned the voice of command. Utterly at a loss for means of effectual opposition, when many were already severely wounded, they retreated in a compact body toward their reserve in the castle, which was not far distant. The light-armed then pressed their assault with increased ardour: the Lacedæmonians gained the fort, but not without loss.

The efficacy of the light troops being now obviated, Demosthenes led his heavy-armed to the attack; but the Lacedæmonians having great advantage of ground, as well as some defence from the old walls, maintained an equal conflict against superior numbers. It was already late in the day; both parties were suffering from heat, thirst, and fatigue, and neither had any prospect of decisive advantage, when the commander of the Messenian troops coming to Cleon and Demosthenes, told them he had dis-

covered a way by which, with a party of light-armed bowmen, he thought he could scale the fort. The party he desired being accordingly put under his orders, he led them, so as to avoid being seen by the enemy, to a precipitous part of the rock, where, through confidence in the natural strength of the place, no guard was kept. Climbing with great difficulty, he made his way good, and appeared suddenly on the summit. Effectual resistance was now no longer possible for the Lacedæmonians, worn with incessant action through a sultry day, and surrounded by superior numbers. Cleon and Demosthenes therefore, desirous of carrying them prisoners to Athens, checked their troops, who would shortly have put them to the sword; and sent a herald to offer quarter, upon condition that they should surrender themselves to the mercy of the Athenian people. It was doubted whether, even in their hopeless situation, Lacedæmonians would submit to become prisoners; but as soon as they saw the heralds approaching they grounded their shields and waved their hands, intimating that they were disposed to hear proposals. Epitadas was no more; Hippagretes, his second in command, had been so severely wounded that he lay for lifeless among the slain; Styphon, on whom the command had thus devolved, desired permission to send a herald to the Lacedæmonian army on the continent for orders. This was refused, but the Athenian generals sent for a herald from the Lacedæmonian army; and after the interchange of two or three messages a final answer came to the garrison of the island in these terms: "The Lacedæmonians permit you to consult your own safety, admitting nothing disgraceful."²³ After a short consultation, they then surrendered, according to the Greek expression, their arms and themselves.

Thucyd. I. 4.
c. 37.

²³ Μηδὲν αἰσχεὸν ποιοῦντας.

On the morrow the commanders of the Lacedæmonian army on the continent sent a herald for their slain, and the Athenians erected their trophy. The killed were a hundred and twenty-eight Lacedæmonians, and the prisoners two hundred and ninety-two. Of the fate of the Helots and others, who were with the Lacedæmonians in Sphacteria,

^{Thucyd. I. 4.} we have no information. The blockade, from c. 39.

the action in the harbour to that in the island, had continued seventy-two days, including the truce of twenty days, during which the garrison was regularly served with provisions. For the rest of the time they had only had such casual supplies as could be introduced by stealth; yet, such had been the economy of Epitadas, provisions remained when the island was taken. The Athenian commanders, leaving a garrison in Pylus, sailed away with the fleet; Eurymedon with his division for Corcyra and Sicily, and Cleon and Demosthenes for Attica: and the engagement of Cleon was com-

^{Toward the end of August.} completely fulfilled; for they entered the port of Piræus with their prisoners within twenty days after he had quitted it.

^{Thucyd. I. 4.} Nothing during the whole war, says Thucydides, c. 40.

happened so contrary to the general opinion and expectation of the Greeks as this event; for it was supposed that neither hunger, nor the pressure of any other the severest necessity, would induce Lacedæmonians to surrender their arms; insomuch that among some it was doubted whether the prisoners were of the same race, or at least if they were of equal rank with their comrades who had been killed. Hence an Athenian auxiliary, with more ill manners than wit, asked one of the prisoners, "Whether those who fell in the island were the men of superior rank and merit."²⁴ To

⁴ Καλοὶ κἀγαθοὶ, a phrase which cannot be exactly translated.

which the Spartan coldly replied, “ An arrow would indeed be a valuable weapon, if it could distinguish rank and merit.”

The prisoners, being many of them connected with the first families of Sparta, were considered by the Athenians as most valuable pledges. It was determined by a decree of the people, that they should be kept in chains²⁵ till the two republics should come to some accommodation, unless any invasion of Attica should be attempted by the Peloponnesians. In that case the decree declared, in terror to the Lacedæmonian public, that they should be put to death. Such were at that time the maxims of warfare among those who boasted to be the most civilised, and indeed the only civilised people upon earth; and such the motives for preferring death in the field to the condition, in modern Europe so mild, except in France during the usurpation, of a prisoner of war.

Thucyd. I. 4.
c. 41.

By the event of the business of Pylus, the Lacedæmonians were in a state of distress totally new to them. From the first establishment of their ancestors in Peloponnesus, it was not known by tradition that such a number of their citizens had fallen into the hands of an enemy: and it was as little remembered that an enemy had ever possessed a post within their country. Pylus was now so fortified that, as long as it was open to supplies by sea, no mode of attack by land, with which the Lacedæmonians were acquainted, would be effectual against it: a garrison of Messenians from Naupactus infested the neighbouring country, with continual incursions; and the Helots deserting in numbers, found sure protection. In this situation of things, the Lacedæmonian government, anxiously desirous of peace, expected only insult from the haughty temper of their enemy, should they send ministers

publicly to propose terms. They made however repeated trials by secret negotiation. The wiser and more moderate Athenians, and those of higher rank in general, would gladly have profited from present prosperity, to make an advantageous accommodation. But the arrogance of the people, fed by success, and inflamed by the boisterous eloquence of Cleon, now the popular favourite, made all endeavours for the salutary purpose fruitless.

CHAPTER XVI.

OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, FROM THE APPLICATION FOR PEACE FROM LACEDÆMON IN THE SEVENTH YEAR, TO THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE BETWEEN LACEDÆMON AND ATHENS IN THE TENTH YEAR.

SECTION I.

Expedition under Nicias to the Corinthian Coast. — Conclusion of the Corcyraean Sedition. — Embassy from Persia to Lacedæmon. — Lacedæmonian Island of Cythera, and Æginetan Settlement at Thyrea, taken by the Athenians. — Inhumanity of the Athenians.

IF, stopping for a moment at this point of Grecian history, we turn our view back to past transactions, as reported by the impartial contemporary historian, we cannot but admire the able policy, the clear foresight, and the bold firmness of him who has by some writers, ancient and modern, been traduced as the wanton author of this, in the end, unfortunate war, the all-accomplished Pericles; and if we take any interest in the fate of Athens, or of Greece, we cannot but regret that he was not yet living to conduct to a conclusion the scene of bloodshed, through the opportunity which now offered, and to exert his capacious mind toward the establishment of a political union, which might have given stability to peace through the country. What might have been done, had Pericles and his virtuous and venerable friend the Spartan king Archidamus met in such a crisis, we might amuse ourselves, perhaps not unprofitably, with imagining, were we to take into the consideration all the circumstances

of the times, as they remain reported by Thucydides, and illumined with no inconsiderable collateral light, by other contemporary and nearly contemporary writers. After the general abolition of kingly power, so fair an opportunity certainly never occurred for carrying into effect the noble project, said to have been conceived, and even attempted

*Plut. vit.
Peric.*

by Pericles, of a federal union of the Greek nation,

which might prevent hostility within itself, and afford means of united exertion against foreign enemies. But the desire simply of keeping peace at home perhaps never led to such a union among any people : some pressure of a foreign power is wanting ; some overbearing neighbour, or a general superiority of force in surrounding states. No such pressure at this time bore upon Greece. Persia had ceased to give alarm : Macedonia was not yet formidable : Carthage had small inducement to turn her views to a country where war was so well understood, and riches so little abounded : it does not appear that even the name of Rome was known in Greece. The little republics therefore of Lacedæmon and Athens, judging from experience of the past, for they were not always led by the capacious mind of a Pericles, vainly supposed themselves equal to resist any power ever likely to arise upon earth ; an opinion indeed generally entertained, as the writings of Plato and Aristotle prove, even among the ablest politicians of the time ; and though Xenophon was aware of their error, yet he was not aware of any good remedy for the weakness of the ancient republics, and the defects of the political system of Greece.

Under the control of Cleon, the Athenian government was not likely to be distinguished for moderation ; and the fortunate event of that adventurer's late presumptuous undertaking, increasing his favour with the people, would not lessen his arrogance. The conduct of the war moreover, on the part of the Athenians, was so far rendered easy, by the

decided superiority which their fleet possessed, and by the pledges in their hands, which secured them from invasion, that they might choose their measures. Any very consistent plan, as in the present circumstances of their administration it was not very likely to be formed, so it was not absolutely necessary to success. Passion seems to have dictated their next undertaking: they would take revenge on the Corinthians, the first instigators of the war, and, upon all occasions, the most zealous actors in it. A fleet of eighty triremes was equipped, and a land force embarked, consisting of two thousand Athenian heavy-armed foot and two hundred horse, with the auxiliary troops of Miletus, Andrus, and Carystus. Nicias commanded. The armament, proceeding up the Saronic gulf, made the shore between Chersonesus and Rhitus, scarcely eight miles from Corinth. The Corinthians, apprised of its destination by intelligence from Argos, had already assembled the whole force of their Peloponnesian territory, except five hundred men absent on garrison duty in Ambracia and Leucadia, and they marched to oppose the expected debarkation. But Nicias, moving in the night unobserved, landed his troops near Chersonesus. The Corinthians, quickly informed by signals, hastened thither with half their forces, leaving the other half at Cenchreæ, for the security of the neighbouring coast and country. A very obstinate action ensued, in which, after various efforts, and some turns of fortune, the exertions of the Athenian horse decided the event of the day. The Corinthian general being killed, with two hundred and twelve heavy-armed, the rest of the army, distressed for want of cavalry to oppose the Athenian, retreated, but in good order, to some strong ground in its rear. The Athenians stripped the enemy's dead, and erected their trophy. The honour of victory thus

Thucyd. 1. 4.
c. 42.

B. C. 425.
Ol. 88. 4.
P. W. 7.
September.

Thucyd. 1. 4.
c. 42.

c. 43, 44.

was clearly theirs, but the advantage gained was otherwise small: they dared not await the junction of the forces from Cenchreæ with the defeated army; and the less, as all the elders and youths in Corinth were besides hastening to join it, and ere long the neighbouring allies would come in. Nicias therefore re-embarked his forces in such haste that he left behind him two of his dead, who had not been immediately found. Apprehensive then of the clamour
Thucyd. I. 4. c. 44. Plut. vit. Nic. and popular ill-will to which this might give occasion, he sent a herald to the Corinthians to request the bodies: and thus, according to Grecian maxims, he surrendered the honour of the trophy, and all claim to the glory of victory.

But the decided command of the sea, which the Athenians possessed, gave them means to distress their enemies greatly, with little risk to themselves. The ancient ships of war were singularly commodious for operations upon a coast; moving any way in any wind, if not too fresh; and for debarkation and re-embarkation wanting no intervention of boats. While the Corinthians were assembling all their forces in the neighbourhood of Chersonesus, the
Thucyd. I. 4. c. 45. Athenians moved to the coast beyond Cenchreæ, now unguarded; and debarking near Crommyon, plundered the adjacent country, encamped for the night, and re-embarking early in the morning, were thus at once secure from the revenge of the Corinthian arms. They then proceeded to the Epidaurian coast, and seizing Methone, a town on a small peninsula between Epidaurus and Trœzen, they raised a fortification across the isthmus. The fleet then returned home; but a garrison, left in Methone, carried depredation, as opportunity offered, through the Trœzenian, Epidaurian, and Halian lands.

The close of this summer brought the tragedy of the Corcyraean sedition to a conclusion. Eurymedon and So-

phocles, according to their instructions, making Corcyra in their way from Pylus to Sicily, debarked their forces, and, with the Corcyræans of the city, stormed the fort on Mount Isthone, held by the aristocratical Corcyræans; most of whom nevertheless escaped to a neighbouring eminence, so difficult of approach that it was inexpugnable. Being however without means to subsist there, they were soon obliged to surrender; their auxiliaries to the discretion of the besieging army, and themselves to that of the Athenian people. Eurymedon and Sophocles, unwilling to give to others the triumph of leading their prisoners into Athens, and to lose the popular favour which attaches strongly in the moment, but is presently diverted by new objects, placed them in the adjacent little island of Ptychia, as on their parole; with the condition, that if any one should attempt escape, the benefit of the capitulation should be forfeited for all. The atrociousness of what followed would be beyond belief, if it came attested by less authority than that of Thucydides.¹ The chiefs of the democratical Corcyræans feared that their fellow-citizens of superior rank, were the Athenian people to decree the doom, though the Athenian people were not always remarkable for mercy, might yet escape death. They devised therefore a fraud to seduce them to their own destruction. Persons likely to find confidence were employed to infuse apprehension that the Athenian generals intended to deliver them to the Corcyræan people; offering at the same time to provide a vessel in which they might escape from what they so beyond all things abhorred. The prisoners gave into the snare, and were taken in the ship.

¹ This was written before the transactions in France had beggared all ideas formerly conceived, among the modern European nations, on such subjects. The reader who has met with information of what passed at Lyons, after its surrender to the republican arms, will be struck with the similarity of some principal circumstances.

^{Thucyd. 1. 4.} The capitulation was undeniably broken, and
^{c. 47.} the Athenian generals surrendered the wretched remains of the Corcyraean nobility, if we may use the term, to the pleasure of their people. These then resolved that their revenge should be completed, and that, as far as might be consistent with public order, the utmost indulgence for that passion should be allowed to every individual among the sovereign multitude. The prisoners were placed all in one large building. The people, in arms, formed a lane at the door. Twenty of their unfortunate adversaries, bound together, were brought out at a time. Men with scourges drove on any that hesitated, while the armed citizens selected for revenge those to whom they bore any ill-will, cutting and stabbing as the passion of the moment excited. Sixty had been thus killed, when the

^{c. 48.}

rest received intimation of what had been passing.

Calling then aloud to the Athenians to put them to death, if such was their pleasure, they declared they would neither go out of the building, nor permit any to come in. The people, not to encounter their despair, got upon the roof, and taking off the covering, thence in safety discharged missile weapons. The prisoners endeavoured at first to defend themselves; but when night came on, no symptom appearing of any relaxation in the animosity of their enemies, they determined to put the finishing stroke to their own misery: some strangled themselves with the cords of some beds which were in the place, some with strips of their own clothes, some used the weapons which had been discharged at them. When day broke, all were found dead. The corpses, heaped upon wagons, were carried out of the city, and disposed of without any of those funeral ceremonies which, among the Greeks, were held of such sacred importance. Eurymedon, after the completion of this abominable scene of treachery and cruelty, prosecuted his voyage for Sicily.

The taking of Anactorium finished the successes of the Athenian arms, and the operations of the war for the summer. Being attacked by the Athenian force from Naupactus, in conjunction with the Acarnanians, it was betrayed into their hands. The inhabitants, a Corinthian colony, underwent no severer fate than expulsion from their settlement, and the loss of all their property. Their houses and lands were occupied by a new colony drawn from the several towns of Acarnania.

From the beginning of the war, intrigue had been carrying on by the Lacedæmonian government with the court of Persia; and that court, it appears, was not disposed to disdain negotiation with a little Grecian republic: but the distance, the difficulty and danger of communication, difference of manners, and contrariety in maxims of government, pride on both sides, and some apprehension on that of Lacedæmon of the superior weight of the Persian empire, had prevented any treaty from being brought to a conclusion. In the autumn following the affairs of Pylus and Corecyra, while an Athenian squadron, under the command of Aristides, son of Archippus, sent to collect tribute, lay at Eion upon the Strymon, Artaphernes, a Persian, was apprehended there. His writings being seized and translated, it appeared that he was commissioned by the king of Persia, Artaxerxes, as his minister to Lacedæmon; that the purpose, or at least the pretence, of his mission was to bring to effect the treaty of alliance with that state; and the reason was found alleged that, of several ministers who had passed from Lacedæmon into Persia, no two had carried the same proposals. Apparently however the principal object of the Persian court was to examine into the state of things in Greece; for Artaphernes was not to conclude any treaty, but only to conduct into Persia ministers from Lacedæmon, sufficiently authorised to

Thucyd. 1. 4.
c. 49.

After 24 Sept.
P. W. 7.
Ol. 88. 4.
B. C. 425.

treat for their commonwealth. Aristides immediately forwarded this important prisoner to Athens. The Athenians had not hitherto solicited any alliance with Persia; yet they were anxious not to embroil themselves with that powerful empire, while engaged in war with Peloponnesus. They would not however permit the minister to proceed to Lacedæmon. He was conveyed to Ephesus, and ambassadors from the Athenian people were appointed to attend him to the Persian court. But these, on their arrival in Ionia, meeting news of the death of Artaxerxes, and of troubles following in the empire, they returned to Athens.

B.C. 424.
Ol. 88.4—89.1.
P.W. 8. Spring advancing, the Lacedæmonians, de-
pressed by their misfortunes, remained inactive; but in Athens, while many were still desirous of peace, the more restless and ardent spirits prevailed, and it was determined to push success, and press the Peloponnesians on all

<sup>Thucyd. 1. 4.
c. 53.</sup> sides. The island of Cythera was a very important appendage of the Lacedæmonian dominion; affording security for the Laconian and Messenian coast against piratical depredation, commodious for such communication with the fertile regions of Africa as the wants of Sparta might occasionally require and its institutions would permit. The lands were all possessed by Lacedæmonians; the government was administered by a magistracy sent annually from Sparta; and a Spartan garrison was constantly kept there. Against this island an armament of sixty triremes, with two thousand heavy-armed Athenian foot, a small body of horse, and a considerable force of auxiliary troops, proceeded under the command of Nicias and Autocles.

^{c. 54.} The garrison and inhabitants were quickly compelled to surrender, on condition of safety only for their lives.

^{c. 55.} The alarm which this event occasioned in Lacedæmon, and the measures taken in consequence,

mark not so much the want of force in the hands of the Lacedæmonian government, as the want of ability to direct it. Descents upon the Lacedæmonian coast were expected, but where they would be attempted could not be foreseen. Their great legislator seems to have been well aware that a moving force may be more effectual for the protection of a country than any fortifications, since he forbade that Sparta itself should be fortified. In opposition to this maxim they now divided their strength in forts and strong posts, through the length of their winding coast. The consequence was that the Athenians could land anywhere without risk ; they wasted the lands at pleasure ; and having defeated the only small body of troops that rashly ventured to oppose them, they erected their trophy, and returned to Cythera. An Ionian trophy in Laconia was unknown before, since the establishment of the Dorians in the country ; and, though the consequence of the defeat was otherwise trifling, the fame of the event made a strong impression through Greece, and the Lacedæmonians felt severely the injury to their reputation. The Athenians then sailing again from Cythera ravaged a part of the Epidaurian coast, and then proceeded to take their last revenge on the unfortunate Æginetans, now established at Thyrea, within the territory and under the immediate protection of Lacedæmon. Thyrea was situated, like most of the older maritime towns of Greece, not upon the shore, but about a mile from it, on rising ground, fitter for defence. But the Æginetans, accustomed to affluence, derived, not from their lands, but from their maritime commerce, had still directed their views to the sea ; and were at this time busied in constructing a fort on the shore for the protection of their shipping. On discovering the Athenian fleet, they hastily retired into Thyrea ; which was however so deficiently fortified that a small band of Lacedæmonians of the bordering country,

Thucyd. I. 4.
c. 56.

appointed by their government to assist in raising and protecting the works, refused to share in the danger of its defence. The Æginetans nevertheless resolved to attempt the protection of the little property remaining to them. Nicias, landing his whole force, quickly overpowered them ; and all, who did not fall in the assault, became prisoners at discretion, together with their Lacedæmonian governor Tantalus, who had been wounded. Thyrea, stripped of everything valuable, was burnt, and the armament returned, with the booty and prisoners, to Athens. A despotic multitude was then to decide the fate of that miserable remnant of a Grecian people, once declared by an oracle, and confessed by all Greece, the most meritorious of the Greek nation, for their actions in its common defence against the most formidable enemy that ever assailed it. What few individual tyrants could have thought of without horror, the Athenian people directed by a deliberate decree. The law indeed established by the Lacedæmonians, and sealed with the blood of the unfortunate Plataeans, was but too closely followed, and the Æginetans were all executed. Tantalus was added to the number of living pledges, obtained at Sphacteria, for the security of Attica.

Another decision then awaited the pleasure of the Athenian people, the fate of their new conquest of Cythera, and particularly that of some of the principal inhabitants, whom the generals had thought it unsafe to leave there. These were distributed among the islands of the Athenian dominion. The rest of the Cytherians, to whom the capitulation only assured their lives, were however left unmolested in their possessions : a yearly tribute of four talents only being required from them.

SECTION II.

Effects of the Superiority gained by Athens in the War. — Sedition of Megara. — Distress of Lacedæmon. — Movements in Thrace and Macedonia. — Atrocious Conduct of the Lacedæmonian Government toward the Helots. — Brasidas appointed to lead a Peloponnesian Army into Thrace. — Lacedæmonian Interest secured at Megara.

THE superiority now acquired by the Athenians began to appear decisive. Their fleets commanded the seas and the islands, without a prospect of successful opposition from any quarter: their land force was growing daily more formidable; while the Lacedæmonians, in a manner imprisoned within Peloponnesus, and unable to defend even their own territory there, were yet more unable to extend protection to their still numerous allies beyond the peninsula. The extravagant views and wild presumption ensuing among the Athenian people, which the vying flattery of interested orators contributed not a little to inflame, are marked by their own favourite poet, the admirable satirist of the age. “A thousand cities,” says one, in his comedy of The Wasps, “pay tribute to Athens.”

Now were each ordered to furnish subsistence for only twenty Athenians, twenty thousand of us might live in all ease and luxury, in a manner worthy of the dignity of the republic, and of the trophy of Marathon.” In another comedy, The Birds, the extravagance of their petulant and presumptuous haughtiness is jeered: “It is intolerable,” says one of them, “that we, an imperial people, commanding many cities, should be treated with an air of superiority by the gods, who ought to know how to respect us as their betters.” And in the same piece, the inordinate craving of their restless ambition is ludicrously noted. Report being spread of a new

B.C. 424.
OL. 88.4—89.1.
P. W. 8.

Aristoph.
Vesp. v. 705.

Av. v. 1225.

v. 1023—1050.

city founded in the air by the birds, the Athenians are represented as immediately earnest to send thither their superintendents and their decrees.² Indignation, hatred, animated and obstinate enmity, became of course mixed with the fear which the prevalence of their arms infused through a large portion of the Greek nation, and hence arose a fermentation which principally gave birth to the transactions now requiring attention.

Thucyd. 1. 4.
c. 66. The circumstances of the little republic of Megara, the nearest neighbour to Athens, were peculiar. Though the government was democratical, and the chiefs of the aristocratical party, with a large portion of their adherents, in exile, yet the ancient animosity between Megara and Athens did not cease. Fear of the tyranny of the Athenian people kept even the democratical party connected with Lacedæmon. Meanwhile adversity enforcing moderation among the Lacedæmonians, they, against their usual practice, and while a Peloponnesian garrison, under a Lacedæmonian governor, held the port of Nisæa, a mile only from the city, with which, as Athens with Piræus, it had a fortified communication, allowed the Megarians to hold their democratical form of government. The islet of Minoa, taken, as we have seen, by Nicias, close upon the mouth of the harbour, meanwhile was occupied by an Athenian garrison; and twice in every year it had been as a rule for the Athenian forces to overrun and ravage the Megarian territory. Yet the aristocratical exiles, possessing Pegæ, the Megarian port on the Corinthian gulf, were enemies to those in the city, exceeding the Athenians in animosity almost as much as they were inferior in power: their watchfulness for every opportunity of plunder, waste, and slaughter, was incessantly

² The French, in the paroxysm of their democratical mania, seem to have borrowed from this antique joke their idea of sending commissioners to fraternize all nations.

harassing. The distress, which this complicated pressure brought upon Megara, rendering the lower people dissatisfied with their leaders, emboldened the remaining friends of aristocracy. Depending upon countenance from Lacedæmon, they ventured to propose a composition with the exiles, and to urge it as of indispensable necessity to prevent impending ruin. The leaders of the democratical party, finding this proposal popular, and fearing that the fall of their power, and perhaps the necessity of seeking safety in exile, might follow, negotiated secretly with the Athenian generals, Hippocrates son of Ariphron, and Demosthenes son of Alcisthenes. Terms being settled, it was proposed to put the Athenians in possession of the walls connecting the city with its port; and communication between the Peloponnesian party in the former, and the Peloponnesian troops in the latter, being thus intercluded, both, it was hoped, must quickly fall.

Matters being prepared, Hippocrates conducted a squadron by night to Minoa, while Demosthenes marched a sufficient land force, and the long walls were mastered with little opposition. The Megarian conspirators had taken measures for introducing the Athenian army into the city; but suspicion among the Peloponnesian party produced precautions that disappointed their purpose. Intelligence of this being communicated to the Athenian generals, they resolved to direct their whole force immediately against Nisaea, supposing it might be taken before any assistance could arrive from Peloponnesus; and then Megara, a considerable party within its walls favouring them, could hardly hold long. The select force which they had first led from Athens was joined by all the troops that could be spared from the guard of the city, together with their usually attending slaves. A contravallation was immediately begun against Nisaea: those houses of the suburbs, which

Thucyd. 1. 4.
c. 67. After
18 July.

Thucyd. 1. 4.
c. 69.

lay conveniently for the purpose, formed a part of it; the others furnished materials for the rest; and the work was prosecuted with such diligence that in two days it was nearly completed from the long walls to the sea. Hitherto the garrison of Nisæa, totally without magazines, had received subsistence daily from Megara. Not only now deprived of this, but all communication being precluded, they supposed the city already in the power of the opposite party. Despairing therefore of being able to make any effectual resistance, they capitulated. The Athenian generals required all the Lacedæmonians as prisoners at discretion: the others they agreed to ransom at a specified price.

Lacedæmon, from the beginning of the war, far from having any man capable of balancing the extraordinary abilities of a Pericles in the supreme direction of affairs, had produced none to equal the science and activity of a Phormion or a Demosthenes in the conduct of a campaign. At this time, Thucydides says, a very unusual dejection prevailed in Sparta. A series of misfortune and defeat the Lacedæmonians had not for ages experienced. In the regular course of their singular government they were accustomed to overbear opposition; insomuch that it seemed as if great abilities in a leader were superfluous: wisdom, communicated by education and practice to every individual of the state, appeared as sufficient, as it had been commonly ready, for public purposes. But a new business had now been undertaken, for which their great legislator not only had not provided, but which his institutions strongly forbade. They had engaged in a naval war, a complicated war, and a protracted war. For conducting this, other abilities and other management, than had sufficed for the simple warfare of former ages, were requisite. But, in seven campaigns, only one man among them had distinguished himself: he was yet a young man; and the Spartan institutions were singularly

unfavourable to eminence in youth. But the good fortune of Brasidas, in his gallant opposition to the first descent of the Athenians on the Messenian coast, had not followed him in his succeeding attempts. Brasidas however could learn from misfortune, without being dejected by it. Of a temper as persevering and a genius as fruitful as his understanding was strong and his courage clear, he alone among the Lacedæmonians was looking around for opportunities of new enterprise, which might relieve his country from the evils which pressed it, from the humiliation into which it was fallen, and from the greater evils which threatened.

Some circumstances appeared favourable to his views, and particularly the alarm arising, on all sides, at the progress of the Athenian power; long since irresistible by sea, and now growing more and more formidable by land. The terror of it had induced the Sicilian Greeks to repress Thucyd. I. 4.
c. 58. & seq. the animosities and accommodate the differences which had long prevailed between the several cities of their island. Those who had been friends to Athens would no farther promote its power; those who had been enemies would no farther irritate its vengeance: the determination was general to maintain peace within the island, and a neutrality with regard to the differences of the mother-country. But the revolted cities in Thrace had not equally c. 79. the means of choosing their party. Expecting that the vengeance which had cut off the people of Ægina from the face of the earth would next fall upon them, there was nothing which they were not ready to undertake in opposition to the power which gave them such apprehensions. Nor was the king of Macedonia easy in any confidence that he could place in his present alliance with the Athenian commonwealth, with which he had been so often at enmity: matter for dispute presented itself even in the very treaties which connected them. The country of Lyncus, or Lyn-

cestis, was a province of Macedonia³, acknowledging a degree of supremacy in the king, but, nearly in the manner of palatinates formerly in modern Europe, under the almost independent government of its prince palatine, Arrhibæus. Thus was a division of the powers of government established, inconvenient in ancient as in modern ages, which therefore Perdiccas was very desirous to abolish, and the more as the Athenian government, among its measures for extending power on all sides, had undertaken a guarantee of the interest of Arrhibæus.

Apprehensions on both sides thus bringing the Macedonian monarch and the chiefs of the Chalcidian towns to a communication of counsels, they had carried on in common

Thucyd. 1. 4.
c. 80. a secret negotiation at Lacedæmon. They desired

a body of Peloponnesian troops, for which they offered to provide all supplies; and, with such assistance, they engaged, not only to maintain the Peloponnesian interest in the revolted towns, but to extend the revolt. The Lacedæmonian government gladly received a proposal to draw the war from their doors, where it now pressed them, and employ the Athenians in the defence of their distant possessions. But means to send the desired succour were not obvious; for by sea they could neither oppose, nor easily evade the Athenian fleets; and by land the march was long and difficult; through the territory, in part of uncertain friends, and in part of apprehended if not declared enemies. Brasidas was the man to put himself forward for the conduct of an undertaking, which to timidity and inertness appeared impossible, and to injudicious boldness would have been really so.

³ Strabo reckoned it doubtful whether, in his time, Lyncestis should be reckoned a province of Macedonia or of Epirus, but Thucydides, in whose day it was called Lyncus, calls the Lyncestians Macedonians. Strab. l. 7. pp. 326, 327. Thucyd. l. 2. c. 99.

But the Lacedæmonian administration was composed of men far different from Brasidas. Though they anxiously desired to carry the war to a distance, they feared to diminish their force at home; where their own slaves, objects of jealousy now more than ever, since Pylus was held by Messenians, caused them even greater apprehensions than their foreign foes. A more nefarious measure than that to which they resorted for obviating the danger is not recorded in history, nor easily to be imagined. Proclamation Thucyd. I. 4.
c. 80. & Diod.
I. 12. c. 67. was made, that any Helots, who thought themselves capable of meriting freedom and the dignity of Lacedæmonian citizens, by their actions in arms, might present themselves to the magistracy, and a number should be selected, to be put upon the honourable trial. This was supposed a ready and a safe method for discovering which among them would be most forward to revolt: for the same high spirit, it was reckoned, would incite to seek freedom and the rank of citizens by deeds of danger, if opportunity offered, equally against Lacedæmon, as against the enemies of Lacedæmon. About two thousand were accordingly chosen; and, being crowned with chaplets, were marched in solemn procession around the temples. Thus, as they were given to expect, they were to receive freedom by being admitted to communicate in religious rites with the free. Soon after they disappeared, and the massacre was managed with such careful secrecy that in what manner any one of them perished was never known.

After this shocking and dastardly measure of precaution, the Spartan ministry less scrupled to send a part of their force on a foreign expedition. Still however they would allow no more than seven hundred Lacedæmonians⁴ for the

⁴ Αὐτῶν — which Rollin and some of the commentators have understood to mean Helots. But Smith, with his usual caution, translating literally and explaining nothing, must be understood to mean Lacedæmonians; and I think

hazardous attempt to march by land as far as Thrace. But
 Thucyd. I. 4.
 c. 81. the reputation of Brasidas for prudent and en-
 gaging conduct among the allies of Lacedæmon,

as well as for ability and activity in military command, had reached Chalcidice ; and the leading men, in the revolted towns, had solicited his appointment to the command of the armament intended for their support. Their solicitation met the wishes of Brasidas ; and the Lacedæmonian ministry did not refuse him an honour for which there seems to have

c. 80. been no competitor. He was to increase the scanty

force assigned him, as he could, by interest, or by hire, among the Peloponnesian states.

c. 70. It happened that he was preparing in Sicyon and Corinth for his march northward, when he received information of the measures of the Athenians against Megara. Brasidas thought no business not his, in which he could serve his country. The allies of the immediate neighbourhood felt as he did for the safety of Megara, and of the Peloponnesian garrison in Nisæa. In addition therefore to the troops collected for the Thracian expedition, two thousand seven hundred Corinthians, and a thousand Sicyonians and Phliasians, put themselves under his command ; and a requisition was dispatched into Bœotia for the force of that country to meet him at Tropodiscus, a village of Megaris, situate under Mount Gerania. On his march intelligence met him that Nisæa was already taken. Upon this, leaving his army at Tripodiscus, he hastened, in the night, with

Thucydides meant to be so understood. In the 34th chapter of his fifth book we learn that the Helots who fought under Brasidas were presented with their freedom, but they were removed from Laconia, and established as a colony in Lepreum. But in the 67th chapter of the same book we find the Brasidian soldiers, Βρασιδίειοι στρατιῶται, holding apparently a post of honour in the line of the Lacedæmonian army ; and they are there distinguished from the νεοδαμάδεις, the newly admitted citizens. They are mentioned again in the 71st, 72d, and 74th chapters.

three hundred chosen men to Megara, and arrived under its walls undiscovered by the Athenians. Meanwhile, <sup>Thucyd. I. 4.
c. 71.</sup> a singular kind of concord between the factions in Megara had been produced by mutual fear. The democratical chiefs apprehended that the admission of a Lacedæmonian general would be immediately followed by the restoration of the exiles, and their own banishment; the aristocratical party not less feared that the consequence of any alarm to the popular mind would be a prevailing resolution to admit the Athenians, which would inevitably produce their ruin. A momentary compromise was therefore followed by a unanimous resolution not to admit Brasidas. Both parties expected a battle between the Athenian and Peloponnesian armies; the event of which being decided, they might choose their measures, they thought, more safely. Brasidas therefore, after having in vain attempted to remove the apprehensions of both, withdrew to Tripodiscus.

Before the arrival of the messenger from Corinth, the Bœotians, in alarm for their allies of Megara, had been assembling their forces; and by daybreak Brasidas was joined at Tripodiscus by two thousand two hundred of their heavy-armed foot, with the very important addition of six hundred horse. The whole of his heavy-armed foot amounting thus to six thousand, a force superior to the regular troops of the Athenian army before Megara, he marched immediately for that place. The Bœotian horse presently put to flight the Athenian light troops, scattered over the plain. The Athenian cavalry advancing to protect them, a sharp action ensued, in which the commander of the Bœotian horse was killed, with little advantage otherwise gained on either side. The measures then of Brasidas mark the judicious commander, who knew when to refrain, as well as how to dare. It was notorious, that the Megarians watched the event to decide their measures. Brasidas

^{I Thucyd. I. 4.} therefore chose for his camp an advantageous situation, very near Megara, and waited there. The Athenian generals, having already carried their purpose in a great degree, deemed it utterly unadvisable, for what remained, to risk the army they commanded, under disadvantageous circumstances, against a superior force. As soon ^{c. 73.}

^{c. 74.} then as the Megarians of the oligarchical party were convinced that the Athenians would not venture a battle, they no longer hesitated to introduce Brasidas. The Athenian generals then, leaving a garrison at Nisæa, withdrew to Athens. Brasidas, after a very essential service to his country, and its allies, thus effected without hazard, except to his own person, returned to Corinth.

What followed, in Megara, seems to have been among the instances of depravity in Grecian manners, to which Thucydides has in general terms adverted, imputing it in some degree to the passions excited and the example set in the Corcyraean sedition. Those Megarians of the democratical party who had been most forward in the Athenian interest, fearing apparently the concurrence of the enmity of Lacedæmon with that of their fellow citizens, avoided worse consequences by a voluntary exile. Those who had been less violent in party-measures thought they might then make a composition with the aristocratical party. A conference was accordingly held for the purpose. What the democratical leaders most feared was the return of those aristocratical chiefs who were in exile at Pegæ. Their restoration however not being to be obviated, it was agreed that a complete amnesty for all past transactions should be solemnly sworn to by all. The exiles accepted the condition, and took the oath. Presently raised then to the principal offices of their little state, they ordered a general assembly for a review of arms, usual from time to time in all the Grecian towns. Causing then a hundred of

those whom they considered as having been most their enemies to be apprehended, they preferred an accusation of treason against them: condemnation was pronounced, and all were executed. By this atrocious measure the superiority of the oligarchical party was rendered decisive, and the supreme power in Megara, says Thucydides, remained long in very few hands.

SECTION III.

Sedition in Bœotia and Phocis. — Attempts of the Athenians against Bœotia. — Battle of Delium. — Siege of Delium.

THE advantages gained by Athens, amid all the mismanagement, continued to extend their effects. P. W. 8. B. C. 424.
Ol. 88.4—89.1. The partisans of democracy in all the oligarchical republics, but with yet more eagerness the democratical exiles, who, such was the misery of the Grecian civil system, were very numerous, unceasingly watched opportunities to profit from the turn in the general affairs of Greece. A plan was concerted for a revolution in Bœotia. Ptœodorus, a ^{Thucyd. I. 4.} _{c. 76.} Theban exile, was leader: some exiles of the Bœotian Orchomenus were among the most zealous and active; and a party in Phocis, always adverse to Theban aristocracy, was prepared to join on the first favourable occasion. The Orchomenians undertook to engage mercenary troops in Peloponnesus: persons either by principle or by circumstances disposed to favour democracy, or open to the persuasion of bribery, being to be found under all oligarchical governments. Ptœodorus meanwhile communicated with the Athenian generals Hippocrates and Demosthenes, and a project was formed for betraying Siphæ and Chæronea into their hands; the former a small seaport of the Thespian territory on the Corinthian gulf, the other an inland town of the Orchomenian territory, on the border of Phocis. The

Athenians were at the same time to seize and fortify Delium, a temple of Apollo in the Tanagræan district, near the coast overagainst Eubœa; and it being intended that these attempts on distant points should take place on the same day, the distraction, it was hoped, would prevent effectual opposition anywhere. If then the democratical party in Bœotia should not be emboldened everywhere immediately to rise, yet those posts being securely occupied, and inroads made from them as opportunity offered, with due encouragement given to the revolted and to those disposed to revolt, the whole of Bœotia would quickly be brought under democratical sway; and of course into the alliance and under the protection, which would be, in a great degree, to be under the dominion of Athens.

Thucyd. I. 4.
c. 77. Such was the project: for the execution, while

Hippocrates kept the force in Attica prepared, Demosthenes conducted a fleet of forty triremes around Peloponnesus to Naupactus; and, to prevent suspicion of the principal design, began operations against the enemies of the Athenian confederacy in the western provinces. On his arrival, he found Oeniadæ, so long the thorn of Acarnania, already reduced by his allies of that province. Being joined by those allies, he marched against Salynthius, prince of Agrais in Ætolia, who was quickly compelled to submit to his terms. After then reducing some hostile towns or clans of inferior note, and settling the affairs of those parts to his satisfaction, he returned to Naupactus, to prepare for the execution of the greater enterprise concerted at Athens.

I. 4. c. 89.
After 13th
October. In the autumn, having collected a considerable force of Acarnanians and other allies of the western provinces, he sailed for Siphæ; but on his arrival he had the mortification to find the place strongly garrisoned, well provided, and the whole strength of Bœotia prepared to oppose him. It appeared afterward that not only the design

had been betrayed to the enemy, but, through mistake of the day on which it was to be executed, Hippocrates had not moved from Athens to make the expected diversion in the east of Bœotia. To attempt anything at Siphæ therefore appearing useless, Demosthenes, after an unsuccessful descent upon the Sicyonian coast, reconducted his armament to Naupactus.

Thucyd. I. 4.
c. 101.

The Bœotians, in giving security to Siphæ, seem not to have been aware of what was intended against the opposite side of their country. Hippocrates therefore, marching with the whole force of Attica, citizens, metics, and foreigners⁵, to Delium, on what he conceived to be the appointed day, found nothing there to oppose him. The object was to fortify the post in all haste, so as to render it tenable by a garrison. A ditch was therefore excavated, and a wall of earth raised, with wooden towers at intervals. The ancient manner of fortification requiring height and perpendicularity, the wall was strengthened with piles, formed of the timbers of some neighbouring houses, and faced with interwoven vine-branches, cut near the spot. The work was begun on the morning of the third day after the army marched from Athens; and being nearly finished by noon of the fifth, the general then ordered the army to move homeward, while he should give final directions to the garrison, for the disposition of their guards and the completion of the works. The irregulars and all the light-troops immediately pressed their march: the heavy-armed halted a little more than a mile from the place, to wait for the general.

⁵ — Ἀθηναῖοις πανδημεὶ αὐτὸὺς καὶ τὸν μετοίκους καὶ ξένων ὅσοι παρῆσαν. — *Omnis Atheniensium populo, civibus, incolis, et peregrinis quotquot aderant.* Duker. — *The whole force of Athens, as well citizens as sojourners, not excepting even the foreigners who chanced at that time to be there.* Smith. — These translations are not satisfactory; and we find no assistance from notes. The precise distinction however between *μετοίκος* and *ξένος*, though we should be glad to know what it was, is not particularly important here.

^{c. 91.} ^{Thucyd. I. 4.} Meanwhile, in consequence of intelligence communicated through Bœotia, the forces of all the towns of the province had been assembled, under the eleven Bœotarchs, at Tanagra. There information came to them that the Athenian army had begun its march homeward; upon which a council of war was held, and the majority determined not to seek a battle. Pagondas however, one of two Theban Bœotarchs, whose turn of command it was for the day, dissatisfied with the determination of the council, addressed his eloquence to the troops, and so efficaciously that he excited a general ardour for engaging. Having thus

^{c. 93.} provided for obedience to his orders, in opposition to his colleagues in office, though it was already late in the day, he would not lose the opportunity, but immediately led the army forward. Where an intervening hill hid him, while the distance was yet small, he halted to form his order of battle; and then marching up the hill, rested upon the top.

^{c. 96.} Hippocrates was yet at Delium, when information was brought of the unexpected approach of the Bœotians. Leaving a body of three hundred horse, to watch an opportunity for attacking the enemy, he proceeded himself with all speed to join the main body of his army. When he arrived it was already formed for action. He rode along the line, making a short speech of encouragement; but scarcely had reached the centre when the Bœotians moved down the hill, giving the shout of battle. Upon this he ordered immediately to advance, according to the usual practice of the age; it being esteemed disadvantageous to remain stationary and receive the onset.

The heavy foot on each side were about six thousand. The Bœotians had, besides, a thousand horse, five hundred targeteers, and above ten thousand light-armed. The Athe-

nian light-armed, whose march, it appears, had been stopped in time, were more numerous, but less disciplined and worse appointed ; the regular light-troops of the republic being mostly on foreign service. The Thebans of the Bœotian army, if we may trust and can understand our copies of Thucydides, were formed no less than twenty-five deep ; the other Bœotians variously, according to the practice of the several towns, or the opinions of the commanders. The Athenian infantry was disposed in files of eight men. The horse of both armies were placed in the wings. The extremes however of neither could come into action, being prevented by the intervention of deep water-gullies. Between the rest the field was well disputed ; in action so close that they joined opposing shields ; and where weapons could not avail against the compact arrangement of defensive armour, they endeavoured to break each other's line by force of pushing. With their right wing the Athenians obtained the advantage, so that the extremity of the enemy's left retreated toward their own right. Next in the Bœotian line to the troops which gave way were the Thespians, whose left flank being thus exposed, they were surrounded, and suffered greatly. But in this evolution the conquerors fell into disorder, and, meeting in action, engaged one another. Meanwhile Pagondas, with the Thebans in the right of the Bœotian line, was gaining advantage against the Athenian left. Information reaching him of the distress of his own left, he sent two squadrons⁶ of horse around the hill, who came unawares upon the victorious wing of the Athenians, while they were yet in the confusion which they had themselves created. Panic seized them, and they fled : the rest of their line, already severely pressed, finding themselves thus deserted, quickly joined in the flight, and the

Thucyd. I. 4.
c. 94.

⁶ Δύο τάλη.

rout became complete : some made toward Delium, some to the port of Oropus, some to mount Parnes, others variously as hope of safety pointed the way.

A re-enforcement of Locrian troops joined the Bœotian army in the moment of victory. Being comparatively fresh, they undertook pursuit, together with the Bœotian cavalry ; and the event would have been very fatal to the Athenians, if approaching night had not favoured their escape. It was

upon this occasion that the philosopher Socrates,
Plat. Laches, p. 181. t. 2. & Conviv. p. 221. t. 3. Plut. vit. who served among the Athenian infantry, pressed

by the pursuing enemy, was in imminent danger of being put to the sword, when his pupil Alcibiades, coming up with a body of cavalry, gave such effectual protection that Socrates, with those about him, made good their retreat.⁷ Near a thousand however of the Athenian heavy-
Thucyd. 1. 4. c. 101. armed fell, with Hippocrates, the commanding general, and a much greater number of the light-armed and irregulars. When pursuit had been pushed as far as circumstances would permit, Pagondas raised his

c. 97. trophy, collected the spoil, and, leaving a strong

guard over the enemy's dead, retired with the main body of his army to Tanagra.

Next day a herald was sent by the surviving commanders of the Athenian troops to request the accustomed leave for burying the slain. On his way he met a Bœotian herald, who assured him that his labour would be vain, and that he would do best to accompany him back to the Athenian camp, whither he was going. The Athenian complied ; and

⁷ Strabo relates that Socrates saved his pupil Xenophon in this battle. Atheneus, as is observed by Casaubon, in his note on the passage, has shown that this could not be, (Athen. 1. 5. c. 15.) and he deduces his proof from Plato. Yet Barthelemy, in his Anacharsis, not only tells the story from Strabo, but has been so careless as to refer to Plato for authority for it. In the passage of Plato to which he refers (Conviv. p. 221. t. 3.) not a syllable is to be found to the purpose.

audience being given to the Bœotian herald by the principal officers, he represented, “ that the Athenians had violated the common law of the Greeks, by which it was established, that, in any invasion of each other’s territories, no temple should be profaned: that in fortifying Delium they had made the sacred precinct a habitation for men, and whatever men usually do in a profane place was done there; particularly the water, which the Bœotians had always held it unlawful for themselves to touch but for holy ablution⁸, was drawn for all common uses: that the Bœotians therefore, in their own name and in that of the god, invoking the gods of the country and Apollo, warned them to quit the temple, and clear it of whatever belonged to them.” Amid the most serious political concerns, with the utmost disregard of all moral obligations, we find such matters of mere religious ceremony often deeply engaging the attention of the Greeks. The Athenians, in return, sent their own herald <sup>Thucyd. I. 4.11
c. 98.</sup> to the Bœotian camp, who represented, “ that the Athenians neither had profaned the temple, nor would intentionally do so: that, by the common law of the Greeks, with the possession of territory the possession of temples always passed: that the Bœotians themselves, who had acquired their present country by conquest, had taken possession of the temples of other people, which they had ever since held as their own: that if, in the necessity to which the Athenians were impelled by the unjust violence of the Bœotians and their other enemies, to use extraordinary means for securing their country against invasion, they had disturbed the sacred fountain, they depended upon the indulgence of the god for the transgression, if it was one where no offence was intended: that, on the contrary, the refusal of the Bœotians to restore the Athenian slain, was an im-

⁸ Πρὸς τὰ ιερὰ χέρνισι χεῖσθαι.

piety without excuse : finally, that the Athenians considered Delium as theirs by conquest, and would not evacuate it ; but they nevertheless demanded that their dead should be restored, according to the laws and customs of all the Greeks, transmitted from their forefathers.” The Bœotians

^{Thucyd. 1. 4.} _{c. 99.} appear to have felt the imputation of impiety and contravention of the institutions of their forefathers ; for they endeavoured to obviate it by an evasion. They said that, if Oropia, the district in which the battle was fought and Delium stood, was a Bœotian territory, the Athenians ought to quit what was not theirs, and then their dead should be restored ; but if it was an Athenian territory, to ask permission of others for anything to be done there was superfluous. With this the negotiation ended, and the Bœotians prepared immediately to besiege Delium.

We learn from the details of sieges remaining from Thucydides, that the Greeks of his age were not only very deficient in the art of attacking fortifications, but that their mechanics were defective, to a degree that we could not readily suppose of those who had carried the arts of masonry and sculpture so high. Fortunate for the people of the age, in the inefficacy of governments to give security to their subjects, that it was so, and that thus, those who could find subsistence within a fortification might generally withstand assault. The Bœotians were far from thinking the army, with which they had defeated the whole strength of Attica, sufficient for the reduction of a fort of earth and wood, constructed in three days, and hopeless of relief. Two thousand ^{c. 100.} Corinthians, a body of Megarians, and part

of the Peloponnesian garrison which had escaped from Nisæa, joined them after the battle. Still they thought themselves deficient in troops practised in the use of missile weapons, and they sent for some dartmen and slingers from the Malian bay. After all perhaps they would have been

soiled, but for an engine invented for the occasion. A large tree, in the want of instruments for boring, was sawed in two, lengthways: and the parts, being excavated, were rejoined, so as to form a pipe, at one end of which, protected by iron plates, was suspended by chains a large caldron, into which, from the end of the wooden pipe, a tube of iron projected. On the seventeenth day after the battle the preparations were complete. The machine, being raised on wheels, was moved to that part of the fort where vine-branches and wood appeared to have been most used in the construction. The caldron was then filled with sulphur, pitch, and burning charcoal; large bellows were applied to the opposite end of the cylinder; and a fire was thus raised that rendered it impossible for any living being to remain in the adjoining part of the fort. During the confusion thus created, the besiegers, choosing their moment for assault, carried the place. A considerable part of the garrison nevertheless found opportunity for flight, and saved themselves by getting aboard an Athenian squadron which lay off the neighbouring coast; some however were killed, and what was most important, about two hundred were made prisoners. Presently after, but while the event was yet unknown at Athens, a herald arriving to demand again the bodies of the slain in the late battle, obtained them without difficulty.

SECTION IV.

March of Brasidas into Thrace. — Transactions in Macedonia and Thrace.

THESE transactions protracted the campaign in Greece to a late season. Meanwhile Brasidas, having put Megara into a state of security, returned to Corinth, and, while summer was not yet far

B. C. 424.
Ol. 89. 1.
P. W. 8.
Thucyd. 1. 4.
c. 78. July.

advanced, set forward on his difficult and hazardous march toward Thrace. He had collected a thousand heavy-armed Peloponnesians in addition to his seven hundred Lacedæ-

Ch. 16. s. 2.
of this Hist. monians. As far as the new Lacedæmonian

colony of the Trachinian Heraclea, he passed through friendly territories; but there he arrived on the border of a country, not indeed at declared enmity with Sparta, but allied to Athens; and across the Thessalian plains, in defiance of the Thessalian cavalry, with his small band, which, including the light-armed and slaves, would scarcely exceed four thousand men, he could not attempt to force his way. The greatest part of Thessaly was nominally under democratical government, and the democratical party was zealous in the Athenian alliance; yet, in most of the towns, the interest of a few powerful men principally decided public measures. This facilitated negotiation, and Brasidas was not less able in negotiation than in arms. Employing sometimes the interest of the king of Macedonia, sometimes that of other allies, and never neglecting the moment of opportunity for gaining a step, he obtained free passage as far as the river Enipeus. There he found a body in arms, whose leaders declared their resolution to oppose his farther progress, and expressed, in reproaches to his Thessalian guides, their resentment at the permission and assistance so far given to an army of strangers passing through the country, unauthorised by the general consent of the Thessalian people. Fair words, discreetly used, nevertheless softened them; and, after no long treaty, Brasidas obtained unmolested passage. Through the remainder of Thessaly, doubtfully disposed toward him, but unprepared for immediate opposition, he made his way by forced marches till he reached Perrhæbia; among whose people, subjects of the Thessalians, he had provided by previous negotiation for a favourable reception. The

Thucyd. I. 4.
c. 79.

difficult passage over mount Olympus, which was next to be undertaken, made the friendship of the Perrhaebians particularly important. Under their guidance he arrived with his force entire at Dium, on the northern side of Olympus, where he was within the dominion of his ally the king of Macedonia.

Here the difficulties of his march ended, but difficulties of another kind arose. A common interest in opposing Athens had united the king of Macedonia with Lacedæmon, and with the allies of Lacedæmon in his neighbourhood; but their interests were otherwise different, and their views, in some points, opposite. The principal object of Perdiccas was to bring the principality of Lyncus, or Lyncestis, among the mountains of the western frontier of Macedonia, and far from the Grecian colonies, held, as we have observed, as too independent a sovereignty by the Macedonian prince Arrhibæus, under his more immediate dominion. But the views of the Lacedæmonian government, and of Brasidas, as its minister, in regard to such matters, little differed from those of the Athenian. It was desired rather to divide than to strengthen the Macedonian kingdom, so that the Lacedæmonian alliance should always be needful. Perdiccas appears to have been aware of this. Eight years ago he had been chosen, by the army of the Lacedæmonian confederacy in those parts, to the secondary command of general of the cavalry, while a citizen of Corinth was appointed commander-in-chief. Apparently then little pleased with such a compliment, he now precluded means for a repetition of it. Joining his forces with those of Brasidas, he assumed command, and directed the march of the combined army towards Lyncestis.

The prince of Lyncestis, Arrhibæus, aware of inability to withstand the united forces of Macedonia and Lacedæmon, and hopeless of sufficiently ready support from his Athenian

friends, had sent to Brasidas to request his mediation with Perdiccas. The Spartan general, not immediately refusing to march, stopped however on the Lyncestian frontier; and representing that the apprehension of so great a force, ready to fall upon his country, would probably induce the Lyncestian prince to a reasonable accommodation, he declared that, for the Lacedæmonians, he judged it neither expedient nor just to proceed hostilely till the trial had been made. Accordingly a negotiation was opened, and shortly a treaty was concluded, by which Arrhibæus became numbered among the allies of Sparta. Perdiccas, unable to prevent this measure, was highly dissatisfied. His immediate manifestation of resentment went no farther than a declaration that, instead of furnishing, as heretofore, half the provisions for an army so little disposed to promote his interest, he would in future furnish a third only.

The accommodation nevertheless would be upon the whole satisfactory to Brasidas, and his Grecian allies, many of whom would desire to support the dominion of Arrhibæus as a balance against the growing power of an ambitious prince of the doubtful character of Perdiccas; and the arms of the confederacy would now of course be directed to the object which the confederate Greeks desired, the reduction of the already overwhelming power of Athens. Their first attempt was against Acanthus. Some of the principal men

Thucyd. I. 4.
c. 84. End of
August or
beginning of
September. there had been always disposed to join with the Chalcidians in renouncing the Athenian dominion.

The democratical party was zealous in the Athenian interest; but, being unable to oppose the approaching enemy in the field, they were in alarm for their property, and especially for their vintage, now ready to gather. Upon a knowledge of these circumstances measures were taken. They were summoned, not as enemies, but as those who ought to be friends, to join the confederacy. After some

conciliatory negotiation, the Acanthians conceded so far as to agree that Brasidas should be admitted into the town alone; and allowed to declare his proposals before the general assembly.

Brasidas, for a Lacedæmonian, says Thucydides, was eloquent: he was besides politic; and, though not strictly scrupulous of truth, he was highly liberal in his policy. He began with assuring the Acanthians, “that the great object of the Lacedæmonians in the war was to give liberty to Greece. It was therefore matter of wonder to him that the Acanthians did not at once receive him joyfully; that they hesitated to join the confederacy; that they entertained an idea of opposing their own deliverance, and that of Greece, from Athenian subjection. Nothing but apprehension of the power of Athens could hold them to such a purpose; and how vain that apprehension was, he had himself had the good fortune to prove to the world, when, before the walls of Megara, the whole force of Athens feared to engage that small band of Peloponnesians which he now commanded in Thrace.” This politic boast, though utterly false, for he commanded at Megara more than triple the force that he led into Thrace, nevertheless passed with the Acanthians, ill informed of transactions in Greece, and had considerable effect. He proceeded then to tell his audience, “that he had received assurances from the principal magistrates of Lacedæmon, confirmed by the most solemn oaths, that whatever cities, through negotiation with him, might accede to the Peloponnesian confederacy, should be subject to no claims of authority from the Lacedæmonians, but remain perfectly independent. From himself he assured them, that none need fear for person, property, or civil rights, on account of any political principles they had held, or any political conduct they had followed; for he was determined to support no

Thucyd. I. 4.
c. 85.

c. 85.

faction, but, with his best power, to establish, wherever he might have influence, that equal liberty for all ranks, which formed the boast and the happiness of his own country. If

Thucyd. I. 4.
c. 87.

then, refusing conditions not only perfectly equitable but highly advantageous, they would persist in their connection with Athens, and, though only by the tribute which they paid, promote the subjection of other Grecian states, he should think himself not only justified, but bound, to consider them as enemies, and to begin immediately the waste of their lands. He trusted however they would save him the necessity of a measure so opposite to his inclination, and would rather be zealous in setting an example to the other cities of Thrace for the recovery of independency."

The eloquence of Brasidas, powerfully seconded by his army at their gates, had its full effect upon the Acanthians, and the suffrages of the assembly being taken secretly, that none afterward might be individually criminated for the vote given, a majority was found for revolting from Athens. The city of Acanthus thus became a member of the Lacedæmonian confederacy; and before the end of the summer the example was followed by the neighbouring city of Stagirus.

Of the ten generals of the regular establishment of Athens, it should seem that two were usually appointed to the Thracian command. Eucles now held that station with Thucydides, the historian. Eucles commanded in Amphi-

Thucyd. I. 4.
c. 104.

polis: Thucydides was at the island of Thasos, with the squadron of the station, consisting of only seven triremes. It was to be expected that in spring the Athenians would send powerful re-enforcements. It behoved Brasidas therefore to make every use of opportunities yet open to him; and the severe season was rather favourable for some of the enterprises which he meditated.

Amphipolis was the most important place held by the Athenians in Thrace. It lay upon a noble river, which it commanded, and whose banks, with the neighbouring hills, bore a growth scarcely exhaustible of excellent ship-timber. The country around was a rich plain, and the neighbouring mountains had mines of silver and gold: the port of Eion, at the mouth of the river, was but an appendage, yet a valuable appendage, of Amphipolis. This advantageous spot had been colonised, first from Miletus by the unfortunate Aristagoras, and afterward from Athens by Cimon; whose colony, also unfortunate, was destroyed, as we have seen, by the Thracians. During the administration of Pericles, and thirteen years only, according to Diodorus, before the campaign of Brasidas in

Ch. 12. s. 3.
of this Hist.
Diod. l. 12.
c. 32.

Thrace, a new colony passed from Athens, under the conduct of Agnon, an Athenian of rank, and of very popular character. The place was already populous and flourishing; but the inhabitants were a mixed multitude from various Grecian cities; some connected, by blood or by habit and intercourse, with the revolted Chalcidians; some, by interest, with the king of Macedonia.

Thucyd. 1. 4.
c. 103.

On these circumstances Brasidas founded a project for gaining Amphipolis to the Lacedæmonian confederacy. Communication was managed with some of the inhabitants, and a plan was concerted with them. Collecting then all the force he could obtain from his allies, he marched on a dark stormy evening, with sleet falling (the weather which he preferred for the attempt), to Aulon and Bromiscus, where the waters of the lake of Bolbe discharge themselves into the sea; and, halting there only while his army took refreshment, he proceeded in the night to Argilus. The people of that little town, always disaffected to Athens, were prepared to receive him. Its territory was divided from the Amphipolitan only

December.
Thucyd. 1. 4.
c. 103.

by the river Strymon. Near Argilus was a bridge, which, as an important pass, was protected by a constant guard : but no attempt being apprehended, the guard was small. Under the guidance of the Argilians, and favoured by the storm, Brasidas surprised the guard. Becoming thus master of the bridge, the Amphipolitan territory was open to him. Extreme alarm and confusion immediately ensued among the

Thucyd. 1. 4.
c. 104. Amphipolitans. A heterogeneous people, collected from various parts, they were almost wholly

without confidence each man in his neighbour; and if, instead of plundering the country, Brasidas had led his forces directly against the town, he might probably have become master of it as soon as he arrived at the gates. In an army of republican confederates however this may have been beyond his means. After gratifying his troops with the spoil of the country, he waited in expectation that, from so populous a place, with an Athenian general commanding, something would be attempted against him ; and in any action in open field he promised himself success, which would not fail to encourage his friends in the town, and promote his measures.

The inactivity of Eucles disappointed Brasidas. No movement was made from the town ; and it was to be apprehended that the arrival of Thucydides, with the squadron from Thasos, would utterly defeat the enterprise : for beside the force he would bring, having large property and ancient family connections in the neighbourhood, Thucydides had great influence among both Greeks and Thracians : and his presence would not only confirm the Amphipolitans in the Athenian interest, but assist much toward the collection of a powerful land force for opposing the Peloponnesians. Measures that might be quickly de-

c. 105. cisive were therefore necessary to Brasidas. Thucydides imputes expressly no blame to his col-

league; yet the conduct of Eucles appears evidently to have been deficient either in judgment or in vigour, or rather in both. Brasidas found means to send assurance into Amphipolis, "That it was not his purpose to deprive any person in the city, not even the Athenians, of either property or civil rights: that all the inhabitants might choose whether they would remain upon the footing of free citizens, or depart with their effects; only, if the latter was their choice, <sup>Thucyd. 1. 4.
c. 106.</sup> they must go within five days." This proposal had immediate efficacy: the Athenians, a small proportion only of the inhabitants, little confident, evidently, in their general, and highly diffident of their fellow-colonists, had supposed their persons, their properties, and their families in the most imminent danger of the worst that could beset them: the terms were incomparably more favourable than, from the common practice and policy of Grecian commanders, was to be expected; and in their present circumstances, hopeless of timely succour, they could hardly wish for more. Such being the sentiments of the Athenians, the other multitude was still readier to rejoice in the offer, generous as it appeared, of the Spartan general. The promoters of the revolt therefore boldly stepped forward; the interposition of Eucles was disregarded; the people in assembly decreed that the terms should be accepted; and Brasidas, with his forces, was immediately admitted into the city. That active officer then, without a moment's loss of time, proceeded to take measures for possessing himself of Eion, distant about three miles, and so excluding the Athenian fleet from the river. But late in the evening of the same day on which Amphipolis surrendered, Thucydides, having made unexpected haste from Thasos, entered the harbour with his squadron. Eion was thus secured, but Amphipolis was beyond the power of Thucydides to recover.

To the loss of that city from the Athenian dominion we seem principally to owe our best information concerning the history of the times with which we are engaged, and almost our only means for any accurate acquaintance with the Grecian republics, in that period in which their history is most interesting. The news of the successes of Brasidas

Thucyd. 1. 4. c. 108. in Thrace, but particularly of the surrender of Amphipolis, made great impression at Athens; and

the more as the public mind was sore with the recent calamity at Delium, the greatest experienced from the enemy in the course of the war. Those distant dependencies, from whose wealth the republic principally derived its power, had been esteemed hitherto secure under the guard of the Athenian navy, with which no potentate upon earth could contend: but now, through the adventurous and able conduct of Brasidas, they were laid open to the superior land force of the Peloponnesians; which, if the Thessalians should not oppose, might be poured in upon them to any amount. Dwelling upon these considerations, and irritated more than instructed by misfortune, the Athenian people vented against their best friends that revenge which they

1. 5. c. 26. knew not how to vent against their enemies. Thucydides,

whose peculiar interest and influence in Thrace gave him singular means to serye them there, was deprived of his command, and banished from Attica for twenty years. Precluded thus from active life in the service of his country, it was the gratification of his leisure to compose that history which has been the delight and admiration of all posterity. The affairs of Athens continued to be known to him through his numerous friends in high situations there. His banishment led to information concerning those of the Peloponnesians, which he could hardly otherwise have acquired.

Brasidas then, successful through the inability or remiss-

ness of Eucle at Amphipolis, and disappointed through the activity of Thucydides at Eion, had however done, with a very small force, very important services for his country. His sedulity to prosecute them was unremitting, and he had now greatly increased his means. The reputa- <sup>Thucyd. I. 4.
c. 108.</sup> tion of his unassuming and conciliating behaviour toward the allies whom he had gained was communicated through the other Grecian cities in Thrace. His character passed for a specimen of the character of his fellow-countrymen ; and his constant declaration, that the great purpose of his commission was to give perfect freedom and independency to all Grecian cities, received such support from the wise liberality of his conduct that it found general credit. Perdiccas, a prince of much policy and little honour, forgetting his resentment, was desirous of profiting from his connection with such an ally as Brasidas, and condescended to visit him with the purpose of concerting measures for prosecuting the common interest of the confederacy. Meanwhile the fame of the late defeat of the Athenians in Bœotia, now spread over the country, assisted to promote the disposition to revolt; tending to establish the credit of the politic though untrue assertion of Brasidas that, with only the small force of Peloponnesians which he commanded in Thrace, he had defied the whole strength of Athens under the walls of Megara. The vaunt had its effect : the naval power of Athens became less an object of fear, when it was supposed that protection against it might always be obtained by land. Shortly Myrcinus, Gapselus, and Oesyme revolted to the confederates ; while several other towns, fearful yet to declare themselves, intimated privately their desire to be freed from subjection to Athens.

Such success and such prospects encouraged Brasidas in sending to Sparta an account of them, to request a reinforcement, which might enable him to pursue his advan-

tages, and attempt still greater things. A man who so united talents for military and civil command, who could conquer, as occasion required, either by force or by persuasion, and who had knowledge and temper to maintain his acquisitions, Lacedæmon had not yet presented to the notice of history. But talents so superior, in a man not of royal race, not qualified by age for superiority, and distinguished only by his spirit of enterprise, his daring courage, his indefatigable activity, his uncommon prudence, his noble liberality, his amiable temper, and those engaging manners which conciliated the affection of all with whom he conversed, excited envy and apprehension among the cautious elderhood of Sparta. The re-enforcement was totally denied. The Athenian people meanwhile, however illiberal, and capriciously rigorous toward those who served them, were not so untrue to their own interest as to neglect the important possessions with the loss of which they were threatened ; some re-enforcements were sent during winter ; more were to follow in spring.

No disappointment however, nor any rigour of season, could abate the activity of Brasidas. With the progress of his successes he enlarged his views ; and, being now possessed of a country favourably situated, and producing materials in singular abundance, he formed the bold project

Thucyd. 1. 4.
c. 109. of creating a fleet at Amphipolis. Meanwhile,

with his small force of Peloponnesians, and what allies he could collect, he marched into Acte, that part of the peninsula of Athos which lay within the king of Persia's canal. It contained the little towns of Sane, Thryssus, Cleone, Acrothoæ, Olophyxus, and Dium, which were so many separate republics. The first only was a pure Grecian colony, from Andrus. The inhabitants of the others were a mixed people, a few Chalcidian Greeks, but the greater part Thracians ; of that Tuscan people⁹, says Thucydides, who

⁹ Τυρηνῶν.

formerly inhabited Lemnus and Athens. All were under the dominion of the Athenian commonwealth, but all presently acceded to the terms offered by Brasidas, except Sane and Dium, whose territories he wasted.

A more important object then offering in the neighbouring peninsula of Sithonia, he led his forces thither. A small party in Torone, one of the principal Chalcidian seaports, invited him to support them in revolt. A majority of the Toronæan people still favoured the Athenian interest; fifty heavy-armed Athenians were in the place, and two Athenian triremes in the harbour. Nevertheless, through the able conduct of Brasidas, and the bold adventure of only seven men, introduced in the night by the party disposed to revolt, it was taken. The Athenians, except a few who were killed, fled, with the greatest part of the Toronæans, to the neighbouring fortress of Lecythus. Brasidas summoned the place, offering permission for the Athenians to depart with their effects, and promising to the Toronæans the full enjoyment of their rights as citizens of Torone, together with the restoration of whatever of their property had fallen into his possession or under his power. The terms were inviting to men in their perilous situation. The Athenians however prevailed upon the Toronæans to adhere to them, surrender was refused, but a day of truce for the burial of the dead was requested. In the great scarcity of any enlarged patriotism among the Greeks, what followed deserves notice as an instance of the firmness with which they often adhered to party-principle. Brasidas granted two days, and used the opportunity for employing all his eloquence and all his address in the endeavour to conciliate the Toronæans to his interest. But the democratical party remained true to the Athenians : and, not till machines were prepared, and a force was assembled, scarcely possible for them to resist, nor then

till an accident occasioned a sudden panic, they quitted their fort of earth and wood, and most of them, getting aboard vessels lying at hand, escaped across the gulf into Pallene. Such was the concluding event of the eighth year of the war.

SECTION V.

Negotiation for Peace between Athens and Lacedæmon. — Truce concluded for a Year. — Transactions in Thrace. — War renewed. — Thespiae oppressed by Thebes. — War between Mantinea and Tegea. — Remarkable Instance of Athenian Superstition.

INTELLIGENCE of the rapid successes of Brasidas, coinciding with the unfortunate event of the battle of Delium, and accompanied with reasonable apprehension of spreading defection among the subject cities, was of powerful effect to damp the wild ambition, and lower the unruly haughtiness of the Athenian people. It began again to be very generally observed and regretted among them, that their leaders, those in whom they most trusted, had advised them ill; and that so favourable an opportunity for making an advantageous peace, as that which had been proudly rejected, might not again recur. Fortunately for them, at this time, no spirit of enterprise animated the Lacedæmonian councils. The successes of Brasidas, highly gratifying as far as they tended to dispose the Athenians to peace, excited at the same time some apprehension among the Lacedæmonian leaders, that their own allies, and even the Lacedæmonian people, might be excited to desire the continuance of the war, which they were anxious to end. The great object of the principal families was to recover their kinsmen and friends, prisoners in Athens; and while they dreaded a reverse of fortune, that might renew the arrogance of their enemies, they feared also such success as might too much elate their allies. Such

being the sentiments on both sides, negotiations for peace were opened, and, in the beginning of spring, a truce for a year was concluded. Each party retained what it possessed ; the Peloponnesians however conceding the entire command of the Grecian seas to Athens ; excluding themselves totally from the use of long ships (the general term for ships of war), and of any vessel of the row-galley kind of above five hundred talents' measurement ; according to Arbuthnot, scarcely more than twelve ton. To this treaty the Lacedæmonians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Epidaurians, and Megarians only were parties ; but they engaged to use their interest for persuading the Bœotians and Phocians to accede ; and it was the professed purpose of the truce to give opportunity for negotiating a general and permanent peace.

During these measures for putting an end to the ravages of war, circumstances arose in Thrace to disturb the effect of the negotiation, and to give new fuel to animosity. The people of Scione, the principal town of the fruitful peninsula of Pallene, reckoned themselves a Peloponnesian people ; referring their origin to a colony of Achæans of Pellene or Pallene, in Peloponnesus, who had established themselves on the coast of Thrace in returning from the war of Troy. This tradition tended to establish, among the Scionæans, a general partiality for the Peloponnesian connection, to which those of higher rank would otherwise incline ; and a party among them communicated to Brasidas their desire to reject the dominion of Athens, and to be received under his protection. To correspond concerning the proposal was not easy ; for not only the Athenians commanded the sea, but by the possession of Potidæa on the isthmus they completely commanded also the communication by land. Brasidas therefore, who chose always to depend upon his own address rather than that of

c. 120.

any deputies, and who refused no danger in the prosecution of the great objects of his command, resolved to go himself to Scione, and, in a small swift boat, escorted by one trireme, he arrived in the harbour. Well assured of the strength of his party in the town, he ventured immediately to assemble the people, and exert that eloquence which he had already found so useful. He began with his usual declaration, which experience had proved no less politic than liberal, “that no man should suffer in person, property, or privileges for past political conduct, or existing political connections.” He was then large in praise of the Scionæan people, “who, notwithstanding the peculiar danger to which their situation, inclosed within a peninsula, exposed them, in revolting against that tyrannical power which at present commanded the seas, had nevertheless not waited till freedom should be forced upon them through the prevalence of the Peloponnesian arms, but had been forward to assert it;” and he concluded with assurances “of his readiness to give all protection, and his wish to do all honour, to a people who, he was confident, would prove themselves among the most meritorious allies of Lacedæmon.”

Thucyd. 1. 4.
c. 121.

The rhetoric and the liberality of Brasidas had their desired effect. Many, even of those who before were adverse to the revolt, became now satisfied with it, and the whole people vied in paying honours, public and private, to the Spartan general. From the city he received a golden crown, which was in solemn ceremony placed on his head, as the deliverer of Greece; and individuals presented him with fillets, a usual mark of approving admiration to the conquerors in the public games; which, as something approaching to divine honour, was esteemed among the highest tokens of respect.

Scione being thus gained, Brasidas was extending his views to Potidæa and Mende, in both which places he held

correspondence, when commissioners arrived, Aristonymus from Athens, and Athenaeus from Lacedæmon, to announce the cessation of arms. The intelligence was joyful to the new allies of Lacedæmon in Thrace, as the terms of the treaty removed at once all the peril of the situation in which they had placed themselves. With regard to the Scionæans alone a dispute arose. Aristonymus, finding upon inquiry that the vote in assembly, by which they formally acceded to the Lacedæmonian alliance, had not passed till two days after the signing of the articles, declared them excluded from the benefit of the treaty. Brasidas, on the contrary, no way pleased with a truce that checked him in the full career of success, the first of any importance obtained by the Lacedæmonians in the war, and conceiving himself strongly pledged to preserve the Scionæans from Athenian vengeance, insisted that the revolt, truly considered, had taken place before the signing of the articles, and he refused to surrender the town. Aristonymus sent information of this to Athens, where preparation was immediately made to vindicate the claim of the commonwealth by arms. The Lacedæmonian government, disposed to support Brasidas, remonstrated; but the Athenian people, indignant, as Thucydides says, that not only their continental subjects, but now even those who were in the situation of islanders, should so presume in the protection of the land force of Peloponnesus, at the instigation of Cleon made a decree, declaring that Scione should be taken, and the people put to death.

Thucyd. I. 4.
c. 122.

At the very time when this passionate act of democratical despotism was passing, an event occurred which might have taught the Athenians, if a mob could be taught, the superiority of the generous policy of Brasidas to their illiberal and inhuman proceedings. Some of the principal men of Mende, an Eretrian colony, also within

c. 123.

the peninsula of Pallene, had already gone so far in measures for leading their city to revolt that they dreaded beyond all things the scrutiny, and the consequent punishment, which were to be expected from the jealous tyranny of Athens. Accordingly, finding Brasidas, notwithstanding the truce, ready to receive them into the Lacedæmonian alliance, they thought it their safest way to prosecute the measure begun; and though a majority of the lower people was adverse, they succeeded in their design. Brasidas justified himself, partly by urging counter-complaints of infraction of the treaty by the Athenians, partly by maintaining that nothing forbade his receiving any Grecian people into the Lacedæmonian alliance, when the measure on their part was voluntary, and on both sides without fraud or treachery. But the Athenians judged otherwise; they would not indeed deem the truce void, but they would proceed to enforce by arms their own sense of the conditions of it. Brasidas, expecting this, removed the families and effects of the Scionæans and Mendæans to Olynthus, leaving the men of vigorous age to defend the towns, and strengthening the native force with five hundred heavy-armed Peloponnesians and three hundred middle-armed Chalcidians. Having then put everything in the best state for defence that time and circumstances would permit, he appointed Polydamidas, apparently a Lacedæmonian, to the chief command, and returned himself to his army.

In the arduous and complex business in which Brasidas was engaged, in his quality of commander-in-chief of the Peloponnesian forces and superintendent of the Peloponnesian affairs in Thrace, while among Grecian towns his negotiations succeeded beyond hope, he appears to have found great difficulty in managing his interests with the ambitious, crafty, haughty, capricious, and faithless king of Macedonia. What occasioned the next measure Thucydides

has omitted to say ; possibly having been unable to satisfy himself whether Arrhibæus had contravened or deserted his engagements, or whether Brasidas thought it of so much importance to preserve the friendship of Perdiccas as to be induced himself to break with Arrhibæus. The Spartan general however, and the Macedonian king, with united forces, invaded Lyncestis. Three thousand heavy-<sup>Thucyd. I. 4.
c. 124.</sup> armed foot formed the principal strength of the former, and a thousand horse that of the latter, who was besides followed by a numerous body of barbarian irregulars. The Lyncestians, who, though their country was mostly mountainous, yet, as Macedonians, were not without regular heavy-armed foot¹⁰, stood a battle in a plain, which it appears to have been their object to protect against ravage. Compelled to fly, they however soon reached the highlands, where neither the Macedonian horse nor the Peloponnesian foot could, with any hope of advantage, follow them. Perdiccas proposed then to overrun the plain country. Brasidas was anxious for his new allies, particularly those of Mende, where the lower people were so generally disposed to the Athenian interest that, should an Athenian force approach the place in his absence, the citizens of higher rank, who had effected the revolt, would be in the utmost peril. Having therefore so far served the king of Macedonia, he thought he might reasonably withdraw his forces, to give necessary protection to their common confederates. Perdiccas was dissatisfied to have his interest deserted in the first moment of its successful prosecution. Brasidas, very unwilling to alienate so important an ally, was endeavouring to manage an accommodation, when intelligence arrived, that a large body of Illyrian mercenaries, expected to reinforce the Macedonian army, had betrayed their engagement, and joined Arrhibæus.^{c. 125. :}

¹⁰ The term ἑπλίτης always imports so much.

This alarming information disposed Perdiccas to retreat with Brasidas; but in consequence of their disagreement measures were not readily concerted between them. Night was approaching, and nothing yet determined, when exaggerated reports of the Illyrian numbers excited a panic through the Macedonian army, and the whole multitude of barbarian irregulars took to sudden flight, in which many of the Macedonians themselves joined. Already the evil was beyond remedy, before Perdiccas was informed of it; and his camp was so distant from the Peloponnesian that it became necessary to follow his flying troops without waiting to communicate with the Spartan general.

Day breaking, Brasidas found himself in a very perilous situation. The superiority of the enemy's force, and his own want of means for subsistence, left no choice but of hasty retreat. He formed therefore his heavy-armed in a hollow square: the light-armed he placed in the centre: he selected a small body of the youngest and most active men, for a reserve, to assist in any point most pressed; and he took upon himself the immediate command of the rearguard, consisting of three hundred chosen men. Having then assured his people that irregular barbarians, however alarming their numbers and their clamour might appear, could never be really formidable to steady troops, he began his march.

Thucyd. 1. 4.
c. 126.

c. 127.

The Illyrians immediately pursued, with much vociferation and tumult, as if already victors, and slaughter their only business. They attacked; and, to their astonishment, were repulsed with loss: they repeated the attempt with no better success; and, deterred by the firm countenance of the retreating army, with its readiness for efficacious resistance in every part, they drew off; but a body of them pressed forward with intention to occupy the defile of the frontier mountains of Lyncestis, through which

the Peloponnesians must necessarily pass to enter Lower Macedonia. Brasidas, aware of this, detached his three hundred, with orders to proceed with all haste to dislodge the enemy from the high ground, at least on one side of the pass. They succeeded in acquiring possession of one of the hills, the enemy evacuated the other, and the army arrived on the same day at Arnissa, the first town of the immediate dominion of Perdiccas.

In the course of this well-conducted retreat the Peloponnesians fell in with much of the baggage and stores of the Macedonians, whose conductors were following, scattered, and without a guard, the disorderly flight of their army. The Peloponnesians, irritated by the base desertion, as they esteemed it, of the Macedonians, took whatever was most valuable and most portable; and then, loosing from their yokes the oxen employed in drawing the carriages, turned them wandering about the country. This ill-judged revenge, which the general probably could not prevent, completed the alienation of Perdiccas. That he might with less danger break with the Peloponnesians, he began to seek opportunity for renewing his alliance with Athens.

On returning into Thrace, Brasidas found reason to regret that he had allowed his desire to maintain the alliance of the king of Macedonia to carry him so far from the care of his interests in that country. An armament had arrived in Pallene, under the command of Nicias and Nicostratus, consisting of forty Athenian and ten Chian triremes, with a thousand heavy-armed and six hundred bowmen of their national troops, a considerable body of middle-armed of their allies, and a thousand Thracian mercenaries. Proposing to direct their measures against the revolted cities of Mende and Scione, the Athenian generals began their operations with an attempt to force Polydamidas from a strong situation near the former, in

Thucyd. 1. 4.
c. 129.

which they narrowly escaped a total defeat. Re-embarking however their troops, they went to Scione, and took the suburbs on the first assault: but, unable to make any impression on the town, they proceeded to plunder the surrounding country. A party favouring them within the place, not powerful enough to put it into their hands, was nevertheless able to deter the ruling party from quitting their walls to protect their fields. Next day therefore the army was divided: half, under Nicias, ravaged the borders of the Scionæan and Mendian territories; while Nicostratus, with the other half, approached the town of Mende.¹¹

Polydamidas, who had retired into that place with his Peloponnesians, thought himself strong enough, if he could persuade the Mendians to zealous co-operation, to attack the Athenians in the field. He accordingly assembled the people, and proposed the measure; but he was answered by one of the democratical party, "that the Mendians would not march against the Athenians, and that no true interest of theirs had led them into their present engagements with the Peloponnesians." Polydamidas, in pursuance of the rules of Spartan discipline, and of that authority which Lacedæmonians in command usually everywhere assumed, rather than of the policy which his situation required and the example of his general recommended, seized the man with his own hands, and was proceeding to drag him out of the assembly. This violent and arbitrary act so incensed the democratical party that they immediately assaulted his adherents. These, imagining that measures had been concerted with the Athenian generals, now at the gates, fled into the citadel, whither Polydamidas and the troops about

¹¹ The text of Thucydides appears here evidently deficient, and neither the ancient scholiast nor the modern annotators give any assistance. It is nevertheless pretty clear, from the context, that the sense given in Smith's translation, here followed, is just. A note however, which we do not find, explaining on what ground his translation rested, might have added to our satisfaction.

him also retired. Meanwhile the gates were actually thrown open by some of the democratical party; and the whole Athenian army, the forces of Nicias having now joined those under Nicostratus, entered, ignorant of what had been passing, and wondering why they were not opposed. The soldiers accordingly proceeded immediately to pillage, and were with difficulty restrained even from putting the Mendians, their friends, to the sword. The tumult however being soon composed, the people were summoned to the agora. The Athenian generals then directed the restoration of the democratical form of government; and, with a politic liberality, declared they would institute no inquiry about the past, but would leave the Mendians to their own measures concerning those, if any such remained among them, who had been active in the revolt.

Matters being thus far settled in Mende, and a part of the army left to watch the citadel, the generals proceeded with the larger part against Scione. Polydamidas had occupied a hill, the possession of which would have prevented the surrounding of the town with a contravallation. They dislodged him, and then immediately began to form their lines. Meanwhile the blockade of the citadel of Mende had its effect in reducing the place into the power of the Athenians; but the garrison, by a bold effort, saved themselves. Sallying in the dusk of the evening, they overcame the Athenian guard next the sea, and proceeding under cover of the night toward Scione, broke through the Athenian camp there, and the greater part got safe into the town.

During these transactions, the negotiation for renewing the alliance between Athens and Macedonia, concerning which, presently after his retreat from Lyncestis, Perdiccas had begun to tamper with the Athenian generals, was brought to conclusion; and the immediate consequence was greatly important. The party in Lacedæ-

Thucyd. I. 4.
c. 132.

mon which favoured Brasidas had so far prevailed that it was determined to send a body of forces, by the way of Thessaly, to strengthen his army. Intelligence of this being conveyed to Nicias and Nicostratus, they applied to their new ally, the king of Macedonia, to prevent the measure. Perdiccas had always maintained a strong interest in Thessaly, principally through personal communication in hospitality with the leading men. Being desirous to give proof of his sincerity in his revived engagements with Athens, and otherwise little willing that his dominion should become a common road of communication for troops between Peloponnesus and Thrace, he prevailed with his Thessalian friends to interfere so effectually that the Lacedæmonian government desisted from their purpose. Commissioners however were sent, of whom Ischagoras was chief, to inspect into the state of things in Thrace; and, contrary apparently to the engagements of Brasidas, officers with the title of harmost, regulator, were sent with them from Sparta, to be constant guardians of the Lacedæmonian interests in the several towns. It is remarked by Thucydides that all of these were under the age required by the Lacedæmonian institutions for foreign command. Brasidas, deprived of the re-enforcement which he had long been soliciting, and which the Lacedæmonian government too late became disposed to

Thucyd. I. 4. c. 135. grant him, nevertheless, toward the end of winter, made an attempt to surprise Potidæa; but, being discovered by the sentries before he could apply scaling-ladders to the walls, he withdrew without effecting anything.

During this year of nominal truce between Lacedæmon and Athens, while the interests of the two states were still prosecuted by arms in Thrace, some circumstances for notice

c. 133. occurred in Greece. The Thebans accused the Thespians of the crime of Atticism, as they termed the inclination to an alliance with Athens, though the Thes-

pians had been principal sufferers in the late battle with the Athenians near Delium. But this very circumstance, which should have proved them not obnoxious to justice, rendered them unfortunately open to oppression; and, under claim of that arbitrary authority asserted by the Thebans over all Bœotia, it was required that the fortifications of Thespiae should be demolished, and the people of that little city were obliged to submit; thus becoming subject to the arbitrary will of whoever might rule in Thebes. Such, throughout the republican ages, were the liberties of the greater part of the Greek nation.

In Arcadia, where was no such superintending authority, about the same time a petty war broke out. An obstinate battle ensued between the Mantineans and Tegeans. Each claimed the victory; each raised its trophy; and, both being disabled for farther exertion immediately in the field, both endeavoured, by presenting at Delphi the spoil collected in the battle, to gain the favour of the deity for future contest. Also about the same time, through some negligence, it was said, of the priestess Chrysis, then in the fifty-fifth year of her sacred office, the celebrated temple of the Argive Juno was greatly injured by fire. Chrysis, in dread of the judgment or the wrath of the Argive people, fled to Phlius.

Thucyd. 1.4.
c. 134.

c. 133.

Meanwhile the informed Athenians were offering a very remarkable instance of popular superstition. Ever looking up to a superior cause for the direction of the events of this world, they did not attribute the reverse of fortune, which they were beginning to experience, to the wretched constitution of their government, now so altered from that which Solon had established, nor to their own insufficiency for deciding on public measures, nor to the folly which, making them dupes to the boisterous eloquence of the ignoble and ignorant Cleon, led them to commit the administration

of public affairs principally to his direction. Nor did they conceive themselves obnoxious to divine anger for all their unjust violence to their allies, and all their shocking cruelties to those whom they called rebellious subjects; yet they did attribute their misfortunes to the indignation of the deity. The fancy arose that the purification of the sacred island of Delos had been deficiently performed, and it was proposed to secure the favour of the god by a new act of cruel injustice. The whole Delian people, subjects who had every right to protection from the Athenian government, were expelled from their island, without having any other settlement provided for them. It was fortunate for those miserable Greeks, thus inhumanly treated, that the Athenians had not the power, of which their orators

Ch. 11. s. 3.
of this Hist. sometimes vainly boasted, to deny to the Persians all approach to the shores of the Ægean sea. The charity refused them by those who boasted to be the most polished of their countrymen, they found from those whom they called barbarians. The satrap Pharnaces gave them the territory of Atramyttium, on the Æolian coast, to cultivate for their subsistence.

SECTION VI.

State of Athens. — Effect of theatrical Satire. — Cleon fined. — Cleon appointed General in Thrace. — Battle of Amphipolis.

AFTER the death of Pericles there seems to have remained no man of rank in Athens whose powers of elocution were of that superior kind which, together with extraordinary talent for popularity, are necessary, in a democracy, for the guidance of public affairs. When all graver men were now tired of ineffectual opposition to the arrogance of the low and petulant Cleon in the general assembly, a poet undertook their cause, and attacked him on the public stage. The

practice of the old comedy still subsisted in Athens: public characters were exhibited with the utmost freedom in the theatre: masks, representing their countenances, were worn by the actors, who, in thus mimicking their persons, assumed, without any disguise, their names. This licence was of great political consequence; giving opportunity for those who could write, but who could not speak, to declare their sentiments, or to vent their spleen on political topics. In the want of that art which now so readily multiplies copies, a composition was thus at once communicated to a whole public; and stage exhibitions supplied the place of the political pamphlets of modern times. The interest of a party thus might be promoted on the stage as in the agora; and those opinions might be propagated, and those passions excited, on one day by theatrical exhibitions, which on the morrow might decide the measures of the general assembly.

It was after the affair of Pylus, when Cleon was in the height of his popularity, when, in pursuance of a decree of the people, he was honoured with precedence at the public spectacles, and maintenance in the Prytaneum, that Aristophanes brought upon the stage of Athens that extraordinary comedy which remains to us with the title of *The Knights*. Cleon is there represented in the most ludicrous and ignominious light; satire being at the same time not spared against the Athenian people, personated in their collective character by a single actor, with the name of Demus; as Swift, whose writings, by their extraordinary mixture of wit, elegance, buffoonery, and political acumen, approach beyond any other modern compositions to those of Aristophanes, has characterised the people of England under the appellation of John Bull. Such was the known influence of Cleon among the Athenian people, and such the dread of the intemperate use he might make of it, that no

Aristoph.
Equit. v. 702.

Aristoph. *Equit.* v. 230. actor could be found bold enough to represent him on the stage, nor any artist to make a mask in his likeness. But Aristophanes would not be so disappointed; himself a man of rank, personally an enemy to Cleon, certain of support from all the first families of the republic, and trusting in his own powers to engage the favour of the lower people, he undertook himself to act the part; and for want of a proper mask, he disguised his face, after the manner of the strolling comedians of Thespis's time, with lees of wine.

The immediate effect of this extraordinary exhibition was great. The performance was relished and applauded; Cleon

Aristoph. *Acharn.* v. 6. & *Nub.* v. 49. was ridiculed and reviled: in this temper of the people an accusation was preferred against him for embezzling public money: and, not finding his wonted support, he was condemned in a fine of five talents, above twelve hundred pounds sterling.

In such a government however as that of Athens, nothing was lasting but the capriciousness of the people. The reproach of a condemnation, against which the greatest and purest characters were scarcely more secure than the vilest, was not likely long to affect Cleon. Pericles himself had been condemned; and within a few days the people anxiously invited him to take again the lead in public affairs. Cleon wanted no such invitation; he did not, with his reputation, lose his impudence. Continuing to cabal in the porticos and vociferate in the assemblies, he loaded with vague accusation all the principal men of the commonwealth. The people gave him credit for abuse of their superiors, as they had given Aristophanes credit for abusing him. In the general assembly the field thus became his own. Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, an able officer, and apparently an able statesman, but unknown as a public speaker, seems to have yielded before him; the mild and timid Nicias feared

to exert his abilities in the contest; and Cleon by degrees so reingratiated himself with the people as to become again the first man of the commonwealth, and to have its forces at his disposal.

His success at Pylus gave him to delude, not only the people but himself, with the imagination that he possessed military talents: he thought he could now command armies without the assistance of Demosthenes; and another fortunate expedition would drown the memory of what his reputation had suffered from the attack of Aristophanes, and enable him to overbear rivalship. He therefore opposed to his utmost all proposals of a pacific tendency; urging continually that the tarnished glory of the commonwealth ought to be restored, and its losses repaired, by at least the recovery of what had been lately ravished from it. His arguments were calculated to make impression on the passions of the multitude: and the truce was no sooner expired than a decree passed for sending a force into Thrace, to the command of which he was appointed. The armament consisted of one thousand two hundred foot, and three hundred horse, of the flower of the Athenian youth, a considerable body of the allies, also select troops, and thirty trireme galleys. The commission of commander-in-chief in Thrace gave power to increase his force from the auxiliaries of that country, and from the Athenian troops already there.

Thus vested with an important and extensive command, in the tenth spring of the war, Cleon took his departure from Piræus with his armament. Touching first in Pallene, and re-enforcing himself with a part of the army which was besieging Scione, he proceeded to a place called the Colophonian port, not far from Torone, in the neighbouring peninsula of Sithonia. He had been informed that, in pursuance of a plan of Brasidas,

Thucyd. I. 5.
c. 2.

c. 2. Aristoph.
Nub. v. 581.

B. C. 422. Ol.
89. 2. P.W. 10.

May.

for extending the fortifications of Torone, so as to include the suburbs, a part of the old wall had been taken down, ^{Thucyd. I. 5.} and the new works were not yet completed. Intelligence now came to him, by deserters, that Brasidas was absent, and the garrison weak. A sudden assault succeeded, and the governor, Pasitelidas, a Lacedæmonian, was made prisoner, with all those of the garrison and people who survived the first slaughter.

^{c. 6.} Elated with this easy success Cleon determined to proceed against Amphipolis, the most important of all the places of which the valour and ability of Brasidas had deprived the Athenian empire. Sailing therefore around Athos, and entering the Strymon, the armament anchored in the port of Eion. This place Cleon chose for his central post. Hence he made a fruitless attempt upon Stagirus, but he succeeded against Galepsus. Meanwhile he applied to the king of Macedonia for the auxiliary force which, according to treaty, he was to furnish, and endeavoured to obtain some mercenaries by negotiation with Polles, prince of the Odomantian Thracians.

^{c. 5.} Brasidas, who depended less upon any force he could with certainty command than upon his own activity and address and the faults of his enemy, had hastened in vain to the relief of Torone; though arrived with a body of troops within five miles when it was taken. When Cleon moved toward the Strymon, Brasidas directed his attention to Amphipolis. He could muster there, exclusively of the Amphipolitans, no more than two thousand regular heavy-armed foot, and one thousand middle-armed Thracian Greeks, with the valuable addition however of three hundred Grecian horse. The strength of the Amphipolitans, to be relied upon, was uncertain, on account of the difference in political sentiments among so mixed a people. The Edonian Thracians however voluntarily joined him with

the whole force of their clan, horse and middle-armed foot, and he engaged fifteen hundred Thracian mercenaries. With a body of fifteen hundred men, selected from these various troops, he occupied Cerdylion, a lofty and strong situation on the western bank of the Strymon, whence he could observe the motions of the Athenian army encamped on the opposite bank. The remainder of his forces he left within the walls of Amphipolis under the command of Clearidas.

This being the situation of the two armies, Thucyd. I. 5.
c. 7, 8. & 10. Cleon, whose business was offensive operation, rested some time in total inaction, through mere ignorance, according to Thucydides, how to proceed. The numbers on each side were nearly equal; but the Athenian army was far superior in the kind of troops; those who were not Athenian citizens being the flower of the Lemnian and Imbrian forces. Confident in their own ability, and from the first little satisfied with the command under which they were placed, they grew uneasy in inactivity; while in c. 7. their leisure they compared the known talents and courage of Brasidas with the evident deficiency of their own general. Cleon, informed of the growing discontent, became apprehensive of consequences. It was his desire to await the re-enforcements which he expected: but, in the mean time, to hold out to his troops the appearance at least of employment, and the expectation of something more intended, and thinking, says Thucydides, to infuse an opinion of his military skill by a movement similar to what, though not his own, had gained him so much credit at Pylus, he quitted his camp and approached Amphipolis. His declared purpose was, not to attack the enemy, who, he trusted, would feel their inferiority too much to venture to attack him; but only to make observations; and, when the expected re-enforcements should arrive, he would at once

surround and storm the town. Accordingly he occupied a lofty hill which overlooked the place, and commanded, on one side, a view of the Strymon expanding into a lake as it approached the sea, on the other, of the varied ground through which its waters flowed from the inland country. Here he formed his camp, confident of holding it in his option equally to remain or retire unmolested. Meanwhile the gates of the town being kept close, and no troops appearing upon the walls, he began to think he had been deficient in not bringing machines, with the co-operation of which, in the apparent weakness and timidity of the garrison, a brisk assault might, he imagined, have carried the place.

Thucyd. 1. 5.
c. 8. Brasidas, aware of the inferiority of his own

troops in arms and in discipline, but the more confident in the resources of his genius as he knew the inability of the general opposed to him, was anxious to bring on a battle before re-enforcements should arrive. As soon therefore as he saw Cleon in motion, he also moved from his post on Cerdylion into Amphipolis.

c. 9. Observing then the disorderly negligence of the enemy, and their

apparent confidence in security, he formed his plan accordingly. By a sudden attack, without that perfect order of battle to which the Greeks generally attached great importance, he expected to gain two points: first, to throw the enemy into a confusion which might reduce their troops to a level with his own; and then to prevent the encouragement which they would derive from the observation, if he allowed them means for it, of the small proportion which his regular heavy-armed bore to his total numbers. He could not however prudently omit those ceremonies which Grecian religion required as indispensable preparatives for a battle; and the Athenians, from the height which they occupied, could plainly distinguish the sacrifice performing in Amphipolis before the temple of Minerva, and the bustle of prepara-

tion throughout the town. Thucydides adds that Thucyd. I. 5.
c. 10. the feet of horses and men in great numbers, as preparing to come out, so near might the ancient fortifications be approached for the purpose of observation, could be discerned under the town-gates.

Cleon, receiving information of these circumstances, and then assuring himself of the truth of it with his own eyes, would not await attack from a force which he had affected to despise, but instantly commanded the retreat of his whole army to Eion. This the nature of the ground would permit only to be performed by files from the left; which, in the Greek system of tactics, was highly disadvantageous, so much depending on the shield, borne on the left arm. To remedy the defect, and obviate the consequent danger, Cleon thinking he should have leisure for it, as soon as the ground permitted, wheeled round his right. If he had been in concert with the enemy to expose his army to certain defeat, he could scarcely have taken a measure more effectual for the purpose. The evolution not only broke, for the time, that compact arrangement whence arose the security and strength of the Grecian phalanx, but exposed the soldier's right side, unprotected by his shield, to the enemy's weapons. This was an advantage beyond what Brasidas had hoped for. Exultingly he exclaimed, "An army moving in that manner does not mean to stand its ground; the victory is already ours; open the gates for me;" and immediately at the head of a chosen band of only one hundred and fifty men, if our copies of Thucydides are right, he ran toward the centre of the Athenian army, the part at that instant the most disordered. At the same time Clearidas, at the head of the rest of the Peloponnesian forces, issuing out of that called the Thracian gate, with a more steady pace, supported Brasidas, and attacked other parts of the Athenian line.

In this situation of things, the Athenian left, already some

way advanced, punctually obeyed the orders received, to hasten the march toward Eion. Breaking away from the centre, it was soon out of reach of the enemy. This conduct was justified by that of the general, whom nothing could divert from his first purpose, to retreat. Quitting his right, with intention to join his left in its security, he was intercepted by a Myrcinian targeteer, from whom he received the death he deserved, marked with the ignominy of flight.

The disordered centre of the Athenian army having been defeated in the first moment of attack, while the left had withdrawn from the contest, Brasidas directed his efforts to the right; which, though deserted by its general, had preserved its order, and regaining the high ground, resisted firmly. In exertion apparently too much as a private soldier, of which his uncommon strength and activity perhaps led him to be over-fond, he received a wound; and falling, unperceived by the Athenians, was carried off by his friends. The heavy-armed under Clearidas, coming to support him, were repulsed more than once, and the Athenians maintained the contest till they were surrounded; the enemy's horse and middle-armed foot galling their rear and flanks, while the whole force of the heavy-armed pressed them in front. Compelled thus at length to give way, they retreated toward the neighbouring mountains, which they gained not without great difficulty and much loss; and then dispersing, fled, each as he best could, to Eion. Brasidas lived to be brought into Amphipolis, and to know that his army was completely victorious, and soon after expired.

Scarcely any Spartan known in history, and indeed few men of any nation, have shown themselves so endowed with talents to command armies and to persuade citizens, to make and to maintain conquests, as Brasidas. The estimation in which he was held was remarkably testified by the honours

paid to his memory. His funeral was performed with the utmost solemnity at the public expense; all the allies, as well as the Peloponnesian forces, attending in arms. A spot in front of the agora of Amphipolis was chosen to receive his ashes, and, as sacred ground, was inclosed with a fence, to prevent profane intrusion: a monument was erected there to perpetuate his memory: every testimony to the foundation of the colony by the Athenian Agnon, whether public building or whatever else, was carefully destroyed; and it was ordained, by public decree, that in future Brasidas, the founder of the liberty of Amphipolis, should be venerated as the true founder of the city; and, to conclude all, worship was decreed to him as a hero, or demigod, and public games, with sacrifices, were instituted, to be annually performed to his honour.

Diodorus, and, after him, Plutarch, relate, that ambassadors from the Thracian Greeks to Sparta (and such a mission is mentioned by Thucydides) were questioned by the mother of Brasidas, Argaleonis, concerning the death of her son. In reply, speaking largely in his praise, they said that Brasidas had not left his equal behind him. "Strangers," answered Argaleonis, "you mistake: my son was a man of great merit, but there are many superior to him in Sparta." This anecdote is perfectly consonant to the spirit of patriotism, which it was the purpose of the Spartan institutions to instil into every citizen of either sex, and it may have had its foundation in fact: but according to every account of the times, particularly that of Thucydides, Argaleonis, if the story is fairly told, was more partial to her country than just to her son, and though the sentiment had something noble, the assertion was not true; for Brasidas did not leave his equal behind him in Sparta, nor apparently in all Greece. The high reputation in which he was held by his enemies may be gathered from

Thucyd. I. 4.
c. 11.

Diod. I. 12.
c. 74. Plut.
Apoph. Lacon.
Thucyd. I. 5.
c. 21.

an expression which Plato has put into the mouth of Alcibiades, where, speaking of great characters, and of Socrates as the only one without a parallel, he says Brasidas was not so, for he might be compared to Achilles.¹²

SECTION VII.

Passage through Thessaly denied to the Lacedæmonian Troops. — Negotiation for Peace resumed by Lacedæmon and Athens. — A partial Peace concluded.

Too late the envy perhaps of some of the leading men in the Spartan administration and the over-cautiousness of others had yielded to the pressing occasions of the commonwealth, which wanted abilities and activity like those of

^{Thucyd. 1. 5.} Brasidas. A body of nine hundred heavy-armed, ^{c. 12.} under the command of Ramphias, Autocharidas, and Epicydides, had been ordered to his assistance. Arriv-

^{Mid. Sept.} ing, not till toward the end of summer, at Heraclea in Trachinia, while settling the deranged affairs of that colony, the action near Amphipolis happened. In-
^{Thucyd. 1. 5.} telligence of it reached them not till they had ^{c. 13.} entered Thessaly, and about the same time a declaration was communicated to them from the Thessalians, that their march through Thessaly would be opposed. The difficulty thus presented, the consciousness, as Thucydides

¹² Οἵσ τὰς Ἀχιλλεῖν ἴγεντο, ἀπυκάστουν ἀν τις καὶ Βρασίδαν. Conviv. p. 221. t. 3. This expression of Plato seems to mark the superior strength and activity of Brasidas, and his disposition to personal exertion in battle. Perhaps we might do him an honour not less his due by comparing him with a soldier of our own country, not particularly remarkable for those qualities. The concluding part of his life, at least, bore a strong resemblance to that of our conqueror of Canada. The obvious differences are, that Wolfe commanded the smaller and more disciplined army against the more numerous and less regular; that his business was attack, that of Brasidas defence; and that, instead of a Cleon, the general opposed to him was a man of rank, and of distinguished abilities, experience, and general worth.

adds, of their insufficiency for the prosecution of those designs which had originated with Brasidas, the consideration that the necessity for re-enforcing the Peloponnesian troops in Thrace was alleviated by the advantages already gained there, and the knowledge that the leading men of their administration were more anxious for peace than willing to risk farther the events of war, they determined immediately to lead their little army home.

A concurrence of circumstances now contributed to induce the two leading powers nearly equally to desire peace. The Lacedæmonians had originally engaged in the war in confidence of decisive superiority, and in full hope that the waste of Attica, with a battle, which they expected would ensue, and in which they had no doubt of being victorious, would bring the Athenians to their terms. The event had everyway deceived their expectation. The ravage of Attica had produced no important consequence: they found themselves utterly unable to raise that formidable navy which they had projected; and, on the contrary, their allies had been exposed to continual danger, and suffered extensive injury from the Athenian fleets; and at length the blow had fallen severely on themselves: their loss in killed and prisoners at Pylus was such as never within memory had happened to their state: the enemy possessed a fortress within their country; a most galling circumstance, and still more strange to them: an island had been taken from them which commanded their coast; and from Pylus and Cythera their lands were infested, and depredation was spread, in a manner before wholly unexperienced. Their slaves at the same time deserted in numbers, and the apprehension was continual that confidence in foreign assistance would excite insurrection among the numerous remainder of those oppressed men. Anxiety meanwhile was unceasing, in the principal families, for their friends and

Thucyd. 1.5.
c. 14.

c. 15.

relations confined in the public prison of Athens. To make Thucyd. I. 5. the prospect more alarming, a truce with Argos c. 14. concluded for thirty years, was on the point of expiring, and the Argives refused to renew it but on terms to which the Lacedæmonians were very unwilling to submit: and it was apprehended, that a breach with Argos would make a schism in Peloponnesus, so that some of the principal states of their alliance would side with the Argives against them.

So many and so weighty were the causes which still urged Lacedæmon, notwithstanding the late turn of fortune in her favour, to be solicitous for peace. At the same time that turn of fortune had considerably lowered the haughty tone of Athens. The defeats at Delium and Amphipolis, the revolt of so many of their dependencies, and the fear that others would follow a successful example, had checked the idea before prevailing, that they could command the fortune of war, and might dictate the terms of peace; and there followed a very general regret that the favourable opportunity, procured by the success at Pylus, had been, in wanton haughtiness, thrown away.

With the inclination of the people, on both sides, it fortunately happened that the temper and interests of the leading men concurred. By the death of the turbulent Cleon the mild Nicias was left the man of most influence in the Athenian commonwealth. A strong concurrence of circumstances disposed him to desire peace. His natural temper, the possession of a very large patrimony which, in the insecurity of the scanty territory of a Grecian republic, peace only could enable to enjoy, and even the desire of glory, to which he was not insensible, led him to seek the reputation of being the peace-maker for his country, while peace could yet be made with certain advantage. At the same time, among the Lacedæmonians, the interest of

Plistoanax, the reigning prince of the house of Eurysthenes, led him to be urgent for peace. Plistoanax, as we have heretofore seen, in early youth, had been condemned to banishment, on suspicion of taking bribes from Pericles to lead the Peloponnesian army out of Attica. The Lacedæmonian ministry, it appears, whether in the necessity of complying with popular superstition, or desirous of finding a cover for their own inability and an excuse for miscarriages, frequently applied for advice to the Delphian oracle; and they were disturbed with the continual repetition of an exhortation annexed to every response, "That the Lacedæmonians should bring back the demigod, son of Jupiter." The friends of Plistoanax interpreted this as a divine admonition to restore that prince, the descendant and representative of the demigods Hercules and Perseus, acknowledged by Grecian superstition as sons of Jupiter; and Plistoanax was in consequence restored, after a banishment of nineteen years. But a report was circulated, and gained extensive credit, that the admonitory response had been procured by bribery to the Delphian priests; and the party in opposition did not fail to use that report for furtherance of their purposes, attributing every adversity that befel the Spartan arms to the anger of the gods at the restoration of Plistoanax; at any rate offensive to them, but doubly so as having been procured by such impious collusion. Thus it became particularly an object with that prince to obviate the risk of calamities from war.

Such being the disposition on both sides, conferences were opened, and they were continued through the winter. Toward spring the negotiation was so little advanced that the Lacedæmonians circulated notices among their allies to prepare, not only for a fresh invasion of Attica, but for the establishment of a fortified post in the country. Soon after however preliminaries were agreed

Ch. 12. s. 5.
of this Hist.

Thucyd.
ut ant.

Thucyd. 1.5.
c. 17.

upon. The fundamental principle was that each party should restore what had been taken in the war, except that Nisaea was reserved to Athens in consideration of the refusal of the Thebans to surrender Platæa. A convention of deputies from the states of the Lacedæmonian alliance being then assembled, the Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleans, and Megarians protested against the proposed terms: but the other states, who formed a majority of the assembly, approving them, the Lacedæmonian government proceeded to ratify the peace in the name of the whole confederacy. It ran nearly thus:

Thucyd. 1. 5.
c. 18. “ That the common temples, the religious rites, and the oracles of the Greek nation (those of Delphi particularly named) should be equally open for all, to pass to and from at all times in safety, by sea or by land; and that the Delphian people should be independent, yielding obedience and paying tribute to none: That the treaty should remain in force for fifty years: That, if any disputes should arise between the contracting powers, they should be determined by judicial process, the mode to be hereafter settled: That the cities reduced by Lacedæmon, namely, Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, Spartolus, together with those in the peninsula of Athos, should be free, paying only to Athens the tribute appointed by Aristides: That those cities should not, by the operation of this treaty, be bound in confederacy with either party; but that it should be permitted them, by their own act, if they should hereafter choose it, to join the Athenian confederacy: That Amphipolis, being an Athenian colony, should be restored unconditionally; and that the Lacedæmonians should procure the restoration of the fortress of Panactum in Attica, taken by the Boeotians. On the other side, that Coryphasium, (the territory in which Pylus was situated,) Cythera, Methone, Pteleum, and Atalanta should be restored to Lacedæmon. Prisoners were to be equally restored on both sides. The

Scionæans, now besieged, were left to the mercy of the Athenian people; the safe departure of the Peloponnesians in garrison with them only being provided for. It was then stipulated that every state acceding to the treaty should severally swear to the observation of it, by that oath which its own religious institutions made for itself most sacred and binding; that such oath should be repeated annually; and that columns, with the treaty inscribed, should be erected at Olympia, at Pytho, (the name by which Homer calls Delphi, and which seems to have been continued in use as a more solemn and sacred appellation,) at the isthmus, at Athens in the citadel, and at Lacedæmon in the Amyclæum: and finally, that it should be lawful for the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, by mutual consent, to supply any omission, and, after due discussion, to make any alteration in these articles."

The date is then added thus: "At the conclusion of the treaty presided the ephor Plistolas, on the fourth day before the end of the Lacedæmonian month Artemisius, and the archon of Athens, Alcæus, on the sixth day before the end of the Athenian month Elaphebolion," which our chronologers make the tenth of April. Fifteen Lacedæmonians and seventeen Athenians, as representatives of the two states, assisted at the sacrifices, and took the oaths. The name of the ephor Plistolas is at the head of the Lacedæmonians, that of Lampon of the Athenians, together with those of Nicias, Laches, Agnon, Lamachus, Demosthenes, and others who had been in high situations in the government.

Thucyd. I. 5.
c. 19.

CHAPTER XVII.

OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, DURING THE PEACE BE-TWEEN LACEDÆMON AND ATHENS.

SECTION I.

Difficulties in the Execution of the Articles of the Peace. — Alliance between Lacedæmon and Athens. — Intrigues of the Corinthians. — New Confederacy in Peloponnesus. — Dispute between Lacedæmon and Elis. — Dispute between Lacedæmon and Mantinea. — Tyranny of the Athenian People. — Surrender of Scione. — Superstition of the Athenian People.

THE treaty of peace thus concluded between the leading powers of the two confederacies, which had been contending, with little remission, now ten years in arms, was ill calculated to give general and permanent quiet to the nation. A want of able men in the administration of Lacedæmon, which had been manifested in the conduct of the affairs of that state through the whole of the war, above all showed itself in this treaty, and in the circumstances which followed. A narrow policy appeared in the treaty itself: the exclusive interest of Lacedæmon was considered: that of the allies, by whom Lacedæmon was powerful, and without whom she scarcely could be safe (such was the alteration since the simple age of her great legislator), were unpardonably neglected. The Lacedæmonians themselves recovered all that had been taken from them; but their old and necessary allies the Corinthians were to remain deprived of their colonies of Solium in Ætolia, and Anac-

torium in Acarnania : the Megarians were to suffer the much more distressing loss of Nisæa, their port, not a mile from the city : the complaints of the Eleans, yet more serious, imputed to Sparta active injustice and oppression, which will be for future notice. With all this the Lacedæmonian administration found themselves unable to carry into effect some of the most important articles of their own treaty. It was to be decided by lot which of the contracting parties should first perform its engagement for the restoration of prisoners and places taken, and the lot fell upon Lacedæmon. Accordingly the Athenian prisoners were immediately released ; and Ischagoras, with two other commissioners, was sent into Thrace, to direct the surrender of Amphipolis, and to require compliance with the terms of the treaty from the towns which had been received into the Lacedæmonian alliance. But those towns refused ; and Clearidas, who had succeeded Brasidas in the command in chief in Thrace, would not, pretending he could not, in opposition to the Chalcidians, surrender Amphipolis. The general however and the Chalcidian chiefs became together apprehensive of the consequences of this disobedience. The former accordingly went himself, the others sent deputies, to apologise for their conduct ; but at the same time with a view to procure an alteration of the articles, or even to disturb the peace. Clearidas was in consequence hastily remanded, with orders to bring away all the Peloponnesian forces if compliance with the terms of treaty should be any longer delayed.

The congress of deputies of the confederacy remained still assembled in Lacedæmon, and the Lacedæmonian administration had been in vain urging the dissentients to accede to the treaty. They were equally unsuccessful in the endeavour to accommodate matters with Argos ; so that, with that state, a war seemed inevitable,

Thucyd. 1.5.
c. 21.

c. 22.

in which, according to all appearance, the greater part of Peloponnesus would be against them. Alarmed by these considerations they proposed a defensive alliance with Athens, which was hastily concluded; and then the Athenians released the prisoners taken in Sphacteria. Meanwhile the congress of the Peloponnesian confederacy was dismissed, with a disposition, among many of the members, far from friendly to the political quiet of Greece.

The complex intrigues ensuing among the Grecian republics form, in the detail remaining from Thucydides, not indeed the most splendid, but one of the most curious and instructive portions of Grecian history. Nothing gives to know so intimately the political state of Greece in general at the time, or the state of parties in the principal republics; and nothing affords equal ground for a just estimation of the value of that union, scarcely to be called a federal union, but rather a connection founded on opinion, and supported principally by similarity of language, manners, and religious belief; a connection subsisting unequally, uncertainly, and yet subsisting, among the numerous and scattered members of the Greek nation. It may indeed be difficult, even with that able and exact writer for our guide, to avoid some tediousness, and perhaps some confusion in the narration; which must nevertheless be hazarded rather than evade an important part of the office of historian.

The Corinthians, irritated now against Lacedæmon, were not less warm than at the beginning of the war in enmity to Athens. When the convention of the confederacy was dismissed, their deputies, instead of returning immediately home, went to Argos, where means of confidential communication with some of the leading men¹

¹ ————— τῶν ἐν τέλει.

were open to them. To these they urged that “since the Lacedæmonians, resigning their ancient character, or rather their pretension to the character, of protectors of the liberty of Greece, had made not only peace, but a close alliance, with the Athenians, its most determined and dangerous enemies, it became the Argives to interfere toward the preservation, at least, of Peloponnesus. The opportunity which present circumstances offered,” they said, “was inviting : for such was the disgust taken at the conduct of Lacedæmon, it would be only to declare, by a public decree, the readiness of the Argive people to enter into alliance with any independent Grecian cities, and they would quickly find themselves at the head of a powerful confederacy.” The Argive chiefs were very well disposed to the measure thus recommended ; but a difficulty occurred in the democratical form of their government. In regular course, all negotiation with foreign states must be transacted with the assembly of the people. This would unavoidably make the business more public than suited the views of the Corinthian deputies, or could consist with the safety of the leading men in some of the republics with which they meant to negotiate. The Corinthian ministers therefore advised to propose, in general terms only, to the Argive people, “That alliances should be made with friendly Grecian states ;” and when this proposition had received the sanction of a decree, it might be ventured farther to recommend, “That the necessary negotiations should be intrusted to select commissioners.”

A concurrence of circumstances at this time favoured the purpose of the Corinthians. While the reputation of Lacedæmon had been considerably lowered in Greece by the events of the late war, Argos, keeping upon good terms with all the contending powers, had thriven in peace. Ambition grew with increasing wealth and strength ; and the decay of

Lacedæmon seemed to offer an opening for Argos to recover its ancient pre-eminence and command in Peloponnesus; far from an empty honour, a very important advantage when, as at present, a war with that still powerful neighbour was im-
Thucyd. I. 5. c. 28. pending. Thus the Corinthian deputies succeeded with the Argive chiefs, and these with the people; and a committee of twelve men was appointed, with full power to conclude treaties of alliance, defensive and offensive, with any Grecian states, except Athens and Lacedæmon. If either of these should offer, it was required that the proposal should be laid before the Argive people.

c. 29. Not any liberal view to an improvement of the federal union of Greece, but the separate interest of particular republics, brought the first accession to the proposed new confederacy under the presidency of Argos. While the war with Athens had kept Lacedæmon fully engaged, the Mantineans had compelled a part of Arcadia, before independent, to submit to their dominion; and they justly apprehended that, in the leisure of peace, however any generous regard for the common welfare might be wanting, the consideration of their own interest would urge the Lacedæmonians to interfere, and prevent such exercise of sovereignty over any people within Peloponnesus. The universal liberty of Greece had been held out as the first principle of the new confederacy; but to make a beginning toward collecting allies was esteemed, by the Argives, of more importance than a strict adherence to any such principle. The government of Mantinea, like their own, was democratical: which was a reason both for their union in opposition to Lacedæmon, and for the allowance of some indulgence to Mantinea in the exercise of a tyrannical authority over other Grecian states.

This narrow and corrupt policy was, in the moment, not

unattended with the proposed advantage. Great and general offence and alarm had been taken at that article in the treaty between Lacedæmon and Athens, which declared that the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, without mention of any other states of Greece, might in concurrence, at any time, make whatever alteration in the conditions to them should seem fit ; which was little less than a declaration of authority, in those two states united, to give law to Greece. The accession of Mantinea to the new confederacy increased the ferment : for, while intelligence of the fact was circulated, the motives were not universally obvious ; and it was very generally supposed that the Mantineans, near neighbours to both Lacedæmon and Argos, knew more than was generally known, and that reasons which impelled them ought probably to weigh with all.

The Lacedæmonian administration, early informed of all these political movements, was greatly alarmed. Ministers were dispatched to Corinth, which was understood to be the fountain-head of the intrigue, to inquire and remonstrate. By the terms of that confederacy, of which Lacedæmon was the head, it was stipulated that the voice of a majority of the states should bind the whole; but with an exception recommended by Grecian superstition, singularly adapted to political evasion, in these terms, “provided no hinderance occurred from the gods or heroes.” Whatever might be the views of some leading men among the Corinthians in desiring the continuance of the war, the cause of the general dissatisfaction of the Corinthian people with the terms of the peace was well known, and was reasonable. The Lacedæmonians, in stipulating for the restoration of all places taken from themselves by the Athenians, had ceded the towns of Solium and Anactorium, taken from the Corinthians. But this, however a real grievance and a just cause of dissatisfaction, could not properly be

Thucyd. 1. 5.
c. 30.

urged by the Corinthians as a cause for refusing accession to the treaty with Athens, which was a regular act of the confederacy. They resorted therefore to the gods for their pretence ; alleging that they had bound themselves by oath to protect the Potidæans and their other allies in Thrace ; whence arose a hinderance from the gods, such that they could not accede to the terms of the treaty. To the complaints of the Lacedæmonians about the Argive confederacy they replied, “ that they would consult their allies, and do nothing but what should be deemed proper and just.” With these answers the Lacedæmonian ministers, unable to obtain any farther satisfaction, returned home.

Thucyd. I. 5.
c. 31. In the disputes, difficult by any means to settle,

to which the division of Peloponnesus into so many independent village states gave perpetual occasion, circumstances had arisen to set the Eleans, still more than the Corinthians, at variance with Lacedæmon. Before the war, the people of the little town of Lepreum, oppressed by the united enmity of some neighbouring Arcadian villages, had applied to Elis for protection, offering half their lands to obtain it. The Eleans, accepting the condition, compelled the Arcadians to make peace, and then allowed the Lepreans still to occupy the ceded territory, paying only an acknowledgment of a talent yearly to Olympian Jupiter. For anything that appears, the bargain was advantageous for a people so unable to defend their property, and maintain themselves in unconnected independency. But when the war with Athens broke out, the Lepreans, as well as the Eleans, being members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, urged the expense of expeditions into Attica, and other burthens of the war, as pretences for discontinuing the payment. This the Eleans would not admit ; upon which the Lepreans appealed to Lacedæmon : but the Eleans, apprehending that they should not have fair measure of justice there, waived the

arbitration, and asserted their right by arms. The Lacedæmonians nevertheless proceeded to give sentence in the cause, declaring the Eleans aggressors, and the Lepreans free; and upon the refusal of the Eleans to accept this decision they put a garrison into Lepreum for its protection.

Irritated by this arbitrary, and, as they esteemed it, unjust proceeding, the Eleans were prepared for the opportunity which now offered for engaging in a confederacy of Peloponnesian states, in opposition to Lacedæmon. Ministers, whom they sent to Corinth, having concluded a separate treaty of alliance with that state, proceeded to Argos, and pledged their commonwealth to the new confederacy. Then the Corinthians also acceded to that confederacy, and their influence decided the Chalcidians of Thrace to the same measure. The Boeotians and Megarians were enough dissatisfied with Lacedæmon to declare approbation of it, and an intention to concur. But the consideration that the presidency of a democratical government could scarcely fail to jar with the interests of their oligarchical administrations made them hesitate to conclude.

While these intrigues were going forward for the purpose of subverting the power of Lacedæmon, the administration of that state were carrying into effect against the Mantineans, after their usual method, by force of arms, that undefined and arbitrary kind of jurisdiction, which the Peloponnesians seem, in some measure, by common consent to have committed to them, and which yet had been opposed, though not often successfully, almost as often as exercised. A party at Parrhasii in Arcadia, one of the townships which the Mantineans had subjected, applied to Lacedæmon for relief. The Mantineans were not only obnoxious at Lacedæmon, for their new connection with Argos, but still more particularly for having put a garrison into Cypsela, a fortress in the Parrhasian territory, close

Thucyd. I. 5.
c. 33.

upon the borders of Laconia. At the same time therefore to take Cypselæ, and to relieve the Parrhasians from their subjection to Mantinea, which would be in effect to bring them under subjection to Lacedæmon, the whole force of the commonwealth marched under the king Plisstoanax.

The resource of the Mantineans, not one of the smallest republics of Greece, is among the strongest proofs of the miserably uncertain state of government, law, property, and freedom, through the greatest part of that country in the age of its republics. That they might exert their whole force in defence of the Parrhasian territory, they committed their own city, with their families, and indeed their all, except themselves and their arms, to a garrison of Argives. They were nevertheless unable to give any effectual opposition to the Lacedæmonian army : Cypselæ was destroyed, and Parrhasii, as far as under Lacedæmonian protection might be, became again an independent state. The Argives however being faithful to their trust, the new connection between their state and Mantinea was thus cemented.

In the course of the summer, Clearidas returned to Lacedæmon with the troops which had fought under Brasidas in

Thucyd. 1.5.
c. 34. Thrace. The government rewarded the valour and zeal of the Helots of that army with the present of their liberty, giving them leave to settle themselves wherever they could find a livelihood. The present seems thus to have been of small value ; for the Helots were little able to provide a settlement for themselves. But in Lacedæmon were some other Helots, who, to strengthen the state in its declining circumstances, had been admitted to the rights of citizens ; and Spartan pride and Spartan jealousy, now peace was restored with Athens, would willingly see all those persons members of any state rather than of their own. The enfranchised Helots therefore were all

established in Lepreum, as an increase of force to that town against the enmity of Elis.

A measure of arbitrary severity, not indicating a good and firm constitution, was about the same time taken, on the plea of necessity for the security of the commonwealth, against the unfortunate men who had been just restored to their country, after so long languishing in Athenian prisons. Not only many of them were of high rank, but some were actually in high offices. They found themselves nevertheless exposed to frequent invective, for having done what was esteemed, among the Lacedæmonians, so disgraceful and so illegal, and hitherto so unknown, as surrendering their arms to an enemy; though, for the occasion, it had been specially warranted by the executive power. Some disturbance was apprehended in consequence. To prevent this, a decree of degradation was passed by the people against them, rendering them incapable of office, and, what appears extraordinary, whether as precaution or punishment, incapable of buying or selling. Some time after however, though what occasioned the change we are not informed, they were restored to their former rights and honours.

Peloponnesus, long esteemed the best governed and the happiest portion of the Greek nation,
Isocr. Archid.
& Or. ad
Philipp.
 might seem thus to have sheathed the sword, drawn against external enemies, only to give the freer opportunity for internal convulsion. Athens meanwhile, and her confederacy, were not better prepared for political quiet and civil order. In that state indeed of the Athenian constitution, which gave means for Cleon to become first minister and general in chief, the fate of the subordinate republics, subjected to the arbitrary will of such a sovereign as the Athenian people, under the guidance of such a minister as Cleon, could not but be wretched, or in the highest degree precarious. That tyranny over them, described and remonstrated

against, especially by Xenophon and Isocrates, appears to have been then at its greatest height ; nor could the mild benevolence of a Nicias go far toward its restraint. Not satisfied with the simple possession and exercise of absolute power, though it sent those who offended to execution or slavery by thousands, the Athenian people would indulge in the pride and vanity and ostentation of tyranny. “ So Isocr. de Pace, diligent,” says Isocrates, “ were they to discover p. 222. t. 2.
ed. Auger. how they might most earn the detestation of mankind that, by a decree, they directed the tribute money to be exhibited, at the Dionysian festival, on the stage of the theatre, divided into talents ; thus making parade before their allies, numbers of whom would be present, of the property wrested from them to pay that very mercenary force, by which they were held in so degrading a subjection ; and setting the other Greeks, of whom also many would attend, upon reckoning what orphans had been made, what calamities brought upon Grecian states, to collect that object of pride for the Athenian people.”

Such was the character of the Athenian government when Thucyd. 1.5. c. 32. the unfortunate Scionæans, all assistance being withdrawn from them, were reduced to the dreadful necessity of surrendering themselves at discretion to the Athenian forces ; and the Athenian people added, upon the occasion, a shocking instance to the many that occur in history of the revengeful and unrelenting temper of democratical despotism. Though Cleon was no longer living to urge the execution of the decree of which he had been the proposer, it was nevertheless executed in full strictness : every male of the Scionæans, arrived at manhood, was put to death, and the women and children were all reduced to slavery : the town and lands were given to the Platæans.

Amid such acts of extreme inhumanity we have difficulty to discover any value in that fear of the gods, and that care

about the concerns of what they called religion, which we find ever lively in the minds of the Greeks. The late change in the fortune of war, and the losses sustained by the commonwealth, gave the Athenians to imagine that the gods had taken offence at something in their conduct ; but they never looked beyond some vain ceremony ; whether, in its concomitant and consequent circumstances, moral or most grossly immoral. The cruel removal of the Delians from their island had been undertaken as a work of piety, necessary toward obtaining the favour of the deity. The contrary imagination now gained, that the god's pleasure had been mistaken ; and the Delians were restored to their possessions. Possibly some leading men found their ends in amusing the minds of the people with both these mockeries.

Thucyd. 1. 5.
c. 32.

SECTION II.

Continuation of Obstacles to the Execution of the Articles of the Peace. — Change of Administration at Lacedæmon. — Intrigues of the new Administration. — Treaty with Bœotia. — Remarkable Treaty with Argos. — Resentment of Athens toward Lacedæmon.

THE peace restored free intercourse between Athens and those Peloponnesian states which acceded to it ; though inability, on one side, completely to perform the conditions, produced immediately, on the other, complaint, with jealousy and suspicion, which soon became mutual. The Peloponnesian troops were withdrawn from the protection of Amphipolis ; but the place was left to the inhabitants, with arms in their hands. The other Thracian towns, which had joined the Peloponnesian alliance, refused to acknowledge the authority of the treaty : for the conditions, though favourable to the democratical, would have been ruinous to the oligarchical, which through the connection with Lacedæmon was become the ruling party. In conse-

Ibid. c. 35.
B. C. 421.
Ol. 89. 3.

quence of repeated remonstrances a day was at length named, within which, if all those included in the treaty, as members of the Peloponnesian confederacy, did not comply with the terms, Lacedæmon should hold them as enemies, and join Athens in her measures. The time passed, and the Lacedæmonians continued to make excuses. They had manifested their desire, they said, to fulfil their engagements, by doing everything in their power: they had restored the Athenian prisoners, they had withdrawn their troops from Thrace; they still hoped, without so rigorous a measure against ancient allies as compulsion by arms, to succeed as they desired with the Corinthians and Boeotians; and with regard to the prisoners in the hands of the latter, about whom the Athenians were particularly anxious, they had no doubt of obtaining their release. It therefore became the Athenians to show an equally good disposition by surrendering Pylus; or, if they would still detain that place as a pledge, they should however remove the Messenians and Helots, implacable and restless enemies of Lacedæmon, and garrison it with Athenians only, who would not contravene the terms of the peace. With the latter requisition the Athenians, after much altercation, complied; and the Messenians and Helots, removed from Pylus, were established in Cephallenia.

Thucyd. I. 5.
c. 36. The change in the annual magistracies, in autumn, brought a change in the politics of Lacedæmon, which of course affected all Greece. Lacedæmon, like other Grecian states, had its factions; and there was now an opposition, if we may use a modern term perfectly apposite, not only adverse to the peace, but holding constant correspondence with the Corinthians, Boeotians, and other seceders from the confederacy. The political power of the kings, which should have given stability to the measures of executive government, was nearly annihilated; while the

ephors, in the name of the people, had been gradually acquiring, to their own office, a despotic control over the whole administration; and, that office being annual, the Lacedæmonian councils became of course liable to much fluctuation. At the late change, two of the opposition, Cleobulus and Xenares, had been elected ephors. In the following winter a congress of deputies from all the principal states of Greece was assembled at Sparta for the professed purpose of accommodating the numerous existing differences; but, after much altercation, they parted without settling anything. Cleobulus and Xenares then put forward an intrigue, apparently well conceived for the purpose, at the same time, of serving their party, of relieving their country from evils actual or threatened, and of confirming and even extending its ancient pre-eminence among the Grecian republics. In Argos itself, the state most inimical to Lacedæmon, they held correspondence with a friendly party; and they had advantage of their predecessors in being upon good terms with the leading men of Corinth and Bœotia. These circumstances formed the basis of their project. Instead of opposing the new confederacy they proposed, through the Corinthian and Bœotian deputies, first, to promote the projected alliance of Bœotia with Argos, and then to endeavour to engage Argos itself in alliance with Lacedæmon. That being effected, it would not be difficult to renew the connection with Bœotia, Corinth, Mantinea, and Elis; and thus Lacedæmon would find itself at the head of its whole ancient confederacy, with the powerful and long inimical commonwealth of Argos added.

The plan, so laid, was communicated to the friendly party in Argos, and the Bœotian and Corinthian deputies returned home. The Bœotarchs, being then sounded, were found perfectly disposed to the measure.

Thucyd. I. 5.
c. 37.

But the publicity required for all transactions of government, even in the aristocratical Grecian commonwealths, thwarted a new project for which secrecy was indispensable. It was

Thucyd. I. 5.
c. 38. necessary for the Bœotarchs to obtain the assent of the four supreme councils.

They began with proposing alliance with Corinth; to which a majority in the councils would have had no repugnancy, could they have been assured of the concurrence of the Spartan administration; but being uninformed of what had passed between their deputies at Sparta and the ephors, they were alarmed at the proposal of a measure which would be apparently a declaration of enmity to the Lacedæmonians, with whom they chose to maintain their connection. Ministers from Argos were already arrived at Thebes; but the leading pro-

c. 37. posal of an alliance with Corinth being rejected, the Bœotarchs did not venture any mention of an alliance with Argos, and, for the present, the whole dropped.

c. 39. While this intrigue was going forward, another business from Lacedæmon was negotiated at Thebes. Nothing now pressed the Lacedæmonians so much as the retention of Pylus by the Athenians; and they knew that nothing pressed the Athenians so much as the retention of the Athenian prisoners and the fortress of Panactum in Attica by the Bœotians. The object of Lacedæmon therefore was to procure from the Bœotians the restoration of Panactum and the prisoners, so that they might obtain in return the surrender of Pylus⁶ from the Athenians. The difficulty was to find means of remuneration to Bœotia. The Bœotians would accept nothing but an alliance with Lacedæmon, upon precisely the same conditions with that lately concluded with the Athenians; but this was directly contrary to an article of the treaty between Lacedæmon and Athens, which positively declared that neither party should

form any new alliance but in concurrence with the other. Through the interest nevertheless of the party in Lacedæmon which desired a rupture with Athens the treaty was concluded: and, after all, the Bœotians deceived the Lacedæmonians; for, to prevent the inconvenience, which might arise to themselves, from a fortress critically situated upon their borders, instead of surrendering Panactum they destroyed it.

Report of the public circumstances of these Thucyd. I. 5.
c. 40. transactions quickly conveyed to Argos, without any information of the secret intrigue, occasioned great anxiety and alarm there. Not imagining the Lacedæmonian government would so immediately contravene their engagements with Athens, after a treaty solemnly made, the terms of which were known, the Argive administration concluded that the alliance with Bœotia had been concerted with the Athenian government; that Athens of course was to be a party to the confederacy; that thus Argos would be precluded from any advantageous connection with Athens, which had always been looked to as a certain resource whenever necessity might press; and, instead of being the presiding power of a confederacy of the principal republics of the Greek nation, they should stand single to oppose Lacedæmon at the head of such a confederacy. Urged by this apprehension, they determined immediately to attempt an accommodation with Lacedæmon, and for negotiators they chose Eustrophus and Æson, the two men among them who, on account of their party-connections, (for these, in every Grecian city, extended among neighbouring states,) were most likely to obtain confidence from the Lacedæmonians now in power. The negotiation is remarkable for a circumstance which proves how far the ideas of the rude ages were still retained in those Grecian commonwealths which had not taken a leading part in the affairs of the

Thucyd. I. 5.
c. 41. nation. The object in dispute between Lacedæmon and Argos was the territory of Cynuria. The Argives demanded that the question of right to this territory, formerly theirs, but long since possessed by the Lacedæmonians, should be referred to the arbitration, either of some state, or of some individuals, who might be agreed upon by the two parties. This was positively refused. The Argives then, anxious for peace, but anxious also to maintain their claim, offered to make a truce for fifty years, without any other condition than a provision for the future discussion of the question, according to a mode of which the history of the two states furnished an example: they proposed that either party should be at liberty to call upon the other, when not engaged in war nor afflicted with endemic sickness, to meet them in battle on the disputed lands, and the victory should finally decide the right of property: but, to prevent unnecessary slaughter, neither should pursue into the other's territory. The Lacedæmonian government, practised in extensive political negotiation for near a century, while their state had presided over the affairs of a great confederacy, received this proposal, however countenanced by the practice of former ages, as somewhat ridiculous. But the Argive administration, probably not wholly unaware of the futility of such a provision, but expecting credit for it with the multitude their sovereign, persevered in the requisition; and the Lacedæmonians, not thinking the matter important enough to warrant the rejection of a proposal otherwise meeting their anxious wishes, at length assented; declaring however that they could not trust the ambassador of a democracy so far as to consider the peace as concluded until it should be ratified by a public act of the Argive people. This was obtained, and the peace thus completely made.

c. 42. Meanwhile commissioners had been sent from Lacedæmon into Bœotia, to receive the Athenian

prisoners from the hands of the Bœotians, together with the fort of Panactum. When they arrived, the fort was already destroyed; and, in excuse for this, it was pretended that, according to an ancient compact between the Bœotians and Athenians, the territory of Panactum was to be the exclusive property of neither people, and cultivated by neither, but to remain a pasture for the common use of both. The prisoners were however delivered to the Lacedæmonians, who repaired with them to Athens; and, in restoring them, declared also the rasing of the fortifications of Panactum, and the retreat of the garrison, which they affected to consider as equivalent to a restitution of the place. But the Athenians, already informed of the treaty concluded by Lacedæmon with Bœotia, so repugnant to repeated professions made to Athens, were disposed to see the matter differently. Reproaches for these, and for many less important breaches or neglects of the treaty, were freely vented; the restoration of Pylus was refused; and the Lacedæmonian commissioners were obliged to return without effecting any of the purposes of their mission.

SECTION III.

Alcibiades. — A third Peloponnesian Confederacy; and Athens the leading Power.

WHILE such was the mutual dissatisfaction between Lacedæmon and Athens, there was in the latter, as well as in the former state, a party desirous of renewing the war; and at the head of that party a new character was coming forward, singularly formed to set the world in a flame. Alcibiades son of Clinias was yet a youth, or at least in any other city, says Thucydides, would have been esteemed too young to be admitted to a leading public situation²; but high birth, great connections,

Thucyd. 1.5.
c. 45.

² Thus, I think with our translator Smith, the passage is to be understood; but Duker's note may be consulted.

and extraordinary talents, gave him premature consequence.

Plat. Alcibiad. 1. & Plut. vit. Alcib. His family boasted their descent, as we learn from the words which Plato puts into the mouth of

Alcibiades himself, from Eurysaces, son of the Telamonian

Isocrat. de bigis. p. 152. & p. 154. t. 3. Ajax, and through him from Jupiter. His great-

of this Hist. Ch. 8. sect. 4. grandfather, named also Alcibiades, had been among the associates of Clisthenes in expelling the

Pisistratidæ, and restoring the commonwealth. His grand-

father Clinias had gained the honourable reward of the Aristeia, for his conduct in the first action with the fleet of

Xerxes, off Artemisium, in a trireme which he had fitted at

Plat. Alcib. 1. p. 112. t. 2. his own expense : and his father, called also Cli-

nias, fell in the service of his country, in the un-

fortunate battle of Coronea, against the Bœotians. His

mother, Dinomache, was daughter of Megacles, head of the

Alcmæonidæ, the first family of Athens; and by her he was

nearly related to Pericles, who, on the death of his father,

Plat. Alcib. 1. p. 122. became his guardian. Unfortunately his con-

nection with that great man did not bring those

advantages of education which might have been expected

from a guardian who so united the philosopher with the

statesman, and, amid all the cares of his high situation, gave

so much attention to science. Left therefore to himself, a

very large patrimonial estate afforded Alcibiades means for

that dissipation in pleasure, to which passions, constitutionally strong, impelled, and various circumstances con-

Plat. Conviv. Xen. Mem. tributed in an unusual degree to invite. The

Socr. l. 1. c. 2. Socr. 24. Plut. vit. Alcib. graces of his person are mentioned by contempo-

rary writers as extraordinary. In the seclusion

in which the Athenian ladies lived they could be little liable

to the seduction of wit and engaging behaviour ; but they

were thence perhaps only the more alive to the impression

of personal beauty, when sacrifices and processions afforded

them the scanty opportunity of mixing with the world,

so far as to see, though not to converse with, men. Alcibiades, as we are assured by Xenophon, was the object of passion and intrigue for many of the principal ladies of Athens.³ The splendour of his fortune, and the power of those with whom he was connected, at the same time drew about him a crowd of flatterers of the other sex: Athenian citizens, allies, subjects, and strangers, vied in paying court to him; and there was danger that the intoxicating powers of adulation might have destroyed, in the bud, all hope of any valuable fruit from the singular talents of his mind.

In this period of his life occurred the extraordinary addition to the rest of his extraordinary fortune, to become acquainted with the philosopher Socrates. That wonderful man, who had then for some time made it his business, as it was his pleasure, gratuitously to instruct the youth of Athens in those two points, which preceding professors of science had most neglected, the duty of men to men, and, as far as unenlightened reason could discover, the duty of men to God, justly considered Alcibiades as one who deserved his peculiar care; since he was certainly one whose virtues or vices might go very far to decide the future fortune of his country. Alcibiades was not of a temper to rest satisfied with ignorance. Ambition, but still more the love of distinction than the love of power, was the ruling passion of his mind. To obtain instruction, therefore, which might promote the gratification of that ruling passion, he submitted his other passions to the control of the philosopher. Consciousness of superior abilities, and ambition inflamed by flattery, had inspired Alcibiades with

Plat. Alcib. &
Conviv.

³ Διὰ μὲν κάλλος οὐτὸ πολλῶν καὶ σφινῶν γυναικῶν θηράμενος. Xen. Mem. Socr. 1. 1. c. 2. s. 24. The coarseness of this expression of an elegant writer among a refined people has been owing to the want of intercourse between the sexes, which alone can give manners their best polish.

the purpose of putting himself forward as a public speaker before he had attained his twentieth year : but, though he spurned at the remonstrances of his other friends, the authority and advice of Socrates diverted him from that extravagance. A similar friendship grew between them.

*Plat. Conviv. p. 219. t. 3.
Socratis de bigis, p. 154. t. 3.* They were companions in peace and in war. Socrates, who was endowed by nature with a constitution of body scarcely less remarkable for its

firmness than that of his mind for its powers, served a campaign in Thrace with Alcibiades, then in earliest manhood. The soldier-sage, yielding to none in courage in the day of battle, was the admiration of all for his patience, in want, fatigue, and the cold of that severe climate. Alcibiades was his most zealous emulator ; but in action it was particularly

Ch. 15. sect. 2. of this Hist. his aim to outdo him. In a battle near Potidæa, apparently that in which the generals, Xenophon son of Euripides, and his two colleagues, were killed, he was

Plut. vit. Alcib. Plat. Conviv. p. 220. t. 3. severely wounded, and would have lost his life, but for the protection given him by Socrates, who fought by his side.

The daring exertion of Alcibiades, which had led him into the danger, was deemed by the principal officers of the army, perhaps a little partial, says Plutarch, to his high rank and high connections, to deserve the Aristeia. The generous youth, just to the superior merit of his master, declared they were much rather due to Socrates : but the philosopher adding the authority of his voice to that of the officers, the reward was given as it was first decreed. Alcibiades returned the benefit, in the un-

Ch. 16. sect. 3. of this Hist. fortunate battle of Delium, where he saved Socrates, as we have already seen, from the swords of the pursuing Bœotians.

But the passions of Alcibiades were too strong for constant perseverance in submission to the advice of his incomparable friend. His predominant passion, the desire of

pre-eminence in everything, was not to be subdued. No sooner had he acquired possession of his estate, than the splendour of his style of living became such as in Athens had been utterly unknown. Much as things differed from those in our time and country, we may form some idea of his extravagant magnificence from one circumstance, related by the authentic pen of Thucydides. It had before been esteemed a splendid exertion for the greatest individual citizen to send one chariot to contend in the races at the Olympian festival; it was reckoned creditable for a commonwealth to send one at the public expense. Alcibiades sent no less than seven to one meeting: where he won
Thucyd. I. 6.
c. 16. Isocrat.
de bigis, p. 158.
t. 3. Plut. vit.
Alcib.

the first, second, and fourth honours. No commonwealth nor any prince had before done so much. In the same manner, in all those public offices which in his rank and circumstances were not to be avoided, presidencies of theatrical entertainments and athletic games, and the equipment and command of ships of war, his sumptuousness far exceeded what had been common. This ostentation, and the general splendour of his manner of living, while they attracted some friends and numerous followers, excited also much censure and many murmurs. They were considered, and with much indignation considered, by many, as repugnant to that moderation and equality which ought to be maintained among the citizens of a democracy: while by others they were looked on with more complacency, as the most innocent way of evaporating that boiling spirit, and reducing those large means, which might otherwise have been more dangerously employed.

In the midst of a career of dissipation and extravagance, that excited at the same time wonder, alarm, indignation, and admiration, the circumstances of the times, and even the wishes of many grave men, seem to have invited Alcibiades

Aristoph. *Pax*, v. 680. 690.
921. 1319.
Equit. v. 1300.
1313. *Nub.*
v. 1061. 1065.
Thucyd. I. 8.
c. 73. *Plut.*
vit. Nic. &
Alcib.

to put himself forward in public business. Nicias, who since the death of Pericles had stood at the head of the most respectable party in the commonwealth, was sinking under the turbulence of Hyperbolus, the friend of Cleon when Cleon was living, of similar birth, similar talents, similar character, and the successor to his influence among the lowest of the people. In this situation of things the nephew of Pericles seemed the person to whom to look for an associate to the successor of Pericles; and the gravity and mild dignity of Nicias, it was hoped, might temper the too vivacious spirit of Alcibiades.

But Alcibiades had not yet learnt the necessity of moderation in anything. Young as he was, he would hold no second place. With his influence, derived from inheritance and connection, and assisted by talents, wealth, and profusion, popularity was much in his power; and he had no sooner determined upon being a public man, than he would in the very outset be at the head of things. It was generally important, for those who sought eminence in any Grecian commonwealth, to have political connections among the

Thucyd. I. 5. c. 43. other states of Greece. The family of Alcibiades

were, from ancient times, hereditary public guests of Lacedæmon, and they had been connected by private hospitality with some of the first Lacedæmonian families.

I. 8. c. 6. Alcibiades was a Laconic name; first given, among the Athenians, to the great-grandfather of the pupil of Socrates, in compliment to a Spartan family, with which the Athenian was connected in close friendship. But

Ch. 5. s. 5. & c. 7. s. 2. of this Hist. the interference of the Lacedæmonians in favour of the Pisistratidæ, which we have heretofore had occasion to notice, would be likely to excite the indignation

Thucyd. I. 5. c. 43. of an associate of Clisthenes; and accordingly the elder Alcibiades, with those ceremonies which

custom prescribed, as creditable among men and necessary to obviate the wrath of the gods, renounced the hereditary hospitality of his family with Sparta. His great grandson resolved to seek a renewal of that ancient connection; and, as a preparatory step, was assiduous in kind attention to the Lacedæmonian prisoners in Attica. But the Lacedæmonian government, systematically indisposed to youth in political eminence, and not less systematically indisposed to the wild and luxurious extravagance of Alcibiades, slighted his advances; and when business occurred with the Athenian commonwealth, as it was necessary to communicate with some leading men, they chose rather to address themselves to Nicias or Laches.

This aversion, on the part of Lacedæmon, decided Alcibiades to a line of political conduct, adverse at the same time to Lacedæmon and to Nicias. He was about his twenty-sixth or twenty-seventh year, when he first tried the powers of his eloquence in the general assembly.⁴ The affair of Panactum was his topic: he inveighed against the faithlessness of Sparta, as if the demolition of that fortress had been concerted by the Bœotians with the Lacedæmonian government. He was heard with ready attention by the Athenian people. All the opponents of the aristocratical cause were not admirers of Hyperbolus. Alcibiades, to carry his point against Nicias, professed zeal for the democratical interest; and the experience of his abilities as a speaker, added to the weight he derived from birth, property, and connection, made him presently the head of a considerable party. He continued his invective against Lacedæmon; and the league hastily made by that state with

Thucyd. 1. 5.
c. 43.

⁴ So we are told by Diodorus and Nepos; but Acacius has calculated, from several circumstances mentioned by Plato, that he must have been at least thirty. The reader who will take the pains to consult the note in the 343d page of Duker's Thucydides, will judge for himself how far to give credit to that calculation.

Argos afforded fresh matter. Nothing, he said, but inimical intentions against Athens could have induced the Lacedæmonians to form such a connection with such inveterate enemies as the Argives ; their purpose could be only to deprive Athens of a valuable ally, that so they might, with better hope, renew the war. The people continued to listen with favouring ears, and Alcibiades gained influence and authority daily. Meanwhile he had been communicating among neighbouring states ; he had confidential intercourse with the leading men at Argos, of the party adverse to Lacedæmon ; and, finding circumstances on all sides promising, he formed an extensive and extraordinary plan, which he began immediately to carry into execution.

B. C. 420.
Ol. 89. 4.
P. W. 12.
Thucyd. 1. 5.
c. 44.

The Argive people were no sooner undeceived concerning the circumstances of the alliance between Lacedæmon and Bœotia, and the supposed participation of Athens in that measure, than they became careless about peace with Lacedæmon, and inclined much rather to renew and improve their connection with Athens ; an ancient ally, and, what was an important consideration, of congenial government. Upon this disposition of the Argives Alcibiades principally founded his project. He proposed to his friends in Argos, leaders of the democratical party there, to procure that ministers should be sent to Athens from their state, and from Elis, and from Mantinea ; and he would then engage to make the Athenian commonwealth a member of the Argive confederacy. His Argive friends undertook the business ; the Argive people were readily persuaded to concur in it ; the influence of Argos prevailed with Elis and Mantinea ; and shortly ministers from all those commonwealths met in Athens.

This unexpected stroke of the young Athenian politician alarmed the Lacedæmonian government. Not only the negotiation of Cleobulus and Xenares, from which such im-

portant advantages had been expected, was likely to be thwarted, but there was apparent danger that Athens might become the leading power of the very confederacy, at the head of which it was the direct purpose of that negotiation to establish Lacedæmon. Anxious to obviate this, they sent an embassy to Athens, carefully composed of persons the most likely to be well received there; of whom Endius was a hereditary friend and guest of the family of Alcibiades. The ambassadors were instructed to apologise for the treaty with Bœotia, as a measure neither in intention or effect injurious to Athens; to demand the surrender of Pylus in return for the evacuation of Panactum; and by all means to obviate any league of Athens with Argos.

On their arrival at Athens, having audience from the council of Five Hundred, whose office, nearly superseded by that of general of the commonwealth in time of war, had now resumed its importance, they found reason to promise themselves a favourable issue to their negotiation. This would not only ruin the immediate project of Alcibiades, but would go far to establish the power of the opposite party in Athens; and no common policy, nor perhaps any honourable policy, could prevent such consequences. Alcibiades was ingenious, and not scrupulous. He engaged the Lacedæmonian ambassadors in a private conference, in which he persuaded them by no means to acknowledge before the Athenian people the fulness of the powers with which they were vested: they would find, he said, the arrogance of the multitude insupportable; and the only way to check the most unreasonable demands would be to deny their plenipotentiary commission. If they would only take his advice, his opposition should cease, and he would even become the advocate of their cause. The reasoning, in itself plausible, was urged in a manner so plausible, and with such pro-

Thucyd. I. 5.
c. 45. Plut.
vit. Alcib. &
Nic.

fessions and protestations, that the Lacedæmonians implicitly assented to it. Here are matters which could be known only to the parties, and by report from them. But no adverse report appears to have gained credit with antiquity; and Thucydides, eminently, among historians, scrupulous of truth, may the more deserve trust here, both as he has been not altogether adverse to the fair fame of Alcibiades, but also as the immediately following public transactions can apparently be accounted for only by the private intrigue.

On the following day the Lacedæmonian ministers had their audience of the assembled Athenian people. After they had declared the purpose of their mission, Alcibiades put the question to them, “Whether they came with full powers, or with limited :” and they answered, that “they were limited by instructions.” The members of the council, whom they had assured that their commission was plenipotentiary, were astonished at this reply: Nicias, with whom they had not had the precaution to communicate, was astonished; but presently the ambassadors themselves were still more astonished, when Alcibiades reproached them as guilty of gross and shameful prevarication, and concluded a harangue, the most virulent against Lacedæmon, and the most soothing and alluring to the Athenian people, with proposing the question for engaging the Athenian commonwealth in the Argive alliance. His daring and well-conducted treachery would have had full success in the instant, such is the declared opinion of Thucydides, but for an accident which alarmed the superstition, at the same time that it excited the natural fears, of the Athenian people. The city was, in the moment, shaken by an earthquake: no mischief followed; but the assembly was immediately adjourned.

The delay of a day, thus gained, giving time for passion to

cool and reflection to take place, was advantageous to the views of Nicias. In the assembly held on the morrow, urging that the people ought not to decide hastily, and in the midst of uncertainty, concerning a matter of very great importance, he prevailed so far against Alcibiades <sup>Thucyd. 1.5.
c. 46.</sup> that, instead of immediately concluding the alliance with Argos, it was determined first to send an embassy to Lacedæmon, of which Nicias himself was appointed chief. But the measure which Alcibiades could not prevent, he contrived to render ineffectual ; or indeed to convert to the promotion of his own purposes. The embassy to Lacedæmon being voted, instructions for the ambassadors were to be considered ; and it was resolved, that the restoration of the fort of Panactum, the immediate delivery of Amphipolis into the power of the Athenian people, and a renunciation, on the part of Lacedæmon, of the alliance with Bœotia, or, instead of it, the accession of Bœotia to the terms of the late peace, should be preliminary conditions, without assent to which, in their fullest extent, nothing should be concluded. The year of magistracy of the ephor Xenares was yet unexpired, and in Lacedæmon the party of Xenares still prevailed. The Bœotian alliance had been the measure of that party : the requisition of a renunciation of it was of course ill received ; and Nicias and his colleagues were obliged to return to Athens without obtaining, either for their commonwealth or for themselves, any one object of their mission.

Indignation would not unnaturally arise upon such an occasion among the Athenian people ; and art was not wanting, and pains were not spared, to inflame it. The party of Alcibiades thus gained an accession of strength, which gave it a decided superiority in the assembly. The Argive, Mantinean, and Elean ministers were still at Athens, and a league offensive and defensive, for a hundred years,

with their republics, the dependent allies of each contracting power (such nearly is the expression of Thucydides⁵) being included, was proposed and carried: it was agreed that pillars of marble, with the treaty engraved, should be erected

^{Thucyd. 1.5.} at the separate expense of each republic, at
^{c. 47.} Athens in the citadel, at Argos in the temple of

Apollo in the agora, and at Mantinea in the temple of Jupiter; and that a brazen pillar, with the treaty also engraved, should be placed, at the common expense of the confederacy, at Olympia. By this extraordinary stroke in politics, Athens, and no longer Lacedæmon, was the leading power even of the Dorian states, and head of the principal confederacy in Peloponnesus itself.

SECTION IV.

Implication of Interests of the principal Grecian Republics. — Continuation of Dispute between Lacedæmon and Elis. — Affairs of the Lacedaemonian Colony of Heraclea. — Alcibiades elected General. — Importance of the Office of General of the Athenian Commonwealth. — Influence of Alcibiades in Peloponnesus. — War of Argos and Epidaurus. — Inimical Conduct of Athens toward Lacedæmon.

^{c. 48.} By the several treaties now lately made, the interests of the principal Grecian republics were strangely implicated. Inimical to Sparta as the late transaction of the Athenian commonwealth certainly was, and not less in direct contravention of subsisting engagements with Athens as the treaty a little before concluded by Lacedæmon with Bœotia appears, the alliance between Lacedæmon and Athens nevertheless subsisted. At the same time Corinth, engaged in confederacy with Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, refused to concur with those states in the Ath-

⁵ Εὐμεμάχων ὁ ερχοντινός ἐκάτερος.

nian alliance ; inclining rather to renew its old connection with Lacedæmon, then at open hostility with Elis, and scarcely upon better terms with the other states of the confederacy.

Meanwhile the Eleans, conceiving themselves grossly injured by the Lacedæmonians in the affair of Lepreum, and unable to vindicate their claim by arms, had recourse to the authority derived from their sacred character and their presidency over the Olympian festival. Before the Olympian tribunal, composed of their own principal citizens, they accused the Lacedæmonians of prosecuting hostilities after the commencement of the Olympian armistice ; and sentence was pronounced, according to the Olympian law, condemning the Lacedæmonian commonwealth in a fine of two mines for every soldier employed. The amount was set at two thousand mines, between seven and eight thousand pounds sterling. The Lacedæmonian government, anxious the more on account of the late turn in Grecian politics to clear themselves of offence against the common laws and common religion of Greece, declared that they would submit to the penalty, had they or their officers been guilty of the crime ; but they insisted that, when the hostilities complained of were committed, the armistice had not been made known to them by the customary proclamation. In the irregularity and uncertainty of the Grecian year, proclamation only could ascertain to each republic when the armistice was to begin. The Eleans maintained that, according to ancient constant custom, it was proclaimed first within their own territory ; that then they held themselves immediately bound to abstain from hostilities against others ; and reason, not less than the Olympian law, required that they should then be exempt from injury by hostility from any member of the Greek nation. The Lacedæmonians still insisted that they ought not to be fined for an involuntary crime. The Eleans

Thucyd. 1.5.
c. 49.

maintained that the sentence was just, and could not be reversed or altered ; but, if the Lacedæmonians would restore Lepreum, which had been so injuriously and impiously seized, they would not only remit the portion of the fine due to themselves, but also pay for the Lacedæmonians that

^{Thucyd. 1. 5.} _{c. 50.} due to the god. The Lacedæmonian government positively refusing both to restore Lepreum, and to pay the fine, the Eleans declared the whole Lacedæmonian people excluded both from contending in the games at the approaching festival, and from partaking in the sacrifices ; not however forbidding their attendance as spectators.

It was apprehended that the high spirit of the Lacedæmonian people, long accustomed to give law to Peloponnesus and to Greece, might not acquiesce under this decision, excluding them from the common religious solemnities of the Greek nation. To obviate violence therefore, the whole youth of Elis attended during the festival in arms ; and a ^{Ol. 90. After July 3.} thousand heavy-armed Argives, as many Mantineans, and a body of Athenian horse came to assist in keeping the peace. Such a measure might alone indicate how hardly the peace of Greece was to be preserved. But, with all this precaution, an occurrence at the games excited general apprehension. Lichas, a Lacedæmonian, had a chariot prepared for the race ; and, not to be disappointed, excluded as he was from entering it in his own name, he obtained permission to enter it in the name of the Bœotian people. As a public chariot of Bœotia it won. But the vanity of Lichas was not to be so satisfied : to make it known to whom the victorious chariot really belonged, he stepped forward before the assembly, and placed a chaplet on the head of his charioteer. The rod-bearers, whose office it was to enforce order, as in the roughness of Grecian manners, amid republican equality, it seems they were authorised to do, without any consideration for the dignity of

the man or of his city, struck Lichas in presence of the assembly.⁶ Such an affront however to a Lacedæmonian citizen it was feared might bring a Lacedæmonian army to Olympia: but the Lacedæmonian government, not subject to passionate counsels, overlooked the offence to an individual, and the affair had no immediate consequence.

After the conclusion of the festival, Corinth became the seat of political negotiation. The Argives sent ministers thither to press the accession of the Corinthian state to the new confederacy. The Lacedæmonian government, judging it necessary to counterwork the various intrigues carrying on to their disadvantage, sent also ministers to Corinth. After much negotiation through the summer, to little or no effect, the terrors of an earthquake, though no mischief is reported, occasioned the dissolution of the congress.

The affairs of the Lacedæmonian colony of Heraclea continue to engage notice, as they contribute to characterise the state of Greece. The people of Trachinia and its neighbourhood had never forgiven the gross trespass committed upon the rights and property of a Grecian people by those who assumed the title of protectors of Grecian liberty, and they disturbed Heraclea with continual hostilities. Success had been various; but in this autumn the Heracleans were defeated in battle, with such loss that the survivors hardly sufficed for the defence of their walls and of the property necessary to their subsistence. In the next spring therefore the Bœotians, fearing that, while the Lacedæmonians were intent upon their nearer interests in

Thucyd. 1. 5.
c. 51.

After 30 Sept.

Thucyd. 1. 5.
c. 52.

B. C. 419.

OI. 93. §.

P.W. 13.

⁶ It is sometimes difficult to estimate the exact value of words and phrases in a dead language, when it depends on laws and customs of which we are not exactly informed. The manner in which Lysias tells this story would rather give to suppose that Lichas was formerly condemned to receive a public whipping, which was inflicted accordingly; and the phrase of Thucydides will bear that meaning.

Peloponnesus, the Athenians might seize Heraclea, took upon themselves to direct its affairs, and to send away the Lacedæmonian governor Hegesippidas, as unfit for his command. The Lacedæmonian government, not a little dissatisfied with this species of kindness, had however too much upon their hands to take immediately any active measures for vindicating their dominion over their colony.

While these transactions engaged some of the principal states, Alcibiades had been prosecuting intrigue, ably and successfully, within and without Attica. His measures at home procured his election to the high office of general-in-chief of the commonwealth ; an occasional office, created only in times of supposed emergency ; and, while any effectual mixture of aristocracy remained in the constitution, rarely ; for, beside the importance of the military command, it conferred, not nominally, yet effectually, greater civil power than any of the permanent magistracies, or than all of them : for the general, having the right to assemble the people at all times, had no occasion to consult any other council ; so that, as long as he could command a majority in the tumultuary assembly, whose votes had raised him to the office, he was supreme and sole director of the executive government. Nearly absolute sovereign thus in Athens, Alcibiades was hardly less so in Argos, and his influence extended widely among other states in Peloponnesus. In the beginning of summer, having previously concerted matters with the leading men of the Argive administration, he went to Argos with a small escort of heavy-armed and bowmen, and thence, with an addition of Peloponnesian troops, proceeded through the cities of the confederacy within the peninsula, arranging matters everywhere with plenitude of assumed power, so as to give a decided superiority to the party which favoured his views. To confirm the democratical interest in the little city of Patræ in Achaia, he per-

suaded the people to connect their town with their port by fortifications, which would bring them more immediately within the protection of the Athenian fleet. A similar measure, proposed at the Achæan Rhium, was prevented by the Sicyonians and Corinthians.

Among these turns in Grecian politics the little republic of Epidaurus, a dismembered branch of the ancient Argolic state, remained firm in the Lacedæmonian alliance. Epidaurus, always obnoxious, would, in the event of the expected war with Lacedæmon, be particularly annoying to Argos. Situated as it was it would very much interrupt communication with Athens. If the Corinthians, who were now dubious, should become adverse, the passage could be made only by sea, round the Scyllæan promontory; and this, in case of a serious attack from Lacedæmon, would make assistance from Athens to Argos slow and precarious. A pretext, of whimsical appearance in modern times, was found for Athens to make war upon Epidaurus: it was the neglect to send a victim to a temple of the Pythian Apollo in the Argive territory, due as a quit-rent for some pastures held of Argos by the Epidaurians. It was proposed to subdue Epidaurus; and measures were concerted with Alcibiades for the purpose.

Meanwhile preparation was made by the Lacedæmonian government, as for some very important enterprise, the object of which was kept a profound secret. Troops were required of the allies, without any intimation of the purpose. Such requisitions are more than once mentioned by Thucydides; and they strongly indicate the importance of that supremacy which subordinate states acknowledged in the head of their confederacy, and the uneasy situation, and uncertain freedom of the people of those subordinate states, which induced them to obey such arbitrary commands, in fear of falling under a dominion that

Thucyd. I. 5.
c. 54.

might be still more oppressive. The whole force of Laconia marched, under the command of king Agis, to Leuctra, on the borders. There, according to the constant practice of the Greeks before they would move in arms beyond their own territory, the diabaterial, or border-passing, sacrifice was performed. The symptoms of the victims being, on this occasion, declared by the priests unfavourable, after all the pomp and all the labour and expense of preparation, Agis immediately dismissed the allies and led the Lacedæmonian forces home. The allies were however directed to hold themselves in readiness to march again immediately after the conclusion of the approaching festival of Carnia.

The Argives, before restrained by the alarm of the great preparations made by Lacedæmon, determined to use the opportunity, now so unexpectedly allowed them, for prosecuting their purpose against Epidaurus, for which the Carnian festival was particularly commodious. The Carnian was a festival common to all the Dorians, and one of the principal of their calendar. Its ceremonies were mostly military, and for the celebration, which lasted many days, a camp was always formed. The Argives, though they chose their time well, seem to have concerted their measures ill; but the measures of their opponents were still more defective, and tend, among numberless circumstances occurring in Grecian history, to show both the inconvenience of the Grecian religious festivals, and the inefficiency of league among the Grecian republics for preserving internal security

^{14 Aug.} and domestic quiet. Four days before the holi-

days, the Argives entered the Epidaurian lands in arms, and immediately commenced plunder. The Epidaurians sent to their allies for succour. Some excused themselves on account of the festival; which, as they affirmed, they were religiously bound to celebrate: some came as far as the Epidaurian borders, and halted: none gave any

effectual assistance. At this very time a convention of deputies of the several states of the Argive alliance was sitting at Mantinea, assembled at the requisition of the Athenian government, for the professed purpose of negotiating a general peace. Intelligence of the attack upon Epidaurus was quickly communicated there, and the Corinthian deputy (for Epidaurus was among the allies of Corinth) remonstrated warmly against it. The Argives in consequence withdrew their troops, but the convention separated soon after without concluding anything; and the Argives recommenced hostilities, which were continued through the remainder of the summer, annoying of course, but with no important result.

A re-enforcement of three hundred men, which passed by sea from Laconia to Epidaurus in the following winter, produced a very remarkable remonstrance from the Argive to the Athenian government. In the treaty of alliance between the two states it was stipulated that neither should permit the enemies of the other to pass through its dominion. The Argive administration accused the Athenian of contravening this article, by permitting the Lacedæmonians to pass by sea to Epidaurus. This may seem to have been dictated by Alcibiades, and to mark the extraordinary extent of his influence in Argos; for, under the semblance of a remonstrance, it was really an acknowledgment that the Grecian seas, even to the very shores of Peloponnesus, and of Argolis itself, were the dominion of Athens. The reparation required for this injury would appear, in modern times, scarcely less extraordinary than the accusation: it was, that the Athenians should withdraw the Athenian garrison from Pylus, and replace there the Messenians and Helots who had been removed to Cephallenia. This requisition may seem to have been concerted with Alcibiades, or suggested by him. He was however the

Thucyd. 1. 5.
c. 55.

mover of measures which followed in Athens. A decree of the people directed that, on the column on which was engraved the late treaty with Lacedæmon, a clause should be added, declaring that the Lacedæmonians had broken the treaty. This being taken as the ground, the same decree then commanded that the Messenians and Helots, lately removed to Crane in Cephallenia, should be re-established in Pylus.

In the course of the winter many skirmishes passed between the Argives and the Epidaurians, but no important action ; and an attempt, toward spring, to take Epidaurus by escalade failed.

SECTION V.

War of Lacedæmon and Argos. — Battle near Mantinea. — Siege of Epidaurus.

THE Lacedæmonians could not consider the present state of things in Peloponnesus without extreme uneasiness, not only as their own command and influence were diminished, but as what they had lost had accrued to their rivals of Athens and Argos. By midsummer of this year the continued pressure of the Argive arms, however defectively conducted, had reduced the Epidaurians, old and still faithful allies of Lacedæmon, to great distress. Some effort must be made, or all command and influence in Peloponnesus, beyond their own territory, would be gone. It was only to sound the trumpet, and the whole Lacedæmonian people might be assembled at any time ready for service. The allies yet remaining to the state were summoned ; and the Lacedæmonian army, strengthened with the greatest force of Helots that could be trusted, marched under the command of king Agis. They were presently joined by the Tegeans, and all those

Thucyd. I. 5.
c. 17.

B. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 2-3.
P. W. 14.

other Arcadians who had not, with the Mantineans, renounced the Lacedæmonian alliance. Phlius was the appointed place of junction for the allies, equally those within and those without Peloponnesus. Five thousand heavy-armed, as many light, and five hundred horse, with a foot-soldier attending every horseman, marched from Bœotia⁷; Corinth sent two thousand heavy-armed; Sicyon, Pallene, Epidaurus, and Megara, all they could spare, and the Phliasians were prepared to join with their whole strength.

The Argives, quickly informed of these movements, dispatched to their allies urgent requisitions for assistance. Accordingly the Mantineans joined them with their whole force, the amount of which Thucydides does not specify: the Eleans sent three thousand heavy-armed. Thus in consequence of the successful treachery of Alcibiades, Peloponnesus was divided at arms within itself; while Athens, preparing indeed assistance for her ally, but risking little, looked on, and enjoyed the storm.

Thucyd. 1. 5.
c. 58.

The Argives, being joined by the Mantineans and Eleans, proposed to prevent the junction of the Lacedæmonians with their northern allies; and with that view took a position near Methydrium in Arcadia. It was evening when Agis encamped on a hill overagainst them, as if intending to engage next morning; but moving silently in the night, he passed on unperceived, so as to secure his way to Phlius. The Argives had then to expect the invasion of their country by the whole combined force of the enemy. To prevent this, they moved to a position on the road of Nemea; the only way by which a numerous army could conveniently pass the mountains which divide Argolis from Phliasia and Co-

⁷ What those attending foot-soldiers were, whom Thucydides distinguishes by the name of *αὐτίπτος*, we are informed only by late writers, whose authority seems very doubtful.

rinthia. Agis, by apparently a very able disposition, rendered this measure fruitless. Leading the Lacedæmonians by a rough and difficult mountain-road, he entered the Argive plain unopposed, and placed himself between the Argive army and Argos. The Corinthians, Phliasians, and Pallenians, by another road, also difficult and little practised, entered another part of the plain, equally unresisted. The Bœotians, Megarians, and Sicyonians only were sent by the Nemean road, with orders to avoid engaging, unless the enemy should move against either of the divisions in the plain. In that case the Bœotian horse, more numerous than that of the enemy, if indeed the enemy had any, might find opportunity to attack with advantage.

These well-judged movements being all successfully executed, the Argive army was surrounded by a force so superior that its destruction seemed inevitable. Thrasyllus, one of the five generals of Argos, saw the peril of his situation : he communicated upon it with Alciphron, an Argive of rank, connected by hospitality with Lacedæmon, and they determined together upon a measure which would appear very extraordinary in itself, and scarcely credible in its success, if we were not already somewhat familiarised with Grecian politics. They went privately to Agis, and, pledging themselves to lead their state to alliance with Lacedæmon, upon terms that should be satisfactory, they prevailed with him to grant upon the spot, of his sole authority, a truce for four months ; and, to the astonishment of the Lacedæmonian army, orders were immediately issued for retreat.

Thucyd. 1. 5.
c. 60.

By this negotiation, fortunate as it was bold, Thrasyllus and Alciphron hoped to acquire such favour among the Argive people as might enable them to promote at the same time their two objects, the oligarchical interest and the Lacedæmonian alliance. They were however utterly disap-

pointed. The Argive people, and even their commanders, totally unpractised in war upon any extensive scale, were so unaware of the danger from which they had been rescued, that they imagined they had been deprived of a most favourable opportunity for crushing the Lacedæmonians; inclosed, they imagined inadvertently, between the allied army and the garrison of Argos. The public indignation, stimulated apparently by the democratical leaders, rose so high that Thrasyllus saved his life only through the protection of an altar to which he fled, and a decree of the people declared all his property confiscated.

Presently after the retreat of the Lacedæmonians the auxiliary force from Athens arrived at Argos; a thousand Athenian heavy-armed and three hundred horse, commanded by Laches and Nicostratus. The oligarchical party in Argos, though unable to protect Thrasyllus against the momentary rage of the people, were nevertheless strong; and they would immediately have dismissed the Athenian forces, as no longer wanted in Peloponnesus for any purpose of the confederacy. But Alcibiades was too watchful a politician to suffer his purposes to be so baffled, and the important alliance of Argos to pass from him. Quickly informed of all circumstances, he went to Argos in quality of ambassador, and, in conjunction with the two generals, demanded an audience of the Argive people. The oligarchical Argives very unwillingly consented, and not without a degree of compulsion from their Mantinean and Elean allies, who were still present. The eloquence of Alcibiades then prevailed. The Argive people felt his reproaches for breach of faith with Athens, gave credit to his representations of the strength of the confederacy, and of the circumstances now peculiarly favourable for prosecuting the war; and, a proposal being suggested for striking an important stroke with little risk, it was summa-

Thucyd. 1. 5.
c. 61.

After 11th
July.

rily resolved upon. Hostages had been taken by the Lacedæmonians from some Arcadian towns of their alliance, whose fidelity they doubted, and had been placed in custody of the Orchomenians, whom they thought firm. The allied army instantly marched to Orchomenus. The fortifications of that little city were weak ; the people were alarmed by the greatness of the force preparing to attack them, and, apprehensive that they might be overpowered before succour could arrive, they insured present safety by an early capitulation. Surrendering the hostages committed to their charge, and giving hostages of their own people, they were admitted members of the Argive alliance.

Thucyd. 1. 5.
c. 62. This stroke being thus rapidly struck, the question was agitated, to what object the allied army should next be directed. The Eleans were urgent for Lepreum ; but the recovery of Lepreum, however desirable for the Eleans, little interested the other allies. The Mantineans therefore proposing the far more important acquisition of Tegea, and giving assurance that they had intelligence with a party in that city, which would favour the enterprise, the Argives and Athenians concurred with them. The Eleans were so dissatisfied with this preference of the great concerns of the confederacy to the particular interest of their state that they marched home. The rest of the allied army prepared to go against Tegea.

c. 63. The Lacedæmonians, more reasonably displeased with their prince than the Argives with their general, had been however more temperate in their anger. While peace was the apparent consequence of his measure, the public discontent vented itself only in expressions of disapprobation. But when, instead of breaking the force of Argos by one blow, or even taking the city, to which some thought the opportunity might have extended, they found, on the contrary, great advantage given to the

enemy, an allied city of some importance lost, and their pledges for the fidelity of the rest of Arcadia taken from them, Agis was called to account with a degree of passion not usual, says Thucydides, with the Lacedæmonians. He was upon the point of being judicially condemned in a fine amounting to more than four thousand pounds sterling⁸, and moreover to suffer the indignity of what was otherwise probably no very important loss, having his house levelled with the ground. But consideration for his former assiduity in service, with his unblameable deportment on all occasions, and respect for the blood of Hercules and the dignity of the Spartan government, at length prevailed. His entreaty to be allowed opportunity for proving, by future conduct, that he had not deserved such severe censure, was granted, and he resumed the command of the army, but not without a limitation never before put upon Spartan kings: ten persons were appointed to be his military council, without whose concurrence he was not to lead the forces beyond the Lacedæmonian dominion. For the detail of military operation however he seems to have been intrusted with the usual authority.

Meanwhile intelligence arrived at Lacedæmon from the party yet ruling in Tegea that, if assistance was not quickly given, their opponents of the democratical interest would prevail, and their city would be annexed to the Argive confederacy. The whole force of Laconia was in consequence assembled, with unexampled celerity, and marched immediately. The Arcadian allies were required to hasten to Tegea, and expresses were dispatched to Corinth, Bœotia, and as far as Phocis and Locris, for the forces of those provinces to meet the Lacedæmonian army before Mantinea. Tegea was quickly put into a state of security: and then the Lacedæmonians, with

Thucyd. I. 5.
c. 64.

⁸ A hundred thousand drachmæ.

their Arcadian allies, entered the Mantinean lands, and the usual ravage of Grecian armies followed.

<sup>Thucyd. 1.5.
c. 65.</sup> The views of the confederates upon Tegea being thus checked, nothing remained for them but by retreat to expose their several countries to extensive waste, or to risk a battle. They determined upon the latter, and, approaching the Lacedæmonian army, occupied some strong ground, where they formed. Agis, eager to do away the disgrace he had incurred, took the earliest moment for leading his forces to action. He was already within arrow's flight of the enemy, when one of the elder officers⁹ called aloud to him, in the terms of a Greek proverb, “That he was going to mend evil with evil¹⁰:” meaning that, to atone for his former ill-judged retreat, he was now rushing to an inconsiderate and ruinous attack. Seeing presently the justness of the admonition, and encouraged by it to the measure which prudence required, though rashness or acrimony might blame, Agis instantly gave orders to halt, and then drew off without engaging.

Whatever, on the other hand, might have been the abilities of the Argive generals, and it appears they were ^{c. 66.} considerable, the democratical weight in the Argive government would have rendered them of little avail. The generals wished to hold their present advantageous ground: but the troops, little practised in military subordination, and impatient of rest and delay, grew tumultuous, and accused them of traitorously permitting a flying enemy to escape. Unable otherwise to compose the disorder, they marched after the Spartan king. This was precisely what Agis desired: and to provoke it, he had been employing his troops in diverting the course of a mountain-stream, so as

⁹ Τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τις, which might mean one of the council appointed to advise him, or possibly only one of the elder officers of his army.

¹⁰ Κακὸς κακῷ ἴστθαι.

to damage the Mantinean lands. Being informed that the confederates nevertheless persevered in holding their strong post, he was returning, without due precaution, toward the hills, when he suddenly met them advancing in order of battle along the plain. Never, says Thucydides, was such consternation known in a Lacedæmonian army. The excellence of the Lacedæmonian discipline however enabled the king to form his order of battle in a shorter time than would have been possible with any other troops then in the known world; and, before the attack could be made, he was prepared to receive it.

The Argives and their allies, after a short exhortation from the several commanders, rushed forward with fury. The Lacedæmonians, continues the contemporary historian, use speeches of exhortation less than any other Greeks; well knowing that discipline, long and carefully practised, gives more confidence to troops than any harangue, however fine and however ingeniously adapted to the occasion. To the astonishment of the confederates, who had observed with joy the tumult occasioned by the first alarm, they were seen presently in perfect order, silent and without hurry, stepping in exact time to the sound of numerous flutes, and thus preserving their front compact and even, without any breaking or floating, the seldom failing defects of extensive lines.¹¹ The numbers

Thucyd. I. 5.
c. 69, 70.

¹¹ It is Thucydides' description of the march of the Lacedæmonian phalanx, upon this occasion, that Milton has imitated in the first book of the *Paradise Lost*:

. rose
 A forest huge of spears; and thronging helms
 Appear'd, and serried shields in thick array,
 Of depth immeasurable. Anon they move,
 In perfect phalanx, to the Dorian mood
 Of flutes and soft recorders; such as raised
 To height of noblest temper heroes old,
 Arming to battle, and instead of rage
 Deliberate valour breathed, firm, and unmoved
 With dread of death to flight or foul retreat.

on either side Thucydides professes that he could not learn with certainty; thus teaching us what credit is due to writers incomparably farther removed from means of information, who pretend to state with precision the force of contending armies. The extent however of the Lacedæmonian front evinced their superiority; and the two armies were the most numerous that ever, within the bounds of tradition, had met in Peloponnesus. On the Argive side the Athenian, on the other the Lacedæmonian, was the only cavalry. Indeed the Lacedæmonians seem to have been the only Peloponnesian people who, at this time, had any cavalry.

Thucyd. I. 5.
c. 71. In all actions among the ancients, the right, on both sides, commonly overstretched the left of the opposing army. For, engaging hand to hand, the shield, the principal defence, being borne on the left arm, was less a protection for their right side; and the soldier in the extreme of the right wing, to avoid exposing the undefended part of his body, would always rather incline to the right. The man then next on the left, and so every man in the line, would also press rather toward the right, to profit from the protection of his neighbour's shield. Thus, on the present occasion, it happened that before the armies met, the Mantineans, on the right of the Argive line, had considerably overstretched the Lacedæmonian left; and, on the other side, the Tegeans, on the right of the Lacedæmonian line (the Lacedæmonian front being of greater extent,) had still more overstretched the Argive left. Agis, observing this, when the armies were only not engaged, inconsiderately ordered a movement, with a view to remedy the inconvenience which he apprehended. The Skirite and Brasidian bands (by the latter name those soldiers were honourably distinguished who had fought under Brasidas in

Thrace), forming the left of the Lacedæmonian line, were directed to break away from the main body, so far as to prevent the Mantineans from taking the army in flank; and two lochi of Lacedæmonians, under the polemarchs Hippoñidas and Aristocles, were commanded, from another part, to fill the interval. The Skirites and Brasidians instantly obeyed: but Hippoñidas and Aristocles, whether the enemy were so near that it was impossible, or they thought the danger of the movement to the whole army would justify their disobedience, kept their former post. The Skirites and Brasidians therefore, being presently attacked by the whole force of the Mantineans, together with a thousand chosen Argives, were cut off from their main body, overpowered, compelled to retreat, and pursued to the baggage of their army.

Meanwhile the rest of the line of the Lacedæmonians had everywhere the advantage, and particularly in the centre, where Agis himself took post. The Argive centre scarcely came to action with him, but fled the onset. The Athenians thus, who formed the left of the confederate line, were completely deserted; the centre having fled, while the right was pursuing. Their total destruction must have followed, but for the protection given to their retreat by their own cavalry, whose services on that day were eminent. Even thus however they would scarcely have been enabled to save themselves, had not the defeat of the Skirites and Brasidians called the attention of the Lacedæmonian king. The victorious Mantineans, when they found the rest of their army defeated, avoided his attack by hasty retreat.

Agis, true to the institutions of Lycurgus, pursued no farther than to make victory sure. The killed therefore were not numerous in proportion to the numbers engaged

Thucyd. 1. 5.
c. 72.

c. 73.

and the completeness of the success : seven hundred Argives, two hundred Mantineans, and two hundred Athenians, among whom both the generals fell, are the numbers of the confederates reported by Thucydides. Of the Lacedæmonians about three hundred were killed, principally Brasidians and Skirites ; and of the allies of Lacedæmon a very small number, as they were little engaged. After collecting the spoil of the field and erecting their trophy, the Lacedæmonians carried their dead to Tegea, and entombed them ceremoniously. The enemy's dead were restored, on the usual application from the vanquished.

Thucyd. 1. 5.
c. 75. The other Spartan king, Plistoanax, had advanced as far as Tegea, with an army composed of Lacedæmonians above and under the age for foreign service, to be ready, in case of misfortune, to support Agis. Immediately upon receiving information of the victory, he returned ; and at the same time messengers were despatched to Corinth, and the more distant allies, to countermand the march of their troops. The victorious army, after paying honourable attendance upon the obsequies of the slain, returned home, and the great Doric festival of the Carnia, whose period was at hand, engrossed the public attention.

The event of this battle restored the Lacedæmonian character in Greece. The advantage of numbers indeed had been on the side of the Lacedæmonians ; but the circumstances of the action proved their superiority in discipline, and in that valour which discipline infuses, by giving individuals to confide in the combined exertions of numbers with whom they act. This discipline in the soldier, we find, was, in the late battle, of efficacy even to counterbalance defective precaution and defective judgment in the general ; while the want of it in the confederate army rendered

superior abilities in the commanders of no effect.¹² The misfortunes, the misconduct, and the apparent slackness of the Lacedæmonians, in the course of the war with Athens, were in consequence no longer attributed to any degeneracy in the people, but to the mismanagement of leaders, and the chance of war: a contempt which had been gaining, for the Spartan institutions and discipline, as if hitherto respected above their worth, was done away, and the Spartan character resumed its wonted superiority.

But the Carnian festival occupied the Lacedæmonians at a very inconvenient season for a military people. Regulated, as all the Grecian festivals, by the revolutions of the moon, it began this year about the seventh of ^{Dodw. Ann. Thu.} August. Its principal ceremonies lasted nine days: but the whole month, named among the Dorian Greeks the Carnian, was, in a degree, dedicated to religious festivity. In the rude ages of the Heraclidae and of Lycurgus this check to military enterprise might be salutary: but in days of more refined and extensive policy, when wars,

¹² Thus much may be gathered from Thucydides' account of the battle. But his opinion is farther delivered in a remark upon it, in a manner sufficiently intelligible, though in cautious and rather obscure terms: 'Αλλὰ μάλιστα δὴ κατὰ πάντα τῇ ἐμπείρᾳ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐλασσωθέντες τότε τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἔδειξαν οὐχ ἕσσον πειρανόμενοι. Thucyd. 1. 5. c. 72. *But on this occasion, more remarkably than ever, the Lacedæmonians, though in all respects outdone in the military art, gave signal proofs of their superiority in true manly valour.* Thus Smith has translated, aiming to follow the letter, and certainly missing the sense. Thucydides could not mean here to speak disrespectfully of that military art and discipline of the Lacedæmonians, which, in the preface to his account of this very battle, he has taken occasion to describe, admirable in theory, and well supported by practice; and which, in his account of the battle itself, he shows to have been not less admirable in effect. Κατὰ πάντα must have been intended to relate to the circumstances of the battle, and not to any circumstances of the military art; and by ἐμπείρᾳ has been meant the experience and science of the general, and not the skill of the soldier. A strong sense of delicacy, not less a characteristic of Thucydides than his scrupulous impartiality, has apparently prevented him from expressing his opinion on this occasion more openly.

not of choice, but of political necessity, might be to be maintained against states capable of supporting lasting hostilities, such avocations should no longer have been allowed to

Thucyd. 1.5.
c. 76. interrupt public business. The Lacedæmonians

were however so attached to their ancient institutions, that, till the period of the Carnia was completed, no military operations were prosecuted for profiting from the victory of Mantinea.

Soon after that event the arrival of a thousand Athenian and three thousand Elean heavy-armed, to join the Argive army, enhanced the regret and indignation of all thinking men in the Argive confederacy at that petulant impatience and unadvised rashness, inherent in democratical government, which had superinduced their defeat. So powerful a re-enforcement, seconding superior abilities in the generals, could those abilities have been effectually exerted, might have given advantage over the ill-directed discipline of the Lacedæmonians. Offensive operations were immediately resumed; not indeed directly against Lacedæmon, but against their allies on the other side of the peninsula. The Epidaurians, objects hitherto of unjust ambition and oppressive policy, had now made themselves objects of revenge, by entering the Argive territory, while its principal force was absent, wasting the country, and slaughtering the inferior troops appointed for its protection: to obviate a renewal of such evils the siege of Epidaurus was regularly formed, and while the Lacedæmonians were supinely intent upon their festival, a contravallation was completed. Winter then approaching, a sufficient force was appointed to guard the lines, and the rest of the troops dispersed to their several homes.

SECTION VI.

Change in the Administration of Argos. — Peace and Alliance between Argos and Lacedæmon. — Overthrow of the Athenian Influence, and of the democratical Interest in Peloponnesus. — Inertness of the Lacedæmonian Administration. — Expulsion of the oligarchical Party from Argos, and Renewal of Alliance between Argos and Athens. — Siege of Melos by the Athenians. — Fresh Instance of atrocious Inhumanity in the Athenians. — Feeble Conduct of the Lacedæmonians. — Distress of the oligarchical Argives. — Transactions in Thrace. — Conclusion of the sixteenth Year of the War.

SCARCELY any disaster could befall a Grecian commonwealth that would not bring advantage to some considerable portion of its citizens. The unfortunate battle of Mantinea strengthened the oligarchical cause in Argos. The fear of such another blow, and of the usually dreadful consequences of unsuccessful war among the Greeks, brought the Argive people to a temper to bear advice about an accommodation with Lacedæmon; while the inconvenience of democratical sway unbalanced, which had been so severely experienced in the circumstances of the battle, disposed them to hear, with less impatience, of the necessity of trusting executive government to a few. On this turn in the public mind, so rarely was moderation found in the temper of Grecian republicans of any description, the oligarchical leaders founded a project to overset the present politics, not only of their own state, but of all Greece. They would first propose to the Argive people simply to make peace with Lacedæmon. That being effected, and the Athenian alliance in consequence no longer necessary, the people might probably be persuaded, for the sake of confirming the peace, to make alliance with Lacedæmon. Having thus far used the power of the people as the instrument of their measures, they

would then turn those very measures against the power of the people: with assistance from Lacedæmon they would abolish the authority of the general assembly, and establish oligarchal government.

Such was the scheme, and it appears to have been ably conducted. The Carnia gave opportunity for communication with Lacedæmon; and though the watchful acuteness of Alcibiades led him to suspect the intrigue, insomuch that he passed to Argos purposely to counterwork it, yet the measures of the oligarchal party were so well taken, and the depression of the popular mind gave them in the moment such opportunity, that the vote for peace was carried. This leading step being gained, the oligarchal party proceeded to push their advantage. Matters had been prepared by secret negotiation, and articles were soon settled; ac-

Thucyd. I. 5.
c. 77. cording to which it was agreed, “ That all Peloponnesian cities, small equally and great, should

be independent, as in the times and according to the customs of their forefathers¹³: that the hostages in the hands of the Argives should be restored to their friends: that the siege of Epidaurus should be raised: that, if the Athenians persevered in prosecuting it, the Lacedæmonians and Argives should unitedly oppose them; and that they should equally oppose the interference of any foreign armed force, upon any occasion, within the peninsula.”

This blow to the politics of Alcibiades, and the
c. 78. interest of Athens, was quickly followed by an alliance, defensive and offensive, between Lacedæmon and Argos, accompanied with a renunciation, on the part of Argos, of the alliance with Athens, Elis, and Mantinea. Among the articles, which Thucydides has reported in the Doric dialect in which they were written, and apparently at

¹³ Κατὰ τὰ πάτρια.

large, the following particularly deserve notice: “ All cities of the confederacy, those of the Lacedæmonian equally and of the Argive alliance, shall have the clear and independent enjoyment of their own laws and their own polity, according to ancient usage.¹⁴ If city has difference with city, it shall be decided by judges to be duly appointed by both¹⁵; or it shall be lawful to refer the decision to any third city equally friendly to both. Military command shall rest with the Lacedæmonians and Argives, who shall, by joint councils, direct, equitably and impartially, the military affairs of the whole confederacy.”

As soon as this second treaty was concluded, a requisition was sent to Athens in the name of the Thucyd. I. 5. c. 80. united republics, for the immediate evacuation of the Epidaurian territory, with a declaration that neither embassy nor herald from Athens would be received while Athenian troops remained in Peloponnesus. The Athenian administration prudently yielded to the necessity of the moment, and Demosthenes was sent to bring away the Athenian forces. That officer showed his usual ability in the execution of this ungrateful commission: he saved the dignity of his republic by giving the affair the appearance of a favour granted by Athens to both Epidaurus and Argos: and he more essentially served his republic by restoring, in some degree, a good correspondence with both those cities.

Success animated the administrations of the newly allied states, and they pushed it with a degree of vehemence. Ambassadors were sent to invite Perdiccas king of Macedonia to join their confederacy, with orders at the same time to

¹⁴ Κατὰ τὰ πάτραις.

¹⁵ I know not how more satisfactorily to paraphrase the single word of the original, διαχειθῆμεν: translators and commentators give no assistance; and here, as for the dispute between Athens and Lacedæmon before the war, we want information by what rule of law, by what process, and under what sanction, such litigation between state and state was to be managed.

ratify by oath, in the name of the two states, to the Chalcidian towns, the alliance and engagement for protection, formerly made by Lacedæmon. Contrary then to that spirit of equity, moderation, and peace, which the terms of their confederacy appeared to hold forth, commissioners, escorted by a thousand heavy-armed from each state, went to Sicyon, and, by their assumed authority, subverting the established democratical government there, committed the supreme power to an oligarchy of their own selection. This however they would vindicate by asserting that the more ancient constitution of Sicyon was oligarchal, and the democracy a usurpation.

Measures, which had been for some time preparing toward a revolution of the same kind at Argos, were now thought mature. Accordingly those leading men who had conducted the negotiations with Lacedæmon, and had since directed the administration of Argos under the nominal authority of the popular assembly, assumed to themselves the supreme power of the state, and the authority of the popular assembly was expressly abolished. Meanwhile the Mantineans, seeing that, instead of any longer receiving protection from Argos, they were to expect oppression from the union of that powerful state with Lacedæmon, yielded, very reluctantly, their command over the Arcadian towns which they had subjected, and made their peace with Lacedæmon upon such terms as they could obtain. The

Thucyd. 1.5.
c. 82. Lacedæmonians then took upon themselves to

regulate the little republics of Achaia, so as to restore the Lacedæmonian influence where it had been overpowered by a democratical party, and to confirm it where it was tottering, and they found universal acquiescence. Thus, before the end of winter, all the effect of the treacherous policy of Alcibiades, which had been at first so threatening to Lacedæmon, was done away, and Pelopon-

nesus was more completely than ever united, not immediately in war, but in politics, against Athens.

This important change seems to have been produced by springs, not within the power of human wisdom in the Athenian administration to control. Its advantages were lost to Lacedæmon through the want of energy, which had so long been conspicuous in the administration of that state. Though the democratical form of government was abolished in Argos, the democratical interest remained powerful; and, early in spring, a conspiracy was formed to overturn the oligarchy. The time chosen for carrying it into effect was the season of the Gymnopædia, B.C. 417. Ol.
90. §. P.W. 15.
After 2d April. the Naked Games, at Sparta. But a democratical party could not easily keep a secret. Intelligence of the design was acquired by the Argive administration, and communicated to Sparta, with a request of precautionary assistance; yet, such was the infatuated attachment of the Lacedæmonians to those stated festivals, they would not stir. The discovery of the plot, and the knowledge that it was discovered, led the two parties in Argos to arms; and, intelligence of this being forwarded to Sparta, then at last it was thought proper to adjourn the celebration of the festival, and send an army to save so important an ally. But it was too late: the two parties had come to action in Argos, the oligarchical party was defeated, many had been killed, and most of the rest forced into exile. Some of the fugitives met the Lacedæmonian army at Tegea, and were the first to give information of their own misfortune. They expressed at the same time confident hope that their affairs might yet be restored. In the confusion, unavoidable immediately on such a revolution, it would be easy, they said, for so powerful an army to become masters of the city; and to their remonstrances they added the most urgent entreaty. But the chiefs of the Lacedæmonian army were not to be

so persuaded; they led their forces immediately home, to conclude the celebration of their festival. Had we not these circumstances from the authentic pen of Thucydides, we should scarcely conceive them possible of a people who could sometimes conduct themselves with so much united dignity and policy as the Lacedæmonians.

The conscious weakness of the prevailing party in Argos, marked by one of their first measures, makes the conduct of the Lacedæmonians appear the more extraordinary and more inexcusable. Confident neither in their own strength, nor in the expectation of assistance from Athens, the Argives sent a deputation to make their peace with Lacedæmon. The exiles did not fail to send deputies to oppose them. The Lacedæmonians, with ostentatious moderation, referred the matter to the general convention of deputies from the states of their confederacy. Both parties were heard; but judgment was given, as might be expected, against the democratical party; and it was decreed that an army should be sent to carry it into effect. The weak remissness of the Lacedæmonian government again showed itself in delaying the execution of this decree, and the Argive administration, thus, at the same time threatened and encouraged, recurred to Athens, where their application was gladly received, and the former connection of Athens with Argos was restored.

Those measures which the existing circumstances rendered advisable were then taken by the Argives, for resisting the vengeance of Lacedæmon; instigated continually by their banished fellow-citizens, and thus to be expected at length to fall upon them. The land force of Lacedæmon would be decidedly superior to any they could expect to assemble: upon their walls therefore they must depend for protection, and upon the sea, if matters were pushed to extremity, for subsistence. Accordingly they applied, with the utmost sedulity, to secure the communication of their

city with the sea by long walls ; such as connected Athens with its ports, and such as the policy of the Athenian government had recommended to many other Grecian towns, standing, according to the usual choice of situation among the early Greeks, near, but not on, the shore. The Athenian government, under the influence of Alcibiades, gave large assistance, particularly furnishing builders and artificers ; and all the Argive citizens, all the slaves, and even the women, assisted in the work. Those indeed were not likely to want zeal for such business who had to apprehend the miseries which the Grecian practice of war usually brought upon a town taken.

It was not till the following autumn that the Lacedæmonians exerted themselves, so far as to undertake any military operation in favour of those miserable families, the principal of Argos, who, confiding in the Lacedæmonian alliance, had engaged in the measures through which, with the loss of all their property and many friends and kinsmen, they now languished in exile. Then at length the confederacy was called upon for the due proportions of troops, and the Lacedæmonian forces marched under Agis. Some friends to the oligarchical interest yet remained in Argos : these had communicated with the exiles and with Lacedæmon ; and it was hoped that the approach of the Lacedæmonian army would enable them to stir with effect. The precaution however of the democratical leaders prevented this ; and the Lacedæmonians were neither prepared nor disposed to undertake the siege of Argos. They however destroyed the yet unfinished works of the long walls ; they took Hysiae, a small town of Argolis, and put all the freemen to the sword ; and then returning home dismissed their forces. The Argives used the opportunity thus left open for revenge. Their fugitive nobles found favour and protection principally in Phlius, where most of them resided.

Thucyd. 1. 5.
c. 85.

The Phliasians suffered for their charity through the ravage of their lands by the Argive forces.

The restoration of Argos to the Athenian confederacy, such as Argos remained, was but a small step toward the recovery of that influence in Peloponnesus, which had accrued to Athens through the management of Alcibiades, and a very deficient gratification for his ambition. That

Thucyd. ut
ant. Plut. vit.
Alcib. & Nic. restless politician therefore looked around for other opportunities to promote his own power and consequence through an extension of the empire of his commonwealth ; and particularly carried his views forward to a war in which he would certainly command, and hoped to shine. An expedition had been prepared, under Nicias, for the reduction of the revolted cities of Thrace ; but it became necessary to abandon the measure, in consequence of the neglect of Perdiccas king of Macedonia to send the troops which, according to treaty, he should have furnished. The alliance of that prince with Argos and Lacedæmon becoming also known, he was, for the two offences, declared an enemy to Athens, and the maritime commerce of his dominions was almost wholly stopped by the Athenian fleet.

Thucyd. 1. 5.
c. 84.
B. C. 416.
Ol. 90.4—91.1.
P. W. 16. Intrigues of the oligarchical party being still carried on, or suspected, in Argos, Alcibiades went thither in spring with twenty ships of war. Supported by the democratical party there he seized no less than three hundred of those supposed most connected with the oligarchical interest, and placed them in several islands of the Ægean under the Athenian dominion. This, among the usual violences of Grecian politics, may be esteemed a lenient measure. The next step of the Athenian democracy, said by Plutarch to have been also dictated by Alcibiades, was a much grosser and more shocking trespass upon the common rights of mankind, and much less defensible upon any plea of political necessity. Alcibiades would not recom-

mend any direct hostility against Lacedæmon ; policy forbade ; but he recommended everything that might most provoke Lacedæmon to begin hostilities. The people of Melos, both irritated and encouraged by the failure of the attempt against them in the sixth year of the war, under Nicias, became presently active in hostility against Athens. They were however of course included in the peace between Athens and Lacedæmon, and we are not informed of any offence they afterward gave ; yet it was now determined by the Athenian people to subdue the island. An armament was accordingly prepared, consisting of thirty Athenian, six Chian, and two Lesbian ships of war, twelve hundred heavy-armed, three hundred bowmen, and twenty horse-bowmen, all Athenians, and fifteen hundred heavy-armed of the allies.

This force, under the command of Cleomedes and Tisias, debarked in Melos without opposition. Before any ravage, a deputation was sent into the city to persuade the people to submit to the Athenian dominion, without making violence necessary to their reduction ; and it was supposed that, could the deputies have addressed their eloquence to the people at large, they might have succeeded ; but this the chiefs would not permit. With the chiefs therefore only a conference was held, of which Thucydides has left an account in detail ; meaning however, apparently, not to repeat exactly what passed, but only to give a methodised account of the general arguments, and perhaps to express his own opinion on some points, particularly the ungenerous inertness of the Lacedæmonian administration, in a less invidious way than if he had spoken in his own person. The claim of the strong to command the weak, with absolute authority, was so familiar among the Greeks that it seems not to have shocked even Thucydides ; who, on this occasion, makes the Athenian deputy assert it in the most unqualified man-

ner; professing even his confidence in a continuance of that favour of the gods, which had already enabled the Athenian people to exercise so many cruelties, and reduce so many Grecian states to subjection.

Thucyd. 1. 5.
c. 112. 114. The Melians however, in hope of assistance from Lacedæmon, refusing to submit, the blockade of their city was formed by sea and land. Their resis-

c. 115. tance was for some time vigorous. In the course of the summer they made a successful sally upon

that part of the contravallation where the Athenian maga-

c. 116. zine was, and carried a considerable supply of

provisions into the town. In the winter they made another sally, attended with some success; but this occasioned a re-enforcement from Athens to the besieging army. The town being then closely pressed, discontent arose among the lower people. The chiefs apprehended sedition, with a design to betray them to the enemy, and, doubting their means of prevention, took the desperate resource of surrendering the place, with all in it, to the pleasure of the Athenian people.

After all we have gone through of Grecian history, we cannot but shudder at what followed. The Athenians had no pretence for any command over the Melians but that they were stronger. Those islanders, connected by blood, by habit, and by their form of government with Lacedæmon, had nevertheless been cautiously inoffensive to Athens, till forced to become enemies. The punishment for this involuntary crime, even to the lower people, supposed all along in some degree friendly, when all were surrendered together to the mercy of the Athenians, was no less than what the unfortunate Scionæans had undergone, for that termed their rebellion. All the adult males were put to death, and the women and children, of all ranks, were sold for slaves. The island was divided among five hundred

Athenian families. With the most unquestionable testimony to facts which strike with horror, when perpetrated by a tribe of savages, we are at a loss to conceive how they could take place in the peculiar country and age of philosophy and the fine arts ; where Pericles had spoken and ruled, where Thucydides was then writing, where Socrates was then teaching, where Xenophon and Plato and Isocrates were receiving their education, and where the paintings of Parrhasius and Zeuxis, the sculpture of Phidias and Praxiteles, the architecture of Callicrates and Ictinus, and the sublime and chaste dramas of Sophocles and Euripides formed the delight of the people.

Though the late battle near Mantinea had restored the tarnished glory of the Lacedæmonian arms and the sullied character of the people, yet the conduct of their administration continued to earn for them those imputations of ill faith, illiberal policy, and inertness, which, in reporting the conference at Melos, Thucydides puts into the mouth of the Athenian commissioner, and which, for their conduct toward Argos, they had deserved. Their total abandonment of the faithful and unfortunate Melians was indeed deeply disgraceful ; and their Argive friends, wandering up and down Peloponnesus, were, wherever they showed themselves or were heard of, striking testimonies to their discredit. In the existing tumult of Grecian politics they could not avoid some exertion ; but it was generally feeble, irregular, and confined to little objects. No less than thrice, since the beginning of hostilities with Argos, the Lacedæmonian army, after advancing to the frontier, was stopped by unfavourable appearances in the border-passing sacrifice, and returned home ; a circumstance little known when able and active men directed public affairs. Once indeed we have this religious trick politically accounted for. Encouragement from the friends of oligarchy in Argos induced the Lacedæmonian army to

march, and intelligence that the plot was discovered occasioned the stop, which was imputed to forbidding tokens in the sacrifice. At times however party contest ran high in Lacedæmon itself. So much, through that necessary allowance for ministers of other republics to reside occasionally there, and the necessary communication with other republics by their own ministers, became known abroad, though, through their systematical seclusion, particulars could rarely be ascertained. To such a source however may reasonably be attributed much of the feebleness and irregularity evident in the conduct of the administration at this period. Before

^{Thucyd. 1. 6.} _{c. 7.} the end of the winter in which Melos fell, an effort was made to relieve the Argive fugitives,


and distress the Argives in possession. The forces of all the Peloponnesian allies, except Corinth, were assembled, and the strength of Laconia joined. Preparations thus promised something great, but what followed was little and ineffectual. It might seem indeed that the object had never been more than to carry off the plunder of the villages of Argolis, for which wagons attended the march of the army, and to establish the Argive fugitives in Orneæ, an Argolic town on the border of Phliasia: and even these were very incompletely executed. A small part of Argolis only was plundered; and the Lacedæmonian army was no sooner withdrawn, and, according to the practice of the Greeks, dispersed for the winter, than the Argives, with a small auxiliary force from Athens, marched against Orneæ; which was so ill provided for defence that those who held it consulted their safety by immediate flight.

During these military transactions the Lacedæmonian administration so far exerted themselves in negotiation as to endeavour to excite the Chalcidians of Thrace, whose present independency was a benefit derived from the arms of Lacedæmon, to join the king of Macedonia in hostilities

against Athens. But the Chalcidians, no longer won and animated by the abilities, the activity, the popular manners, and the generous faith of a Brasidas, and probably both apprehensive of the power and mistrustful of the character of Perdiccas, refused. While indeed they enjoyed independency in peace, the small tribute assessed by Aristides was apparently not an object for which to provoke the naval power of Athens; and it was rather their interest to see Perdiccas, after all his wiles, unquiet within his own government, as well as harrassed by a foreign war. The troubles within Macedonia disabled him for any considerable exertion without; while Methone, an Athenian garrison on the border, became an asylum for Macedonian refugees and malcontents; who, together with a body of Athenian horse stationed there, employed themselves in inroads wherever they could find most plunder and least resistance. Such were the transactions of the sixteenth winter of the war.

END OF THE THIRD VOLUME.

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